In the completely separate political system of China, where Alexander was
unknown, the preliminary stages had been accomplished in a process by which
another unifying empire would appear during the next century. The border state of Qin, the westernmost of the complex of states along the Yellow River, had
begun to expand. Its soldiers were hardened by constant border warfare. Two
highly capable rulers, dukes Xian and Xiao, ruled from 385 to 338, and carried through reforms which increased the availability of military manpower and the
effectiveness of the government system. Its nearest neighbour, the kingdom of
Wei, was seriously damaged by a war with Qi to the east in the 340s, and Qin and Qi helped themselves to parts of Wei’s lands in the decades following. The Qin state was beginning to turn its honed military power on to the interior cities – just as Macedon, whose troops were toughened in fi ghting Illyrians and Thracians,
turned on the Greek cities. Not for nothing is this the ‘Era of Warring States’
in China. Qin emerged as one of the three or four Chinese great powers, just
as Rome was about to do in the west, and by similar means: a disciplined war-
making machine and an internal need to keep on conquering. In contrast to the
Macedonian empire, however, Qin constructed an effective and well-established
government system.13
8
Antigonos the One-Eyed, 319–311 bc
Antipater’s death removed the only man who could pretend to be the ruler of
the whole Macedonian Empire, no matter how feebly he had exercised that rule.
He nominated Polyperchon as his successor as regent, 1 a man few respected, and left Antigonos with a dangerously vague commission as general in Asia. Both
appointments were frequently ignored or rejected by others. Polyperchon was
undermined by Kassander, Antipater’s son, who had been named as chiliarchos by Antipater in his will, but had expected the chief post.
This emptiness at the centre, and Antigonos’ ambitions, meant that the many
satraps had to play their own hands; no super-satrap had the authority or the
power to control them. Some may well have been working largely for themselves
from the start: Antigonos is one obvious suspect, Ptolemy another, Peithon a
third; they might aim at cutting themselves a slice of the empire, and going into independence, or they might aim for the whole. Some changed from one variety
to the other, as conditions changed. Some took the lesson from Alexander’s
spectacular career that it was enough to have an army and to win battles. It was a most confusing period, until the small fry were eliminated. 2
Antigonos’ initial task was to suppress the last of Perdikkas’ supporters,
including Alketas, his brother, and the satrap of Kappadokia, Eumenes. Both
were at large in Asia Minor, though Alketas was swiftly driven to defeat and
suicide at Termessos. 3 Antigonos also drove out other local satraps, Arrhidaios of Hellespontine Phrygia and Kleitos of Lydia. These had been put in place by
Antipater to confi ne Antigonos. 4 These were prominent men: Arrhidaios had been briefl y regent before Triparadeisos, and Kleitos had been the commander of the victorious fl eet in the Lamian War. Kleitos emulated Antigonos and fl ed to the regent. Antigonos now refused to accept Polyperchon’s promotion, interpreting
his position as ‘ strategos over Asia’ in the widest possible terms. He became the effective ruler of all western and central Asia Minor soon after Antipater’s death, and having been given Perdikkas’ former army, by recruiting and by enlisting
his former enemies’ forces, he became the commander of the largest army east
of the Hellespont.
Polyperchon was challenged by Kassander, who seized control of the
Macedonian garrisons in Greece. Kassander never showed any ambition to
rule the whole empire, but he did insist that he was entitled to have a version of
A L E X A N D E R T H E G R E AT F A I L U R E
104
Antipater’s authority, by hereditary right. So now it became clear that one man was making a play for one section of the empire, and historic Macedon at that, basing his claim on the fact that his father had ruled it. Antipater’s long stint as Macedonian viceroy (334–319) had certainly predisposed a section of the
population to accept Kassander’s claims. Antigonos, whose interest at the time was in reducing Polyperchon’s authority, considerately sent Kassander some
troops. Kassander also contacted Ptolemy, who had married his sister Eurydike.5
Kassander and Polyperchon neutralized each other, and Antigonos could move
east against Eumenes.
