49. Johnson, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition,” pp. 7, 14.
50. The election results are from Afghanistan’s Joint Electoral Management Body.
51. nternational Republican Institute, Afghanistan: Election Day Survey (Washington, DC: International Republican Institute, October 9, 2004).
52. U.S. State Department, Afghanistan: Closer to One Nation than a House Divided (Washington, DC: Office of Research, U.S. Department of State, January 29, 2007), pp. 1, 3.
53. Memorandum from the Rendon Group to J5 CENTCOM Strategic Effects, “Polling Results—Afghanistan Omnibus May 2007,” June 15, 2007.
54. Asia Foundation, Voter Education Planning Survey: Afghanistan 2004 National Elections (San Francisco: Asia Foundation, 2004).
55. Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People: Afghanistan in 2006 (San Francisco: Asia Foundation, 2006).
56. Author interview with Ambassador James Dobbins, July 11, 2007.
57. S. Frederick Starr, “Sovereignty and Legitimacy in Afghan Nation-Building,” in Francis Fukuyama, ed., Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), pp. 107–24; Starr, U.S. Afghanistan Policy: It’s Working (Washington, DC: Central Asia—Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University, 2004).
58. On ideology and insurgency, see, for example, Michael F. Brown and Eduardo Fernández, War of Shadows: The Struggle for Utopia in the Peruvian Amazon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 98.
59. Military Teachings: For the Preparation of Mujahideen, n.d. The Taliban manual was leaked to the press in 2007. See, for example, Isambard Wilkinson, “How To Be A Jihadi: Taliban’s Training Secrets,” Daily Telegraph (London), August 16,2007.
60. Trinquier, Modern Warfare, p. 43; Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, p. 31.
61. As David Galula argues: “[C]onventional operations by themselves have at best no more effect than a fly swatter. Some guerrillas are bound to be caught, but new recruits will replace them as fast as they are lost.” Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, p. 72.
62. Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks, Can Might Make Rights? pp. 137–40.
Chapter Ten
1. Gary C. Schroen, First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005), p. 358.
2. Amrullah Saleh, Strategy of Insurgents and Terrorists in Afghanistan (Kabul, Afghanistan: National Directorate of Security, May 2006).
3. German Federal Ministry of the Interior (2004), p. 6; Asian Development Bank and World Bank, Afghanistan: Preliminary Needs Assessment for Recovery and Reconstruction (Kabul: Asian Development Bank and World Bank, January 2002), p. 7.
4. German Federal Foreign Office and Federal Ministry of the Interior, Assistance in Rebuilding the Police Force (Bonn: Federal Foreign Office and Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2004), p. 6.
5. Author interview with Jochen Rieso, Training Branch, German Project for Support of the Police in Afghanistan, June 27, 2004.
6. Author interview with senior U.S. official, White House, September 2004. This view was corroborated by multiple interviews with U.S. officials in Washington and Afghanistan in 2004 and 2005.
7. German Federal Foreign Office and Federal Ministry of the Interior, Assistance in Rebuilding the Police Force, p. 3.
8. Letter from Donald Rumsfeld to Jerry Bremer and General John Abizaid (cc to General Dick Myers, Paul Wolfowitz, and Doug Feith), Assistance from Germany, September 29, 2003.
9. Author interviews with members of DynCorp International, Kabul and Gardez, June 2004 and November 2005.
10. Author interview with Interior Minister Ali Jalali, September 4, 2007.
11. Author interview with Lieutenant General David Barno, September 4, 2007.
12. Author interviews with senior U.S. Defense Department official involved in the discussions, August 21 and October 4, 2007.
13. Author interview with Nora Bensahel, May 7, 2008.
14. Author interview with Major General Robert Durbin, January 3, 2008.
15. Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook 2007 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2006). The list included small, poor countries such as East Timor, Djibouti, and Liberia.
