numbered 3,500. 11 As the numbers grew, Philip implanted change. One group was singled out as the Royal Squadron, 300 strong, and the rest were organized as squadrons ( ilai), recruited from the several regions of Macedonia. They rode bareback, wore a metal breastplate and helmet and were armed with a longish
spear. They were ‘heavy’ only in a relative sense, owing their shock value to their ability to charge in formation, particularly in a ‘wedge formation’, in which the narrower front allowed a widening penetration of the enemy formation and the
maintenance of good control.
This is the most remarkable of Philip’s military innovations. By the end
of his reign it is clear the cavalry had been induced to put aside their innate individualism and submit to discipline, just like hoplites. This involved a major change in behaviour by the baronage, whose preferred method of fi ghting was
in loose formation, leaving room for individual display and activity. This would seem to have been one of the lessons Philip had brought from Greece. The Balkan tribes fought in the ‘old’ manner, loosely, and the Persians in Alexander’s battles were almost as undisciplined. The carefully controlled cavalry Philip developed was capable of defeating any number of their undisciplined enemies – just as
hoplites could beat their less controlled light infantry enemies. 12
The infantry were little more than a mob in earlier battles, more notable
for their speed of retreat than their constancy in the fi ght. There had been an earlier elite group, called the Foot-Companions ( pezhetairoi), which may have fallen out of use; Philip re-formed it. 13 They were the equivalent of the hetairoi of the cavalry: well equipped, polished, proud, and capable of standing guard
over the king and the palace. The rest of the infantry was levied, like the cavalry, by regions. This was not a new system, but Philip did insist on improvements:
drill, discipline, uniform armament and, above all, obedience to orders. It seems likely that the improvement was mainly due to the fact that the infantry had
earlier been simply the followers of the nobles, brought along when the army was called out. Philip’s innovation was thus to separate them from their landlords to organize them into disciplined formations. Both cavalry and infantry became better drilled and more competently employed. He spent a good deal of time
in the fi rst year of his reign meeting his forces, consulting them in assemblies, speaking to them, drilling them, getting to know them, and them to know him. 14
T H E S E C U R I T Y O F M A C E D O N , 3 5 9 – 3 5 4 b c 27
The infantry were trained to move and march as units; instead of a mob they
became a phalanx.
It is in this organization of the troops that Philip’s real contribution to
Macedon’s military power lies, but he is also credited with the introduction of a longer infantry spear, the sarissa. Its effect in battle was to keep the enemy at a greater, and so safer, distance. 15 The heavier weapon also required a reduction in defensive armament, so the troops used a smaller shield, and wore no breastplate.
The net effect was to make the infantry much more mobile and aggressive, and
yet also more vulnerable. Philip had taken in the power of the heavier Theban
phalanx, and the Athenian innovation of the use of peltasts and the overall
value of drill, discipline and careful preparation, and had added in his own
longer spear.
He was able to do much of this reorganization in his fi rst year, which suggests that he had worked out what needed to be done during his years as his brother’s subordinate, based in part on his experience at Thebes. But to think it all out and to apply his ideas were two different things; and to put into practice what he was preaching required him to win battles. The Paeonians and the Illyrians of Bardylis were to be his testing ground. No doubt the disaster suffered by Perdikkas’ army had predisposed Macedonians to accept, or at least to try out, new methods, but only victory would be convincing. 16
Most of what Philip imposed on the Macedonians was not new. The sarissa,
possibly, but the Macedonian barons were used to wielding long spears in hunt-
ing. Infantry in phalanxes, cavalry under discipline, uniform equipment, drill, obedience to shouted orders, pride after victory, were all part and parcel of Greek warfare. He adopted the use of siege weapons developed particularly in Dionysian Sicily, and had them available for use by 357. 17 This basic unoriginality may be an aspect of the changes which led to their acceptance: Greek warfare was something familiar to the Macedonians, who had been easily beaten in the past by smaller Greek forces. Earlier kings back to Alexander I had tried to implement many of these innovations, but Philip would seem to have been the fi rst to try them all out at once on a receptive population at the beginning of his reign. There was also Philip’s generalship, a quality enhanced in his son, which was even more
important than all his innovations.
