On the other side of Attika, the island of Euboia had been part of Athens’
league until a few years before; it contained half a dozen cities with unstable political systems, some friendly with Athens, some not. Philip may or may not
have encouraged revolutions in these cities, but he was certainly prepared to help one along if one party showed itself to be his supporter; generally, as in Elis, he supported oligarchs; democrats therefore looked to Athens. In 343 he intervened at Eretria to fi nish off an oligarchic coup. The survivors of the displaced regime had taken refuge in the fortifi ed town of Porthmos, and Philip sent 1,000 soldiers to take the place. 13 Eretria lay close to Attika, and even those Athenians who had not been convinced by Demosthenes so far will have been worried by the
appearance of a substantial force of Macedonian troops only a few miles from
their own shores.
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51
Apart from its home territory, the most sensitive point for Athens was the
Straits from the Black Sea to the Aegean, through which Athens received much of her food supplies – the Hellespont, the Propontis, the Bosporos. In 343 a new set of settlers were sent to the Thracian Chersonese, where there were several Athenian holdings already,14 including Sestos. But here a third element was now inevitably involved, for the Asian side of these waters was part of the Persian Empire.
Since the accession of the Great King Artaxerxes III Ochos in 359, the great
empire had made substantial progress towards recovering its lost or disobedient territories and provinces. Ochos had extinguished the revolt of the satraps, and then he attended to the real issue, the independence of Egypt. He approached
the problem systematically, dealing fi rst with the Egyptian forward defences: Cyprus was reconquered; Sidon captured and burnt. By 343 Artaxerxes was able
to mount an attack across the Sinai Desert which fi nally succeeded in reaching the Nile. The Egyptian Pharaoh fl ed upriver and his armies disintegrated. To avoid the fate of Sidon, the Egyptian cities rapidly surrendered. 15
The Hellespontine Phrygian satrap, Artabazos, had lived at Philip’s court for
ten years, and could provide plenty of information about the empire. Philip
therefore had a fi rm basis of knowledge in watching the unfolding events. The rickety state of the empire was no doubt interesting, but Philip will have noted its powers of recovery. He needed to be concerned whether he had to keep up
his guard against it, for the reconquest of Egypt freed the Great King, and freed his forces also. No doubt Artaxerxes was kept informed in general terms of
developments in Greece, and Artabazos had returned to Persia by 342. In 346
Isokrates had published his pamphlet suggesting a Macedonian conquest of
Persia; Artabazos will have known of this.
Artaxerxes sent envoys to Greece in 344 seeking to recruit soldiers for his
intended attack on Egypt. They went to Athens and Sparta, which both refused,
and to Thebes and Argos, which contributed 1,000 and 3,000 men respectively.
Athens’ refusal was worded very rudely, which might have momentarily helped
Philip to hope that the alliance was still operative, 16 but the Athenians’ suggested amend ment to the peace terms came soon after. Not only that, but the two
cities to send troops to Asia were Philip’s allies; Athens was surely pleased to see them go.
In these circumstances Philip cannot have been making any serious plans to
attack Persia, despite the attraction of the Persian preoccupation with Egypt.
After Egypt, Artaxerxes sent his Greek general Mentor to establish full control over Artabazos’ old satrapy,17 which was just when Philip decided he needed to establish his power fi rmly in Thrace. The Straits, Athens’ sensitive lifeline, were what separated the Macedonian and Persian campaigners.
In 342 Philip began a determined attempt to remove two of the Thracian
kings, Kersobleptes and Teres (the son of Amadokos), who had caused him
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52
trouble so often. This required a long and diffi cult campaign into the Thracian interior, whereas before he had kept to the coast. It took him the rest of 342 and well into 341 to succeed. The Thracian kings were then ejected, no one knows to where. Philip went on to campaign into the Haemos (Balkan) Mountains, and
made hostile contact with the Triballi, the main tribe between these hills and the Danube. On the other hand, a treaty was arranged with the Agrianes, a tribe living in a strategic area near the headwaters of the Strymon, between the Triballi and the Paeonians. The details of this campaign are largely inaccessible now, but the net result was a great expansion of Macedonian territory. The conquered
lands were pinned down by several Macedonian garrison towns: Philippopolis,
Alexandropolis, Kabyle and others, peopled by a variety of immigrants from
Macedonia and elsewhere; and generous estates went to Companions and others
who became eligible to be Companions. The land was to pay a regular tax to
the king – more work for an epimeletes. Its government seems to have been partly Thracian, partly from the cities which will have been allocated substantial territories, and partly under Macedonian epimeletai.
One of Philip’s reasons for intervening so forcefully in Thrace was that
Kersobleptes had been pressuring Greek cities in the Hellespont area. Philip
also made contact with the Greek cities on the Black Sea coast – Odessos, Istros, Apollonia, Mesembria – with which he made alliances. 18 He collected two more wives, daughters of kings of parts of the interior with whom he made peace and alliances. 19 The extent and fi rmness of his control of the conquered lands is diffi cult to gauge. The Thracians were certainly beaten in battle and their kings were expelled, but this did not imply full Macedonian control, and certainly it did not mean that the Thracians were content.
