phalanx.
Once Alexander was awakened the Macedonian army was marshaled in the most complex
formation used thus far. The tactical requirements of the situation demanded no less.
On the right wing was the Companion cavalry, led by the Royal Squadron in front, and commanded
by Cleitus the Black. Parmenio’s son Philotas was the general officer in charge. The shock troops
( agema) of the Guards were closest to the Companion cavalry, supported by the rest of the Guards
units who were commanded by Nicanor, another son of Parmenio. Next were the infantry battalions
commanded successively by Coenus, Perdiccas, Meleager, Polyperchon, and Simmias.
The left of the Macedonian line was held by the infantry battalion of Craterus, who also
commanded the entire left of the phalanx. Next to them came the allied cavalry under Erigyius and
next to them, on the left wing, the Thessalian cavalry commanded by Philip. Parmenio was the overall
commander of the Macedonian left. Close around him were the mounted troops of Pharsalus, the best
and most numerous of the Thessalian cavalry. Crucially, behind the front line was a reserve phalanx
formation. The officers of this formation had orders to face about and meet any attack coming from the
rear.
Half of the Agrianes under Attalus, and the Macedonian archers under Brison were thrown forward
at an oblique angle on the right wing next to the Royal Squadron of the Companion cavalry in case it
was necessary to extend or close up the front line of infantry. Next to the archers were the “Old
Guard” of mercenaries under Cleander.
In advance of these units were posted prodromoi and the Paeonians under Aretes and Ariston. At
the very front of the oblique formation on the right wing was the Greek mercenary cavalry under
Menidas. He and his men had orders to wheel about at an angle and attack the enemy flank if the
enemy tried to ride around their wing.
In front of the Royal Squadron of the Companion cavalry were half of the Agrianes and archers,
supported by Balacrus’ javelin men, who were posted opposite the Persian scythed chariots.
On Alexander’s far left, forming another oblique angle to his front, were the Thracian javelin men
under Sitalces, supported by the allied cavalry under Coeranus, and then the Odrysian cavalry under
Agathon. At the front of this section were the foreign mercenary cavalry commanded by
Andromachus. Thracian infantry guarded the pack animals. Alexander’s entire army totaled 7,000
cavalry and about 40,000 infantry.
His battle order obviously was set in order to deal with the Persian numerical superiority and the
likelihood of being outflanked on the right or the left or on both wings. Thus, Alexander and his staff
presented Darius and the Persian army with a kind of rectangle or tactical square, designed to repel
attacks on all four sides. It was a brilliant adaptation to the situation facing the Macedonians.
THE BATTLE OF GAUGAMELA
Before the two armies met, Alexander gave a long address to the Thessalians and the other Hellenes,
who shouted for him to lead them against the barbarians. Alexander realized that the role of the
Thessalians in the battle would be crucial. If they broke or were defeated on the left of his line, all
would be lost. If they held up under the pressure of the inevitable Persian cavalry charge,
Aristander’s prophecy might come true.
Alexander was wearing a vest made in Sicily and over this a breastplate of two-ply linen taken
from the spoils of Issos. The helmet he wore was a work of Theophilos, made of iron. It gleamed like
silver and fitted to it was an iron gorget set with precious stones. Around his waist was fastened an
elaborate belt, a work of Helicon, given to him by the city of Rhodes. He carried a sword of
astonishing temper and lightness, presented to him by the king of the Citieans. Unlike many of the
Macedonian riders, Alexander had trained himself to rely chiefly on his sword in battle.
As he had been at the Granicus, Alexander was almost ostentatiously visible both to his own troops
and to the enemy as he rode up and down the line, exhorting the officers and anyone else nearby.
There could be no doubt who Alexander was and what he was about to do. Readying himself for the
attack, Alexander, now mounted on Bucephalas, shifted his lance into his left arm and raised his right
hand. The king then called upon the gods and prayed: if he really were sprung from Zeus, let the gods
protect and strengthen the Greeks.
Aristander, wearing a white mantle and with a crown of gold on his head, also rode along the lines
and fortuitously spotted an eagle that hovered above Alexander’s head, apparently directing its flight
against the Persians. This was said to have filled the Macedonians with great courage. The
Macedonians could have received no better omen: the eagle was the creature most dear to Zeus.
The proper omens found, Alexander sparked the combat, moving to the attack with the Royal
Squadron. At once, he was outflanked on his right, and he inclined farther to that side. The Persians
countered this move, far outflanking the Macedonian right. During this time the Persian chariots
remained on their smooth, prepared ground. However, as Alexander moved even farther out to the
right, the Persian mounted troops moved with him, out to their left.
Alexander’s initial attack in the battle of Gaugamela, at an oblique angle until his right wing made
contact with the Persian left, was a tactical innovation that anticipated by two millennia tactics that
would make Frederick the Great the most celebrated soldier of his day. Attacking at an oblique angle
allowed Alexander to “economize”—that is, to hold in reserve his other forces until he was ready (as
always) to launch his decisive offensive thrust at the head of the Companion cavalry.
