by Bob Woodward
Lute wondered why the president did not pursue things further by asking McChrystal to compare all the ink spots to the population density. And to ask questions like, Why do you have all this blue on this map? Why do I need to buy all this? Why are some areas along the Pakistani border not blue?
Biden began a cross-examination. “As I hear what you’re saying, as I read your report, you’re saying that we have about a year,” he said. “And that our success relies upon having a reliable, a strong partner in governance to make this work?”
Yes, sir, McChrystal said.
Biden then addressed Karl Eikenberry, the retired three-star general who was ambassador to Afghanistan and appearing by videoconference. He had graduated from West Point a year before Petraeus. Fluent in Chinese, he had a hard-charging reputation. Serving under him was like an apprenticeship with a pirate captain, according to former junior officers. Eikenberry had served as the military commander in Afghanistan for 18 months from 2005 to 2007. Obama picked him to become ambassador the previous January, despite the rarity of having a retired general in the post.
Instead of calling Eikenberry “Ambassador,” the vice president said, “General, in your estimation, can we, can that be achieved in the next year?”
No, sir, Eikenberry said, because that kind of reliable, strong partner did not exist in Afghanistan.
Eikenberry gave a pessimistic 10-minute summary of his views. He agreed with the assessment that the situation was deteriorating and more resources were needed, but a counterinsurgency strategy was too ambitious and would edge into nation building—a massive undertaking that could be a dramatic overreach.
In counterinsurgency, he said, “We talk about clear, hold and build, but we actually must include transfer into this,” Eikenberry said. The “transfer” was how the U.S. would get out and that required a reliable partner, which was not currently the case.
Are we aligned with the Kabul government? he asked. We assume yes. “I would challenge that assumption,” he said. They were severely hindered by Karzai’s weakness as president, the absence of a strong central government.
“Right now we’re dealing with an extraordinarily corrupt government.” All this, he added, is “depressing and discouraging.” The Kabul mansions belonging to senior Afghan officials had only become more ornate since he had last been in the country as the military commander.
There are limits on what we can do in dealing with corruption, he said. They had to be realistic.
“The Afghans think we’re there because we have to be there, so they don’t have to pay attention to what we want them to do,” the ambassador said. He had almost said it was hopeless.
He said they had to think through the political and psychological implications in neighboring Iran and Pakistan of adding more troops into Afghanistan.
“Before looking at resources,” Gates said, “we’ve gotten ourselves wrapped around three options.” There was: 1. Counterinsurgency, which has come to mean nation building; 2. counterterrorism, which people think means missiles coming from a ship in the ocean; and 3. the counterterrorism plus proposed by the vice president. There obviously are more than these options, Gates said.
The goals that we have set out were right but, “we frame this in a way that is too ambitious.” The objective that we have is right—defeating the Taliban. But then, “What do we mean by defeating the Taliban?”
Gates was elaborating on the box McChrystal had added to his slide about the U.S. goals in Afghanistan.
“The Taliban will probably be an element of the political fabric going forward,” Gates said. “On the security side, we have to deny the Taliban the ability to hold ‘consequential lands and territory.’” Especially, in the south and east of Afghanistan.
A key was denying the Taliban access to cities and driving down violence to a point where the Afghan National Security Forces can handle it.
“We need to redefine the goal,” Gates said. “Not to destroy the Taliban—that sets a bar we probably can’t achieve.” He was retreating from his insistence in the implementation plan that summer that they “defeat” the insurgency.
The U.S. has probably been trying for more than is achievable, Gates said. Good governance is contrary to Afghan history, so the focus should instead be individual ministries that matter. He offered his opinion of Karzai’s government, “This group is way beyond the pale in terms of corruption.
“We’ve talked the talk on corruption, but we’ve never exercised serious leverage.” Once the election is resolved, the U.S. should be willing to hold back on funds.
“We need a new compact that says there won’t be one dollar that will go to a corrupt minister, but we’ll support those who do the right thing,” Gates said.
The secretary of defense recapped. They needed to reframe an alternative to counterinsurgency or counterterrorism. Any final strategic plan should deny the Taliban the ability to occupy and control territory—his new standard—but facilitate the reintegration of the Taliban with the government and improve governance.
As usual, Petraeus had written out a summary of what he wanted to say before the meeting—all aimed to illustrate the dire situation and underscore the urgent need for adding forces.
He seconded Gates, “We’re not going to defeat the Taliban,” but we do need to deny them access to key population areas and lines of communication to “contain” them.
“If we don’t reverse the downward spiral on security, we will enter a security death spiral as we had in Iraq.
“We learned in Iraq”—muted groans from some—“that as violence gets worse, first the local police and then other forces become increasingly challenged.”
Security, which he felt had not been fully explained, was the cornerstone for all other progress in Afghanistan. Without it not only would advancing the Afghan security forces be impossible, but the development of local governance and the reintegration of reconcilables would be highly unlikely. People were too afraid with all the killings and bombings to take the necessary steps, finding it easier instead to submit to the Taliban shadow governments.
