40. United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 15 November 2007 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities Addressed to the President of the Security Council, November 29, 2007, S/2007/677, p. 8.
41. United States of America. v. Hassan Abujihaad, a/k/ a Paul R. Hall, Abu-Jihaad, United States District Court, District of Connecticut, No. 3:07-CR-57, Exhibit 2, Federal Bureau of Investigation FD-302 of William “Jamaal” Chrisman. Interview conducted December 2, 2006.
42. Statement from Mullah Omar, Leader of the Taliban, released December 17, 2007.
43. United States of America v. Babar Ahmad, United States District Court, District of Connecticut, No. 3:04-CR-301-MRK, Indictment, Filed October 6, 2004.
44. United States of America v. Syed Talha Ahsan, United States District Court, District of Connecticut, No. 3:06-CR-194-JCH, Indictment. Also see United States of America. v. Hassan Abujihaad, a/k/a Paul R. Hall, Abu-Jihaad, United States District Court, District of Connecticut, No. 3:07-CR-57, Indictment.
45. Author interviews with European, Afghan, and Pakistani government officials, Kabul, Afghanistan 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007. Also see Ali Jalali, “The Future of Afghanistan,” Parameters, vol. 36, no. 1, Spring 2006, p. 8.
46. Author interviews with U.S. government officials in Shkin, Afghanistan, April 2006. Al Jazeera interview with Mullah Dadullah, July 2005. Also see such press accounts as Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Unholy Allies,” Newsweek, September 26, 2005, pp. 40–42.
47. In what appeared to be a forced confession, Saeed Allah Khan stated: “I worked as a spy for the Americans along with four other people. The group received $45,000 and my share is $7,000.” Hekmat Karzai, Afghanistan and the Globalisation of Terrorist Tactics (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, January 2006), p. 2.
48. Author interview with U.S. government officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, December 2005.
49. On the rationale for suicide bombers, see Al Jazeera interview with Mullah Dadullah, February 2006.
50. Zawahiri, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, p. 200.
51. C. Christine Fair et al., Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan, 2001–2007 (Kabul: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, September 2007), p. 10.
52. Hekmat Karzai, Afghanistan and the Logic of Suicide Terrorism (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, March 2006); “Taliban Claim Responsibility for Suicide Bomb Attack in Afghan Kandahar Province,” Afghan Islamic Press, October 9, 2005; “Pajhwok News Describes Video of Afghan Beheading by ‘Masked Arabs,’ Taliban,” Kabul Pajhwok Afghan News, October 9, 2005; “Canadian Soldier Dies in Suicide Attack in Kandahar,” Afghan Islamic Press, March 3, 2006; “Taliban Claim Attack on Police in Jalalabad, Nangarhar Province,” Kabul National TV, January 7, 2006.
53. See, for example, Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005); Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Christoph Reuter, My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Hoffman, Inside Terrorism.
54. Hekmat Karzai and Seth G. Jones, “How to Curb Rising Suicide Terrorism in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, July 18, 2006.
55. In its public rhetoric, the Taliban tended to identify the suicide bombers as Afghans, since it suggested there was a significant indigenous component of the insurgency.
56. Fair et al., Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan, p. 28.
Chapter Seventeen
1. Author interview with Commander Larry Legree, June 10, 2008.
2. Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2008: A Survey of the Afghan People (Kabul and San Francisco: Asia Foundation, 2008).
3. Author interview with Colonel Martin Schweitzer, March 7, 2008.
4. Colin Soloway, “I Yelled at Them to Stop,” Newsweek, October 7, 2002; Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), pp. 141–42.
5. Author interview with Colonel Martin Schweitzer, March 7, 2008.
6. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, translated by Daniel Lee (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), p. 6.
7. Author interview with Commander Larry Legree, March 8, 2008; author interview with Colonel Martin Schweitzer, March 7, 2008.
8. Author interview with Colonel Martin Schweitzer, March 7, 2008.
9. British Government, Afghanistan: Countering the Insurgency RC(E) vs. RC (S) Comparative Approaches, May 12, 2008.
10. The quote is from Bruce Hoffman and Seth G. Jones, “Cell Phones in the Hindu Kush,” The National Interest, No. 96, July/August 2008.
11. International Security Assistance Force, ISAF Campaign Plan (Kabul: ISAF, November 2008).
12. Trinquier, Modern Warfare, p. 6.
13. Prior to the establishment of the first Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells and U.S. Army Civil Affairs Teams—Afghanistan supported humanitarian assistance, relief, and reconstruction efforts throughout Afghanistan. These began in 2002.
14. Robert Borders, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: A Model for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development,” Journal of Development and Social Transformation, vol. 1, November 2004, pp. 5–12; Michael J. McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” Parameters, vol. 35, no. 4, Winter 2005–06, pp. 32–46.
15. Author interview with Commander Larry Legree, June 10, 2008.
16. McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan,” p. 40.
17. Trent Scott and John Agoglia, “Getting the Basics Right: A Discussion on Tactical Actions for Strategic Impact in Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal, November 2008; author interview with John Agoglia, November 13, 2008.
