by Bob Woodward
The war was not politically sustainable, he said. It has been nearly eight years. If we put in more troops, statistically, we’re going to see our casualties go up, adding fuel to public and congressional disillusionment.
Biden proposed what he called counterterrorism plus. Focus on al Qaeda in Pakistan. The U.S. and NATO troop presence in Afghanistan would soon reach about 100,000—enough to ensure that al Qaeda would not move back there, and enough to hold the Taliban insurgency at bay.
The vice president’s lecture lasted almost as long as Riedel’s talk. An NSC staff director sitting on the back bench clocked Biden as speaking for 21 minutes.
Jones turned to Secretary Clinton, the ranking principal after Biden.
“Well, Joe, tell us what you really think!” she said.
Those in the room burst into laughter. Clinton argued for sustained counterinsurgency—protecting the Afghan people, winning them over, getting popular “will” on our side, improving the legitimacy and competency of the Karzai government. Do you understand what the alternative would be if we don’t stick with this? she asked. The gains for women would evaporate and the United Nations would be driven out. She fully supported Riedel’s strategic review and the recommendations.
Lock, stock and barrel, Riedel thought. It was a ringing endorsement that he appreciated.
Gates took the floor briefly and said that he too agreed with Riedel’s review—but without the warmth of Clinton’s blanket endorsement.
Jones said there appeared to be three force options since the president had approved 17,000 more troops the previous month.
The first was counterterrorism “lite” as they called it: no more troops, maybe even bring some out, basically the vice president’s position.
Second was 4,000 more trainers for the Afghan army, which General McKiernan, General Petraeus and Secretary Gates had recommended.
Third would be ramping up to full counterinsurgency, meaning one member of the U.S., NATO military, Afghan army or police for every 40 to 50 people in Afghanistan. This was the standard ratio in the theoretical model for counterinsurgency, or as the military called it, COIN. To do that would require another 100,000 U.S. troops—a position that no one had even come close to advocating, including Petraeus.
At one point, Riedel spoke with Rahm Emanuel, who was astounded that the intelligence on bin Laden was not better. “What do you mean you don’t know where he is?” the chief of staff asked. Some $50 billion a year spent on intelligence “and you don’t have a clue where the most wanted man in the history of the world is?”
We let the trail go cold back after 9/11 when the Bush administration turned to Iraq, Riedel answered. The solution by the Bush White House and the Congress had been to add more people, throw more bodies into the CIA, the DNI and the National Security Agency. They were highly motivated but inexperienced. About two thirds of those in the CIA’s Near East and South Asia office of analysis, for example, had less than five years’ experience, roughly an inversion of how it had been when Riedel joined the CIA almost three decades ago.
In a later discussion with Jones, Riedel said, “The intelligence community is always better off when it’s given direction rather than too much love.” They’re big boys and can handle the discipline.
The NSC principals met again five days later, March 17, for final approval of the Riedel strategy and to choose among the military options.
“Bruce has done the classic Henry Kissinger model,” Gates said, referring to the military options. “You have three options, two of which are ridiculous, so you accept the one in the middle.”
“Yes, that’s right,” Riedel said. “Guilty as charged.” It was a vintage White House trick, one that offered the illusion of choice. But even though everyone recognized this for the stunt it was, the Kissinger model remained popular.
Gates and the others voiced objections to the third option of 100,000. Though it was the theoretical model, it was not serious, so they took it off the table, and all, with the exception of Biden, backed the Riedel strategy with the military option of 4,000 trainers.
Biden, whose opinion Gates had called ridiculous, said he wanted his dissent noted.
Emanuel interjected that they now had to get the review paper to the president. “The president’s got to get his head into this, in depth,” Emanuel said. “He’s got to read it carefully, and he’s got to have somebody walk him through it.”
Jones agreed.
“So guess what, Bruce?” Emanuel said, turning to Riedel. “You’re going to California tomorrow.” Obama was taking Air Force One to appear on The Tonight Show with Jay Leno and conduct several town hall meetings. The flight would give him five hours of unscheduled time—an ideal opportunity for him to digest the 44-page report. Riedel could ride along, walk him through it, and answer his questions.
The next day, March 18, Riedel boarded Air Force One. Over the years, he had flown numerous times on the presidential plane and had a favorite seat, a window seat, well behind the private cabins used by the president and isolated from the chairs clustered around tables. Riedel didn’t feel like chitchatting. He sat down and looked over his notes to make sure he had it right.
Emanuel’s plan was to stage the presentation away from the White House so none of the national security team—Clinton, Gates, Jones, Mullen, Blair, Panetta, Holbrooke or Petraeus—would feel they had been excluded from an important presidential meeting. Obama would be able to give Riedel his undivided attention.
About two hours into the flight, Axelrod came over to Riedel. Both the president and he had finished reading the report.
Showtime, Riedel thought as he stepped into the president’s office in the front.
Obama was behind his desk, in a shirt and tie, with his suit jacket nearby for their arrival in California.
Riedel told Obama that the written report was by necessity a bureaucratic document, a reflection of the interagency process. The 20 recommendations were serious and focused, he hoped, and the 180 sub-recommendations fixed around actions that should be taken. It was dense—not Shakespeare—and there were parts that required some decoding. Mr. President, what I can do is read between the lines for you, he said.
