by Danny Orbach
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28. Both the Dutch and the Belgians refused to believe: Deutsch, Conspiracy Against Hitler, 94–98.
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29. “I have seen the man”: Reynolds, Treason Was No Crime, 207–8.
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30. His eyes were wet with tears: Hassel,Tagebücher, 127.
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9. Signs in the Darkness: Rebuilding the Conspiracy
1. “The last time we met, Hans”: Dorothy Thompson, Listen, Hans (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942), 137–38.
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2. Some of them were even bribed: Norman J. W. Goda, “Black Marks: Hitler’s Bribery of His Senior Officers During World War II,” Journal of Modern History72, no. 2 (June 2000): 413–52.
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3. “No one can deny the magnitude”: Ulrich von Hassell,Die Hassell-Tagebücher, 1938–1944: Aufzeichnungen vom anderen Deutschland, ed. Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gärtringen (Munich: Goldmann, 1994), 199.
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4. “In October 1941, an old friend of mine”: Beria to Stalin, 19.9.1944, GARF Fond R-9401, Opis 2, Del 66, pp. 297–98.
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5. “Discussing practical issues about the organization”: Ibid., p. 319.
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10. On the Wings of Thought: Networks of Imagination
1. The first proposal for an “alternative governmental structure”: For the full document, see Ulrich von Hassell,Die Hassell-Tagebücher, 1938–1944: Aufzeichnungen vom anderen Deutschland, ed. Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gärtringen (Munich: Goldmann, 1994), 305–8. For Hassell’s view of foreign policy, see p. 105, as well as his important memorandum “Germany Between West and East” (“Deutschland zwischen West und Ost”), in Gregor Schöllgen, Ulrich von Hassell, 1881–1944: Ein Konservativer in der Opposition (Munich: Beck, 1990), 207–18. For analysis, see Schöllgen, 138–54, and Peter Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat: Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler (Munich: Piper, 1985), 233–39, 261–63. A similar, though more moderate, plan had been drafted in 1939 by Beck and Groscurth. According to this plan, the future of Austria and the Sudetenland would be decided by a referendum. See Aufzeichnungen von Frau Inga Haag, Frankfurt A.M, 4.4.1948, 2, Deutsch Papers, series 3, box 2, Material on Groscurth.
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2. Goerdeler’s vision was liberal: The full document is reproduced in Wilhelm R. von Schramm, Beck und Goerdeler: Gemeinschaftsdokumente für den Frieden, 1941–1944 (Munich: Müller, 1965). For analysis, see Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat,239–46; Hans Mommsen, Alternative zu Hitler: Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Widerstandes (Munich: Beck, 2000), 159–207; and Marianne Meyer-Krahmer, Carl Goerdeler—Mut zum Widerstand: Eine Tochter erinnert sich (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitatsverlag, 1998), 222–23. For the tension between divine and earthly authorities, see Sabine Gillmann and Hans Mommsen, Politische Schriften und Briefe Carl Friedrich Goerdelers (Munich: Saur, 2003), 2:1226; and for Goerdeler’s criticism on German ultranationalism, see 2:1178.
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3. Some scholars have argued that there was no real difference: Klemens von Klemperer has skillfully criticized these radical views, while contending with the question of the perceived similarity with National Socialist ideas. See Klemens von Klemperer, “Der deutsche Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus im Lichte der konservativen Tradition,” in Demokratie und Diktatur: Geist und Gestalt politischer Herrschaft in Deutschland und Europa; Festschrift für Karl Dietrich Bracher, ed. Manfred Funke (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1987), 277.
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4. Almost all conspirators . . . agreed to liberate: Hans A. Jacobsen, ed., “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung”: Die Opposition gegen Hitler und der Staatsstreich vom 20. Juli 1944 in der SD-Berichterstattung: Geheime Dokumente aus dem ehemaligen Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1984), 1:66–67, 140–42, 147–56, 199–203.
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5. all laws enacted by the National Socialist Party: Hassell, “Programm für erste Maßnahmen bei einem Umsturz,” in Hassell, Die Hassell-Tagebücher,454.
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6. “On January 19 and 27 [1942]”: Gillmann and Mommsen, Goerdelers, 2:846–47; “Der Weg,” in Schramm, Beck und Goerdeler, 217. The emphasis is Goerdeler’s.
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7. in the prewar years even the Third Reich: The exception was Polish and Romanian Jews, as their respective countries showed little interest in protecting their Jewish citizens abroad. See Fritz Kieffer, “Carl Friedrich Goerdelers Vorschlag zur Gründung eines jüdischen Staates,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte 125 (2008): 487–88.
