Nashville should be his base for a move against Longstreet and southwest Virginia, but when Grant arrived on December 19 what he found was discouraging. For several days he was a frequent sight walking briskly on the city sidewalks, or in an open buggy moving at a speed some thought recklessly fast as he made his inspections.11 Thomas’s staff departments were not functioning smoothly. Indeed, Thomas’s imperious provost marshal even ignored Grant’s orders. He allowed the inevitable speculators—“Jews and citizens generally,” Grant called them—to travel in and out of the city as they chose, but refused to honor Grant’s passes and actually arrested one of his staff’s servants. Grant directed Thomas to replace the man, but not before he encountered the problem in person.12 On the bitterly cold day after Christmas, wrapped in a huge overcoat, he went to the Nashville & Chattanooga rail depot to return to Chattanooga. As he started to board a car a guard stopped him, saying, “Here, sir, you can’t go in there.” Grant identified himself, but the guard insisted that he had orders to admit no one until after his pass was examined by the military conductor. Amused despite the inconvenience, Grant just smiled, replied “right, sir, right,” and got in the conductor’s line to wait his turn.13
Before leaving Grant set in motion a campaign to clear enemy cavalry from west Tennessee, and told Sherman to disrupt enemy communications in east and central Mississippi to keep the enemy from operating there that winter. He also wanted Thomas’s army to advance into north Georgia. Only once that was all going would he undertake the Mobile operation.14 Uppermost in his mind by the time he left Nashville was Longstreet, and it was evident to Grant that he would have to do it himself. Once back in Chattanooga, he made a hard ride on horseback over bad roads to Knoxville, but enjoyed it, telling Julia that “hard labor is the easiest duty I have to perform.”15 He arrived on New Year’s Eve, only to find that Foster could not make even a brief campaign, despite all of Grant’s efforts to get him supplied. The route from Chattanooga being so unreliable, the old quartermaster set out in person to find a more dependable avenue. It was not just hyperbole when Grant declared that a good quartermaster was “more important to the Government, than an Army Corps commander.”16 Over the next week, in subzero temperatures, he rode 120 miles from Knoxville through the Cumberland Gap into southern Kentucky and on to Lexington to see if wagon roads would serve to supply Foster; he also ordered units into position to move against Longstreet as soon as they were properly supplied. His ride convinced him that this route was no more reliable, and that for the time being Foster would have to live off the land while Grant explored other possibilities.
He kept pressing his main goal. Taking Atlanta would secure him much of west Georgia. Taking Montgomery would gain central Alabama. He could take the latter first by moving up the Alabama River from Mobile, and then be in position to move from there to Atlanta, using the Tennessee via Chattanooga for a supply line. At the same time Thomas could push directly south, drive the Army of Tennessee out of its winter quarters at Dalton, and force it back to Atlanta where he and Thomas would force it to withdraw eastward, giving up that major industrial and rail center. Meanwhile, Sherman’s raid through central Mississippi could cooperate with Union forces in Montgomery to neutralize enemy movement in west Alabama and Mississippi. Grant would command one arm of that pincer, and Sherman the other.17
Grant’s Henry-Donelson campaign had been sophisticated, and Vicksburg even more so, but nothing to date revealed the level of grand strategic insight that he displayed in this concept. Each of three forces could achieve much on its own, while each also could cooperate with another to double their gains, and all with secure lines of communications. He also envisioned that success here would impact Virginia as well. Unlikely though it might be that Lee would leave the state to rescue central Georgia and Alabama, Grant reasonably saw that as Lee’s only alternative to finding Grant sweeping up from Atlanta through the Carolinas to threaten Richmond and his own rear while he faced Meade. Even if Lee did not take the bait, on January 19, 1864, Grant proposed a way for Meade to take care of Lee by himself.
