area north along the coast occupied by his army during the siege of Pagasai; he could claim that it was ‘spear-won’ land. The Thessalians made a formal request that he return it to Thessaly, but he did not bother. Philip also collected another wife, Nikesipolis, a niece of Jason of Pherai and a cousin of the expelled tyrants, presumably as a conciliatory gesture to that city. 18
An epimeletes called Agathokles was installed to administer some or all of Perrhaibia, 19 the northern section of Thessaly, the neighbour of Macedon and Elimaia. Control of the area was Philip’s forward defence if things went wrong again in Thessaly. The land’s several cities were possibly omitted from Agathokles’
remit; he would thus have responsibility for the rural areas, acting also as an early warning system for Macedon, and presumably collected local taxation.
It is notable that Agathokles was a Thessalian, not a Macedonian, but he was
appointed by Philip.
When he was finished Philip marched south, presumably intending to
join forces with the Boiotians. At Thermopylai he found the pass held by the
Phokians along with contingents from Athens and Sparta and other Phokian
allies, including the former tyrants of Pherai. Having looked, he turned round and went home. 20 Philip’s priorities were clearly his own, even though he fought Onomarchos in the name of Apollo of Delphi. He was uninterested in the ‘Sacred’
war as such, being mainly concerned to control Thessaly to prevent its use by his enemies. Similarly Athens was involved at Thermopylai not because the city was keen to support Phokis, but because it was at war with Philip and Thebes, whose junction would pose great dangers. Both veered away from a direct confl ict.
The Athenian fl eet commanded by Chares, which had threatened Philip’s
ships at Neapolis in Thrace earlier, was active again. Chares seized and colonized Sestos on the Chersonese side of the Hellespont, and roused the Thracian kings, where Kersobleptes made an alliance with Athens.21 This was what drew Philip away from Thermopylai.
The situation in Thrace was complex. Kersobleptes menaced Amadokos,
who joined Philip; Byzantion and Perinthos were also involved. Philip’s arrival in strength disrupted the complex conflict, and he immediately defeated
Kersobleptes, imposing severely restrictive peace terms. Later he besieged
Heraion Teichos, a small town close to Perinthos, which would seem to have been in Athenian hands – at least the Athenians reacted vigorously, voting for a fl eet of 40 triremes to go to the town’s rescue.
T H E D E F E N C E O F T H E K I N G D O M , 3 5 4 – 3 4 6 b c 39
But Philip fell ill, the expedition by the Athenians was abandoned, and
Heraion Teichos was left untaken. 22 The result was that Philip had fastened an even fi rmer grip on parts of Thrace than before, but he had not damaged the
real enemy, which was Athens. Philip had been kept fully occupied in fi ghting Athens’ allies and clients for the past two years, which was why these allies had been recruited in the fi rst place. Athens itself had sent out only small expeditions, which were generally successful, at Neapolis, Thermopylai and the Chersonese.
The real problem was that Philip kept winning, and eventually there would be
no allies left. Athens would then have to do more than send out fl eets and occupy defensible posts. Less visible was another effect: Philip was steadily consolidating his power both in Macedon and in the surrounding lands. When the war with
Athens began, he had been confi ned to traditional Macedon, from Mount
Olympos to the Strymon River; now his southern boundary lay across the water
from Euboia, and his eastern was approaching the Propontis.
From Macedon these acquisitions pushed likely enemies well away from the
homeland, but there was still another Athenian ally very close by. While Philip was involved in Thrace and Thessaly, the leading city at the Chalkidian League, Olynthos, had begun negotiations with Athens, and had publicly declared
friendship between the two cities. This was in violation of the treaty of alliance Olynthos had made with Philip in 355, and was probably provoked by Philip’s
increasing power and his defeat in 353 in the fi rst war in Thessaly.23
Philip reacted by protests and attempted negotiation, accompanied by threats.
