The worst fire was in the petty officers’ mess under ‘B’ turret, and the heat caused fires to break out in the chief petty officers’ (CPOs’) mess just aft. This had been taken over by the surgeon lieutenant, who attended to casualties there, and in the sick bay and the sick bay flat, under extremely difficult conditions. Finally, smoke and danger of the fire spreading made conditions in the CPOs’ mess impossible, and it was decided to move all casualties aft.[126]
By 14.00 the fires were thankfully under control, and by 14.30 they were all out, but by now the ship had developed a 10° list to port. By flooding No. 7 oil tank this was reduced to 6°, but the large amount of water used to douse the fires brought it back to 10°. The forward shell room was flooded as a consequence, and the ship brought back on to an even keel. The sea was now relatively calm, and as water only entered through the hole in the torpedomen’s messdeck when the ship rolled to port, it was possible by pumping to keep the height of the water down to 2 ft (0.61 m).[127]
As a fighting unit Onslow was now of little use; her ASDIC, RDF and forward guns were all out of action, and should the weather worsen she would be in grave danger of foundering. As a consequence, Lieutenant-Commander Marchant requested that she be allowed to proceed independently to the Kola Inlet, and Commander Kinloch agreed. At 19.30 Onslow was detached and given the 20.00 course and speed of the convoy, which she was to pass to Home Fleet Operational when 50 miles (80 km) clear. She arrived at Kola at 08.30 on 1 January and proceeded to Vaenga Pier to disembark her wounded, arriving there at noon.
On receipt of reports of the action on the 31st, C-in-C Home Fleet put to sea with the battleships Howe and King George V (flagship), the cruiser Bermuda and six destroyers, in case it should prove possible to catch the German battle group at sea. He also detached Rear-Admiral Hamilton with the cruisers Kent and Berwick to cover westbound convoy RA51. The battle fleet cruised to the west of Bear Island until 3 January (see map D, p. 148), then, being sure that the threat from German surface units had passed, returned to Scapa Flow followed on the 4th by Rear-Admiral Hamilton’s cruisers.
—♦—
For the convoy, the first day of January 1943 saw them making slow progress through weather which had been deteriorating for most of the night. With heavy seas and winds approaching gale force, at around 07.30 Northern Gem, with Lieutenant Aisthorpe himself taking the helm, edged toward Obdurate’s port quarter in order to transfer the doctor from the destroyer. Both ships yawed, rolled and pitched badly, but Lieutenant Aisthorpe skilfully closed the gap to around 10 ft (3.04 m). As the decks of the two ships rose and fell, the gap widened and narrowed but, calling upon all his exceptional seamanship, Aisthorpe judged the moment to nudge the destroyer’s well-fendered side and the medical officer, Lieutenant Maurice Hood, bravely leapt the 8 ft (2.4 m) down to the trawler’s deck. The difficult and dangerous manoeuvre had taken some two hours to complete, but once below, the doctor immediately set to work. As the storm continued, both he and those assisting him had to be anchored around the waist by two men each, enabling them to keep both hands free to minister to the injured as the tiny trawler corkscrewed around in the heavy seas.[128]
At 11.00 the convoy altered course to 185°, the noon position being 71°30’ N, 38°24’ E, at which time Vizalma and Chester Valley also made a welcome reappearance. With the wind blowing a lusty force 7, Executive began to fall astern due to excessive rolling and fears for her deck cargo, but by 23.00 the wind had dropped to force 2, and course was altered to 226° for the approach to Kola. At first light on 2 January land was sighted ahead, and at 10.15 the convoy altered north-westwards to 310° for entry into the inlet. Calobre had dropped astern during the night; otherwise all merchant ships were present and accounted for. As the White Sea had not yet frozen, the convoy re-formed into three columns, the starboard column departing at 13.00 to proceed down the coast to Archangel.
Close as the convoy was to its destination, a drama or two remained to be played out. Twice during the afternoon air-raid warnings were given, although mercifully no enemy planes appeared. At 17.40 Kildin Island on the approach to Kola was sighted, and Obedient, assisted by Rhododendron, led round to starboard to join up with the pilot vessel. Almost immediately Ballot went aground, and after the rest of the convoy had been shepherded into position, Orwell was detached to try and tow her free. Despite the best efforts of the destroyer, assisted by two Russian tugs through the night, as the morning of 3 January dawned Ballot remained firmly aground. Having almost completed the hazardous journey, the twenty-year-old veteran finally had to be abandoned within sight of port; nevertheless lighters subsequently removed her invaluable cargo.
