Down below with the repair parties, Lieutenant Peyton-Jones felt the increase in speed and made his way up to the gunnery transmission station below the bridge and wheelhouse. As he arrived there was a heavy explosion and the ship shuddered from what must have been a direct hit. Going out on deck he could see no immediate signs of damage, but as he made for the bridge he was met by a white-faced young seaman sent to fetch him. Arriving first at the wheelhouse, he could see that the hit must have been to the bridge above, as the deckhead now bulged ominously downwards. In the wheelhouse, Coxswain Daniel Hall endeavoured to revive two telegraphsmen who lay wounded and in shock beside him. As the usual way up to the bridge had been wrecked, Peyton-Jones stepped out onto the port Oerlikon platform and clambered up the remains of an outside ladder. The bridge was a shambles of blackened twisted metal, with the remains of a few recognisable objects sticking grotesquely out of the wreckage. Where the compass platform had been, Lieutenant-Commander Johns, the officers, signalmen, lookouts and asdic operators who had been standing there were all killed, their remains ‘mercifully unrecognisable’. Farther to the rear of the bridge the damage was less severe, but yet more bodies, some dead some wounded, lay scattered about. Yeoman Albert Taylor stumbled forward, dazed and in shock, but still able haltingly to tell Lieutenant Peyton-Jones of the recent exchange of signals with Obedient. However, a more immediate problem than the tactical situation intervened. In response to the last orders given, Achates steamed at 28 knots, circling to starboard under 20 degrees of wheel and with a consequent 20 degree list to port. The only way to communicate with the wheelhouse below was through a jagged hole in the deck and Peyton-Jones shouted to Hall to put the wheel amidships. He was much relieved to receive the coxwain’s reply that the steering appeared to be undamaged. The destroyer slowly came around to a south-easterly course, and the heel to port decreased. The engine-room telegraph was not working however, and orders had to be passed down by word of mouth.[95]
As Lieutenant Peyton-Jones attempted to take stock of the situation shells exploded on either side of the destroyer, sending columns of water mushrooming skywards as Hipper tried once more to finish the job she had started that morning. Word was sent to the only gun now working, the aft main turret, to open fire, but the message never arrived, the messenger almost certainly having been killed en route. The view from the shattered remains of the bridge was severely restricted by thick smoke belching from a cordite fire which had broken out on ‘B’ gundeck immediately forward, so Peyton-Jones could only guess at who and where Achates’ adversary might be. Shouting down to the wheelhouse for a sharp turn to port the first lieutenant heard and felt another loud explosion as the ship suffered another direct hit, while two near misses sent yet more shell fragments searing through her side. However as the destroyer came around into the wind, heavy seas shipped over the forecastle put out the fire on ‘B’ gundeck and, better able to see, Peyton-Jones peered toward the horizon for the next ripple of gun flashes. When they came he was relieved to see that Hipper was no longer firing at them.[96]
With Yeoman Taylor’s help he was able to establish Achates’ position. In the half-light Rhododendron, Hyderabad, and Northern Gem were just discernable shepherding the convoy southward. Away to the north-east a faster group, which it was assumed were the British destroyers, could just be made out, while to the north gunflashes still lit up the horizon. The tactical situation now was far from clear, but it did appear that whatever threat there was lay to the north; consequently Peyton-Jones decided to ignore his earlier orders to join Onslow, instead maintaining position astern of the convoy to recommence laying smoke – the only defence Achates was now in any condition to give to the merchantmen. As the black clouds rolled once more from the funnel, he conned the ship onto a broad weave across the stern of the convoy.[97]
CHAPTER 6
‘STEER FOR THE SOUND OF THE GUNS’
At 11.15 Kapitän zur See Stange altered course eastwards to 090° to take Lützow away from the snow squall, and out of the smokescreen laid by the convoy escorts. Gun flashes from Hipper’s engagement with Achates could be seen in the distance port side astern, and as there appeared to be no prospect of anything approaching a clear target in his present position, Stange made the decision to come around full circle, set course to link up with Hipper and attack in concert with the flagship. Starting at 11.26 Stange made his turn to starboard, subsequently increasing speed to 24 knots as he returned to the north-west.[98]
Shadowing Lützow in all these manoeuvres, the British destroyers Obedient, Obdurate and Orwell kept themselves between their menacing opponent and the convoy. It was now the turn of Obedient to find herself the target of accurate fire, Commander Kinloch initially being under the impression that Lützow had opened on her. It was, however, the ever-present Admiral Hipper away to the north-east. Having finished with Achates she shifted her fire, and at a range of 8500 yards (7760 m) straddled Obedient, putting the destroyer’s wireless out of action and obliging Commander Kinloch to hand over direction (but not overall command) of the destroyers to Lieutenant-Commander Sclater of Obdurate.