Philip was now richer than ever. The loot of Thrace was supplemented by the
new taxes he could collect. His control of the silver and gold mines of Macedon already provided him with more of those metals than anyone in Greece, or even of all the Greeks put together – the mines of Philippi are said to have produced 1,000
talents of silver annually. 20 (But Athens’ income at this period was more than that: perhaps 1,100 talents a year under the treasury management by Euboulos and
Lykourgos. 21) Philip used his wealth in gifts and in pursuing his political aims
– which his enemies, of course, called bribes. He recruited troops from among
his allies, and had an army which, as was to be proved later, was now as large as any combination of the Greek cities could produce, and better disciplined than theirs. The conquest of Thrace was a notable achievement, but it might become a burden if the Thracians would not accept his rule. The Thessalians had required his attention repeatedly over a period of a decade and a half before they settled down; the Illyrians had been repeatedly fought as well, without being conquered.
For Thrace to become a permanent part of his kingdom, Philip would need to
pay close and detailed attention to it for at least the next ten years.
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53
The warfare in Thrace inevitably connected with Athenian sensibilities.
Athens’ settlers in the Chersonese were under the command of Diopeithes, who
was left in place during the next two years, and had to fi nd money to pay his troops. He did this by raiding the territories round about, which were Thracian at fi rst, but by the year after his arrival had become Macedonian. His presence also revived an old quarrel between the independent city of Kardia and Athens over
the boundary between their respective territories. It was a nasty little disputatious area marginally concerning Philip – he put a
protective garrison into Kardia
at that city’s request – but Athens more centrally.22 Control of the Chersonese was crucial to Athens’ prosperity, partly because of the settlers sent there, but mainly because from bases in the Chersonese the Athenian fl eet could dominate the whole line of the Straits; an annual convoy of grain ships was shepherded
through.
One minor dispute could have been easily dealt with if both sides had been
willing. A group of pirates occupied the island of Halonnesos in the Aegean.
The island technically belonged to Athens, which did nothing about the pirates, perhaps because they were very discriminating in their victims. But they
attacked Macedonian ships, so Philip sent a force to remove the pirates, and the Macedonians stayed on the island.23
This took place probably in 342, which was the same year that Athens continued to block Philip’s progress in Akarnarnia, and the same year that Diopeithes and his cleruchs revived the old quarrel with Kardia, and raided Philip’s new conquest of Thrace. It is also the year Philip campaigned to conquer Thrace and his agents and troops established his supporters in the Euboian towns. There were thus
many areas where Philip and Athens were in dispute – Akarnania, Elis, Megara,
Euboia, Halonnesos, the Chersonese – but in none of them was the dispute
insoluble, if only both sides would work for it. The problem was that the constant series of disputes convinced both sides that an overall solution was not possible, and each problem exacerbated the others. Demosthenes and his supporters
now saw that war with Philip and the destruction of the Macedonian power he
had constructed was their eventual aim. We do not know what Philip’s attitude
was, though he refused to back down in any of the disputes – his protest about Diopeithes was particularly sharp.
The Halonnesos and Chersonese issues persuaded Philip to send new
proposals to Athens. He claimed Halonnesos by right of conquest, but offered it to Athens as a gift; he offered a treaty to compensate the dispossessed Athenian cleruchs from Potidaea; he offered to join Athens in suppressing pirates; he
suggested widening the ‘Peace’ to include other Greek cities; he offered to revive the alliance with Athens, which could, he suggested, bring great benefi ts to the city; and he offered to negotiate the settlement of other disputes. 24
There was little here to persuade the Athenians that Philip was serious: the
A L E X A N D E R T H E G R E AT F A I L U R E
54
suggestions about Halonnesos and Potidaia involved Athens recognizing his
possession of those places; the offer of joint anti-pirate patrols was understandably seen as an insult, particularly as Philip’s navy was small and so Athens would do the work; the offer of negotiations implied that Athens’ case, particularly in the Chersonese, was not just. The one hopeful proposal was for a widening of the
peace treaty, but this could only be done in an atmosphere of mutual trust, which did not exist. Philip hardly expected Athens to accept these proposals, and the Athenians did not take them seriously, any more than Philip had taken seriously the Athenian demand that he ‘return’ Amphipolis. They seem a set of proposals
aimed at neutral opinion, so that Philip could claim to be working for peace,
whereas Athens’ rejection could then be portrayed as obduracy. There were
plenty of opportunities for negotiation if the Athenians wanted them but it was easy for the Athenians to knock each idea down as it was suggested. Meanwhile
both sides were busily bolstering their general positions: Philip in Thrace, Athens in Greece.
Athens had already thwarted Philip in Akarnania and Megara; Corinth was
probably inclining Athens’ way as a result of Philip’s apparent threat to Ambrakia; Athens had a fi rm grip on the Chersonese, thanks to Diopeithes. All these places were populous and martial and their alliance or friendship would certainly assist Athens against Philip. More important, from Athens’ point of view, was Euboia.