From the early hours of the morning of the 3rd Obedient, Rhododendron and Hyderabad carried out anti-submarine patrols until finally, between 05.00 and 09.00, all merchant ships except Calobre, Vermont and Pontfield entered harbour. Obedient located Vermont anchored in the Kildin Straits, and in leading her to harbour was joined by Vizalma, which had been sent to find Calobre and was escorting her in. During a morning of heightened tension caused by more air-raid warnings, Orwell finally tracked down Pontfield which had also gone aground but was refloated by a Russian tug and towed safely down the inlet.
With the ships berthed, the men who had fought them through at last had a little time to themselves. Walter Watkin visited Onslow’s injured chief stoker, whom he had stopped from sliding into the sea, and Lieutenant Peyton-Jones called in on Achates’ wounded, who had been transferred ashore. Sadly he found conditions in the hospital to be ‘primitive’; nevertheless the two Royal Navy doctors on hand, joined by Obdurate’s Lieutenant Hood, struggled to cope under difficult circumstances.
During a previous visit to Murmansk, Peyton-Jones had attempted to requisition a particularly fine pair of Arctic gloves, but his request was firmly refused by the Base Supply Officer who ruled that they were for survivors only. Now that he qualified in all respects, he was glad to be able to obtain a pair of the gloves, with temperatures capable of plunging to – 50°C.[129]
It was decided that most of Achates’ survivors, including Lieutenant Peyton-Jones, and the more seriously wounded, including Captain Sherbrooke, should be taken home as soon as possible in Obedient. The destroyer sailed from Murmansk on 11 January and arrived at Scapa Flow five days later to refuel and transfer the wounded to a hospital ship. Peyton-Jones, and those survivors from Achates who were not wounded, carried on to Leith in Obedient, where buses were waiting on the jetty to take them on the next stage of their journeys home. With his shipmates mustered on the quayside, Lieutenant Peyton-Jones said a last few words, then shook each by the hand as they filed away. Achates had been a happy ship, and it was a moving moment, the end of a commission which all the survivors would have good reason to remember.
For Midshipman Albert Twiddy in Sheffield, not yet eighteen years old, the abiding memory of this, his first action, was the burning wreck of Friedrich Eckholdt – a brief moment which brought home the stark reality of war and the death of a ship and her crew, and which has remained a vivid image in his mind ever since. No doubt echoing the thoughts of many of those on both sides who survived, he recalls the last few hours of 1942 disappearing with only the feeling that God had spared his ship, his shipmates and himself on this occasion.
CHAPTER 8
SEEING RED
At 11.45, as Sheffield switched from her attack on Hipper to engage Friedrich Eckholdt, Admiral Kluber in Narvik despatched another message to Vice-Admiral Kummetz: ‘Most immediate. Return passage at increased speed. Presence of 2 enemy cruisers in the Murmansk area confirmed. These include Jamaica’.[130]
So the German high command maintained its apparently relentless pressure to ensure that the commander at sea jumped at the sight of his own shadow. Vice-Admiral Kummetz received this message at 12.55, by which time he had already disengaged and was returning to Altenfjord, but the state of mind of the naval high command is clear, the message having been despatched while the engagement w
as still in progress. The Kriegsmarine had in action a battle group which, even separated into two squadrons, had the firepower to expect to be able to take on two light cruisers and five destroyers (which would also be separated, at least at the commencement of any action), and emerge victorious. Had the German high command been a little more aggressive they would surely have realised that they had been presented with a golden opportunity to inflict a significant defeat on their enemy’s naval forces, plus the destruction of a convoy. They could not, however, achieve these great things without expecting damage of one sort or another to their heavy ships – but this desire to avoid damage to the big ships had become an obsession with Hitler. This obsession made itself felt down through the chain of command to the extent that the message quoted above, while rightly informing the commander at sea of the presence of two enemy cruisers in his area of operations, falls just short of ordering him to abandon his assault, regardless of the situation at sea, and betrays a tone approaching panic which is entirely inappropriate to the situation.