That he was able to do all this so early in his reign is what makes Philip so
important in Macedonian history. Earlier kings had established themselves in
power fi rst and then introduced changes, generally on a fairly small scale. Given that the average reign of a successful Macedonian king was only two decades, the reforms had only started to have effect when the king died, and were then lost in the subsequent succession crisis. Philip, compelled by the all-enveloping crisis at his accession, had a relatively free hand as well as a compelling necessity to innovate. It was essentially a succession crisis followed by a military crisis; the fi rst
A L E X A N D E R T H E G R E AT F A I L U R E
28
was dealt with diplomatically and by assassination, so it was in the military area that he introduced his changes. Other governmental defi ciencies were ignored
or tackled later. The emphasis on the current crises coloured the future indelibly with a military hue; once Philip had survived, any other innovations could be
introduced in the old manner, slowly and cautiously, if at all.
The several pretenders had not, thanks to Philip’s diplomacy, presented a
real threat. The Macedonians’ northern and western neighbours were more
dangerous. The Paeonian king died soon after the agreement with Philip, and the agreement became void. Philip had made progress with his new army, and in the
spring of 358 he invaded Paeonia, won a victory, and imposed a treaty on the new king, making him a subordinate ally of the type well understood in the region. 18
This was an easy victory; Philip was able to choose his victim, so giving his new army confi dence, something the army surely needed after Perdikkas’ disaster.
The Illyrians were next. Bardylis, perhaps prompted by a peace offer from
Philip, demanded that Philip accept that Bardylis should keep those parts of
Upper Macedon he had occupied, 19 regions such as Orestis and Lynkos. These Illyrian demands, when publicized, demonstrated to the Macedonians that
the Illyrian threat remained, so an Illyrian war could be justifi ed, both as revenge for their dead comrades and Philip’s dead brother, and as a preventive against future Illyrian attacks. Philip inevitably refused Bardylis’ demands, and marched his new army into Illyrian-occupied Lynkos.
Of all the enemies besetting Macedon in 359, Bardylis was the most formidable, and it was no doubt for this reason that Philip had left him to the last. Philip had agreed to an armistice – perhaps he even requested one – as soon as he became
king, though this left Bardylis in possession of the conquered lands. Philip had, it seems, accepted an Illyrian princess, Audata, as his wife. Philip was always willing to marry, but if Bardylis imagined that Philip was now his ally, or even his subordinate, he discovered otherwise when he presented his peace terms.
Between Perdikkas’ death and the spring of 358, Philip had survived, seen off
many enemies and inva
ders, and trained up his new army. He had been king for
a year, and had done very little actual fi ghting, for the victories over Argaios and the Paeonians were fairly minor affairs. Bardylis had good cause to be confi dent that he could again win a battle.
The two armies were approximately equal in numbers, each with 10,000
infantry, and Bardylis with 500 and Philip 600 cavalry. Bardylis formed his men into a square, which is an interesting action, suggesting that he was well aware of the new Macedonian tactics. Philip commanded the pezhetairoi, his newly trained Foot Companions (described by Diodoros as ‘the best of the Macedonians’)
personally. They were armed with the new long sarissa, and were used to break
into the square, no doubt at a corner. When the square broke he sent the cavalry on a ferocious pursuit. Bardylis’ army was destroyed, losing 7,000 men killed,
T H E S E C U R I T Y O F M A C E D O N , 3 5 9 – 3 5 4 b c 29
and he at once made peace. The terms were the return of the Upper Macedonian
kingdoms to Macedonian suzerainty. 20
The battle, described fully enough by Diodoros for us to appreciate the tactics involved, demonstrated to any who cared to notice that a military commander
of genius had arrived. Philip coordinated the actions of his soldiers and operated on his opponent’s weakest point. He cannot have faced an infantry square before, nor can he have expected to face one now, but he took command personally
at the decisive point, and understood that the battle was only won after the
pursuit was fi nished. He was able to inspire his soldiers to fi ght, and to fi ght as he wished.