Still wary of torpedo attack, Hipper altered away to starboard, coming on to course 360° (due north), Kummetz intending to come around shortly to drive on the convoy again. At 11.32, on the submarine frequency, the Vice-Admiral signalled to Narvik: ‘Battle with protection forces. No cruisers with the convoy.’[99]
Conforming to instructions laid down by Captain Sherbrooke, as the range opened to Hipper the British destroyers altered to port to close on the convoy, (see map, p. 74).[100]
—♦—
The battle had not gone entirely as Vice-Admiral Kummetz had planned, but this was probably not unexpected given the poor light and complications with the weather, which must have been anticipated. Nevertheless, with the time at just after 11.30 the two powerful German squadrons were undamaged, and coming together to brush the three British destroyers remaining in action aside and fall upon the merchant ships of the convoy.
—♦—
Command in battle is inevitably a highly complex affair, but there is one principle to which British armed forces are expected unfailingly to adhere, a principle designed to clarify any and all situations which might arise – ‘When in doubt, steer for the sound of the guns.’
Having left the mystery echo behind, Rear-Admiral Burnett with Force ‘R’ now put this principle into operation with a vengeance. Heading due south at 31 knots, by 10.30 it was evident from continuing gunflashes on the horizon that a sustained engagement was in progress. At this time an RDF contact was obtained on a vessel larger than a destroyer, faster than a merchant vessel, and therefore necessarily an enemy. This contact, bearing 180°, was followed shortly by contact with another large vessel bearing 140°, distance 30,000 yards (27,432 m). Rear-Admiral Burnett altered to port to track the targets, and at 10.54 when the second contact made a turn to the south-east, he altered to conform. As the second target appeared to be moving away from the scene, and the original target was in action and firing to the eastward, at 11.12 Rear-Admiral Burnett altered course to 190°, directly toward this engagement.[101] As observers on the rapidly approaching British cruisers attempted to identify their target, at 11.28 the big warship altered to starboard, presenting her broadside to them. Most observers in Force ‘R’ believed they were closing on Lützow, though it was in fact Admiral Hipper turning away from her attack on Obedient. (This incorrect identification is not too difficult to understand given the poor visibility, augmented perhaps by the fact that the cruiser Hipper was physically the larger of the two German heavy ships present, despite Lützow being the more powerful pocket battleship type.) At 11.30 Force ‘R’ also made a turn to starboard, and a minute or so later, at a range of 16,000 yards, (14,630 m), Captain Storey gave the order and Sheffield opened fire, followed rapidly by Jamaica.[102]
—♦—
Midshipman Hutton, aboard Jamaica, heard the alarm sound with what seemed to be ‘extra urgency’ at 9
.10 that morning. Dashing to the bridge he found the captain, navigating officer and others already at their posts in their anti-flash gear and tin hats. At his action station were massive pairs of binoculars, one mounted either side of the bridge, with pointers indicating to the director control tower any specific target which the captain wished to engage – ‘a rather antiquated concept, but wonderful for seeing what was going on’.