Withdrawing westward and believing Sheffield and Jamaica still to be in hot pursuit, Kummetz opted to cancel Aurora, Lützow’s solo operation, and at 12.33 sent a message to Narvik on the submarine frequency: ‘No communication with Eckholdt. Enemy shadowers with formation. Not possible to detach Lützow.’[131]
Having despatched this message Kummetz took the understandable, but as later events were to show critical, decision to maintain complete radio silence during the return to Altenfjord due to continuing uncertainty as to the extent of Hipper’s damage and a desire not to give away the battle group’s position.[132]
As mentioned, when Sheffield’s 6 in (152 mm) shell detonated in the German flagship’s No. 3 boiler room a serious fire broke out, and tons of seawater plus fuel oil from a ruptured tank rapidly entered. As a result of the flooding, Hipper was down by the bows, and to restore her trim Second Boiler Engineer Dr (Eng.) von Pawel and Engineer Officer Fregattenkapitän (Eng.) Schafer arranged to pump fuel aft from the forepeak through oil transfer pipes which had to be laid through the steering compartment.[133]
After thirteen minutes it became necessary to shut down the boilers and abandon No. 3 boiler room, but temporary repairs were effected, the fire brought under control and the room pumped out. Despite the efforts of the damage-control parties, working in extremely difficult conditions, water and oil continued to enter and the room was again abandoned, necessitating the shutting down of the starboard main engine. At 12.18 the level of water and oil in No. 3 boiler room reached approximately 6 ft (1.83 m), and began to flood the adjacent No. 2 boiler room through leaks around the bulkhead glands for the interconnecting piping system between the two rooms. Desperate efforts were made to keep No. 2 boiler room in operation but water entered the boilers, causing cracks in the superheater tubes, and as a result fires in the boilers were extinguished, necessitating the shutting down of the port main engine – and a consequent reduction in speed to 15 knots. Engineers worked on in No. 2 boiler room and shortly after 18.00 their efforts were rewarded when sufficient pressure was raised on one boiler for speed to be increased to 18 knots, and maintained for the remainder of the voyage to Altenfjord.
The situation in the boiler rooms having been stabilised, the surrounding area was ventilated for three hours to enable those off watch to rest and get some sleep in nearby rooms. Despite the ventilation a number of crewmen suffered cramps, vomiting and shortness of breath, some coughing up a bloody foam, some becoming unconscious. Dr Martin Goeder, the ship’s medical officer, diagnosed poisoning from Ardexin fumes, which proved to be extremely persistent despite the ventilation. This may have been due to leaking storage units (although they had been thoroughly checked), damaged as a result of vibration from the shell explosion, or from the firing of Hipper’s own guns. For the affected crewmen Dr Goeder prescribed medication for blood circulation, plus oxygen to be administered as required for breathing difficulties. In a number of cases further treatment, requiring bleeding of 100 to 250 ccm, followed by the infusion of a physiological salt solution of 500 to 1000 ccm with a 100 ccm glucose solution, was used. In one case chloral hydrate as a clyster was administered, dissolved in glucose.[134]
—♦—
Narvik ordered U-boats in the battle area to search for wreckage, and in particular to attempt to locate Friedrich Eckholdt. At 18.52 U354 reported ‘heavy artillery fire’ at a distance of 10 miles (18.4 km), which, as the action was by then over, seems in all probability to have been ammunition aboard the German destroyer exploding as she tore herself apart.