On top of this newly revealed military expertise, Philip showed in his dealings with his enemies that he was a most cunning and accomplished diplomatist, using negotiations to hold off dangerous enemies (Bardylis, the Paeonians, Athens)
until he was ready to confront them, to deal with his enemies one at a time, and to choose the time to strike. This combination of military genius and diplomatic fi nesse was the key to the history of Greece for the next quarter-century.
If Audata was not given to Philip at the armistice in 359, she was now, in the peace terms. One of Philip’s diplomatic innovations is here on view: instead of offering daughters and sisters to neighbouring kings as wives and daughters-in-law, he used himself, collecting daughters of other kings. These marriages
performed differing diplomatic purposes: Audata symbolized peace and the
subordination of an enemy, whereas his second marriage, to Phila, daughter of
Derdas of Orestis, bound the important Elimaian region to Macedon. A year later he married Olympias, the niece of the king of the Molossi, whose lands had also been subjected to Illyrian raids just as had the Macedonians’. 21 These marriages linked these areas together politically, but the destruction of Bardylis’ army had been the key to the whole system. This diplomatic structure was designed,
presumably, to block Illyrian expansion southwards. By these military and
diplomatic victories Philip revived Macedonian power and added an association
with the Molossi to a serious restriction on the power of Bardylis.
There was little reason for others to take much note of what was going on.
To southern Greeks, the battle in Lynkos was one between barbarian kings, of
no real interest. Dangers still lurked to the south, in Thessaly, and to the east, at Amphipolis, areas that were possible sources of hostility to Macedon. Athens’
enmity was not something to be conjured away by eliminating a pretender, and
the possibility of it recovering control of Amphipolis was ominous. Thessaly had been troublesome for Macedonia repeatedly for the past 20 years, either in the persons of Thessalians, or from Thebes by way of Thessaly.
There were even closer potential Trojan horses: the Greek cities which lay
along the two sides of the Thermaic Gulf, Pydna and Methone (Athens’ base
with Argaios), and the reviving league of Chalkidian cities, an old intermittent
A L E X A N D E R T H E G R E AT F A I L U R E
30
enemy. The league once more was interested in expanding, and this inevitably
would be at Macedon’s expense.
The victory over Bardylis and the settlement of the western borders did not
necessarily make these polities apprehensive. For Macedon the major problem
was Thessaly, which was a close neighbour, and was potentially powerful if it
was united; Philip had to ensure that it remained divided, and in 358 he helped Larissa defend itself against an attack by Alexander of Pherai, who aimed to
reconstruct the quasi-kingdom of his father Jason. Alexander was thwarted, and Philip came away with an alliance with Larissa, and another wife, Philinna. 22
Not long after, Alexander was killed by Thessalian assassins; more than Philip’s intervention, this ensured Thessaly’s continued division.