16. Author interview with Major General Robert Durbin, January 3, 2008.
17. Author interview with U.S. Army general, Washington, DC, January 10, 2008.
18. Author interviews with members of the Office of Security Cooperation—Afghanistan, Kabul, December 2005.
19. Offices of Inspector General of the Departments of State and Defense, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness (Washington, DC: Offices of Inspector General of the Departments of State and Defense, 2006), p. 1.
20. Colonel Rick Adams, Police Reform Directorate: Overview—Current Operations and Strategic Initiatives (Kabul: Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, 2006), slide 6.
21. Author interview with Minister Ali Jalali, September 4, 2007; author interviews with Shahmahmood Miakhel, August 29 and September 14, 2007.
22. Author interview with Minister Ali Jalali, September 4, 2007.
23. Atos Consulting, Afghanistan Stabilisation Programme: Summary Project Completion Report (Kabul, Afghanistan: Atos Consulting, May 2007).
24. Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, RC South-ANP Efforts to Increase Security (Kabul: Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, 2006), p. 2.
25. General Barry R. McCaffrey (ret.), Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Memorandum from General McCaffrey to Colonel Mike Meese and Colonel Cindy Jebb, United States Military Academy, June 2006; McCaffrey, Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Memorandum from General McCaffrey to Colonel Mike Meese and Colonel Cindy Jebb, United States Military Academy, February 2007.
26. Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, Better Distribution of Afghan Uniformed Police-Close the Gap” (Kabul: Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, 2006), slide 9.
27. Quoted in Chris Sands, “Bring Back Taliban to End Police Corruption, Say Afghan Truckers,” The Independent (London), May 10, 2007.
28. Author interviews with U.S. and German police officials, Afghanistan, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007.
29. Author interview with Minister Ali Jalali, September 4, 2007; author interviews with Shahmahmood Miakhel, August 29 and September 14, 2007.
30. Colonel Rick Adams, Police Reform Directorate: Overview—Current Operations and Strategic Initiatives (Kabul: Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, 2006), slide 16.
31. Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan, Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward, National Police and Law Enforcement (Kabul: Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan, January 2004), p. 10.
32. Author interviews with U.S. State and Defense Department officials, 2004, 2005, and 2006.
33. Author interviews with Office of Security Cooperation—Afghanistan officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, November and December 2005.
34. Afghan National Police Program (Kabul: Ministry of Interior, 2005); Barnett R. Rubin, Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition from Turmoil to Normalcy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006); U.S. Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined (Washington, DC: GAO, 2005).
35. Government of Germany, Doha II Conference on Border Management in Afghanistan: A Regional Approach (Berlin: Government of Germany, 2006). Also see U.S. Department of State, Border Management Initiative: Information Brief (Kabul: Afghanistan Reconstruction Group, U.S. Department of State, 2005).
36. Ali Jalali, “The Future of Afghanistan,” Parameters, vol. 36, no. 1, Spring 2006, p. 10.
37. Afghan Non-Governmental Organization Security Office, Security Incident—Armed Clash: ANP Was Disarmed (Kabul: Afghan Non-Governmental Organization Security Office, March 2006).
38. Com
bined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, Better Distribution of Afghan Uniformed Police-“Close the Gap” (Kabul: Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, 2006), slide 17.
39. Author interview with Lieutenant General David Barno, September 4, 2007.
40. Author interviews with U.S. State Department and Defense Department officials involved in police training, Afghanistan, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007.
41. Author interview with Ambassador Ronald Neumann, September 7, 2007.
42. Author correspondence with Ambassador Ronald Neumann, October 29, 2008. On policing during counterinsurgency and stability operations, see Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg, eds., Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998); Seth G. Jones, Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley, Establishing Law and Order After Conflict (Washington, DC: RAND, 2005); Robert M. Perito, Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2004); David H. Bayley, Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, June 2001).