18. Author interview with Michelle Parker, August 15, 2007.
19. Author interviews with NATO officials involved in the meetings, Kabul, Afghanistan, May 2008.
20. Author interview with senior NATO intelligence official, November 13, 2008.
21. J. Alexander Thier and Azita Ranjbar, Killing Friends, Making Enemies: The Impact and Avoidance of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, July 2008); Human Rights Watch, “Troops in Contact”: Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan (New York: Human Rights Watch, September 2008).
22. Trista Talton and Robert Burns, “Probe: Spec Ops Marines Used Excessive Force,” Marine Corps Times, April 13, 2007. Also see Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Investigation: Use of Indiscriminate and Excessive Force against Civilians by U.S. Forces Following a VBIED Attack in Nangarhar Province on 4 March 2007 (Kabul: Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, 2007).
23. Josh White, “69 Afghans’ Families Get a U.S. Apology,” Washington Post, May 9, 2007, p. A12.
24. Memorandum from Brigadier General Michael W. Callan to Acting Commander, United States Central Command, Subject: Executive Summary of AR 15-6 Investigation into new information relative to civilian casualties from engagement by U.S. and Afghan Forces on 21–22 AUG 2008 in Azizabad, Shindand District, Herat Province, Afghanistan, October 1, 2008.
25. Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, Kai Eide, on Civilian Casualties Caused by Military Operations in Shindand District of Herat Province, August 26, 2008.
26. Jon Boone, “Kabul Accuses Allies of Civilian Deaths,” Financial Times, August 22, 2008.
27. Office of the President, President Karzai Condemns Shindand Incident (Kabul: Office of the President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, August 23, 2008).
28. Author interview with senior U.S. State Department official, October 2, 2008.
29. Memorandum from Brigadier General Michael W. Callan to Acting Commander, United States
Central Command, Subject: Executive Summary of AR 15–6 Investigation into new information relative to civilian casualties from engagement by U.S. and Afghan Forces on 21–22 AUG 2008 in Azizabad, Shindand District, Herat Province, Afghanistan, October 1, 2008.
30. Memorandum from the Rendon Group to J5 CENTCOM Strategic Effects, Polling Results—Afghanistan Omnibus May 2007, June 15, 2007.
31. Charney Associates, Afghanistan: Public Opinion Trends and Strategic Implications (New York: Charney Associates, 2008), slide 20.
32. Author interview with senior NATO intelligence official, November 13, 2008.
33. United Nations Department of Safety and Security, Security Incidents in Afghanistan, July 2008
34. NATO ISAF, Afghan National Security Forces Update (Kabul: NATO ISAF, July 24, 2008), slide 5. Between January 2007 and July 2008, there were 333 Coalition soldiers killed (20 percent), 1,015 Afghan police killed (59 percent), and 369 Afghan soldiers killed (21 percent).
35. Memorandum from Investigating Officer to Commander, Combined Joint Task Force—101, Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, Subject AR 15–6 Investigation Findings and Recommendations—Vehicle Patrol Base (VPB) Wanat Complex Attack and Casualties, 13 July 2008, 13 August 2008.
36. The NATO after-action report was leaked to Canada’s Globe and Mail newspaper. See Graeme Smith, “Taliban Making the Grade in Guerrilla War,” The Globe and Mail, August 20, 2008.
37. Author interviews with U.S. intelligence officers, Bagram, Afghanistan, March 8, 2008.
38. U.S. Department of State, “Pakistan: Refocusing Security Assistance,” January 2008.
39. State Bank of Pakistan, Monetary Police Statement, July—December 2008 (Islamabad: State Bank of Pakistan, 2008).
40. Author interview with senior State Department official, September 30, 2008.
41. Dexter Filkins, “The Long Road to Chaos in Pakistan,” New York Times, September 27, 2008.
42. Dexter Filkins, “Right at the Edge,” New York Times Magazine, September 5, 2008.
43. Author interview with senior NATO official, September 29, 2008.
44. Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, August 1, 2008, p. A1.
45. Author interview with senior White House official, September 25, 2008.
46. Iftikhar A. Khan, “Kayani Warns US to Keep its Troops Out,” Dawn (Pakistan), September 11, 2008.
47. Combined Joint Task Force-101, CJTF-101 Assessment (Bagram: CJTF-101, 2008), slide 7.
Chapter Eighteen
1. Zehr-Ed-Dn Muhammed Bbur, Memoirs of Zehr-Ed-Dn Muhammed Bbur: Emperor of Hindustan, vol. 2, translated by John Leyden and William Erskine (London: Oxford University Press, 1921), p. 19.
2. Author interview with Lieutenant Colonel Simon Heatherington, Commander, Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, Kandahar, January 16, 2007.
3. Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), pp. 101, 149.
4. Francesc Vendrell, EUSR Vendrell’s Valedictory Report (Kabul: European Union, 2008).
5. Olivier Roy. Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 10.
6. U.S. Embassy Kabul to Department of State, Cable 4745, August 2, 1971, “Audience with King Zahir.” Released by the National Security Archive.
7. Thomas Schweich, “Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?” New York Times Magazine, July 27, 2008.
8. See, for example, United States Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, FM 3–24 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), pp. 1–13.