Polyperchon sent a new commission to Eumenes to recruit a force in the
name of the kings. Eumenes persuaded the Argyraspides, whom Krateros had
left in Kilikia, to join him in the name of the regent and of the kings. These ‘Silver Shields’ were a fearsome set of old soldiers who undoubtedly understood that
Eumenes was playing on their emotions and their loyalty to the Macedonian royal family. He had an empty tent set up in which he communed with the spirit of
Alexander, whose empty throne was the object of obeisance and incense-burning
before meetings. The old soldiers accepted this. Eumenes, after all, did have a deal of legality on his side, and the display of the royal dress and insignia was a reminder of the legitimacy of his command.6 It had become increasingly clear that his opponents – Antigonos, Kassander, Ptolemy – aimed at either removing
the kings to whom these men were loyal, or at carving off bits of the empire
which they had been instrumental in conquering. The Argyraspides were both
a formidable fi ghting unit and a powerful symbol of the sentiment for unity of the empire.
Ptolemy as satrap in Egypt had begun by acting as a loyal subject. He quickly
removed Kleomenes, which helped bring him popularity in Egypt. He expanded
the empire by an expert mixture of intimidation and persuasion in Cyrenaica,
thereby fulfi lling part of Alexander’s western plans. 7 He insisted that Alexander’s wish to be entombed in Egypt be respected, despite Perdikkas’ intention to bury him at the traditional royal cemetery at Aigai. Both were using the issue for their own political purposes, but Ptolemy was acting in accordance with Alexander’s
wishes when he persuaded Arrhidaios to head for Egypt rather than Macedon. 8
None of this was a sign of ambition for independent rule.
The decisive break in Ptolemy’s loyalties came after the murder of Perdikkas.
He had been, he felt, unjustly attacked and so had defended himself, and
Perdikkas’ death could be seen as the execution of a man whose ambition had
fl own too high, causing the deaths of Macedonian soldiers. After the murder, at a con fer ence of the leaders, Ptolemy was offered the regency. If he took up the offer he would have to leave Egypt to someone else, he would enter into a political contest with Antipater, who was approaching, and he would have had to try to
control these rambunctious Macedonians. He refused the job, remaining instead
A N T I G O N O S T H E O N E - E Y E D , 3 1 9 – 3 1 1 b c 105
as satrap in Egypt. It was, in a quiet way, a declaration of independence. 9
Ptolemy was one of the most successful political operators of the time. His
control of Egypt – a country prone to taking against foreign rulers – was fully accepted by the native Egyptians. He was a conscientious administrator. His
diplomacy was almost always clever and subtle; his military ability was of no
great account, but his political timing was usually good, and his geopolitical understanding was always spot-on; his mistakes and defeats
never threatened
his essential base. These qualities might have ensured that, as regent, he would have at least delayed the collapse of Alexander’s empire. Instead he was one of its prime destroyers.
Ptolemy’s decision to hold Egypt in defi ance of the rest of the empire made
it necessary for him to put the defence of his satrapy fi rst. Egypt was vulnerable to attack primarily from Syria; it had been conquered three times in the recent past from that direction, and threatened by Perdikkas. The Persian conquest had been delayed by Egyptian control of Phoenicia and Cyprus; Ptolemy’s solution
was the same: to move his defence forward. In 319, at Antipater’s death but before Antigonos’ victories over Alketas and Arrhidaios, Ptolemy moved into Syria, taking control as far north as Phoenicia. He evicted the satrap, Laomedon of Mitylene, who took refuge with Alketas in Asia Minor; a poor choice. 10 Ptolemy contacted the kings in the several Cypriot cities. Phoenicia and Cyprus were the traditional sources of wood for Egyptian shipbuilding. Ptolemy had thus reconstituted
the Egyptian kingdom as it had been under the last independent pharaohs.
