The 199th LIB Intelligence Officer briefed Forbes and Schroeder that the VC Dong Nai Regiment, a unit that traced its lineage to 1948, was based in War Zone D. The Dong Nai Regiment was composed of three maneuver battalions, designated K1, K2, and K3. The K1 and K3 were formerly local force battalions; however, the K2 was formerly the 7th Battalion, 568th Regiment, 330th NVA Division. Enemy troops wearing NVA uniforms and helmets were spotted in the new AO by aerial observers. It was highly probable that these troops were members of the Dong Nai Regiment’s K2 battalion.
The troops of the Dong Nai Regiment were very familiar with the dense jungle terrain and the trail network that crisscrossed it. In addition to using the area to train for major operations, the Dong Nai Regiment was responsible for defending the logistical base areas and camps scattered throughout the region. The Dong Nai Regiment would not of relinquish control of their stronghold without a fight.
War Zone D was a vastly different environment from the one the Warriors were accustomed to. The area around Thu Duc where the battalion had operated for the prior eleven months was made up of open rice paddy fields, canals, streams, marshes, and nipa palm bogs. Immersion foot was more of a drain on manpower than wounds sustained in combat. The terrain in the new Area of Operations, just barely 20 kilometers to the north, was strikingly different. In the former area, the mean elevation averaged eight meters above sea level, while in the new AO the average was 22 meters with rolling hills up to 54 meters high. Instead of flat open terrain cultivated with rice paddies, the troops would be operating in continuous double and triple canopy jungle. Beneath the canopy was an understory of small trees, patches of bamboo, and weedy grasses that hindered cross-country movement and limited observation to a few meters. The area was ideal for the establishment of fortified enemy base camps and supply depots that could not be easily spotted from the air. Due to the differences in terrain and vegetation, the tactics developed by Schroeder’s men over the past year were of limited use in the new AO.
Brigadier General Forbes and LTC Schroeder were also concerned that the troops of the Warrior battalion had become, in a sense, victims of their own success. By November 1967, it was a rare occasion when the infantrymen encountered more than a squad of VC. A lack of contact with the enemy led, in some cases, to carelessness, lack of alertness, and overconfidence. Schroeder was concerned about this, and convinced Forbes to let the outfit operate just north of the Bien Hoa/Long Binh area for a couple of weeks before moving into the heart of War Zone D. This area was the responsibility of the US 9th Infantry Division, and his battalion would be operating under 9th Infantry command, but he didn’t give a damn. He wanted to give his men a chance to re-hone their combat skills in a different environment.
Although there were no large main force enemy units operating in the area, there were a number of guerrilla squads charged with reconnaissance, tax collection, propaganda, and communication missions. There was also a support unit charged with establishing and guarding numerous supply and arms caches. It was one of the former units that Schroeder’s men brought to bay on 29 November 1967.
Staging out of Fire Support Base Concord just east of Bien Hoa, Schroeder ordered his Charlie Company to conduct an airmobile assault into the southernmost part of War Zone D just north of the Dong Nai River. Charlie Company landed on three separate landing zones (LZs), and began to sweep south toward the river. As the troops advanced on parallel axis, Schroeder, orbiting overhead in an OH-23 Light Observation Helicopter, spotted a squad of VC. He directed the ground troops to intercept the enemy.
Charlie Company’s 3d Platoon was first to make enemy contact. The point man, backed-up by PFC Jim Pittman of Saranac, Michigan, spotted ten guerillas advancing toward their position. Reacting aggressively, the two grunts tossed four grenades at the enemy and then cut loose with their M-16s, killing five of the VC, and capturing two more. Third platoon then began to pursue the remaining VC. Pittman was again in the lead. Suddenly he found himself on the edge of a 15-foot bank overlooking the river. The bank was overgrown with a choked assortment of vines and weeds, and below was a flat piece of ground some ten feet from the water’s edge.