This had the opposite effect to that intended. The League became allied with
Athens and, as a direct threat to Philip personally, Olynthos granted asylum to his two surviving half-brothers, Arrhidaios and Menelaos. Philip’s illness in the Thracian campaign in 352 will have reminded everyone that he was both mortal
and irreplaceable. It was only a step from there to the thought that, by replacing him, any threat to Olynthos would cease, particularly if the new Macedonian
king had a good reason to be grateful to Olynthos. Certainly if Philip was
suddenly eliminated, a new succession crisis would erupt (his own sons were
still small children), Thessaly would go its own way, the Thracian kings would be released, the Illyrians would be less fearful. The appearance of his half-brothers at Olynthos after a decade in which they had been out of sight indicates a new phase of the war. 24
Philip was at war with Athens very unwillingly. He had avoided direct con-
fl ict so often that it looks very much as though not fi ghting Athens was Philip’s preferred policy. He had generously released Athenians he captured in the fi ght against Argaios and at Potidaia; he had avoided Athenian expeditions off Neapolis, in Thessaly, at Thermopylai and at the Chersonese. His release of Athenian prisoners must mean he hoped for peace. He did not like it when Olynthos made peace
with Athens, but he did not react until that city sponsored his half-brothers.
A L E X A N D E R T H E G R E AT F A I L U R E
40
To understand what Philip was about it is necessary to look more compre-
hensively at his overall intentions and aims. This is diffi cult. We have nothing on the subject from Philip himself, nothing from his ancient biographers (of
whose work we only have fragments), and what he may have intended has been
hidden by what he actually achieved, and by what his son accomplished.25 The basic issue concerns his aims towards Greece and Persia. In 346 the Athenian
pamphleteer Isokrates urged him to attack Persia. 26 This was probably the fi rst public comment on this, but Persia had been attacked by Greeks repeatedly in the previous half-century: by Xenophon’s men in 401, by the Spartan king Agesilaus in the 390s, by Pammenes in 355, and it was Jason of Pherai’s ambition in the
370s. That is, almost every successful Greek ruler had aimed to attack Persia, so it was perhaps the widespread presumption that Philip would also do so. He
assisted Pammenes in 355, and gave refuge to the Persian rebels the year after.
The weight of public expectation may well have been that he would turn against Persia when he was able.
Persian military power was concentrated in its cavalry, its warships and its
wealth. The cavalry fought in the traditional way which Philip knew he could
beat with his newly disciplined horsemen; the empire’s wealth allowed it to hire innumerable Greek mercenaries, and he knew he could beat them; its sea power,
however, was out of his reach. Macedon, even enlarged, was simply not large or rich enough to support both a full-scale army and a navy able to combat a Persian fl eet of up to 400 warships. But the Athenian fl eet was large enough and skilled enough to defeat any Persian force. If he intended to attack Persia the fl eet of Athens had to be on his side.
Attention to Greece was the fi rst essential, for earlier attacks on Persia had been regularly thwarted by trouble in Greece. If Philip aimed to attack Persia, it was fi rst of all necessary to ensure that Greece was on his side (as Isokrates implied) or that Greece was fi rmly and reliably neutral. The most power
ful Greek state was Athens. Everything led towards a policy of alliance with Athens.
Athens did not cooperate, being persuaded that he was an inveterate enemy,
but Philip was clearly determined to avoid an all-out fi ght if he could, and
aimed to recruit Athens as his ally if possible. An Athenian alliance would do two things: together they could dominate Greece; and the Athenian navy would
protect his communications and Greece’s seaward fl ank in any Persian invasion he mounted. This is the best explanation for his actions; if he had wanted merely to dominate Greece, Thebes was as good an ally, and he was allied with that city already; Athens’ fl eet was unique in Greece, and this was the one military asset Philip did not have. I conclude that, from round about 350, Philip’s ultimate
intention was to attack the Persian Empire, preferably in alliance with Athens. 27
(The suggestion that Philip was allied with the Empire at some point is to be
dismissed, as is the story of Persian envoys at Philip’s court.)28
T H E D E F E N C E O F T H E K I N G D O M , 3 5 4 – 3 4 6 b c 41
In 350 Philip campaigned in Epiros, defeating Molossian king Arybbas, uncle
of his wife Olympias, and probably taking Parauaea, along the Epirote border, as a result. Olympias’ brother, Alexander, was taken to Pella either as a hostage or to preserve his life from the possibility of Arybbas’ anger. Alexander had a good claim to the Molossian kingship, Arybbas having succeeded Alexander’s father in that post. Philip already had a son of Kersobleptes as a hostage at his court, not so much a threat as a requirement to good behaviour by his father.