43. Author interview with Richard Armitage, October 17, 2007.
44. Author interview with Minister Ali Jalali, September 4, 2007.
45. Author interview with Ambassador Ronald Neumann, September 7, 2007.
46. Author interview with Major General Robert Durbin, January 3, 2008.
47. Author interview with Ambassador Ronald Neumann, September 7, 2007.
48. Author correspondence with Ambassador Ronald Neumann, October 29, 2008.
49. Author interview with Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, October 27, 2007.
50. The author visited the Office of Military Cooperation—Afghanistan in 2004 and the Office of Security Cooperation—Afghanistan in 2005, as well as regional training centers, to assess the U.S. and Coalition efforts to rebuild the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. On training of the ANA, also see Anja Manuel and P. W. Singer, “A New Model Afghan Army,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 4, July/August 2002, pp. 44–59; Luke Hill, “NATO to Quit Bosnia, Debates U.S. Proposals,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 40, no. 23, December 10, 2003, p. 6.
51. Anthony Davis, “Kabul’s Security Dilemma,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 37, no. 24, June 1 2, 2002, pp. 26–27; Mark Sedra, Challenging the Warlord Culture: Security Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Afghanistan (Bonn, Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2002), pp. 28–30.
52. Author interview with Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, October 27, 2007.
53. Ibid.
54. Attrition was caused by a number of factors, such as low pay rates and apparent misunderstandings between ANA recruits and the U.S. military. For example, some Afghan soldiers believed they would be taken to the United States for training. On attrition rates, see Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward, National Army (Kabul: Ministry of Defense, 2004); Capitol Hill Monthly Update, Afghanistan (Washington, DC: United States Department of State, June 2004); Rebuilding Afghanistan (Washington, DC: The White House, 2004). Also, author interviews with U.S. Department of Defense officials, May 2006.
55. Author interview with U.S. Army general involved in police and army training in Afghanistan, January 3, 2008.
56. Author interview with Minister of Defense Abdul Rahim Wardak, November 13, 2008.
57. Author interview with Daoud Yaqub, January 2, 2008.
58. “Fighting in Afghanistan Leaves 40 Insurgents Dead,” American Forces Press Service, June 22, 2005.
59. “Coalition Launches ‘Operation Mountain Lion’ in Afghanistan,” American Forces Press Service, April 12, 2006.
60. U.S. Air Force F-15Es, A-10s, and B-52s provided close air support to troops on the ground engaged in rooting out insurgent sanctuaries and support networks. Royal Air Force GR-7s also provided close air support to Coalition troops in contact with enemy forces. U.S. Air Force Global Hawk and Predator aircraft provided intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, while KC-135 and KC-10 aircraft provided refueling support.
61. Neil Chandler and Billy Labrum, “Apache Apocalypse,” Sunday Star (UK), March 16, 2008.
62. Major Robert W. Redding, “19th SF Group Utilizes MCA Missions to Train Afghan National Army Battalions,” Special Warfare, vol. 17, February 2005, pp. 22–27.
63. Afghanistan: Managing Public Finances for Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), p. 24.
64. General Barry R. McCaffrey (ret.), Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Memorandum from General McCaffrey to Colonel Mike Meese and Colonel Cindy Jebb, United States Military Academy, June 2006.
65. National Ground Intelligence Center, Afghanistan: Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Charlottesville, VA: U.S. Army, National Ground Intelligence Center, 2004).
66. Amrullah Saleh, Strategy of Insurgents and Terrorists in Afghanistan (Kabul, Afghanistan: National Directorate of Security, 2006), p. 8.
67. Presidential Office of National Security, National Threat Assessment 2004 (Kabul: Presidential Office of National Security, April 2004), p. 5.
68. Author interview with Ambassador Said Jawad, August 24, 2007.
69. Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan, Afghan National Development Poll (Kabul: Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan, 2005), p. 46.
70. International Security Assistance Force, Nationwide Research and Survey on Illegal State Opposing Armed Groups (ISOAGS): Qualitative and Quantitative Surveys (Kabul: International Security Assistance Force, 2006), p. 120.