You might remember, Riedel said, that during the campaign I told you that al Qaeda was as dangerous now as they were on the 10th of September, 2001. After a review of the intelligence, he said, it turns out that I was underestimating the danger.
Though my first recommendation is an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency for Afghanistan, you, Mr. President, have to be focused on the real, central threat—Pakistan.
Some al Qaeda watchers would argue that bin Laden, hiding in Pakistan, is irrelevant, Riedel said. He’s stuck in a cave somewhere, and yes, he puts out these audiotapes once in a while, but he’s more of a symbol than the commander of a global jihad.
What I learned is that’s just not true, Riedel said. He communicates with his underlings and is in touch with his foot soldiers. His troops believe they are getting his orders, and we know from good intelligence that they are. But we don’t know the exact mechanism by which this happens. And that we don’t know is one of the more troubling facts. We know that, say, four people get his messages. What we don’t know is if 40 other people are getting his messages. Or even 400? If you are seeing a slice of the picture, how big is what you’re not seeing? It could be huge.
You could ask, Riedel said, what was the last thing al Qaeda or its affiliates did on the world stage. And the answer, as Obama knew, was the brutal Mumbai attack organized by Lashkar-e-Taiba that previous Thanksgiving. That was a big deal, and LeT is growing.
Al Qaeda is clearly plotting against targets in Western Europe and, less clearly, in North America. For Europe, al Qaeda is using Pakistanis who have relocated to the United Kingdom, Norway and Denmark and can pass through our screening and defenses. They are not young Saudis or Somalis, but the children of immigrants, with British, French, Belgian passports. So this is a triple probl
em—recruiting, plotting and traveling with relative freedom.
“These guys are serious,” Riedel said. “They are clever, and they are relentless. Until we kill them, they’re going to keep trying to kill us.”
You have to see the threat as a syndicate, Riedel continued. Al Qaeda is part of a larger militancy in Pakistan. It incubates the Afghan or Pakistani Taliban or LeT. The groups all interact. Bin Laden can’t be found because he is swimming in a sea of like-minded people.
The singular feature of the syndicate is that despite the Bush administration’s efforts—the extreme rendition, detention and interrogation techniques—no one has turned in bin Laden, his deputy, Ayman Zawahiri, or the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar. Lost in the entire torture controversy is the fact that none of those interrogated ever gave up the major intelligence priority—the location of bin Laden. Whether the Bush-Cheney approach was right or wrong, it did not get us what we most want to know.
That fact suggests a greater discipline than is normally attributed to al Qaeda now, Riedel warned.
You could make the case, he continued, that we were surprised once on 9/11 for all kinds of reasons. It’s going to be pretty hard to explain what happened to the American people if we’re surprised again. We can’t be complacent. It’s great that drones are killing bad guys, but we don’t know where the top leaders are, where “the essence is.” Drone strikes are similar to going after a beehive one bee at a time. They would not destroy the hive.
Predator drone strikes only work because CIA paramilitary teams have an ultra-secret presence on the ground in Pakistan. Without the local informants these teams develop, there would not be good signals intelligence so that the drones know where to target. This was a risky enterprise that might collapse overnight. So don’t rely on drones, Riedel said. They look like a cheap way out, but they’re not.
Turning to Afghanistan, Obama asked if sending in 17,000 and then 4,000 more troops would make a difference.
Yes, Riedel said, or at least you will know the answer in a reasonable time frame. Given what President Bush and you have ordered—nearly 33,000 more troops this year—that will double the number there now. The additional forces will be there by summer or early fall. We’re going to go into parts of southern Afghanistan where nobody’s been in a long time. If that doesn’t have a measurable impact on the Taliban, then you’ve got a fundamental problem. In his 44-page report, Riedel wrote that the Taliban’s momentum “must” be reversed that year.
When an 18-year-old Pashtun warrior has 5,000 Marines in his neighborhood he may say, “You know, I think I’ll sit out the next campaign season. I’ll just go home.” I wouldn’t call that reconciliation between a Taliban insurgent and the Afghan government, but I would call that victory, Riedel said.
“But you should have a measurement over the course of six to 12 months whether you’re succeeding,” Riedel said.
If you don’t see progress, there are lovely words in the bureaucratic process. You can “on-ramp” more forces or you can “off-ramp” them, meaning that because of the months of delay between your approval and actual deployment, you can decide to not deploy them. Basically, you’re not locked in.
How much does this cost? Obama asked.
We don’t know, Riedel answered. This is a review, not a budget. But to put an American soldier in Afghanistan, to pay everything including his veteran’s bill, his health insurance, take care of his family, feed him and arm him, is roughly $250,000 a year. Having an Afghan solider on the ground is roughly $12,000. And a committed, well-trained Afghan army unit knows the language, terrain and neighborhood. But remember, the United States would still have to pay for the Afghan forces because their government does not have anything near the revenue.