It was while he was in Epiros that the Olynthians received Philip’s half-
brothers.29 They were no real threat to him, for by this time he had two sons, Arrhidaios, whose mother was Philinna of Larissa, and Alexander, son of
Olympias: the former was about seven, the latter six, in 350. There were also
two daughters. In addition he had at his court Amyntas, the son of Perdikkas,
who had a claim, and was now adult. Philip’s succession was thus assured, but
his half-brothers were clearly a nuisance. When he returned from the Epiros
expedition, Philip could turn to deal with Olynthos.
The menaces he had uttered against the Olynthians had no effect. Olynthos
was the most important city of the Chalkidian League, counting for about half
of its full military strength; the rest of the League consisted of about 30 cities, mostly small and weak. In 349 Philip attacked, at fi rst ignoring Olynthos, in order to destroy the League by capturing other members. Most of them could not resist and fell either without a fi ght or after only a brief resistance.30
The Olynthians were not intimidated. A contingent of Athenians commanded
by Chares arrived to bolster the defence. 31 The winter was spent in diplomacy and intrigue by both sides. Philip was in all probability partly responsible for the rebellion of Euboia from Athens; 32 it is quite possible that Athens had something to do with a rising against Philip at Pherai, instigated by the former tyrant Peitholaos. 33 Evidence is poor or non-existent in both cases but both risings were so very convenient for both sides that it is diffi cult to believe they were coin-cidences. At the very least one might assume that the initiators of the events were taking advantage of the preoccupation of Athens and Philip with Olynthos.
Philip had no real trouble at Pherai, but it took time and effort to remove
Peitholaos and settle matters in Thessaly again. Athens had more diffi culty in Euboia, where Kallias of Chalkis recruited mercenaries and eventually defeated the Athenian forces sent against him. Athens had to accept a treaty by which
the Euboian cities left the Athenian league and formed a league of their own.
In the meantime the Athenian commander of their forces in the Chalkidike,
Charidemos, was able to mount a campaign of his own against the cities which
defected or fell to Philip the year before. 34
Philip abandoned the method of picking off the smaller cities to exert periph-
eral pressure on Olynthos. This might have been designed to indicate that he was prepared to see the league continue if it would only make, and keep, a peace with
A L E X A N D E R T H E G R E AT F A I L U R E
42
him. Now he ignored the smaller cities and concentrated on Olynthos itself. To do so he had to defeat the league army in two battles, and then lay siege to the city.
This also allowed him to accept the surrenders of other cities unable to receive support from Olynthos, and he came to the conclusion that only the complete
elimination of Olynthos would end the war. When the Olynthians asked for
terms he offered none. The Athenians, preoccupied in Euboia, sent some help
with Charidemos at the start of the campaign of 348, but it was not enough.
The Olynthian cavalry surrendered; it was outside the city, and was probably
outnumbered and defeated; it was commanded by men opposed to the war in
the fi rst place, and there is a strong suspicion of treason. The siege tightened and when Mekyberna, Olynthos’ port, was taken, Athenian ships and men could not
enter. Olynthos eventually fell after a hard fi ght, was sacked and destroyed, and its people were sold. 35
Philip’s methods in this war are reminiscent of the whole approach he was
using in the wider war with Athens. In both cases he used a combination of
diplom acy and force, and displayed a good deal of reluctance to get to grips
with the main enemy, preferring to tackle subjects or allies fi rst, and only when absolutely necessary attacking the principal enemy. The Olynthian war was a
replica of the Athenian war on a small scale.