Although the Macedonian Foot Companions ( pezhetairoi) could be deployed in any formation (straight line, oblique, crescent, or wedge) to suit the requirements of the tactical situation, at the battle of Gaugamela it was Alexander’s innovative use of a tactical square that
allowed the Macedonians to defeat the Persians despite the Persians’ vast numerical superiority.
Alexander then ordered an attack by Menidas and the mercenary cavalry against the Persian
mounted troops. This was probably another one of Alexander’s tactical stratagems, designed to draw
the Persians into committing their cavalry, in preparation for a devastating counterattack. Alexander
had used a similar “drawing” tactic at the Granicus, when he had sent Socrates and his squadron
down into the riverbed to bring the Persian cavalry down from the high ground into the river. If this
was what Alexander intended at Gaugamela, however, it did not work. The numerically superior
Scythian cavalry and the Bactrians counterattacked in very good order, driving Menidas’ small
squadron back, but not into disorder. Thereupon, Alexander put into the action the Paeonians and the
mercenaries. There a cavalry engagement ensued in which the Macedonians eventually broke the
enemy formation.
Meanwhile, before Alexander could get off the level, prepared ground, Darius sent his scythed
chariots into action. They were met by the Agrianes and Balacrus’ javelin throwers, who dragged the
drivers to the ground and cut down the horses. The Macedonians let other chariots through their
formations, to be dealt with by guards and Alexander�
��s grooms. The calm way the Agrianes and the
javelin throwers eliminated these terrifying contraptions helps to explain why the Macedonian army
never lost a battle while Alexander led it. Alexander was a visionary genius of warfare commanding
men as brave and as competent as any soldiers of any era.
On the far left wing, however, the Macedonians fared less well. Mazaeus, who commanded the
best of the Persian cavalry on the right side of the Persian line, killed a number of Alexander’s men
during the first onslaught. He also sent 2,000 Cadusians and 1,000 picked Scythian horsemen around
Parmenio’s flank to the Macedonians’ camp to capture the baggage. When the Scythians stormed into
the camp, most of the captive Persian women rushed out to welcome them; Sisygambis, the mother of
Darius, however, did not. She neither trusted the turns of fortune nor wished to tarnish her gratitude
toward Alexander, we are told. Less colorfully, but more important, using his superior numbers,
Mazaeus pressed his attack and the Macedonians on the left of Alexander’s line gave ground.
But what proved to be the decisive action of the battle took place on the Macedonian right. As
more Persian cavalry were sent to help their comrades who were attempting to encircle the
Macedonian right, a gap was opened up in the Persian front. Into that gap, at the double, with a loud
battle cry Alexander rode with the Companion cavalry in its famous wedge formation, along with the
part of the phalanx stationed there, straight in the direction of Darius himself. This was the one drop
—or wave—that made the vessel run over, the moment in the engagement when, as Napoleon
observed in another context, a single maneuver was decisive and gave the victory to one side. A close
struggle ensued, with the Macedonians thrusting at the Persians’ faces with their spears and the
phalanx, bristling with pikes, adding irresistible weight. At some point during this fierce encounter
Darius took fright and rode for safety. Meanwhile, Aretas and his men broke up a Persian outflanking
party.
The infantry battalion under Simmias, however, was unable to join up with Alexander as he
pursued the Persians; it was forced to stand and fight on the spot, especially because the Macedonian
left still was having difficulties. Between Alexander’s force and Simmias’ a gap opened up in the
Macedonian line. Some of the Indian and Persian cavalry burst through this hole and advanced to the
place where the pack animals were held. The reserve phalanx then sprang into action and dealt with
these Indians and Persians. Alexander’s tactical square had functioned just as designed.
On Alexander’s far left, however, the Persians were pressing home the attack against Parmenio’s
forces. Eventually Parmenio was compelled to send a dispatch rider or riders to Alexander to report
that his troops were in distress and needed help.
The hypaspistai (whose name in Greek meant literally, “under the shield,”) were heavy infantry, commanded by Nicanor, the son of
Parmenio, at the battle of Gaugamela. Its elite unit, the agema, protected the king when he fought on foot.
But, according to one account, Parmenio’s riders found that Alexander was already in pursuit of
Darius, and the messengers gave up hope of reaching him. Parmenio and the Thessalians were left to
face Mazaeus and his cavalry on their own. Fighting brilliantly, they eventually emerged victorious
against an enemy disheartened by Darius’ flight. Indeed, Parmenio eventually took possession of the
Persian camp including all of its baggage, elephants, and camels. Alexander meanwhile pursued
Darius to Arbela but could not overtake him; once again he captured Darius’ chariot, his shield, and
his bow and arrows, but not the Persian king himself.