As Jamaica raced along in line astern of Sheffield the young midshipman could not help but find the situation thrilling, while at the same time being aware that only a sketchy idea was to be had of what the two cruisers were speeding into. As Force ‘R’ rapidly closed on its target, Midshipman Hutton spotted the menacing shape of Admiral Hipper slide out of the Arctic gloom at 10,000 yards (9144 m) distance, and almost immediately they were in action: ‘We were able to engage her before she became aware of the two British cruisers. Good old fashioned stuff, the flash of our guns and within the relevant time of flight, one hoped the glow from a hit.’ As Hipper and Force ‘R’ continued around on their turn to starboard, he recalled: ‘our hurtling across Hipper’s bow, and she seemed massive bearing down on us at what was now about nine thousand yards [8229 m]’.[103]
The situation at 11.30 hrs (PRO. ADM. 234/369)
—♦—
On board Admiral Hipper there was consternation at this new attack. Absorbed by their engagements with the destroyers, an all-round RDF watch had not been maintained; consequently Kummetz had no idea of the British cruisers’ presence until they opened fire from his starboard quarter.
Hipper was straddled by Sheffield’s first salvo and with the second suffered a direct hit to her No. 3 boiler room. This plunging shot struck Hipper as she heeled over to port while making her starboard turn, the shell entering her starboard side some 11 ft 6 in (3.5 m) below the waterline, and below the armoured belt around her hull (see diagram, p. 77). The shell sliced through a bunker oil tank before entering and detonating in the boiler room, which caught fire and began to fill with water topped with fuel oil from the ruptured tank. Incredibly, the only fatality was Engineering Mate Gunther Walter, who received severe head injuries and drowned. Also injured was Engineering Lance Corporal Heinz Hess, who was rescued and taken to a first-aid station. The fires were brought under some measure of control with the use of Ardexin[104] fire extinguishers, but with the influx of an estimated thousand tons of sea water into the ship, the boiler room had to be shut down. This also necessitated the shutting down of the cruiser’s starboard main engine, and speed reduced to 28 knots as a consequence.
Meanwhile the engagement continued, and as Sheffield fired two further salvoes in quick succession, Hipper received two more hits, the first setting fire to her aircraft hangar amidships, the second entering her starboard side and tearing through the midship compartments causing a number of casualties, finally coming to rest against the inner wall of the hull on the port side, but incredibly failing to explode (see diagram, p. 77). Hipper returned fire but the columns of spray thrown up by near misses from Sheffield froze on contact with the instruments on her forward observation position, while the view from the rear observation position was cloaked by thick oily black smoke issuing from her funnel as a consequence of the hit to the boiler room, aggravated by smoke from the burning hangar.[105] The result was that her usually accurate salvoes were ragged and wide of the mark. Josef Schmitz, control telephone officer for heavy artillery aboard Admiral Hipper during the battle, remembered: ‘Hipper had not shot for some time due to the change in sides [she had been engaging Obedient to port before making her starboard turn]… Nevertheless the [British] cruiser’s fire was good and fast and Hipper received first hits. This threw Hipper into a state of uncertainty.’[106]
Damage to Admiral Hipper from Sheffield’s first salvoes.
(a) 6 in (152 mm) shell causes severe damage to No.3 boiler room as Hipper heels over to port (cross-section looking aft)
(b) 6 in (152 mm) shell enters starboard side, traverses midship compartments causing damage and casualties, but fails to explode (cross-section looking forward) (Diagrams reproduced with permission from Bernard & Graefe Verlag, Bonn)
For Vice-Admiral Kummetz the situation had now changed dramatically.
Hipper has been hit, the consequences of which cannot be fully assessed at the moment. Her hangar is on fire, but this is being controlled. Judging by the thick black smoke coming out of the funnel… which blocks any vision astern, it appears that the boiler has been hit. The incoming report of a blow in K3 and the breakdown of power station 3 confirm this assumption. Hipper’s ability for battle has been reduced. Time will tell the full impact of the blows. The enemy’s type of ship, which has just appeared on the scene and bombarded Hipper from the north, has not yet been identified beyond doubt. According to the kind of shooting, the closeness of the impacts and their effect, it can only be a cruiser. If this is the case I am positioned between an enemy cruiser and the convoy destroyers in the south.
