42. Ralph Peters, “Blood Borders: How a Better Middle East Would Look,” Armed Forces Journal, June 2006.
43. Author interview with senior Afghanistan government official, Kabul, Afghanistan, September 2006.
44. Pakistani officials frequently denied this assertion. As one Pakistani senator noted in testimony before Pakistan’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “Pakistan has arrested over 500 Taliban this year from Quetta and 400 of them have been handed over to Afghans.” Pakistan Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations, Report 13 (Islamabad: Pakistan Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 2007), p. 38.
45. Author interview with Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin, August 27, 2008.
46. Author interview with Richard Armitage, October 17, 2007.
47. Author interview with Robert Grenier, November 6, 2007.
48. Joint Paper by the Government of Afghanistan, UNAMA, CFC-A, ISAF, Canada, Netherlands, UK, and U.S. Governments, Assessment of Factors Contributing to Insecurity in Afghanistan (Kabul: Government of Afghanistan, 2006), p. 1.
49. See, for example, “Al Jazeera Airs Hikmatyar Video,” Al Jazeera TV, May 4, 2006.
50. Amrullah Saleh, Strategy of Insurgents and Terrorists in Afghanistan (Kabul: National Directorate of Security, 2006), p. 2.
51. European Union and UNAMA, Discussion of Taliban and Insurgency, p. 2.
52. Mahomed Ali Jinnah, Quaid-i-Azam Mahomed Ali Jinnah: Speeches as Governor-General of Pakistan, 1947–1948 (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1960), p. 133.
53. Dossiers of Rebel Field Commanders, date unknown. Released by the Cold War International History Project.
54. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), pp. 201–3.
55. Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB (New York: Random House, 2003), p. 289.
56. On Pakistan raids against Haqqani, see Iqbal Khattak, “40 Militants Killed in North Waziristan,” Daily Times (Pakistan), September 30, 2005; “Pakistani Law Enforcers Intensify Hunt for Haqqani,” Pajhwok Afghan News, March 7, 2006. On Haqqani’s historical role, also see Charles Dunbar, “Afghanistan in 1986: The Balance Endures,” Asian Survey, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 127–42.
57. Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 131, 167, 202.
58. European Union and UNAMA, Discussion of Taliban and Insurgency, p. 2
59. Rahimullah Yousufzai interview with Sirajuddin Haqqani, July 2008.
60. John D. Negroponte, Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of Natio Intelligence for the Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement to Senate Armed Services Committee, February 28, 2006.
61. “Al Jazeera Reveals New Al Qa’ida Leader,” Washington Times, May 25, 2007, p. 17.
62. Mariam Abou Zahab, “Changing Patterns of Social and Political Life Among the Tribal Pashtuns in Pakistan,” Paper presented at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2006.
63. On Ismail, see “Taliban Claim Shooting Down U.S. Helicopter,” The News (Islamabad), June 29, 2005. On Wana, see Intikhab Amir, “Whose Writ Is It Anyway?” The Herald (Pakistan), April 2006, pp. 80–82.
64. On al Qa’ida in the tribal areas, see Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, pp. 264–81.
65. U.S. Department of State, Afghanistan, Autumn 2006: A Campaign at a Crossroads (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, 2006), p. 2. Unclassified document.
66. Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (London: Hurst & Company, 2007), p. 13.
67. Quoted in Selig S. Harrison, “Ethnicity and the Political Stalemate in Pakistan,” in Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, eds., The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986), p. 285.
68. Statement of Karen P. Tandy, Administrator, U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, June 28, 2006.
Chapter Seven
1. Author interview with Richard Armitage, October 17, 2007.
2. Author interview with Colin Powell, January 15, 2008.
3. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” New York Times, August 12, 2007, p. A1.
4. Author interview with Ambassador James Dobbins, October 4, 2007.
5. See, for example, Vernon Loeb, “Franks Supports an Afghan Army,” Washington Post, February 26, 2002, p. A16; Tim Friend, “U.S. Hints It Will Back More Peacekeepers,” USA Today, February 25, 2002, p. IA.
6. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the ReEstablishment of Permanent Government Institutions, Annex I, Paragraph 3. The agreement, commonly referred to as the Bonn Agreement, was signed on December 5, 2001.
7. United Nations, Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, February 6, 2002). Also see, for example, William M. Reilly, “Brahimi: Expand, Extend Afghan Force,” United Press International, February 6, 2002.
8. Author interview with Ambassador James Dobbins, October 4, 2007.
9. Author interview with Richard Armitage, October 17, 2007; author interview with Douglas Feith, November 4, 2008.
10. Author interview with senior U.S. administration official, Washington, DC, January 15, 2008.
11. Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), pp. 1012.