The aim of those who had led the secession from Athens’ alliance in 348 had
been to gather all the island cities into a league, an aim not realizable if Eretria and Oreus were closely aligned with Philip. The leader of the league movement, Kallias of Chalkis, had hoped for Philip’s support, but the intervention of
Macedonian forces in 343 had meant he could not get it: a disunited Euboia was more attractive to Philip than a strong league. Kallias had no better luck with Thebes, similarly more interested in dividing and ruling its neighbour.
Kallias, reluctantly no doubt, turned to Athens. He was clearly worried by
Macedon’s infl uence in the island; and here Athens was just as equally concerned.
Kallias met with a display of Athenian statesmanship which is a credit to the city.
A force was put together of Athenian and Megarian troops, which joined with
forces from Chalkis to ‘liberate’ Oreus. This city lay just across the strait from Philip’s Thessaly, and was the obvious landing place for Macedonian troops. Later in the year the same services were performed for Eretria. Kallias was then able to form his Euboian League, and Athens forbore to make any menacing moves
aimed at recovering its control of the island. In return Kallias brought Chalkis and the league into an alliance with Athens. 25 Kallias also put his political weight behind the policy advocated by Demosthenes in the name of the freedom of the
Greek cities from Macedonian domination. He could be the more persuasive in
that role since he could claim that he had only just escaped from such domina tion himself.
C O L D WA R , 3 4 6 – 3 4 0 b c
55
Kallias and Demosthenes went on a diplomatic tour of the northern
Peloponnese and across into Akarnania, returning to Athens with promises
of troops or money from Megara, Achaia and Akarnania, to add to those the
Athenians and Euboians could raise. 26 Demosthenes summoned a meeting of the anti-Philip coalition to Athens for spring 340, and persuaded the Athenian Assembly – by now largely convinced that he was right, and that his policies
were bearing fruit – to send envoys seeking similar alliances and contributions to Rhodes and Chios in the eastern Aegean, to Perinthos, Selymbria and Byzantion
in the Propontis, and to the Great King in Persepolis. 27
If there is ever any doubt that Demosthenes had the Assembly in his grasp
by now, these measures should be convincing. The Greek cities he visited were
those whose ‘rebellion’ in 357 had broken the second Athenian Confederacy; real statesmanship was required to appeal to Chios and Rhodes. The appeal to the
Great King was another example, for Athens prided herself on her long-standing opposition to Persian power and pretensions, and had rudely replied to his
request for troops only a couple of years before. Philip’s successful campaign in Thrace had alarmed all these targets of the Athenian embassies. Byzantion was
already in dispute with Philip, while Perinthos was close to Heraion Teichos,
attacked by Philip some years before. Even if the Great King was not willing to become involved directly, he had already helped Diopeithes with a subsidy, 28 and money was one of the main requirements of the allies.
Byzantion was the city most directly involved. It had exercised some sort of
hegemony in the local waters in the Black Sea, and had profi table relations with one of the Thracian kings dispossessed by Philip and so was adversely affected by Philip’s actions. Demosthenes visited the city in the autumn of 341 urging an alliance with Athens, but the Byzantines were not yet actually at war with Philip, though incidents had certainly occurred which would give either side an excuse for war if one was required. 29
Philip sent an envoy to protest Diopeithes’ actions, but the general locked
h
im up, tortured him and then demanded 9 talents as a ransom. A Macedonian
herald had also been kidnapped, and his dispatches were read out in the Athenian Assembly. 30 Diopeithes’ raid and the Macedonian garrison in Kardia brought the confl ict in the Chersonese as close to open warfare as could be conceived. All that was missing was a declaration. Neither side was yet ready for that: Athens’
alliances were not yet fi rm; Philip was busy in Thrace.
In the spring of 340 both sides notched up the tension. An Athenian envoy
set out on the long journey to Persepolis or Susa. The meeting of the Athenian allies that Demosthenes hoped for probably did not take place, but the alliances remained; the seceded members of the old Athenian League were certainly
bothered by Philip’s actions; Byzantion could keep them informed. In Thrace
Philip decided he needed the use of a fl eet in the Propontis if he was to exert
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real pressure on the cities. The problem was that an Athenian fl eet, larger than his, was already in the Athenian harbours in the Chersonese. Philip seized the chance to send a clear message to Athens: he marched his army into the Athenian section of the Chersonese, down the west coast and out again along the east coast, escorting his fl eet through the Hellespont into the Propontis along the way. The Athenian land forces, now commanded by the competent but less provocative
Chares, did not move, nor did the Athenian fl eet. 31 The Athenians knew full well that their fl eet now blocked the seaward exit: Philip’s fl eet, they could argue, was now trapped.
Philip wished to ensure that the Greek cities did not interfere with his
control of Thrace. This meant persuading Byzantion and Perinthos to remain
neutral or accept his authority, perhaps by a more binding alliance than already existed. Encouraged no doubt by Demosthenes’ visit in the autumn, and by
Chares’ presence nearby, but above all menaced by Philip’s power, Perinthos and Byzantion also defi ed him. It became necessary, so Philip decided to use force.
He wrote again to Athens, justifying his actions in the Chersonese, listing
Alexander the Great Failure Page 10
