68. Ewald Felix’s (in American accounts his name is often reversed) cooperation with the Americans is attested to by Gallery among his personal papers (Folder D, “Miscellaneous Correspondence,” Box 37), the content of which is summarized in Gilliland and Shenk, Admiral Dan Gallery, 127-31. Felix’s own POW record confirms that he was a German national, born well within the 1923 German boundaries of Upper Silesia. Hans Goebeler claims (Steel Boats, 246-47) that Felix contributed little to the American salvage effort, and certainly Felix remained in Germany and an active member of the U-505 veterans’ association. On the Polish-German confusion, see the author’s comments in Neither Sharks, 137 and 289n.
69. “Auszug aus dem Wachmeldebuch des Wachoffiziers der 2. U.-Flottille vom 3.6.42,” in folder “A I” Heft 1, Offene Bootsakte, U-505 administrative records at MSI.
70. Raw interrogation reports for U-505, Special Activities Branch (Op-16-Z), RG 38, NA-CP.
71. See Ludwig C. Hannemann, Die Justiz der Kriegsmarine, 1939-1945, im Spiegel ihrer Rechtsprechung (Regensburg: S. Roderer, 1993), 318-22.
72. 2. U.-Flottille, “Laufender Flottillenbefehl Nr. 26,” 1 Dezember 1943, among a collection of 2nd U-boat Flotilla standing orders for 1943-44 located in file 24309-U, formerly secret reports of naval attaches, 1941-44, RG 38, NA-CP.
73. See Heinrich Walle, Die Tragödie des Oberleutnants zur See Oskar Kusch (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1995), esp. 89ff.
74. See the detailed study by Manfred Messerschmidt and Fritz Wüllner, Die Wehrmachtjustiz im Dienste des Nationalsozialismus. Zerstörung einer Legende (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1987), 63-89.
75. Search of NSDAP membership cards on NAAM A3340, series MFOK; Party data for Albert Weingärtner located on roll Y048, frame 1403.
76. MSI interview with Wolfgang Schiller, Chicago, March 1, 1999.
77. Copies of U-505’s Bücherverzeichnis and Schallplattenverzeichnis, together with one issue of the boat’s newsletter, are reproduced on reel 81 of the German Submarine Materials in the custody of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. The list of phonograph recordings was annotated by hand to indicate replacements of titles.
78. Goebeler, Steel Boats, 222-23.
79. Based on reviews of U-boat casualty lists in the custody of the U-Boot-Archiv, Cuxhaven; I am indebted to that institution’s Horst Schwenk for assistance in consulting the records. Omitted from the final figure of 115 officers and men are those crewmen who transferred off U-505 during her training period, and Lt.z.S.d.R. Knoke, who briefly replaced Stolzenburg for the last three weeks of the patrol in November-December 1942.
80. In addition to Zschech and Fischer, those killed in the war, with their approximate period of service on board U-505 indicated in parentheses, include: Lt.z.S. Werner Jacobi (September 1941-May 1942), lost with U-973 on March 6, 1944; Lt. (I) Erich Altesellmeier (October-December 1942), lost with U-377 on January 15, 1944; Btsmt. Wallfred Gerlach (August 1942-June 1943), lost with U-154 on July 3, 1944; Btsmt. Hannes Bockelmann (September-December 1942), lost with U-124 on April 2, 1943; Fk.OMt. Gottfried Fischer (August 1941-June 1944), KIA on U-505 on June 4, 1944; Masch.Mt. —— Krautscheid (December 1941-December 1942), lost with U-755 on May 28, 1943; Masch.Mt. Lothar Lipka (August 1941-December 1942), lost with U-504 on July 30, 1943; Masch.Mt. Erhard Mosch (December 1941-December 1942), lost with U-676 on February 12, 1945; Matr.OGfr. Werner Marenberg (August 1941-December 1942), lost with U-336 on October 5, 1943; Matr. Gfr. Rudi Nepaschings (August 1941-January 1942), lost with U-381 in May 1943; Matrose Rudolf Heinemann (January-December 1942), lost with U-1199 on January 21, 1945. For a discussion of the final casualty rates among U-boat crews, see Mulligan, Neither Sharks, 251-56.
81. Veteran crew lists, reunion data, and Loewe’s comments from the September 1990 reunion all in the U-505 subject folders, U-Boot-Archiv, Cuxhaven; data on Hans-Joachim Decker’s work at the Museum in Gallery Papers, folder “U-505,” Box 38.