Shunning his predecessors’ avenues of approach, Meade should shift most of his army to Norfolk, use it as a base to concentrate in Suffolk, and then move southwest on Raleigh, North Carolina, 130 miles distant, destroying the rail lines concentrated around Weldon. Changing his base to New Bern or Wilmington, both closer and less vulnerable, Meade should move west from Raleigh to threaten the rail line at Greensboro. If the Yankees could cut that and hold Knoxville, they would isolate Virginia and Richmond from all communication with the rest of the Confederacy. Grant believed that rather than lose that rail line, Lee would send a large part of his army to protect it, virtually forcing the evacuation of Virginia and Longstreet from east Tennessee. With their state already rife with dissension, thousands of dispirited North Carolina troops would likely desert Lee’s army. Thousands of slaves would run away to Union banners, Union armies could live off the country and still have good lines of supply, and Lee would be forced to give up well-prepared lines of defense to meet the Federals on unfamiliar ground, with no time to erect new works. The move would also isolate Wilmington, the South’s last major Atlantic port for blockade traffic, and Meade would be in a climate where he could campaign without waiting for spring. Grant thought that 60,000 men could do it.
Some of the plan originated with General Smith and Lieutenant Colonel Cyrus Comstock just the day before, but Grant added the threat to the railroad west of Raleigh, giving it greater scope and greater potential gain.18 As always, he sought an indirect approach to his objective, an opportunity for large territorial gains without major action, and concentration of force while making the enemy face him on his own terms. Events beyond his control would dictate that neither this plan nor his Mobile operation would ever launch as conceived. Of course either—or both—might not have worked, but it is unfortunate that two of the subtlest strategic concepts of the war were never tested. The other unknown was the Confederates’ reaction. Grant consistently underestimated their determination. He might have remembered his own thoughts on the Mexican soldiers he faced in 1847. They had little drill or discipline, inadequate rations, and scant pay. Those deficiencies relieved, however, he believed “they would fight and persist.”19 Thus far the Confederates had outlasted the Mexicans at war by nearly a year. Convinced of the injustice of their cause, Grant could not see their motivation to protect home soil or defend the sacrifices made already, nor understand a growing Confederate nationalism. They were not going to yield easily.
His planning bore one practical result. Having commenced thinking in continental terms, he did not stop, yet it was Halleck’s invitation that got him started. Thereafter, interest and ingenuity kept him at it intermittently, surely mindful of the possibility of another star. Characteristically, the most immediate attraction of more rank was the increased salary.20 That would secure his finances more than ever, while with promotion yet undecided, Grant finally framed the “just reward” he hoped the country might offer. From the outset he knew that at war’s end there would be a massive demobilization of the volunteers. Hundreds of generals would be civilians again, for all their battles won, and he could be back working for brother Orville in Galena. Commissions and promotions in the Regular Army were another matter, and Grant was now a major general in the regulars. Barring some legislation to the contrary, he should retain that rank and salary after the war and through retirement. That would be reward enough. “Through Providence I have attained to more than I ever hoped,” he told a friend, “and with the position I now hold in the Regular Army, if allowed to retain it will be more than satisfied.”21 The war that had made him would sustain him thereafter.