Philip turned to Amphipolis. A dispute developed which led to Philip laying
siege to the city. He cannot have been trusted by the citizens since he appeased Athens by withdrawing Perdikkas’ garrison. The city asked for help from the
Chalkidians, and two Amphipolitans even went to Athens, suggesting that an
expedi tion be sent to ‘take over’ the city. Athens, preoccupied by the ‘revolt’ of its allies, did not respond. It is doubtful that the two Amphipolitans spoke for more than a small group in the city, but it seems that some of the citizens were so desperate to stay out of Philip’s control that they contemplated Athenian
rule instead. 23
Philip defl ected Athens with negotiations, implying that once he had taken the city he would hand it over to Athens: the negotiations were on how this would be accomplished, or so the Athenians believed. The Chalkidians wanted an alliance with Athens before tackling Philip, but the ‘offer’ of Amphipolis persuaded
Athens to reject this request. When he took Amphipolis by assault after a siege Athens hinted at a swap, Pydna for Amphipolis. Pydna was therefore not a city
Athens would fi ght for, so Philip took it for himself, and Athens found itself with neither city. Angrily the city declared war, but several of its island allies now broke away, leaving Athens fi ghting its old allies rather than its new enemy. Yet the condition of war remained. 24
The Chalkidian League, led by the Olynthians, began to grow again. It was
at enmity with both Macedon and Athens, though Athens’ preoccupation with
the break-up of its league relieved the pressure. The Chalkidians allied with the Illyrian King Grabos whose territory lay to the north of Macedon, and in one
of his diplomatic feats in his accession year, Philip had neutralized the league by handing it Anthemous, the rich valley disputed between the two in the past. 25
Then he helped the league to capture Potidaia, a lapsed member which was also
an Athenian ally. Potidaia had been reinforced by a band of Athenian cleruchs
(settlers), and the siege of the city, in which Philip deployed an effective siege train, took up much of 356. It was conducted jointly with the Chalkidians.
During the siege Philip received an appeal for help from Krenides, a mining
T H E S E C U R I T Y O F M A C E D O N , 3 5 9 – 3 5 4 b c 31
town about 50 km east of Amphipolis which was threatened by the Thracian king
Kersobleptes. Philip took part of his army there and seized the town, probably without a fi ght, before Kersobleptes could take it.26
Leaving a garrison at Krenides, he returned to fi nish the siege of Potidaia. When he took the city – and it was Philip’s achievement, no matter the Chalkidikian involvement – he destroyed it, handed over the site to the league, released the Athenian cleruchs, and sold the rest of the inhabitants into slavery:27 he thus conciliated an enemy, bribed a new friend, enriched his treasury and pleased his army, all at
once.
The capture of Krenides took Macedonian power much farther east than ever
before. This and the Chalkidian alliance with Grabos the Illyrian roused two
powers, Grabos and another Thracian king, Ketriporis, and they were joined by
the Paeonian king Lyppeios, whom Philip had defeated in 359. Athens joined in, but could do nothing concrete to help. The coalition was not much of a danger
to Macedon; Philip could deal with the members, one at a time. Philip sent his general Parmenion to cope; he defeated Grabos, who had to fi ght alone. 28 We know nothing of what happened to the others, but presumably the alliance broke up after Grabos’ defeat. 29 The threat cannot have been too serious, for most of Philip’s army was involved at Krenides and Potidaia at the time. Lyppeios
probably reverted to his earlier vassalage; Ketriporis, a neighbour of Krenides, was intimidated into a subject alliance.30
Philip fi nished off this sequence of victories by the siege of Methone; the ease with which Argaios had reached Aigai from there was ominous, and the city was
an Athenian ally, so at war with Philip. It was a small city but well fortifi ed, and its people defended the city stoutly. Philip was severely wounded by an arrow
in the process, but went on to force surrender, the terms being that the people could leave with what they could carry. Athens had yet again failed to assist an ally, even though by the end of the siege she was free from the war against her
other erstwhile allies.31
The fi ghting in the past three years had dealt with Macedon’s closest enemies.
Bardylis, the Chalkidian League, Ketriporis, Lyppeios, the Athenian bases at
Pydna, Methone and Potidaia were all reduced to the status of subjects or allies, often after smashing military defeats. Beyond the gains in territory and security, however, the problems of Thessaly and, above all, Athens, still existed. Philip may have had to help Larissa again in 355 or 354, more or less at the same time as he was besieging Methone. The issue was still the independence of Larissa in the
face of the ambitions of the rulers of Pherai to control all Thessaly, ambitions not quenched by the failures of Jason and Alexander. A loan of troops seems to have been enough, just as Perdikkas’ loan of troops to Amphipolis had warded
Alexander the Great Failure Page 6