From the Lion’s Roar to Blunted Axe:
The Combat Patrols of U-505
by Lawrence Paterson
1. Loewe’s words were recorded in private notes by Hans Goebeler, who wrote his memoirs of his service aboard U-505 in Hans Jacob Goebeler with John P. Vanzo, Steel Boats, Iron Hearts: The Wartime Saga of Hans Goebeler and the U-505 (Holder, FL: Wagnerian Publications, 1999).
2. In German naval parlance the word “Crew” refers to the officer class Loewe attended, 1928 being his first year as an officer candidate.
3. Hans Joachim Decker, “404 Days! The War Patrol Life of the German U-505,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 86, No. 3 (March 1960), 34. The allocation of U-boats to various flotillas was purely logistical and did not reflect any localised command of the U-boats concerned. BdU (Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote—U-boat command) continued to exercise central control over U-boats in action.
4. KTB U505, January 25, 1942, U-Boot-Archiv, Altenbruch, Germany.
5. For further details of operations against Freetown by long-range U-boats see specific references in Lawrence Paterson, Second U-Boat Flotilla (Naval Institute Press, 2003).
6. See Admiral Dönitz’s comments noted in BdU KTB, January and February 1942, 30302–30304b; National Archives Microfilm Publication T1022, roll 3979.
7. Decker, “The War Patrol Life of the German U-505,” 36. RAF Coastal Command began to step up operations within the Bay of Biscay at the “choke points” that U-boats were forced to traverse to enter and exit the French Atlantic ports. These operations were soon augmented with extended ASW sweeps along the Bay of Biscay, such as Operations Seaslug and Musketry. Aircraft, with improved radar, became the primary threat to U-boats by 1943.
8. Crewmember Hans Goebeler mentions the fractious state of the crew aboard U-505, in Steel Boats and Iron Hearts, 31-38.
9. Decker, “The War Patrol Life of the German U-505,” 36. Anderson, his fifty-one crewmen and four gunners were eventually rescued by a Sunderland flying boat of 95 Squadron and landed at Freetown.
10. Goebeler, Steel Boats and Iron Hearts, 35, and KTB U-505, copy held in U-Boot-Archiv, Altenbruch. See also an eyewitness description left by Thorstein Schau in his article in the Norwegian magazine Krigsseileren (2000).
11. Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt conferred often during 1942 regarding the fragile Allied position in the Middle East and Africa, and the very real fear of German occupation of Morocco. See, for example, Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV: The Hinge of Fate (Cassell & Co, 1951), 364.
12. The outbreak of war between Germany and the United States prompted Brazil’s severing of diplomatic relations. Despite being treated the same as all other neutral vessels, U-boats accidentally sank seven Brazilian ships between February and April 1942 as the war moved closer to the Americas. Brazil and Germany edged closer to outright hostilities until August 19, 1942, when Brazil declared war. Dönitz discusses this issue in his memoir, Ten Years and Twenty Days (Naval Institute Press, 1990), 239-240.
13. A stoker from among the survivors also died of wounds the next day, raising the death toll to fifteen. However, all four lifeboats landed east of Las Palmas and one week later the survivors were taken to Freetown by two Free French corvettes. Survivors’ account held in the Royal Navy Submarine Museum, Gosport, papers collected by Gus Britton. Unfortunately, this collection is not yet fully catalogued, and no box or volume number is provided.
14. Goebeler, Steel Boats, Iron Hearts, 42.
15. War Diary (Kriegstagebuch) of U-505, August 26, 1941–November 7, 1943, PG 30542/1-7; ONI roll T-5-F, T-6-F, National Archives Microfilm Publication T1022, rolls 3065-3066.
16. The five boats that launched “Operation Westindien” sank 222, 651 tons of Allied shipping, or 70, 000 more tons than the celebrated “Operation Paukenschlag.” For more on this theater of operations, see Gaylord T. M. Kelshall, The U-Boat War in the Caribbean (Annapolis, 1994).
17. U-157 was only officially listed as missing on August 13, two months after i
t was sunk. BdU was initially swayed by reports from U-67, operating in the same region, suggesting U-157 was probably still active and that its radio was out of commission. NARA Microfilm T1022, Roll 3980.
18. This, as well as other attacks, prompted Dönitz to issue orders on June 24 that U-boats were to proceed submerged by day and night when crossing Biscay, surfacing only long enough to recharge batteries. BdU Log, NARA Microfilm T1022, Roll 3980.
19. Survivor’s account held in Royal Navy Submarine Museum, Gosport, England. Unfortunately, this collection is not yet fully catalogued, and no box or volume number is provided.