“The principals are in consensus on this,” Riedel said. “The vice president, however, has a different point of view,” a modified counter-terrorism strategy. But that is what the Bush administration did, and it’s how we ended up where we are today. Biden’s basic argument is that the war is not politically sustainable, Riedel said. That’s politics, and not in my purview. “Mr. President, that’s better left for you to decide.”
“Yes, that’s right,” Obama replied. “That shouldn’t be part of your writ.”
The president also had to think about how to respond to what might happen, Riedel said. For example, we’re attacked again and the address is Pakistan, what do you do about it? Obama knew about the retribution plan against Pakistan, to bomb more than 150 sites linked to al Qaeda and other groups. But, Riedel said, problem two, Pakistan’s internal situation continues to deteriorate and you get a jihadist government there. What do you do?
Third bad thing. Pakistan attacks India again, either directly or indirectly, Mumbai redux. What are we going to say to the Indians this time? We admire your Gandhi-like self-restraint? I think we’ve probably reached the threshold in India, Riedel said. The next attack will get a military response. And that means you’re talking about the potential for nuclear war.
Another problem would be responsibility for the next attack, which Riedel said he wanted to underscore again. We simply don’t know enough about al Qaeda. There are dimensions, capabilities or quirks we don’t understand. Al Qaeda may be more formidable than we think.
And when it came to Pakistan, Riedel said bluntly, the president and his team should not rely on Admiral Mullen’s latest conversation with General Kayani. At best, it would be half the story.
To summarize, Riedel said that they would have to change the strategic direction of Pakistan. Making the necessary kind of strategic change in any country would be difficult, but particularly with Pakistan.
“That is not something you do in two years,” Riedel said. “It may take two decades. It may not be possible.” This was an extraordinary—and chilling—prospect.
When Air Force One landed at the Costa Mesa County Fairground, Obama and Riedel were still talking. Obama put on his jacket to greet the crowd of 1,300.
Taping The Tonight Show that afternoon, Obama told Jay Leno that he had picked the University of North Carolina to win the NCAA basketball tournament known as March Madness.
“Isn’t that a swing state?” Leno teased.
“Complete coincidence,” Obama said. “Absolutely.”
There was no hint in Obama’s demeanor that he had just received a devastating analysis of the threats against the U.S., a warning that al Qaeda was as dangerous as it had been on September 10, 2001.
At one point during their time in Southern California, Axelrod explained to Riedel why Obama went with UNC in his bracket. North Carolina, which Obama had carried in the presidential election, was normally a swing state, so he wanted a team from that state to win. Supporting Duke University would have been too blue, an appeal to the Democratic base. UNC, however, could be seen as more red, a way to reach Republicans.
The former CIA agent could not tell if Axelrod was joking. Politics was not Riedel’s writ. On the way back from California, Obama, Axelrod and Riedel watched nearly five hours of the college basketball tournament.
Later, the president confirmed that Pakistan would have to be the centerpiece of any new strategy. “Bruce felt very strongly, as I did,” he told me, “that we had to have a serious heart-to-heart with Pakistani civilian, military and intelligence leaders.”
“And it continues to this day, does it not?” I asked on July 10, 2010, more than a year after Riedel briefed the president.
“It continues to this day,” Obama said.
• • •
The National Security Council met with the president on March 20 to review the Riedel strategy. Everyone was now familiar with it, and they discussed Biden’s argument that the war was politically unsustainable.
“I think I have two years with the public on this,” Obama said. “They’ll stand by us for two years. That’s my window.”
Gates said that the Afghan National Army and National Police would be the key—increasing their numbers, their training
, professionalism and commitment. “That’s our ticket out.”
“I think the die is cast,” Biden said. With his dissent noted, he would support the president’s decision. “We’ve pretty much reached agreement with how to go forward. I have some concerns about it, but the die is cast.”
“I think this is right,” Obama said. “I’m in general accord with it.” But he indicated it was not a done deal. “I’m going to think about it a little bit more and I will get back to you.” Nonetheless, the die was cast. And unlike the deployment announced in February, this would have to be explained to the American public.
11
In the overcast night, General Petraeus hurried along the sidewalks of Washington’s Georgetown neighborhood. His spartan frame looked smaller in real life than in photographs.
The general’s fame evolved from a strategy in which soldiers lived as the locals did, no matter the squalor, danger or—in the case of Washington—luxury. He had a dinner reservation and a draft of Obama’s planned speech on the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy.
There was some dissonance between the speech and the Riedel strategy review it was based on. The review’s first recommendation on page 19 was to put a “fully resourced” counterinsurgency into Afghanistan. The president’s draft gave scant attention to that and, ominously, the word “counterinsurgency” was not mentioned.
This concerned Petraeus. Some thought the general was trans-fixed by his protect-the-people counterinsurgency success in Iraq. But Petraeus was aware of his infatuation. He worried about becoming the victim of his previous triumph. It was possible a counterinsurgency could be the wrong track for Afghanistan.
“I’ve looked very hard at that,” he had told some of his staff. “That is something that can have you spring awake in an early hour of the morning, that you turn over a thousand different ways when you’re running.” Petraeus had assigned a “red team”—groups of intelligence and operations experts who developed the contrarian view—to study the issue.