He went to St. Louis late that month to see his son Fred, then dangerously ill with a fever. Finding the boy recovering, he accepted invitations to two dinners in his honor. At one he found himself in a crowd of hundreds including, uncomfortably, Rosecrans, now commanding in Missouri. Only their host sat between th
e two at the table, and while Grant kept quiet in his seat, Rosecrans did his best to upstage the guest of honor. Toasted as hero of the hour, Grant responded by saying, “it will be impossible for me to do more than to thank you,” and sat down, after which Rosey spoke at some length on the heroism of the Union soldier, but pointedly failed to mention the guest of honor.22 On leaving St. Louis, Grant wrote his father that he hoped not to “leave ‘Dixie’ again” until the end of the war. All the attention flattered, but it was embarrassing as well.23 He daydreamed of going somewhere remote “where no body lives and where but few people are to be seen,” and no one would know him.24
“Time sets very lightly with me,” Grant wrote his friend Daniel Ammen in February. “I am neither grey nor bald nor do I feel any different from what I did at twenty-five.”25 His health was excellent, he had recovered fully from the accident in New Orleans, and he had the upper hand over alcohol. A week before the battles for Chattanooga he found some of his officers, chiefly Lagow, engaged in drunken revelries at headquarters and himself broke up one party at four in the morning. A few days later he allowed Lagow to resign rather than be dismissed. Grant himself may have had a drink or two in that period, but no more, and Rawlins gave him a refresher talk that cemented his resolve.26 He had a fine staff of eighteen men well trained in their duties, and excellent relations with a cadre of top commanders starting with Sherman and McPherson, lower ranks like John Logan, and a new man he spotted at Chattanooga, Philip H. Sheridan. In Thomas he had a fine army commander, despite the absence of warmth between the two, and some concern about the man’s reliability. Grant was mature enough to incorporate suggestions like Smith’s and Comstock’s into his own plans without feeling threatened. “He listens quietly to the opinions of others,” wrote Major General David Hunter after three weeks at Grant’s headquarters, “and then judges promptly for himself.”27 Awaiting guidance from Washington on his next mission, he worked to get his armies ready to move, at the same time advising Northern governors on how to have their new recruits ready for action as soon as they reached him. He still believed the war would end soon—it was always going to end soon—giving it until the end of 1864, but they must move quickly.28 His hope for a winter campaign was gone, but by mid-February he expected operations to commence in early April.29
Events soon reshaped his expectations. Longstreet began a retreat back into southwest Virginia, with Major General John M. Schofield pursuing in place of Foster. Bragg’s army, now commanded by Joseph E. Johnston, remained at Dalton. Then on February 26 Washburne’s bill passed both houses of Congress, and Lincoln appointed Grant, who got the news at his Nashville headquarters on March 4, along with orders to report to Washington.30 Grant initially mirrored Lee’s concern about resentment and resistance if placed over an army he had not led. He also told Washburne early on that he wanted no position that kept him in Washington.31 Expecting that he might have to oscillate between the two theaters of the war, he had no other inkling of his assignment.32 Before leaving Nashville he offered thanks to Sherman and McPherson for making him a success. Sherman warned him to beware of the political swamp in Washington, imploring that he “continue as heretofore to be yourself, simple, honest, and unpretending.”33
Reaching the capital on March 8, Grant went to the White House for his first meeting with the president, who that evening introduced him to a throng of guests by asking him to stand on a sofa for all to see, which Grant found embarrassing. The next day at a cabinet meeting Lincoln formally presented his commission, and later they discussed Grant’s mandate. The president said all he wanted was for him to act, and to defeat Lee’s army, promising all the assistance in his power. Grant pledged what he always did, that he would do his best with what he was given. He would determine his own operations now, and Lincoln did not immediately press him.34 A friend in the city was less patient. “You mean to capture Richmond, I hope?” he asked the new lieutenant general. Grant’s reply was simple, and typical: “I mean to beat Lee.”35
Lee meant not to be beaten, but the collapse of the Army of Tennessee augured ill. Bragg resigned on November 30, but President Davis had only two full-rank generals available, and loathed both Johnston and Beauregard. Again he turned to Lee, the general he regarded most highly. The Virginian followed western events as he could through the newspapers, well aware that his sources were incomplete, often unreliable, and tainted by editorial prejudice. Still, what he called “impressions” told him the Yankees would aim deep into Georgia for supply depots and factories, meaning Atlanta. He knew there was risk in recommending Beauregard or Johnston for the command, but suggested the former cautiously as the better choice if he should be “considered suitable for the position.” Beyond that he urged that the Deep South from Florida to Mississippi ought to be stripped to rebuild the Army of Tennessee, even if it risked points of secondary value. Lee further proposed that the slim forces defending southwest Virginia could reinforce Longstreet to attack Knoxville again. Finally, Lee proved Grant right to expect they might think alike. He perceived that if the enemy moved deeper into Georgia, then Savannah, Charleston, Wilmington, even Richmond would be threatened by Grant’s advance as much as by Meade. It was the first time Lee ever mentioned Grant in relation to Virginia.36