Kassander and Ptolemy were pitted against Eumenes and Polyperchon in the
contest between fragmentation and unity. Antigonos was leaning towards the fi rst two, though operating essentially for his own ambition. By helping Kassander
he was undermining the imperial idea personifi ed by Polyperchon, whom he
had refused to accept as his superior. By pushing out other satraps from their offi ces in Asia Minor he was building up his own local power, at fi rst returning to a position similar to that held under Alexander. He was challenged over this by Eumenes, who had a commission from Polyperchon which was very like that
which Antigonos had received from Antipater. By working for the continuity
of the empire, Eumenes therefore set himself against both Antigonos and the
fragmentizers. When Laomedon fl ed to Alketas, he was making the point that
both Ptolemy and Antigonos were working against the unity of the empire.
Antigonos marched after Eumenes, who retreated into Syria, and this forced
Ptolemy to retire to Egypt. Ptolemy appealed to the Silver Shields, but they
remained loyal to the kings and Eumenes. 11 Eumenes moved eastwards and this forced Seleukos in Babylonia to declare himself. He came out against Eumenes,
though he was probably just as unenthusiastic about Antigonos.12 Eumenes marched on farther eastwards, and at Susa joined with a group of eastern satraps who had just succeeded in blocking the local ambitions of Peithon of Media.
A L E X A N D E R T H E G R E AT F A I L U R E
106
Media was the most important satrapy in the east and Peithon had developed
ambitions of his own to control the east. This forced the other eastern satraps, in Baktria, Arachosia, Karmania, Persis and others, to resist him.13 To these men the continuation of a unifi ed empire was preferable to either Peithon’s type of ambition or that of Antigonos, which by this time looked very similar to that of Peithon. The Alexander tent came in useful; Eumenes established a precarious
supremacy over the easterners. To their confederation, he brought his forces,
probably a bigger persuader than the imaginary Alexander. Peithon, Seleukos
and Antigonos joined forces in reply. 14 By now, the contest was for the control of the whole empire.
The armies of Antigonos and Eumenes campaigned against each other in Iran
throughout 317 and into 316; the campaign, therefore, took two full years, from the start in 318. They fought complex battles and intricate campaigns, until in the spring of 316 Antigonos got the upper hand. One of Eumenes’ many allies
betrayed him; at the battle of Gabiene the Argyraspides’ baggage (including their families) was captured by Antigonos’ cavalry. They then handed Eumenes over
as ransom. He was executed.15
In the west the unifi ers suffered repeated defeats. Polyperchon turned to the Greeks for help, issuing a proclamation in which he purported to restore the
freedom of the Greeks by returning to the system of Philip and Alexander, instead of the military occupation instituted by Antipater; 16 this was designed to cut the ground from under Kassander’s position. But Polyperchon’s fl eet was destroyed by that of Antigonos, and Kassander outbid him for Greek support by removing
the garrison from Athens and establishing a regime sympathetic to him in the
city, under a philosopher, Demetrios of Phaleron.17
From his Athenian base, Kassander moved to Macedon, gained control of King
Philip III, and was welcomed by the Macedonians.18 Holding this base allowed him to return to re-establish his domination over Greece. Polyperchon, with
King Alexander IV (now six years old) and Roxane, moved to the Peloponnese.
Philip III was married to Eurydike, the granddaughter of Philip II (his own
niece), and was wholly under his vigorous wife’s control. She sided with
Kassander and organized the proclamation of Kassander as regent for her
husband.19 Polyperchon contacted Olympias who was in Epiros, and handed the young Alexander to her; she invaded Macedon. The army which Eurydike had
raised to combat old Olympias was wholly unwilling to fi ght such a war and at once changed sides. 20
Olympias thereby gained control of Philip III and Eurydike, whom she had
killed. She then set about murdering Kassander’s people, killing a good hundred of the Macedonian baronage. 21 Opinion in Macedon, which had generally welcomed her return, swiftly changed. Kassander drove her into the city of
Pydna, which he besieged. In 316, she surrendered, and Kassander left her fate to
A N T I G O N O S T H E O N E - E Y E D , 3 1 9 – 3 1 1 b c 107
be decided by his army of Macedonians in an Assembly; she was executed soon
after. 22 Roxane and Alexander were kept alive, strictly secluded at Amphipolis. 23
Kassander married another of Philip II’s daughters, Thessalonike, daughter
of the Thessalian Nikesipolis and half-sister of King Alexander. 24 This was a studiedly ambiguous gesture, either a protection for Alexander (and Roxane)
or positioning himself within the Macedonian royal family as a claimant if the boy died. It certainly helped his relationship with the Macedonians and the
Thessalians, and by the end of 316 Kassander had made himself lord of Macedon
and overseer of Greece; Polyperchon survived, but without either of the kings
he had little power.