I have to pull out of this unfavourable tactical situation, especially as it has become even more difficult to keep an overview of the overall situation due to the deteriorating visibility. Going down south, which would move me away from the cruiser and closer to the convoy would offer the possibility of a renewed convoy attack [but] cannot be considered due to the uncertain condition of Hipper. Neither can I release the destroyers close to Hipper to let them operate against the convoy on their own. I therefore decide to pull all armed forces to the west away from the battle area.[107]
As a result of his deliberations, at 11.37 Kummetz signalled to his squadron: ‘Break off, turn away to the west.’[108]
—♦—
Having been detached to finish off Bramble, 5th Destroyer Flotilla leader Friedrich Eckholdt, now in company with Richard Beitzen, had been attempting to rejoin Hipper from the north-east when the engagement with Force ‘R’ erupted.
Peering into the deepening gloom from Eckholdt’s bridge, Flotilla Commander Schemmel observed gunflashes and the dim shape of two warships ahead. Assuming that these were Hipper and Z29, Schemmel could not make out their target as the convoy should have been away to the south. At 11.42 he exchanged radio messages with the flagship:
‘Eckholdt to Hipper. I can see a cruiser and destroyer at 300°, is that you?’
‘Eckholdt to Hipper. In what direction to the convoy are you?’
‘Hipper to Eckholdt. North of the convoy.’
Schemmel could see no other ships in the rapidly worsening light and sent a hurried reply: ‘Eckholdt to Hipper. You are bombarding me.’
Astern of the flotilla leader the awful truth dawned, and Richard Beitzen sent a hurried message: ‘Beitzen to Eckholdt. No. It’s an English cruiser.’[109]
—♦—
With Force ‘R’ shadowing Hipper around in a turn to starboard (see map B, p. 146), an urgent report was received on Sheffield’s bridge that a destroyer had been sighted fine on the port bow, at a range of some 4000 yards (3657 m) and closing fast. Captain Storey ordered the flagship’s helm reversed hard to port, as presenting the cruiser’s beam to the destroyer would make her a sitting target for a torpedo attack. As she swung round Sheffield engaged the destroyer, now fast approaching on her starboard bow, with all arms from her main 6 in (152 mm) down to her anti-aircraft pom-poms. Paying the price for her mistaken identification of the warships ahead of her, Friedrich Eckholdt was hit by Sheffield’s first salvo, heavily damaged by the third and was down by the stern, on fire, and a complete shambles when fire was checked after the sixteenth salvo.[110] Astern of Sheffield, Jamaica engaged Richard Beitzen but the German destroyer had better luck than her flotilla leader, turning away at speed to make her escape undamaged.
—♦—
Closed up at action stations in Sheffield’s ‘A’ turret, Midshipman Twiddy could see nothing of what went on outside. As ‘phone number’, his only contact with the outside world was the telephone headset that he wore, through which came instructions from the 6
in director tower. The guns were fired automatically from the director, but the eighteen-man turret crew were responsible for loading shells and cordite, applying correct settings for training and elevation, setting fuses, and being prepared to operate all systems local to the guns should power fail or other malfunctions occur.
As Albert Twiddy recalled, the turret of a warship in battle is no place for the faint-hearted:
My vivid memories during the action are of excessive vibration as the ship was making best speed, and the acrid smell of burning cordite. The loud crashes as the bows ploughed into the heavy seas, the continuous noise of activity within the turret as the machinery for shell and cordite handling began providing the ammunition to the guns, and men in the guns crews applying themselves to the task, shouting their reports to be heard above all else that was going on. I was concentrating on listening to the orders being received through my headphones, and ensuring as best I could that I understood them, and relaying them as correctly as I knew how to those in the turret who had to obey them. I do remember well that at some point during the action when the elevation of the guns was as low, or even lower than ever I had experienced in practice and training, when the gun breeches were high enough to make the ramming of shells and cordite more difficult, the order was received to set fuses 2 at delay, and 1 at non-delay. [This enabled part of the salvo to explode immediately on contact, whereas the remainder would penetrate armour before exploding, to cause maximum damage. Fuses were in the nose of the shells and required setting manually before being loaded.]… The seriousness of the situation became apparent when the next instruction, ‘Stand by to Ram’, was given. We were just so close to the enemy that this would have been the Coup de Grâce, though how we would have fared is certainly open to conjecture… However, the order was very quickly ‘belayed’, and firing ceased temporarily. The quiet that descended was as dramatic as had been the noise, and speculation as to what had happened was rife.
Red Sky in the Morning Page 8