Davis asked once more for Lee to take command of the Army of Tennessee, even temporarily, adding his own voice to the chorus expecting Lee and Grant to meet in the field.37 As before, Lee begged off, saying it would be pointless unless he went in permanent command, and he doubted he could do much even then, believing that “I would not receive cordial cooperation.” To that he added doubts in his strength or ability to be successful with that army, then wisely raised the matter of who could replace him in Virginia. His senior subordinate Longstreet was absent with his corps and Lee did not mention him, which could also indicate that Lee doubted his capacity for top command. Ewell was the next senior. Saying nothing of his expressed concern over that general’s capacity, Lee argued that he was “too feeble” in health for the rigors of the position. Inevitably that brought them back to Beauregard and Johnston again. Genuinely fearing that Davis might peremptorily order him to go west, Lee reminded the president of what he would have to do in Virginia, and that forestalled any such order. From the outset Lee demonstrated keen subtlety in managing his president, and was getting better at it.38
Davis tried that skill two days later when he summoned Lee to Richmond for what proved to be more than a week of conferences.39 Lee clearly feared that the peremptory order might be coming after all. “My heart and thought will always be with this army,” he told Jeb Stuart before leaving, and his peculiar closing words, “I expect to be back,” sounded like an expectation that it might only be a visit before going elsewhere.40 If Davis pressed again for the command change, Lee continued his diplomatic resistance. When the depth of the president’s animus to Beauregard became evident, Lee shifted to support Johnston. During their meetings reports arrived from Dalton that no imminent attack was expected. At the same time they learned that Longstreet had given up on taking Knoxville, that the enemy at Chattanooga appeared to be moving most of its army toward Nashville, and most disturbing, word arrived that Grant was moving east into Virginia.41 With no means of sifting fact from rumor, Davis had to act on the information in hand and Lee’s counsel as his chief advisor, and all of that worked to Lee’s purpose. Now the Army of Tennessee’s immediate front ought to be quiet long enough to give a new commander time to settle in. Longstreet’s retreat and the Yankees’ apparent pursuit presented a new threat to Richmond from a new direction, making Lee’s presence essential with the only army that could hope to hold Meade and stop Grant.42 By December 16 Davis yielded and appointed Johnston, and Lee let his staff know that he had dodged the assignment.43
Relieved of one concern, Lee returned to face another. His army was famished. Stuart’s cavalry had received no issue of beef from the commissary since the summer of 1862, and in the interim virtually fended for themselves for mea
t. His infantry were down to a quarter pound of salt beef or pork a day, with just three days’ supply of that, leaving him anxious that he might have to disperse the army to the interior for it to forage for itself. Reassembling it on call was not a task he could contemplate optimistically.44 Lee had never been a supply officer like Grant, but he understood the critical importance of steady provisions. He also believed the problem was not availability, but distribution. Colonel Lucius B. Northrop, the commissary general in Richmond, had a well-justified reputation as hopelessly inadequate, an opinion Lee shared. Presented with Lee’s complaints of empty bellies, Northrop actually suggested that Lee assume nominal control of Northrop’s officers and impress what he needed from the civilian population, in essence doing his job for him. Lee refused, even more chagrined when he learned that while his men were on half rations or less, Johnston’s in Georgia had plenty of everything.45
Late in January Lee issued a general order that amounted to an apology to his men for their short rations and an indirect protest that the responsibility was not his.46 That same day he warned the secretary of war that declining morale and increased desertions were the inevitable result. Lee resorted to furloughing up to one-sixth of the army at a time so they could subsist at home and reduce the pressure, but that hazarded that some might not to return.47 He dispersed his cavalry to get food for the animals, and the situation in some cases was so bad that in one division 400 men had no shoes, and more than 1,000 were without blankets for the winter.48 Lee understood that wholesale impressments would produce disaffection in the short term, and the future probability that farmers would hide their livestock and produce from Northrop’s agents. His insight into the ramifications of any kind of seizure was clear, but knowing that it was necessary, he pleaded that impressments be universally applied so that all suffered equally.49 Happily, he found the quartermaster general both more cooperative and more competent, and set in train plans for the army to collect the hides necessary to make its own shoes, using ersatz ingenuity to make up for official shortfalls.
Crucible of Command Page 47