9. On the role of tribes, see Shahmahmood Miakhel, “The Importance of Tribal Structures and Pakhtunwali in Afghanistan: Their Role in Security and Governance,” in Arpita Basu Roy, ed., Challenges and Dilemmas of State-Building in in Afghanistan: Report of a Study Trip to Kabul (Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2008), pp. 97–110; David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 39–114.
10. Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2008: A Survey of the Afghan People (Kabul and San Francisco: Asia Foundation, 2008).
11. Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan—The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2001), p. 64.
12. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), p. 186.
13. Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland in Two Volumes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
14. Author interview with Ambassador Ronald Neumann, September 7, 2007.
Afterword
1. Author interview with U.S. Army soldier, September 17, 2009.
2. Author interview with White House official, November 2009.
3. Memorandum from Stanley A. McChrystal to the Honorable Robert M. Gates, Subject: COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, Reference: Secretary of Defense Memorandum 26 June 2009, August 30, 2009, p. 1-1.
4. Steven Simon, “Can the Right War Be Won? Defining American Interests in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 88, no. 4, July/August 2009, p. 134. Also see, for example, Rory Stewart, “How to Save Afghanistan,” Time, July 17, 2008.
5. Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, “Afghanistan: How Much is Enough?” Survival, vol. 51, no. 5, October–November 2009, pp. 47–68.
6. John J. Mearsheimer, “Hollow Victory,” Foreign Policy, November 2, 2009.
7. Letter from Matthew Hoh to Ambassador Nancy J. Powell, September 10, 2009.
8. Author interview with U.S. army soldier, November 5, 2009.
9. Memorandum from Investigating Officer to Commander, Combined Joint Task Force—101, Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, Subject: AR 15-6 Investigation Findings and Recommendations—Vehicle Patrol Base (VPB) Wanat Complex Attack and Casualties, 13 July 2008, August 13, 2008.
10. “Haqqani Says No Use of Negotiations; Vows to Defeat ‘Crusaders’ in Afghanistan,” in the 30th issue of Al-Samud monthly magazine, December 2008. The magazine was published on the Hanin Net Web site at www.hanein.info/vb.
11. Author interviews with British, Pakistani, and Afghan government officials, April and May 2009.
12. Author interviews with NATO government officials, September 2009.
13. Author interview with U.S. intelligence official, November 2009.
14. GEO TV (Pakistan) interview of Shaykh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (aka Shaykh Saeed), June 21, 2008.
15. See, for example, Stephen Biddle, “Is it Worth It?” American Interest, July–August 2009, vol. 4, no. 6.
16. Steve Coll, “The Case for Humility in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, October 16, 2009.
17. Author interview with Taliban commander, April 2009.
18. Hanin Net Web site, www.hanein.info/vb, December 2008.
19. Taliban (Afghanistan) press release, “Code of Conduct,” Voice of Jihad, August 6, 2009. The author received a copy of the press release from a Taliban contact.
20. Taliban (Afghanistan) press release, Voice of Jihad, April 29, 2009. The author received a copy of the press release from a Taliban contact.
21. La’iha, May 9, 2009. The La’iha, or code of conduct, is the Taliban’s comprehensive set of rules and regulations governing Taliban activity in Afghanistan.
22. Author interviews with Paktia tribal leaders, October 2009.
23. Memorandum from Stanley A. McChrystal to the Honorable Robert M. Gates, Subject: COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, Reference: Secretary of Defense Memorandum 26 June 2009, August 30, 2009, p. 1-1.
24. Author interview with senior U.S. military official, October 2009.
25. See, for example, Faisal Aziz, “Fear Grows of U.S. Strikes in Pakistan’s Baluchistan,” Reuters, October 12, 2009.
26. Author interview with Afghanistan cabinet minister, November 2009.
27. See, for example, James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Buildi
ng: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003).
28. See, for example, Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); M. Nazif Shahrani and Robert L. Canfield, eds., Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1984); David B. Edwards, Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
29. Author interview with Kandahar tribal leader, October 2009.
30. Author interview with senior U.S. State Department official, June 2009.
31. Mohammad Ehsan Zia, “Thoughts on a National Police Force,” November 2009. The author received a copy of the piece from the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.
32. Author interview with Minister of Interior Mohammad Hanif Atmar, September 2009.
Table of Contents
ALSO BY SETH G. JONES
Title Page
Copyright
Dedication
CONTENTS
List of Maps and Graphs
Chronology
Photographic Insert
Introduction
1. Descent into Violence
2. The Mujahideen Era
3. Uncivil War
4. The Rise of the Taliban
5. Al Qa’ida’s Strategic Alliance
6. Operation Enduring Freedom
7. Light Footprint
8. Early Successes
9. The Logic of Insurgency
10. Collapse of Law and Order
11. A Growing Cancer
12. The Perfect Storm
13. A Three-Front War
14. National Caveats
15. The Water Must Boil
16. Al Qa’ida: A Force Multiplier
17. In the Eye of the Storm
18. Back to the Future
Afterword
Acknowledgments
Notes
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In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan Page 49