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8. Goerdeler never called for the expulsion of Jews: Gillmann and Mommsen, Goerdelers, 2:895–97; “Das Ziel,” in Schramm, Beck und Goerdeler, 105–7. For Christoph Dipper’s arguments, see “Der Widerstand und die Juden,” in Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus: Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler, ed. Jürgen Schmädecke and Peter Steinbach (Munich: Piper, 1985), 598–616. For critical research refuting Dipper, see Kieffer, “Carl Friedrich Goerdelers Vorschlag,” 474–500. For further evidence on the regime’s hesitancy to persecute Jews with foreign passports, even in the wake of Kristallnacht, see Nuremberg Blue (USA-261, PS-1816), 27:507, 521–23; as well as NA, T 188/226, pp. 133–60. Another important question is the correct timing of “Das Ziel” (The Goal). The study of Sabine Gillmann and Hans Mommsen, the most up-to-date and in-depth study written so far, dates it from December 1941 to January 1942 (Goerdelers, 2:873). This is also a key to contextualizing Goerdeler’s Jewish clause. His proposal to establish a Jewish state was written as a reaction to the Nazi plan to exterminate European Jewry. For the debate about dating, see Kieffer, “Carl Friedrich Goerdelers,” 475–76.
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9. “The vegetable fields and fruit orchards”: Gillmann and Mommsen, Goerdelers, 1:628, 632.
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10. “It often appeared as though the ordinary pleasure of life”: Helmuth James von Moltke, A German of the Resistance: The Last Letters of Count Helmuth James von Moltke (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), 15. Moltke was similarily described in a report of the American intelligence service OSS; see “OSS Biographical Files: Personal Data of Helmuth James Graf von Moltke, 2.11.1943,” in American Intelligence and the German Resistance to Hitler, ed. Jürgen Heideking and Christof Mauch (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press), 362–63.
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11. he did not want to find shelter abroad: Ger van Roon, Neuordnung im Widerstand: Der Kreisauer Kreis innerhalb der deutschen Widerstandsbewegung (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1967), 32, 102–6.
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12. Moltke had no illusions: See interview with Freya von Moltke in the documentary of Hava Kohav Beller, The Restless Conscience: Resistance to Hitler inside Nazi Germany, 1933–1945 (1992; Los Angeles: New Video Group, 2009), DVD.
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13. he even went to the Viennese Gestapo: Roon, Neuordnung im Widerstand, 67.
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14. His group . . . all the while maintained: Ibid., 68–74, 212–15; Fugger-Gloett to Zeller (undated), Zeller Papers, IfZ ED 88/1, p. 70.
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15. Now, the two small groups united: The Kreisau Circle was also in touch with a like-minded Bavarian group called the Augsburg Circle; see Fugger-Gloett to Zeller (undated), Zeller Papers, IfZ ED 88/1, p. 71. Fugger-Gloett maintained that Moltke was expected to be the first post-Nazi prime minister, but I was unable to find corroboration for this argument in other sources.
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16. “all laws and acts discriminating against”: Helmuth James von Moltke, “Erste Weisung an die Landesverweser,” in Roon, Neuordnung im Widerstand, 568.
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17. the Kreisau plan departed radically: The full text of the remaining segments from the Kreisau draft is reproduced in Roon, Neuordnung im Widerstand, 561–71.
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18. still their Christian idealism prevented them: Theodore S. Hamer
ow, On the Road to Wolf’s Lair: German Resistance to Hitler (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997), 367; Constantine FitzGibbon, The Shirt of Nessus (London: Cassell, 1956), 104–5.
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19. “I am not and could never be a Nazi”: Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Erich Zimmermann, eds., 20 Juli 1944 (Bonn: Berto Verlag, 1960), 173; Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:181; English translation taken from Peter Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance, 1933–1945, trans. Richard Barry (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1985), 526.
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20. “We are ready to help you to win”: Peter Hoffmann, “The Question of Western Allied Cooperation with the German Anti-Nazi Conspiracy, 1938–1944,” Historical Journal 34, no. 2 (1991): 459.