By an alternative tradition, Alexander did receive the message from Parmenio; he at once broke off
his pursuit of Darius and came to the aid of the Thessalians. Encountering first the enemy cavalry
already in flight, and then the Parthians, the Indians, and the Persian cavalry, the most numerous and
best of the enemy forces, Alexander and the hetairoi then fought the fiercest cavalry engagement of the
whole battle. There was no throwing of javelins or maneuvering of horses. The cavalrymen of both
sides sought only to break their way through, giving and taking blows unsparingly. About sixty
Companion cavalry lost their lives, and among the wounded were several commanders. But
Alexander was once again victorious.
Which of the “messenger” stories is true?
The first story is consistent with what the majority of sources report about the circumstances at the
moment when the riders were dispatched. Diodorus tells us that because of the numbers of the
Persians, and the thickness of the dust, Alexander could not tell in what direction Darius was fleeing.
Confusion and thick dust thus prevented Parmenio’s riders from delivering their message. If
Alexander did come to the aid of Parmenio and the Thessalians, it was essentially after the
engagement on the Macedonian left wing was settled, and perhaps after Alexander had broken off his
pursuit of Darius anyway.
The second version, on the other hand, was created by Callisthenes, Alexander’s court historian,
who was responsible for developing a portrait of Parmenio as sluggish and inefficient in this battle
and indecisive elsewhere. So the story of Alexander breaking off his pursuit of Darius to help a
beleaguered Parmenio should be seen as propaganda, generated later to justify Alexander’s failure to
achieve what for him was the primary objective of the battle itself: the capture of Darius. The story of
Alexander saving Parmenio was a fig leaf created to cover over or explain Alexander’s failure to
capture or kill Darius at Gaugamela and thus to bring the pan-Hellenic campaign to an end.
Nevertheless, the seer Aristander had been right: before the month that saw the moon’s eclipse was
over, the battle had been fought and Alexander had won it.
THE COSTS OF THE BATTLE
The fulfillment of the prophecy had a dreadful human cost. Diodorus tells us that about 500
Macedonians were killed and very many wounded, among the latter being Hephaestion, Perdiccas,
Coenus, and Menidas, some of the most prominent Macedonian officers. Diodorus also gives a figure
of 90,000 Persian cavalry and infantry killed.
The risks to Alexander and to the Macedonian army as a whole at the battle of Gaugamela cannot
be overestimated. The Macedonians were outnumbered and potentially overlapped on both wings.
Moreover, if they had lost the battle, there was nowhere to hide; for them, it was victory or death.
Once again, Alexander had understood perfectly the tactical dangers facing the Macedonians, and
he had devised a revolutionary order of battle to meet the challenge. Of the Macedonians, he wisely
required only that they do their jobs in their places within his brilliantly conceived tactical square. As
the battle unfolded, the Macedonians fought as if there were no tomorrow. Although his opening
gambit (the drawing attack of Menidas) failed, Alexander personally led what proved to be the
decisive charge into his opponent’s line. Despite what Alexander’s propagandists later claimed,
Parmenio had fought a crucial holding action against the finest of the Persian cavalry. Although
Darius’ escape was a major setback for Alexander, the victory at Gaugamela against the n
umbers and
the odds had left open the road to Babylon and Persia. At the age of twenty-six Alexander had led the
Macedonians and their allies to the greatest military victory in Greek history.
CHAPTER 11
The Sack of Persepolis
BABYLON
For Greeks and Macedonians, Gaugamela was a moment of unprecedented triumph. Not since Plataea
in 479 had a Hellenic army so decisively defeated a Persian force. Yet even that famous victory had
been achieved against what amounted to an expeditionary force, led by one of the Great King’s
generals. Now Alexander and his peerless Companions had utterly annihilated Persia’s grand
imperial army, commanded by Darius himself. After three years of warfare Alexander was the sole
ruler of the western half of the Persian empire. Darius, still the ruler of its eastern provinces, had
survived Gaugamela, but for how long?
After the battle, Darius made his escape first to Arbela and thence eastward by way of the
Armenian mountains into Media with the Bactrian cavalry, some Persians, the royal kinsmen, and a
few of the Golden Apples. Media, the homeland of the Medes, comprised the Kermanshah-Hamadan
region in the central Zagros along the Khorasan road. During his flight the monarch was joined by
around 2,000 of the foreign mercenaries.
Alexander, as we have seen, had pursued Darius to Arbela, but was too late to capture him.
Nevertheless, in Arbela Alexander was first proclaimed king of Asia, despite the fact that Darius was
still alive. In keeping with the propaganda of the campaign, Alexander then wrote to the Greeks,
stating that all tyrannies were now abolished and that henceforth they were autonomous.
He wrote to the Plataeans, too, saying that he would rebuild their city because their forefathers had
made their territory available to the Greeks in the struggle for their common freedom (against the
Persians in 479). He also sent some of the spoils from Gaugamela to the city of Croton in Italy. In
480, when the rest of the Greeks in Italy had refused to help their fellow Hellenes against the invading
Persians, a citizen of Croton, an athlete named Phaÿllus, had equipped a ship at his own expense and
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