12. In the October 11, 2000, debate between George W. Bush and Al Gore, Bush noted: “I don’t think our troops ought to be used for what’s called nation-building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win wars.” See Commission on Presidential Debates, Debate Transcript: The Second Gore-Bush Presidential Debate, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, October 11, 2000.
13. Todd Purdum, “Bush Offers Afghanistan U.S. Help for Training of Milit and Police,” New York Times, January 29, 2002, p. A13. On opposition fr Pentagon officials, see Bill Gertz, “Rumsfeld Takes Dim View of U.S. Pea keeping Role,” Washington Times, February 27, 2002, p. A8; Loeb, “Fras Supports an Afghan Army.”
14. Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer (Washington, DC: White House Office of the Press Secretary, February 25, 2002).
15. Author interview with Ambassador James Dobbins, October 4, 2007. See Michael Gordon, “A Nation Challenged: Policy Divisions,” New York Times, February 21, 2002, p. Ai. On the divisions between the State and Defense Departments, also see Ben Barber, “U.S. Considers Force Expansion,” Washington Times, February 22, 2002, p. A13; Alan Sipress, “White House May Support Peacekeeping Force Growth,” Washington Post, February 28, 2002, p. A16.
16. Author interview with Ambassador James Dobbins, October 4, 2007.
17. Author interview with Richard Armitage, October 17, 2007.
18. The account of the NSC meeting was courtesy of the author’s interview with Ambassador James Dobbins, October 4, 2007.
19. On the Marshall Plan, see, for example, Melvyn A. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 157–65, 173, 178; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 54–88; Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 37–43; Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 62–63, 74.
20. George W. Bush, Speech at Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia (Washington, DC: White House Office of the Press Secretary, April 17, 2002).
21. Author interview with Ambassador Said Jawad, October 5, 2007. In early 2002, Jawad had returned to Afghanistan to serve as President Karzai’s press secretary, chief of staff,
and director of the Office of International Relations before becoming the ambassador to the United States.
22. Author interview with Ambassador James Dobbins, September 21, 2004; Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004); Afghanistan Stabilization and Reconstruction: A Status Report, Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, S. Hrg. 108–460, January 27, 2004, pp. 14, 17–18; Seymour M. Hersh, “The Other War: Why Bush’s Afghanistan Problem Won’t Go Away,” The New Yorker, April 12, 2004; Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security, UN doc A/56/875-S/2002/278, para. 98.
23. General Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, American Soldier (New York: Regan Books, 2004), p. 324.
24. Ibid.
25. Author interview with Daoud Yaqub, January 2, 2008.
26. United Nations, Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, February 6, 2002).
27. Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Stephen Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security, vol. 22, no. 2, Fall 1997, pp. 5–53; Rui de Figueiredo and Barry Weingast, “The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict,” in Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 261–302; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,” American Political Science Review, vol. 94, no. 4, December 2000, p. 780.
28. Robert M. Perito, Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2004); Perito, The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations (Clementsport, Canada: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2002); Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg, Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998).
29. James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Security Operations,” Parameters, vol. 25, no. 4, Winter 1995–96, pp. 59–69; James Dobbins, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003); Dobbins, The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005).
30. James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones et al., Europe’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Balkans to the Congo (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008).
31. Dobbins, America’s Role in Nation-Building; Dobbins, The UN’s Role in Nation-Building.
32. Vincenzo Coppola, “Briefing on the Multinational Specialized Unit,” Paper presented at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, June 16, 1999; Paolo Valpolini, “The Role of Police-Military Units in Peacekeeping,” Jane’s Europe News, July/August 1999.
33. Author interview with Colonel Domenico Libertini, commander of the Multinational Specialized Unit, Pristina, Kosovo, April 2007. Also see Multinational Specialized Unit, MSU Concept (Pristina, Kosovo: Multinational Specialized Unit, 2007).
34. These numbers include local police, sheriff, primary state, special jurisdiction, constable/marshal, and federal. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Statistics (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2004).
35. The CIA comes with significant historical baggage in working with foreign police. By the early 1970s, the U.S. Congress became deeply concerned that U.S. assistance to police abroad frequently strengthened the recipient government’s capacity for repression. Congress was particularly concerned about the role of the CIA, which trained foreign police in countersubversion, counterguerrilla, and intelligence-gathering techniques. Consequently, Congress in 1974 adopted Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which prohibited the United States from providing internal-security assistance to foreign governments. In addition, the CIA does not have a viable policing arm. The CIA’s Special Activities Division is primarily a paramilitary organization—not a policing one. See, for example, Seth G. Jones et al., Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? U.S. Internal Security Assistance to Repressive and Transitioning Regimes (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), pp. 9–22.
36. Dobbins, Europe’s Role in Nation-Building.
37. William I. Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 267–73; Doyle and Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding.”