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21. It is possible that the detailed information on the atrocities: According to Gerhard Ringshausen (Hans-Alexander von Voss: Generalstabsoffizier im Widerstand, 1907–1944 [Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2008], 75–76), Witzleben initially declined to kill Hitler, pointing out that legality could not be reachieved through an illegal act and that he was a field marshal, not a murderer. However, at the same time, he silently authorized the plans to kill Hitler without being personally involved; see also Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat, 325–26; Erwin Lahousen, “Erklärung,” 1–2, 30.1.1953, Deutsch Papers, series 4, box 9, Halder Franz. Lahousen testified that among all high commanders of the Wehrmacht, Witzleben was the only one who drew practical conclusions (namely, about the need for a coup) based on the atrocities report given to him by Canaris in 1940. According to Fromm’s testimony, Witzleben remained steadfast in his belief that Germany would lose the war even at the height of the Third Reich’s military success (Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:366).
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22. Again, a coup was not . . . planned: Crome testifies that there were some preparations for a revolt, but Witzleben was skeptical about its prospects. The organization, he said, was just “too weak.” See Beria to Stalin, 19.9.1944, GARF Fond R-9401, Opis 2, Del 66, p. 317.
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23. Schwerin belonged to the tiny minority: Bengt von zur Mühlen, ed., Die Angeklagten des 20. Juli vor dem Volksgerichtshof (Berlin: Chronos, 2001), 302.
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24. Witzleben, he wrote, was like his father: Ringshausen, Hans-Alexander von Voss, 62–74.
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25. He was usually reluctant to visit the fronts: As Ringshausen writes (ibid., 75), Voss’s farewell letters, written in November 1941, are a strong indication that the assassination attempt was imminent. Considering his safe desk position in France, he had little chance to die on the front. The precise date of this assassination attempt is unclear. Some date it to early 1942, such as Ringshausen, ibid., 74–94. Hans Crome’s testimony, Beria to Stalin, GARF, pp. 312–17, dates Voss’s attempt to December 1941 but Beck’s decision to assassinate Hitler to early February 1942. Inga Haag, Groscurth’s confidante, dates the attempt to February 1942. Schwerin’s wife, by contrast, dates it to late 1940: Aufzeichnungen von Frau Inga Haag, Frankfurt A.M, 4.4.1948, 2–3, Deutsch Papers, series 3, box 2, Material on Groscurth. In any case, the sources on the 1941 plot are all hazy and confused. Juxtaposing all of them, I believe that Schwerin and Voss’s attempt was probably scheduled for late 1941, but this is only an educated guess. See “2.Teil, Fortsetzung der Befragung Professor Deutsch von Botho von Wussow [und Gräfin von Schwerin]” (undated), 8, Deutsch Papers, series 3, box 3, round 1 Material.
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26. “Who will save us?”: Hermann Kaiser,Mut zum Bekenntnis: Die geheimen Tagebücher des Hauptmanns Hermann Kaiser, 1941, 1943, ed. Peter M. Kaiser (Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2010), 127.
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27. the opposition was merely a medley of disgruntled citizens: Toivo M. Kivimäki to Marshal Mannerheim, 6.5.1942, KA, kotelo 24.
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28. In January 1942, they agreed, with Witzleben’s consent: GARF Fond R-9401, Opis 2, Del 66, p. 313.
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29. One such list proposed Witzleben: Ibid.
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11. Brokers on the Front Line: The New Strategy
1. “In 1939 the Reich government sought”: Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, 1918–1945 (Baden-Baden: Impr. Nationale, 1950–95), 2:2, 887–89.
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2. “I believe . . . that we are talking about war”: “Beceda Narkoma Inostrantsih Del SSSR V. M. Molotova s Posolom Germanii v SSSR F. Shulenbergom,” in Rossia XX Vek: Dokumenti, 1941 God v 2-x Knigah, ed. A. N. Yakovlev et al. (Moscow: Mezhdunarodniy Fond “Demokratiya,” 1998), 2:432.
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3. The broker’s job is to bridge remote groups: The most important measure for an actor’s function as a broker is his or her “betweenness,” defined as “the extent to which a particular point [actor] lies between the various other points in the graph.” In practice, the meaning of “betweenness” is “the extent to which an agent can play the part of a ‘broker’ or ‘gatekeeper’ with a potential of control over others.” See John Scott, Social Network Analysis: A Handbook (London: SAGE, 2009), 86–87. A UCINET analysis in March 2012 of German resistance networks, based on the connections described in the primary sources and the memoir literature, shows that in-betweenness, Schlabrendorff and Kaiser were leading by far (59.13 and 29.374, respectively), followed by the two leaders Beck and Goerdeler (14.995 each), Tresckow (13.554), and Oster (13.551).