Philip had knocked aside most of the underpinnings of the Athenian alliance
by this time. All northern Greece had been brought under his direct control
or indirect infl uence, from the Propontis to the Ionian Sea, from Illyria to the southern border of Thessaly. The one Athenian ally in a position to provide substantial aid and to block an advance southwards was now Phokis, and its resolve was crumbling, along with the evaporation of the stolen Delphian riches.
Philip used diplomacy fi rst. Messages went to Athens, suggesting peace nego-
tia tions, even while the siege of Olynthos continued. One came by way of the
Euboians, arriving while the third Athenian expedition to help Olynthos was
being prepared;36 an Athenian on private business in Macedon returned with a message from Philip, in effect asking to make peace. The issue became a serious one in Athens, where the man who proposed negotiations, Philokrates, was
prosecuted for making the suggestion. His acquittal was a sign that negotiations were now possible.37 Athenian opinion was not yet fully committed; many Athenians felt they still had alternatives to peace. 38
These were attempted during 347. An expedition was sent to the Chersonese,
where Kersobleptes was contacted and several forts were built on the Propontis
and inland.39 Philip was distracted once more by events in Thessaly, where Halos rebelled against control by Pharsalos; Philip sent Parmenion to besiege it. 40 His control of Thessaly was obviously less than complete, and the country was taking up much of his time. There is no sign that the rising by Halos was Athens’ doing, but it was a coastal town, and accessible from the Athenian-dominated sea. The
T H E D E F E N C E O F T H E K I N G D O M , 3 5 4 – 3 4 6 b c 43
fact that Philip was involved in war with Athens may not have been missing from the Halians’ calculations.
Philip’s ally Thebes was doing badly in its continuing war with Phokis, and
during 347 Philip sent a small force to help the Boiotians, and together they
defeated the Phokians in a small battle. 41 Athens made attempts
to rouse other Greeks to what some saw as the danger of Philip, but was generally unsuccessful.
Sparta was interested, but the Arkadians were not. 42 There was no reason for these cities to play Athens’ game. If they wished they could point out that Athens was allied with the condemned party in the ‘Sacred’ war, and that Philip was
the only ruler to have made a serious dent in the Phokian power on behalf of
Delphian Apollo. In fact, the Arkadian cities’ major problem was Sparta, whose ambitions to revive its predominant position in the Peloponnese were a threat
to every Spartan neighbour. So, if Sparta was Athens’ ally, Athens’ policies were automatically suspect.
The lack of success in recruiting allies was compounded by the news that
Phokian resolution was failing. Phalaikos, the general in command, was deposed in favour of a board of three generals who, after initial successes, were beaten by the joint Macedonian-Boiotian force. Phalaikos resumed command. A suggestion
had been made that the Phokians should hand over their forts at Thermopylai to Athenian garrisons, but Phalaikos cancelled that idea. An offer from the Spartan king Archidamos to install a Spartan garrison was also refused. It was not only Arkadians who were suspicious of Sparta and Athens. 43
Athens’ various ploys had all failed by early 346; there was to be no grand
alliance of Hellenes against barbarian Macedon; Kersobleptes had taken the forts in Thrace but had done nothing more, being fully aware that Philip had him in
his sights once more. The Phokians were exhausted, and Phalaikos’ insistence on holding Thermopylai himself demonstrated quite clearly his lack of trust in his distant and barely active allies. In March 346 the Athenians in Assembly voted to appoint ten ambassadors to go to Macedon to negotiate peace.44
Phalaikos was dismayed when this news arrived. If Athens made peace he and
the Phokians and his mercenary army would be left alone to face the Boiotians, the Thessalians and Philip’s Macedonians, and the money from Delphi was
almost fi nished. At Pella, the Athenians found embassies from Phokis, Thebes
Alexander the Great Failure Page 8