“I can understand the reluctance to commit more forces until the political situation in Kabul is sorted out,” Petraeus said, “but time is of the essence. We have to break the Taliban momentum and regain the initiative.”
He pulled out all the stops. “This is important, not just physically, but morally as well. Struggles like these are contests of will. I do think the objectives that we have discussed are important, not just for Afghanistan but for the region, NATO and the United States. And I would contend that we recognize that we don’t know how long it will take to sort out the political situation and need to be sober about that fact, as Karl has noted.
“I understand the government is a criminal syndicate,” he said. “But we need to help achieve and improve security and, as noted, regain the initiative and turn some recent tactical gains into operational momentum. I strongly agree with Stan’s assessment and recommendation, albeit with some clarification,” about the Taliban. “Secretary Gates will provide my formal comments with the chairman and JCS endorsement early next week.”
Biden broke in for a question. “If the government’s a criminal syndicate a year from now, how will troops make a difference?”
No one recorded an answer in their notes. Biden was swinging hard at McChrystal, Gates and Petraeus.
“What’s the best-guess estimate for getting things headed in the right direction?” he asked. “If a year from now there is no demonstrable progress in governance, what do we do?”
No answer.
Biden tried again. “If the government doesn’t improve and if you get the troops, in a year, what would be the impact?”
“The past five years are not heartening,” Eikenberry answered, “but there are pockets of progress. We can build on those.” For the next six to 12 months, he said, “We shouldn’t expect significant breakthroughs.”
Biden admired Eikenberry and privately showered him with his hi
ghest accolade, “a goddamned stand-up guy.”
19
It was the secretary of state’s turn at the October 9 meeting. “Mr. President,” Clinton began, “the dilemma you face …”
On the back bench, press secretary Gibbs noted that she said “you” as if there was only one person in the boat and she and the others were at a pleasant distance. To Gibbs, it seemed as though Clinton was opining from afar. Memories of the vicious scrap and deep hostility from the Democratic presidential primaries lingered inside the White House, at least for former campaign aides like Gibbs and Axelrod.
Clinton’s use of “you” also floored Holbrooke, since she should have said “we” to underscore and even trumpet her team-player status. Holbrooke suspected the Obamaites would recognize the “you” as distancing on the part of the secretary of state. He held his tongue as Clinton spoke, because interrupting her would be unforgivable when she was in full flower like this. It was “a Freudian giveaway,” Holbrooke later told others. The only question was whether it was conscious or not. Whatever it was, he thought Clinton felt detached from both the policy and the process. And the more hawkish her position, the more she came under suspicion from White House staffers loyal to the president.
The “you” was a formulation used by others. And it was a matter of fact that the decision was Obama’s, so the word was correct. But Gibbs’s and Holbrooke’s reactions revealed how raw the emotions were running.
Clinton said the dilemma was which should come first—more troops or better governance? “But not putting troops in guarantees we won’t achieve what we’re after and guarantees no psychological momentum. Preventing collapse requires more troops, but that doesn’t guarantee progress.”
She tipped her hand further. Afghans had to feel safe before their governance could improve. It was the same logic as Petraeus’s argument that she had seemed to challenge in earlier meetings. Obama “must move on more troops.
“In the absence of a troop commitment, can we achieve our goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan?” she asked. Answering her own question, Clinton said, “The only way to get governance changes is to add troops, but there’s still no guarantee that it will work.”
Clinton then rattled off the reasons why there was no guarantee. If there is a troop commitment, what size? How to coordinate with Pakistan? How to support reintegration and how to conduct partnering? What’s the most effective way forward with the Afghan leadership?
“These are all difficult, unsatisfactory options,” she said. “We do have a national security interest in ensuring the Taliban doesn’t defeat us. The same with destroying al Qaeda, which would be difficult without Afghanistan. It’s an extremely difficult decision, but the options are limited unless we commit and gain the psychological advantage.”
Admiral Mullen echoed the other hawkish comments, saying that Secretary Gates’s reframing of the objectives was correct. “Security is achievable, but time does matter.” In his opinion, the training of a 240,000-man Afghan army in “three to five years is reasonable.”
“Possibly we’ll see by the end of next year if this will work,” Mullen added. “The urgency is there. Psychologically, this is huge. NATO’s commitment and future are in the balance.”
• • •
DNI Dennis Blair suggested that domestic politics might be a problem. It would be tough because of casualties, he said. Last month had been tough—40 killed, double the rate of the year before.
“Will this be worth it?” he asked. “The answer is, people will support it as long as they think we’re making progress.” For the first time, the president would have a strategy developed by his full war cabinet, and we’ll be able to tell the American people what we’re doing, he said.
What they could not do, CIA Director Panetta said, is accept the status quo. “You can’t leave.” And, he agreed, “You can’t defeat the Taliban.” They were not talking about a Jeffersonian democracy in Afghanistan, said Panetta, who saw this as a basis for narrowing the American mission and accepting Karzai despite his flaws.