At 02.45 on the morning of 1 January Kummetz received the following message from Kluber in Narvik, which gives some hint of the pressure for news of the operation emanating from much higher up the German chain of command: ‘Emergency. Request brief preliminary survey by w/t of successes and situation, even before sending short report.’[135]
Kummetz coded his reply while at sea but declined to send it until the battle group had entered Lopphavet Sound, in order not to give any clues as to which route would be used for their return. As it was, Hipper was spotted by the British submarine Graph shortly after 01.00 on the 1st, but she was too far away to make an attack (see map D, p. 148). (Some three hours later Graph reported unsuccessfully attacking two enemy destroyers, one apparently in tow of the other, although there are no indications of serious battle damage to any of the remaining five German destroyers from the Barents Sea action, and Vice-Admiral Kummetz makes no mention of any problems in his report.) By 04.10, with the battle group safely in the fjords the Vice-Admiral despatched his message:
31.12 from 0230 hours onwards 5-Fl [5th Flotilla] reconnaissance strip Qu.4196 AC to 4939, cruisers behind it. Hipper convoy 0740hrs Qu.4395 sighted. Alarm. Eckholdt contact holder. Artillery battle Hipper with guarding destroyers, in the end cruisers, at first not recognised as such though. Hipper, 3 destroyers north, Lützow, 3 destroyers south, convoy. Lützow and various destroyers also in artillery battles. Hipper damaged 3 destroyers, 1 further probably sunk. Eckholdt was hit by cruiser artillery during sinking of this destroyer. Due to difficult enemy position and onset of darkness, assistance [to Eckholdt] no longer possible without a high risk to the formation. Formation withdrawn westwards. At first enemy contact holders on both sides. Hipper suffered one full blow to K.3 from cruiser artillery. Due to overflow K.2 shut down… One blow to hangar, fire extinguished. One blind hit, personnel loss.[136]
This is a necessarily brief but accurate account of the battle; however truth and accuracy were not what was required in the fevered atmosphere of a Nazi high command which had much higher expectations.
At 19.30 on the 1st Kummetz was summoned to the telex connection to Narvik for a conversation with Admiral Kluber. The conversation opened with a quote from Narvik of a message for Kummetz which had been received from C-in-C Gruppe Nord, Admiral Karls in Kiel, and read:
To BdK and Lützow Commander.
Request an immediate detailed coherent report on Regenbogen. This is required urgently for report to a superior department. BdK to comment in detail on the battle group Lützow, especially concerning reaction, battle distance, success. Approve formation withdrawal once enemy cruiser resistance identified.[137]
There were at this point communications glitches at various stages along the German chain of command, resulting in Kummetz receiving increasingly strident requests for detailed information from several sources, including some passed via the cruiser Köln anchored nearby. After clarifying what Admiral Kluber had or had not received by way of reply, Kummetz went on to state his position again, particularly concerning reports not sent by himself as the commander at sea, and his use (or lack of use) of the battle group destroyers:
1. Initially I would like to establish that I cannot understand how the impression of a great success could arise at home. If there is no success I will not report it. It did not occur to me to specifically report that there is no success. If an impression arose as a result of a submarine co
mmander’s report stating that he saw crimson, this is not my responsibility. I could no longer correct this impression as I was in retreat [and maintaining radio silence].
2. I think one does not appreciate the difficulties connected with the task given. I had no doubts about them at any time. Experience gained during exercises and at war have shown that it takes a considerable length of time to fight down guarding armed forces, even if they are only destroyers and they act skilfully. Only on rare occasions does one succeed in getting to the steamers within a convoy before the guarding armed forces have been fought down.
3. The time which was available to me was very limited. There are virtually only two hours of rifle light [twilight] in this latitude per day… My last advance onto the convoy at approximately 11.00 hours with the Hipper and Lützow groups, in loose tactical connection with increasing darkness, already involved a risk that I could only take heavy-heartedly in view of the instructions given to me…
4. Therefore undivided attention had to be given to torpedo risk during these light conditions. I considered it to be wrong to approach closer because of torpedo risk. I slowed Hipper commander down on one occasion and approve of Lützow’s conduct during his battles.
5. It was necessary to keep the groups together, meaning the destroyers with the cruisers, as otherwise any control would have been lost. I only once managed to set the Eckholdt group on an immobilised destroyer [Bramble]. This task was taken on by Eckholdt single-handedly. He took quite some time with it. As he was about to connect he met an enemy cruiser group… It appears that he believed he had connected with Hipper whilst it was in fact English cruisers… This instantly highlights the difficulties which existed in recognising friends, enemies and types. What is more this was a very reliable, experienced and exceptionally efficient flotilla commander. It would therefore have been wrong to release the destroyers, as control would have been lost and it would have been virtually impossible to get back together…[138]
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