Chapter Eleven
1. Lieutenant General David W. Barno, Counter-Insurgency Strategy (Kabul, Afghanistan: Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan, 2005), slide 14.
2. World Bank, Afghanistan—State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), p. 153.
3. Author interview with Ambassador Ronald Neumann, April 16, 2008.
4. Ibid.
5. The Asia Foundation, Voter Education Planning Survey: Afghanistan 2004 National Elections (Kabul: The Asia Foundation, July 2004), p. 105.
6. The question posed to Afghans was: “What is the biggest problem in your local area?” I combined the similar issues of unemployment, poverty, and poor economy into one category. See The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2006: A Survey of the Afghan People (Kabul: The Asia Foundation, 2006), p. 97.
7. U.S. Department of State, In Their Own Words: Afghan Views of the U.S., Karzai and the Taliban (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 2006), slides 13 and 16.
8. World Bank, Afghanistan: State Building, p. xxvi.
9. Anne Evans et al., eds., A Guide to Government in Afghanistan (Kabul: World Bank, and Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2004), p. 145.
10. World Bank, Afghanistan: State Building, p. 83.
11. Ibid., p. 86.
12. Ibid., pp. 133–34.
13. Other countries also exported electricity to Afghanistan. In May 2003, Tajikistan resumed supplying electricity to the northern Afghanistan province of Kunduz, although power supplies were expected to halt in October 2003. Iran also supplies electricity to Afghanistan, in some areas directly adjacent to the Afghan-Iranian border in Herat, Farah, and Nimroz Provinces. See, for example, U.S. Department of Energy, Afghanistan Fact Sheet 2004 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, 2004); U.S. Department of Energy, Afghanistan Fact Sheet 2006 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, 2006).
14. Author interview with Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, September 14, 2007.
15. Andrew S. Natsios, “The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development,” Parameters, vol. 35, no. 3, Autumn 2005, pp. 4–20.
16. Ron Synovitz, “Afghanistan: Workers Still Await Security Clearance to Repair Kajaki Dam,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 12, 2007.
17. A
uthor interview with Michelle Parker, August 15, 2007. She had previously managed the USAID Jalalabad Field Office, where she served as the USAID representative in Nangarhar and Laghman Provinces and as the development lead in the Jalalabad Provincial Reconstruction Team from 2004 to 2006.
18. Author correspondence with Ambassador Ronald Neumann, October 29, 2008.
19. Author interview with Michelle Parker, August 15, 2007.
20. Author interview with senior official, Canadian International Development Agency, Kandahar, Afghanistan, January 14, 2007.
21. Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan, ANSF Operational Primacy Process Planning Group (Kabul, Afghanistan: Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan, June 2006), slide 16.
22. Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan, Update to LTG Eikenberry: ANSF Operational Primacy Process Planning Group IPR #3 (Kabul, Afghanistan: Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan, July 15, 2006), slide 10.
23. Joint Center for Operational Analysis, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 2006), p. 12.
24. Author interviews with senior U.S. Defense Department official with knowledge of the assessment, August 21 and October 4, 2007.
25. Denis D. Gray, “Afghan Village ‘On the Fence,’” Washington Times, April 30, 2007, p. 12.
26. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA Assessment of the Effects of the Musa Qala Agreement (Kabul: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, January 2007), p. 3.
27. Author interview with Michael Semple, September 14, 2007.
28. Author interviews with Shahmahmood Miakhel, and August 29 and September 14, 2007.
29. Author interviews with Royal Canadian Mounted Police and U.S. police trainers, Kandahar, Afghanistan, September 18, 2007.
30. Joint Paper by the Government of Afghanistan, UNAMA, CFC—A, ISAF, Canada, Netherlands, UK, and U.S. Governments, Assessment of Factors Contributing to Insecurity in Afghanistan (Kabul: Government of Afghanistan, 2006), p. 3.
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