20. The development of both centimetric radar sets for aircraft and long range bombers combined during 1942 and 1943 to rob U-boats of their ability to surface in safety and recharge both crew and batteries while in the mid-Atlantic. Air power was a decisive factor in the defeat of the German U-boats.
21. Loewe later became a member of the Reichsministerium für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion from August 1944 to April 1945, and then commanded the 1. Marine Panzerjagdregiment.
22. Johann Mohr commanded U-124 between September 1941 and March 1943. On April 2 he was killed with his entire crew after U-124 was depth-charged by HMS Black Swan and Stonecrop west of Oporto.
23. Decker, “The War Patrol Life of the German U-505,” 39. Zschech was not Turkish, despite his birthplace. His father had been part of the German military mission based in Turkey’s capital.
24. The “Metox” radar detector was named after the French electronics company Metox-Grandin that produced the apparatus in Paris. Officially designated FuMB-1 (Funkmess Beobachtungs-Gerät 1) the unit consisted of a flimsy wooden cross with wires wrapped around it to provide a horizontal and vertical aerial. Introduced in August 1942, it initially proved successful against early Allied radar sets, but ultimately useless against the centimetric radar introduced later in the war. Despite Germany’s ignorance of centimetric radar, Metox’s use was discontinued in August 1943 when fears were raised that the radar detector radiated its own signature that was detectable by Allied aircraft. For more on this issue, see Eberhard Rössler, The U-Boat: The Evolution and Technical History of German Submarines (Arms & Armour Press, 1981), 196.
25. Nollau took charge of U-534 in December 1942. His boat was sunk in May 1945, subsequently discovered, and raised in 1993. It is now on display in Birkenhead, England. This makes Nollau the only man to serve on two of the remaining four Second World War U-boats.
26. This aspect of the relationship between Peter Zschech and Thilo Bode remains extremely conjectural with no evidence to support it other than Hans Goebeler’s recorded opinion.
27. Hans Goebeler mentions information regarding the extreme disharmony developing aboard U-505 during this period. Goebeler, Steel Boats and Iron Hearts, 6-80.
28. The survivors were later rescued by HMS Pimpernel and landed at Santiago de Cuba.
29. Yellow aluminum from the downed Hudson was found all over U-505’s decking. It was collected and later fashioned into small axes, the emblem of the boat, and used to decorate the crewmen’s caps. Goebeler, Steel Boats and Iron Hearts, 93.
30. Ibid., 91; Decker, “The War Patrol Life of the German U-505,” 40-41.
31. Translations of ULTRA intercepted radio traffic for U-505, U.S. National Archives, RG38. 10, Box 130, Naval Security Group.
32. The provision of Milchkuh tankers to the U-boat service allowed not only the replenishment of U-boats at sea with ammunition and provisions, but also the services of an onboard surgeon who was equipped with the necessary tools and space in which to carry out emergency operations. The limited space available in a combat boat made this almost impossible. For a recent and thorough study of these large boats, see John F. White, U-Boat Tankers, 1941-1945 (Naval Institute Press, 1998).
33. Decker, “The War Patrol Life of the German U-505,” 42. In hindsight the looming defeat seems clear. At the time Dönitz treated his strategic withdrawal as a temporary measure that would enable his boats to rest and refit. However, they were never to return in force to the Atlantic battle, although anti-convoy operations were later resumed.
34. The Allied air and naval campaign against France’s Atlantic ports escalated into 1944 and culminated in “Operation Kinetic” during August. By that stage U-boats and their small escort craft were regular victims of increasingly aggressive Allied attacks. The narrow “choke points” through which U-boats exited and entered the French bases allowed concentrated attacks by their enemies. This, coupled with air supremacy over the Bay of Biscay by late 1943, spelled the end for Germany’s Atlantic flotillas. For more information on the defeat of the German effort against convoys, see Michael Gannon, Black May: The Epic Story of the Allies’ Defeat of the German U-Boats in May 1943 (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1998).
35. Several reports held in Allied records tell of the execution of several French dockyard workers in relation to these acts of sabotage. These records are held at the Bundesarchiv-Zentralnachweisstelle (BA-ZNS), AachenKornelimünster. See “Anti Submarine Warfare Report,” Volume 4 (1943), British Admiralty, RNSM, Gosport.
36. ULTRA intercepts for U-505, RG38, 10, Box 130, Naval Security Group, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, USN.