38. Seth G. Jones, Jeremy Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and Jack Riley, Establishing Law and Order After Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005); Dobbins, America’s Role in Nation-Building; Dobbins, The UN’s Role in Nation-Building.
39. Author interview with Ambassador James Dobbins, September 21, 2004; Hersh, “The Other War.”
40. Dobbins, Europe’s Role in Nation-Building.
41. Author interview with Dov Zakheim, January 30, 2008.
42. Ibid.
43. Author interview with senior White House official, Washington, DC, January 15, 2008.
44. Letter from Rangin Dadfar Spanta to Adamantios Vassilakis, Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations, September 20, 2006.
45. Colin L. Powell, “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 5, Winter 1992/93, pp. 32–45. On the Weinberger Doctrine, see Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990); Thomas R. Dubois, “The Weinberger Doctrine and the Liberation of Kuwait,” Parameters, vol. XXI, no. 4 (Winter 1991–1992), pp. 24–38. The Weinberger Doctrine and the Powell Doctrine are named after Caspar Weinberger, Ronald Reagan’s secretary of defense, and Colin Powell, most recently George W. Bush’s first secretary of state.
46. Powell, “U.S. Forces,” p. 40.
47. Speech by Caspar Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power,” November 28, 1984, Reprinted in Defense Issues, January 1985, p. 35.
48. Seth G. Jones, “Averting Failure in Afghanistan,” Survival, vol. 48, no. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 111–28.
49. Interview with Major General Craig P. Weston, Chief, Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, June 23, 2004, Kabul, Afghanistan.
50. Author interview with Richard Armitage, October 17, 2007.
51. Feith, War and Decision, pp. 14–15.
52. Ibid., pp. 51–52.
53. Author interview with senior U.S. official present at the September 2001 Camp David meetings, Washington, DC, January 15, 2008. Also see, for example, Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), pp. 74–92.
54. Author interview with senior U.S. official present at the September 2001 Camp David meetings, Washington, DC, January 15, 2008.
55. See, for example, Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), pp. 21–23.
56. Author interview with Lieutenant Colonel Edward O’Connell (ret.), October 4, 2007.
57. Author interview with Richard Armitage, October 17, 2007.
58. Gary C. Schroen, First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005), p. 360.
59. See, for example, Seymour Hersh, Chain of Command (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), p. 188; George Packer, The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), p. 45.
60. Author interview with Robert Grenier, November 6, 2007.
61. Author interview with Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, October 27, 2007.
62. Author interview with Dov Zakheim, January 30, 2008.
63. Sarah Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), p. 155.
64. Ahmed Rashid, “Afghanistan: Progress Since the Taliban,”
Asian Affairs, vol. 37, no. I, March 2006, p. 33.
65. L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), p. 143.
66. Letter from Jeb Mason to Ambassador Bremer, Talking Points: Progress in the War on Terror, September 17, 2003.
67. Ali Jalali, “The Future of Afghanistan,” Parameters, vol. 36, no. 1, Spring 2006, p. 5.
68. Andrew M. Roe, “To Create a Stable Afghanistan,” Military Review, November-December 2005, p. 21.
69. David L. Buffaloe, Conventional Forces in Low-Intensity Conflict: The 82d Airborne in Firebase Shkin, Landpower Essay 04–2 (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2004), p. 12.
70. On a firsthand account of the Battle for Deh Chopan, see Michael McInerney, “The Battle for Deh Chopan, Part 1,” Soldier of Fortune, August 2004; McInerney, “The Battle for Deh Chopan, Part 2,” Soldier of Fortune, September 2004.
71. Anne Evans et al., A Guide to Government in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2004), p. 14.
72. On warlords and Afghanistan, see Roe, “To Create a Stable Afghanistan,” pp. 20–26; Government of Afghanistan, Security Sector Reform: Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups Programme (DIAG) and Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Programme (DDR) (Kabul: Government of Afghanistan, October 2005); Mark Sedra, Challenging the Warlord Culture: Security Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Afghanistan (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2002).
73. Several warlords were reassigned as provincial governors, including Sher Muhammad Akhundzada of Helmand (2005), Ismail Khan of Herat (2004), Gul Agha of Kandahar (2004), Haji Din Muhammad of Nangarhar, Muhammad Ibrahim of Ghor (2004), Gul Ahmad of Badghis (2003), and Syed Amin of Badakshan (2003).
74. Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan and Altai Consulting, Afghan National Development Poll (Kabul: Combined Forces Command, 2005).
75. Afghanistan National Security Council, National Threat Assessment (Kabul: Afghanistan National Security Council, 2005), p. 4. Also see Afghanistan Ministry of Defense, The National Military Strategy (Kabul: Afghanistan Ministry of Defense, October 2005).
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