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4. Under the pretext of frequent work trips: Hermann Kaiser, Mut zum Bekenntnis: Die geheimen Tagebücher des Hauptmanns Hermann Kaiser, 1941, 1943, ed. Peter M. Kaiser (Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2010), 347.
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5. Kaiser was not only a liaison: Ibid., 20.11.1941, p. 312.
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6. he had access to a generous supply: Ibid., 42.
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7. “As an enthusiastic idealist and devout Christian”: Friedrich Meinecke, Die deutsche Katastrophe: Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen (Wiesbaden: Brockhaus, 1946), 144–46.
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8. Later, he was disgusted by atrocities: Kaiser,Mut zum Bekenntnis, 230, 269, 452.
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9. “not one day is to be lost”: Ibid., 91–92, 266–69. Like many others, Beck is mentioned in Kaiser’s diary under several code names, including Generaloberst von v.d. RhH and Generoberst X. However, at the end of the entry, he is mentioned as B., and his quoted words are similar to, almost verbatim, Beck’s famous memoranda from summer 1938. These clues, probably, led Ger van Roon to argue that RhH is the code name for Beck. See Ger van Roon, “Hermann Kaiser und der deutsche Widerstand,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 24, no. 3 (July 1976): 267.
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10. an implacable enemy of Hitler: Tresckow had abandoned his opposition to Hitler after the occupation of France. He wrote to an acquaintance, Luise Jodl, that all of his doubts were now gone as a result of the “astounding achievements” and the high hopes for a favorable peace. However, Hitler’s failure to obtain a peace agreement and the German mistreatment of the French had quickly turned him back into an anti-Nazi. As for the Jewish question, Tresckow opposed not only violence against the Jews but also the “legal” anti-Semitism of the Nuremberg Laws. For testimonies about his motives, see Margarethe von Hardenberg (Oven) to Bodo Scheurig (interview, 2.5.1969), Luise Jodl (undated), Fabian von Schlabrendorff (interview, 17.6.1967), Schmidtke to Hesse, 21.3.1966, Erika von Tresckow (interview, 1.5.1969), Scheurig Papers, IfZ ZS/A 0031-2, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_02.pdf, pp.165, 209–12; ZS/A 0031-3, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_03.pdf, pp. 75, 93, 136–37.
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11. “A leader one would wish to have”: Peter von der Groeber to Bodo Scheurig (interview, 4.6.1970), Scheurig Papers, IfZ ZS/A 0031-2, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_02.pdf, p. 149; “Henning von Tresckow—Beurteilung,” March 1944, BA-MA BAarch PERS 6/1980.
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12. “He had a personality that simply bowled you over”: Dorothee von Meding, Courageous Hearts: Women and the Anti-Hitler Plot of 1944, trans. Michael Balfour and Volker R. Berghahn (Providence, R.I.: Berghahn Books, 1997), 60–61.
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13. He promised Schlabrendorff: Fabian von Schlabrendorff, The Secret War Against Hitler, trans. Hilda Simon (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 135. Compare with Kurt von Hesse to Bodo Scheurig (interview, 12.10.1969), Scheurig Papers, IfZ ZS/A 0031-2, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_02.pdf, p. 183.
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14. “one of National Socialism’s natural enemies”: Schlabrendorff, Secret War Against Hitler, 123. See also Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff, “History of the Attempt on Hitler’s Life (20 Jul. 1944),” Historical Division Headquarters, United States Army Europe, Foreign Military Studies Branch, USAMHI D739, D6713 No.A-855 Fgn Ms, 9.
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15. “a synthesis of duty and freedom”: The quote is taken from a speech given by Tresckow in the confirmation ceremony of his sons, their official admission into the Protestant church. For the full text of the speech, see Sigrid Grabner and Hendrik Röder, eds., Ich bin der ich war: Henning von Tresckow; Texte und Dokumente (Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2001), 52.
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16. “The German army attacking Russia”: Ibid., 42; Gersdorff, “History of the Attempt,” 5.
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17. “We, the younger people, respected and revered”: Eberhard von Breitenbuch, “Erinnerungen an Generalmajor von Tresckow,” Scheurig Papers, IfZ ZS/A 0031-2, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_02.pdf, p. 54.
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18. The group liked to shut themselves up: Alexander Stahlberg, Die verdammte Pflicht (Berlin: Ullstein, 1988), 220–24. Compare with Albrecht Eggert to Bodo Scheurig (interview, 7.10.1968), Scheurig Papers, IfZ ZS/A 0031-2, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_02.pdf, p. 82.
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12. War of Extermination: The Conspirators and the Holocaust