“That leaves you to a targeted mission: to battle against al Qaeda, ensuring no safe havens,” Panetta said.
We have to work with Karzai, he went on, sounding like Karzai’s case officer. The CIA had been in alliance with the Karzai family for more than eight years. A narrower mission still meant securing population centers and pursuing the Taliban. They had to continue targeting Taliban leaders, he said. But the major question was: “Within one year, can we turn the momentum around?”
Susan Rice, the ambassador to the United Nations, spoke next. A former Rhodes Scholar who was a top Obama foreign policy adviser during the 2008 campaign, Rice had been something of a prodigy in Bill Clinton’s administration, serving at 33 years old as the assistant secretary of state for African affairs.
“I have not made a decision yet personally,” Rice said. She believed improved security in Afghanistan was necessary to defeat al Qaeda, since the relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban was intertwined and the two groups couldn’t be separated.
Rice drew attention to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, which had a minimal U.S. and NATO presence in the McChrystal plan. There are possible safe havens there, she said.
More actions were needed against corruption, “including possibly Karzai’s brother,” she continued. While others had stressed security, Rice believed that the U.S. strategy should emphasize an anti-corruption campaign.
“If the government removes the worst actors, then our investment may yield dividends.”
The president picked up on the problem with the bubbles on McChrystal’s map. At one point, he noted that the blots didn’t encompass all of the country. Other than a few bubbles, their locations were not necessarily connected to where Afghans lived. One hugged the Iranian border to the west. Based on the counterinsurgency manual ratio of one member of the security force for every 40 to 50 people, Obama noted that would require a total U.S., NATO and Afghan security force of 500,000 to 600,000 to be at Iraq levels.
“Sir,” Petraeus said, holding both his hands high in the air like it was a stickup, “I’m not out there telling people this is like Iraq.”
But the president had made a dispiriting observation for the COIN-istas. These numbers were not in the realm of the possible. Petraeus’s major concern was that this would be a rationale for shortchanging any counterinsurgency strategy.
Stan’s recommendations, Holbrooke said, are good for one country dealing with one issue. You were given the task of Afghanistan, he addressed McChrystal, but your responsibility ends at the border. The resource request did not take into account Pakistan or terrorists coming into Afghanistan from Pakistan.
“If I were fully convinced that there were no other questions, this would be a good request,” Holbrooke said. “But I have concerns.” He noted that General Pasha, Pakistan’s intelligence chief, explicitly opposed having more American troops in Afghanistan.
The two weakest links were corruption and the Afghan police. “Our presence is the corrupting force,” Holbrooke announced. All the contractors for development projects pay the Taliban for protection and use of the roads, so American and coalition dollars help finance the Taliban. And with more development, higher traffic on roads, and more troops, the Taliban would make more money.
He expanded on his concerns about the Afghan police. Over the next three years, the training command planned to grow the Afghan forces to 400,000—160,000 policemen and 240,000 soldiers. Holbrooke felt the police numbers were phony and getting phonier, so he had dispatched some of his staff to Afghanistan to look into things. About 80 percent of the Afghan police force was illiterate. Drug addiction was common. And many police were “ghosts” who cashed paychecks but never showed for duty.
Holbrooke opened one of the briefing folders that had been passed out to everyone before the meeting. He pulled out the documents from McChrystal about the Afghan police.
The yearly attrition rate was more than 25 perce
nt, a figure that exceeded the number of new recruits. With the recruitment levels McChrystal projected, the size of the police force of roughly 80,000 would actually shrink. Doubling it to 160,000 would be mathematically impossible.
“It’s like pouring water into a bucket with a hole in it,” Holbrooke said.
“Richard,” McChrystal answered, “you’re absolutely right. And that’s why we have to lower the attrition rate.”
Holbrooke said that in 2006 he had visited a police center in the western Afghan city of Herat. Two months ago, he returned to the same center. Though everyone said it was much better, he found it hadn’t changed at all.
“The police are the weak link,” he said, and the Afghan policy was only as good as its weakest link.
The muddle on the Afghan presidential elections, Holbrooke said, has hurt U.S. credibility. Almost two months after the vote, Afghans had yet to see final certified results.
Yes, he said, we need more troops. The question was how many and how to use them. We need a significant increase in training personnel, but more forces may result in more dependency.
Like the others, Holbrooke was heavy on diagnosis but light on solutions. Several note takers had learned to do the same thing when Holbrooke embarked on his discourses. They set down their pens and relaxed their tired fingers. The big personality had lost its sheen. He was not connecting with Obama.
“What are we trying to achieve?” asked John Brennan, 55, the deputy for counterterrorism and a former CIA operative who had spent most of his career on Middle Eastern countries. “The security decisions here will be in play in other areas too.”
Brennan’s head, as well as Blair’s and Panetta’s, would be on a pike if there was another successful terrorist attack in the United States. Stopping that attack was his main concern and the focus of his professional life.
Why are we contemplating this in Afghanistan? Brennan asked. He could not realistically envision a fix.