As Pittman surveyed the scene, Schroeder’s helicopter returned and hovered thirty feet over the river. All at once, the bubble-nosed chopper began taking fire from VC concealed in spider holes dug into the bank. Schroeder’s pilot tilted the blade toward the bank to separate the vegetation and expose the VC to the Charlie Company grunts standing above. Schroeder leaned out the door of the ship and fired his .45 caliber pistol downward at one of the VC, killing him. Taking their cue from their commander, the grunts fired down the bank at the VC positions.
Anxious to finish the fight, Pittman leapt down the15-foot drop, landing beside the river’s edge, and began spraying the bushes with his M16. After finishing off two VC, he looked up at Schroeder’s helicopter still hovering 25 to 30 feet above, and moved his hand across his throat to signal that the VC were dead. He was only partially right. Three diehard VC popped up from their camouflaged spider holes and opened fire on Pittman. He stiffened as he was hit, staggered forward, and collapsed into the river. Bleeding profusely, he crawled through the knee-deep water to the shore before collapsing again. Schroeder’s pilot attempted get low enough to pull the wounded man onto the chopper’s skids, but he was driven off by more hostile fire. The pilot pulled pitch and as he gained altitude he radioed for a dust-off.
The grunts on top of the bank again opened fire on the VC, driving them back into their holes. The platoon medic, George Hauer, a stalwart Alabaman, stripped off his web gear and weapon and, with only his medical bag, leapt the 15 feet down the bank, landing next to PFC Pittman. The VC opened fire on the pair, but Hauer ignored the rounds impacting around him and continued to work on the wounded man. Inspired by Hauer’s actions, several more Charlie Company grunts jumped down the bank and finished off the remaining VC with hand grenades and rifle fire.
Moments later, a medevac chopper arrived and hovered a few yards offshore. Doc Hauer and Sergeant Louis Warmack, known to his men as “Mobile,” carried Pittman into the fast moving current until they were able, with the crew’s help, to hoist the severely wounded Pittman into the chopper. Pittman was kept alive until he reached the 93d Evac Hospital, but his wounds were so extensive that he was flown to Japan for extensive treatment, and then on to the States. He was paralyzed from the waist down.
While Schroeder was impressed with Pittman’s and Hauer’s bravery, he was concerned with Charlie Company’s overall performance during the fight. The company commander had been slow to react when his men made contact, and only one platoon was able to reach the area in time to engage the enemy. The Warrior commander resolved to provide closer guidance to the Captain in the future.
While 4/12th continued operations along the Song Dong Nai, planning was underway for a deeper incursion into War Zone D. Brigadier General Forbes wanted a thorough air and ground reconnaissance of the new area, but he didn’t own the assets to accomplish this mission. Fortunately, there were other units available. The 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 12th Aviation Group was assigned the mission of aerial reconnaissance, while the mission of ground reconnaissance was assigned to F Company, 51st Long Range Patrol. Forbes convinced his boss, General Fred Weyand, the II Field Force Commander, to give operational control of F Company, 51st Long Range Patrol to the 199th Brigade. F Company, a ground reconnaissance unit, was commanded by Major William C. Maus, a six foot two, highly respected West Pointer with prior combat experience in the 1st Infantry Division. All of the soldiers assigned to the LRP Company were volunteers and they were anxious for a mission.
F Company was activated two months earlier, and its members spent their first two months in training at the 5th Special Forces Recondo School at Nha Trang, where they learned the techniques of long range patrolling and survival skills while operating deep in enemy controlled territory. Maus was eager to give his teams a final shakedown mission in support of the 4/12th Infantry.
They were given the mission of infiltrating into the Warrior battalion’s new area of operations ahead of the ground troops to locate enemy base camps and supply dumps.
The site chosen by LTC Schroeder for the new fire base in War Zone D was nine kilometers north of the Song Dong Nai in the Tan Uyen District of Bien Hoa Province, just one kilometer south of the Binh Duong-Bien Hoa Province boundary. The base was given the name Fire Support Base Nashua. The exact location was in a large cleared area that was once the location of a Vietnamese “Strategic Hamlet” that had been abandoned several years before. The site was accessible by a dirt road that branched to the northeast off Highway 16 about six kilometers north of Tan Uyen. The Song Be River flowed west to east in a serpentine path some six kilometers to the north. Schroeder selected the site after an aerial reconnaissance of the area, but had to convince his boss that it was the best site. Brigadier General Forbes was concerned that the site selected by the Warrior commander was too far north, and that it could not be easily reinforced. Forbes wanted the firebase established further to the south, but Schroeder convinced him otherwise.