Antigonos was proving to be lethal to the satraps put in place at Triparadeisos.
In addition to those he had accounted for in Asia Minor, he now eliminated
some easteners: Peukestas, the betrayer of Eumenes, was deposed from Persis,
and Seleukos was soon to be driven out of Babylonia as Antigonos returned to
the west. The commander of the Silver Shields, Antigenes, one of Perdikkas’
murderers and satrap of Susiana, was now himself murdered. 25 Peithon, the most dangerous of the easterners, was detected in, or merely accused of, an ambition to increase his power, and was executed. 26
Antigonos, like Antipater, had not experienced the great fi ghting in Baktria
and India; he ignored the east; most of the surviving satraps were reinstated; some of the Argyraspides were sent to the east, to get them out of the way. 27
Antigonos turned west again, and now his actions revealed the extent of his
ambition. In Babylon he demanded that Seleukos produce his satrapal accounts.
Such an inspection was guaranteed to discover, or invent, malfeasances. There
was no apparent set of rules on fi nance in the satrapies, so discrepancies could be found easily; the audit was the preliminary to Seleukos’ arrest and execution.
Seleukos, without forces to resist, fl ed. He was able to take
his family and an escort of 50 troopers; the journey was thus perhaps arranged already. Antigonos’
behaviour in Iran had been warning enough. 28
Only the king or his regent had the right to demand that a satrap display an
account of his stewardship, so Antigonos’ demand implied that he was setting
himself up in such a position. He was still ‘ strategos over Asia’, and no doubt this was the formal ground for acting against Seleukos, but his power now stretched from the eastern satrapies to the Hellespont and to the border of Egypt. He was bound to try to subordinate the remaining independent satraps.
Seleukos fl ed to Ptolemy in Egypt to whom he explained what Antigonos
was doing.29 To both it was clear that Antigonos aimed to reconstitute the Alexandrian empire under his own rule. It will have become clear to Ptolemy
that, despite his tacit alliance with Antigonos against Eumenes two years before, Ptolemy himself would be now due for elimination.
Ptolemy was convinced by Seleukos’ tale and his explanation of events in
A L E X A N D E R T H E G R E AT F A I L U R E
108
the east. Seleukos sent envoys on to explain the situation to Kassander and to Lysimachos of Thrace, the only westerners still outside Antigonos’ control, 30
thereby doing to Antigonos what he had done to Perdikkas. Kassander was
soon convinced, and Lysimachos, who might well be a target before Kassander,
joined in. One of the items of news which Seleukos could reveal was the scale of the wealth Antigonos now controlled: a war chest of 25,000 talents, picked up
by the occu pa tion of imperial treasuries at Ekbatana and Susa and Persepolis, and an annual income of 11,000 talents. 31 He had also recruited a large part of Eumenes’ former army. None of the allies could compete with this scale of
wealth or manpower, not even Ptolemy with the reserves of Egypt, and Kassander and Lysimachos were positively poor by comparison; Seleukos, of course, was
destitute.
But they were all satraps, legally appointed at the conference at Triparadeisos, which was earlier than the Antigonos’ commission as strategos. They issued a joint ultimatum based on their legal rights, which Antigonos could not gainsay; the men who were aiming to dismantle the empire were thus proclaiming their
Alexander the Great Failure Page 18