37. War Diary of U-505, PG 30542/1-7; T1022, 3065-3066; Decker, “The War Patrol Life of the German U-505,” 43. The nickname Bold was short for Kobold, meaning “deceiving spirit” or “goblin.” This clever system used a 15cm diameter capsule filled with calcium and zinc that was expelled from the stern compartment of a U-boat through a specially built ejector system or Pillenwerfer (pill-thrower). The calcium-zinc compound was packed inside a wire bag and stuffed inside an aluminium canister. A hydrostatic valve regulated the entry of seawater into the “pill.” Hydrogen gas was produced when the water mixed with the calcium-zinc, and the result was a large rather “solid” mass of bubbles that to Allied sonar vaguely resembled a submarine signature. When they worked properly, Bold capsules could emit bubbles for up to 25 minutes.
38. ULTRA intercepts for U-505, RG38, 10, Box 130, Naval Security Group, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, USN.
39. Goebeler, Steel Boats, Iron Hearts, 206-207.
40. Decker, “The War Patrol Life of the German U-505,” 44. Decker may have confused U-505’s April 7 meeting with U-123.
Deciphering the U-boat War:
The Role of Intelligence in the Capture of U-505
by Mark E. Wise and Jak P. Mallmann Showell
1. The Allies generally learned U-boat numbers through prisoner interrogation or decrypted radio messages. In particular, information derived from Enigma intelligence would have been classified Top Secret Ultra, a level of classification beyond the photo interpreters’ security clearances.
2. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (NARA), Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Record Group 38 (RG 38), Messages, message 101047, CTG 22.3 to CINCLANT, June 10, 1944; NARA, RG 38, Records of the Naval Security Group Central Depository, Crane, Indiana; CNSG Library; folder “U-505 (Code Name Nemo) Navy Dept. Documents (memoranda, messages, etc.) re capture and dispositions vessel, crew, and captured materials” (cited hereafter as NARA, RG 38, U-505 Documents); memorandum from Commander J. N. Wenger, USN to OP-20, countersigned by RADM Joseph R. Redman, July 13, 1944, 1. Cited hereafter as NARA, RG 38, U-505 Documents, Wenger Exploitation Memorandum.
3. Captain Wyman H. Packard, USN (Ret.), A Century of Naval Intelligence (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence and Naval Historical Center, 1996), 204; Ladislas Farago, The Tenth Fleet (New York: Ivan Obolensky, 1962), 213.
4. Packard, A Century of Naval Intelligence, 204; Farago, The Tenth Fleet, 214.
5. Ibid., 204.
6. Ibid., 205.
7. Ibid., 204.
8. Ibid., 205.
9. Ibid., 206.
10. Kenneth A. Knowles, Jr., Professor of Weapons Systems Engineering, U.S. Naval Academy, telephone interview with the author, March 13, 2002.
For the sake of clarity, “F-21” will be used to denote the Atlantic Section of COMINCH Intelligence throughout this chapter, although that designation did not apply until July 1, 1943, as noted above.
11. Knowles telephone interview.
12. Farago, The Tenth Fleet, 215-216.
13. Packard, A Century of Naval Intelligence, 206.
14. David Kahn, Seizing the Enigma: The Race to Break the German U-boat Codes, 1939-1943 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991), 243-244.
15. David Syrett, The Defeat of the German U-Boats: The Battle of the Atlantic (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), 18-20.
16. Packard, A Century of Naval Intelligence, 206.
17. Ibid., 207.
18. NARA, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, Record Group 457 (RG 457), Lieutenant John E. Parsons, USNR, F-211; Memorandum for F-21, Subject: Functions of “Secret Room” of Cominch Combat Intelligence, Atlantic Section, n.d., 1; Document SRMN-038; United States Navy Records Relating to Cryptography, 1918-1950. Cited hereafter as NARA, RG 457, Parsons Memorandum.
19. NARA, RG 457, Parsons Memorandum, 1.
20. NARA, RG 457, Parsons Memorandum, 1. It is unclear from the memorandum whether “Chief of Staff” refers to Low, who was Chief of Staff, Tenth Fleet, or to Edwards. Since Low exercised routine command over the Tenth Fleet, issuing orders in King’s name, he was probably the Chief of Staff in question.
21. NARA, RG 457, Parsons Memorandum, 10.
22. Ibid., 3.
23. Ibid., 3.
24. Ibid., 4.
25. Ibid., 5.
26. Ibid., 5.
27. Packard, A Century of Naval Intelligence, 124, 127. “Foreign material exploitation,” usually shortened to FME, is the examination of captured, purchased, or stolen equipment for any information of intelligence value.
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