The site chosen by LTC Schroeder had several advantages. It had clear fields of fire out to several hundred meters around the perimeter, and it was accessible to tracked and wheeled vehicles. A platoon from Delta Troop, 17th Armored Cavalry was attached to Schroeder’s battalion, and its nine M113 ACAV vehicles would escort the battalion trains to the new firebase after the rifle companies air assaulted into the area to secure it. Schroeder didn’t think the Cav’s tracked vehicles would be of much use in the heavy jungle of War Zone D, but their .50 caliber and 7.62 machine guns would bolster the defensive fires along the firebase’s perimeter. He was also promised a battery of 155mm howitzers that would also have to be towed in. Schroeder wanted the firebase established as quickly as possible so that the Warrior battalion’s rifle companies could begin operations in the new AO. He was unaware that the site selected for Fire Support Base Nashua was in the center of a Vietcong regimental area with well-concealed base camps all around. The enemy would not abandon their stronghold without a fight.
Major Ed King, the battalion S-3 operations officer, developed the plan for the Warrior battalion’s incursion into War Zone D. King, a Citadel graduate, joined the Warrior battalion a month prior, and quickly gained the confidence of LTC Schroeder. King was a natural for the job, an expert planner and a quick thinker, who could quickly adjust tactical plans to adapt to any changing situation. Like Schroeder, Ed King never “lost his cool.”
King coordinated with Major Maus, the A Company, 51st LRP Commander, to insert five Long Range Patrols into the AO beginning on 3 December. The LRP teams would prowl the areas in a five-kilometer circle around the proposed fire base location, and watch the trails for enemy movement. The Warrior battalion commander did not want any surprises when his men air-assaulted into the area. A few days earlier an aero scout team from 3/17 Cav had spotted an enemy soldier in a tree near one of the proposed LZs. Schroeder and King both knew that the enemy routinely employed LZ watchers.
After Major Maus’ LRP teams conducted their reconnaissance missions, 4/12th’s four infantry companies would air assault into the area on the morning of 4 December, and establish the perimeter of Fire Support Base Nashua. Once the infantry companies secured the perimeter, Charlie Battery, 40th Artillery would sling load it’s 105mm howitzers in by CH-47, Chinook helicopters. Simultaneously, the battalion’s tactical operations center (TOC) would be airlifted in, followed by other support units. A combat engineer squad from the 87th Engineer Company would also join the battalion to clear any mines in the area and operate the D7 bulldozer and ditch digger that were to be airlifted in.
While the massive airmobile operation was in progress, an armored cavalry platoon from D Troop, 17th Cavalry and support vehicles would depart Fire Support Base Hanover just north of Tan Uyen for the new location. The 3/17th Air Cavalry operating out of Hanover would provide convoy cover and security on the route, and conduct reconnaissance in the new area. Artillery support would be provided by Bravo Battery, 2/40th Artillery located at Fire Base Hanover. King and Schroeder hoped that the speed and size of the operation would surprise the enemy and buy enough time to get the firebase established before nightfall. The first twelve hours of the operation were critical.
CHAPTER 2
ACROSS THE SONG DONG NAI
3–4 December 1967
The first of Major Maus’ six-man LRP teams was on the helipad at 1700 hours on the afternoon of 3 December. The men wore camouflage fatigues and bush hats with their faces painted to match the camouflage pattern of their uniforms. Their rucksacks each weighed up to 75 pounds, and were loaded with extra ammunition, Claymore mines, LAWs, and an assortment of other survival equipment. This was their first real mission and the men were pumped. Their adrenalin began to flow as they clambered aboard the Huey that would insert them into the jungles of War Zone D. The pilot pulled pitch and the ship lifted off the helipad bound for the LZ. Flying low level, the UH-1D skimmed over the fast flowing waters of the Song Dong Nai and then continued north over the jungle canopy toward a tiny remote landing zone selected for the insertion. The LZ was five kilometers southwest of the area where Schroeder’s infantrymen would land the following morning. Five minutes after they took off, the pilot yelled over the roar of the Huey’s engines that they were 30 seconds out of the LZ.
The LRPs, seated on the floor of the slick with their legs dangling over the side, stepped out onto the skids, and prepared to leap to the ground as the ship touched down. Three feet off the ground the men jumped and ran toward the tree line, while the ship took off over the trees. It was a perfect insertion. After moving into the jungle, the patrol formed a tight perimeter and listened for any movement toward their location. Before moving out, the patrol members used branches and other flora to complete their camouflage.
Fifteen minutes later, a second LRP team was inserted three kilometers to the east. Both teams moved to pre-selected night positions as darkness fell. The LRPs sensed the enemy’s presence around them, and they occasionally heard the sound of movement amid the cacophony of sounds in the darkened jungle. They hunkered down in the thick undergrowth hoping not to be discovered. Their job was to watch, listen, and report enemy sightings and movement.
A third LRP team was inserted at 0630 hours on the morning of 4 December. Their AO was four kilometers southeast of 4/12th’s designated LZs. While the LRPs began to prowl the jungle looking for the enemy, Schroeder’s infantry companies began to line up on their pickup zones (PZs) for the airmobile assaults. Ed King and the airmobile company commanders planned the operation with clockwork precision. King had requested enough aviation support to lift all four of the battalion’s rifle companies simultaneously. He also flew a reconnaissance of all the pick-up and landing zones with each company commander the day before, and he was confident that the battalion would be firmly established in the new AO by sunset.
At 0730, thirty minutes before the 4/12th airmobile operation was to commence, LRP Team 12 made contact with a VC platoon, less than four kilometers away from one of the Warrior battalion’s LZs. The firefight lasted less than ten minutes and the LRPs managed to kill two VC and wound four others. Outnumbered and outgunned, they called for artillery support, broke contact, and sprinted toward one of their prearranged PZs with the enemy in hot pursuit. Their job was not to stand and fight. At 0755, the LRPs jumped aboard the extraction ship, while Major Maus orbited overhead in a C&C chopper, directing a pair of gunships that pounded the surrounding jungle with rockets and machine gun fire. The Huey lifted off amid a hail of gunfire from the surrounding jungle.
LTC Schroeder and Major King monitored the LRP extraction from their C&C ship, as they prepared for the battalion’s airmobile insertion. They were concerned. In addition to the LRP contact, Delta Troop, 3/17th Cavalry scouts had reported numerous sightings of enemy bunkers, trenches, and tunnel entrances near the Warrior battalion’s LZs. The scouts also report
ed small groups of enemy soldiers moving throughout the AO. Some wore NVA uniforms. The commander and his operations officer were also worried about a report they received from a forward air controller (FAC) the evening prior. Three Russian made enemy trucks were spotted driving on a secondary road about eight kilometers north of the LZs. The trucks disappeared before a flareship and gunships could arrive on the scene. Both Schroeder and King were apprehensive about the level of enemy activity in the area.
As the LRPs flew back to their base at Bien Hoa, the sky around them began to fill with helicopters. The airmobile operation began shortly after 0800 hours. Alpha and Bravo companies were picked up just outside the perimeter of Fire Base Concord, while Charlie and Echo Companies moved to PZ s north and east of the Song Dong Nai. As artillery and gunships pounded the LZs with preparatory fires, the lift ships made their final approaches. The men were briefed to expect a “hot” LZ.
The airmobile assault achieved tactical surprise, and all LZs were “cold.” By 0905 hours all four rifle companies were on the ground. The battalion’s prior experience conducting airmobile assaults paid off, and this one was performed with precision. Bob Eaton, Bravo Company CO, wrote, “There was no confusion, no problem. We went in fast. Set up security. Cleared fields of fire, and dug in. We expected to be hit immediately.”
Days of Valor Page 3
