Days of Valor

by Robert L. Tonsetic

  Throughout the remainder of the day, intelligence reports were received indicating a strong enemy presence west and northwest of the racetrack. LTC Gibler and Major MacGill developed plans to search and clear those areas over the next two days. Both men knew that some tough fighting lay ahead for the Cottonbalers.

  Mike Swearingen, a 199th LIB Public Information Officer (PIO), accompanied the Cottonbaler battalion on its second trip to the racetrack. Swearingen, who escorted members of the media covering the fighting in Cholon, recalled, “There were so many news media types trapped in Saigon for Tet that we literally were hauling them around by the deuce-and-half loads to get them to the action.” When a reporter accompanied a unit on patrol, Swearingen usually went along to insure things went smoothly.

  Describing one patrol, the former PIO wrote, “The infantry companies moved out in two columns, one on each side of the street, just like in the WWII movies…. The door-to-door stuff was new to everyone. I tossed my first frag grenade there during Tet.” Swearingen further wrote, “On one sweep with the 3/7th in Cholon, the VC had weighted down an NVA flag in the middle of the street as sniper bait. Nobody was dumb enough to fall for the bait of course, and the VC snipers were quickly engaged and killed up in higher buildings on both sides of the street. I was planning on going back and snagging that flag after the fighting, but someone beat me to it.”

  When he was not ferrying the press around Cholon, Lieutenant Swearingen set up a makeshift office at the racetrack. As he described, “There was a great overview of the city from the top of the grandstands, which is where I slept in a VC hammock…. There was a knocked out ACAV out in the racetrack infield and an empty yellow three-hatch South Vietnamese water truck just outside the track.” He later found out that the VC had used the truck to smuggle their men into Cholon and the racetrack before the offensive.

  On 10 February, the Cottonbaler companies swept through the areas to the northwest and west of the racetrack. There was only light contact with small enemy units and individuals during the daylight operations. As darkness fell, the rifle platoons established ambush positions throughout the areas to the west.

  Chester Porter was assigned to 3rd Platoon, Delta Company. Describing his platoon’s activities that day he wrote, “We found some weapons caches but nothing significant. At dark we set up in a three-story building.” The platoon leader positioned two squads on the third floor of the building and two on the second floor to cover the street below. Two men were left to cover the first floor entrance that was booby trapped with a grenade, and a Claymore mine was placed in front of the door. The platoon leader put the men on 50 percent alert with half the men trying to catch a few hours sleep while the other half stood guard.”

  Porter continued, “Around 2200 hours, we heard someone on a loudspeaker speaking in Vietnamese. Our Kit Carson scout said it was an enemy commander calling his units together. Shortly after that, North Viet Regulars started coming out of the alley across the street. We opened up on them from the third floor…. As soon as we opened up an RPG round came through the wall and went out the ceiling where it exploded. It was followed by a second RPG round.”

  Porter’s squad was sprayed with bits of concrete, plaster, and small bits of shrapnel, but no one was seriously wounded. The firefight continued for several minutes, and several enemy were cut down as they tried to rush the building where Porter’s platoon was holed up. Similar actions were going on all over Cholon, as both sides battled for control of the streets.

  Late in the afternoon of 10 February, LTC Bill Schroeder, Task Force Ware’s G-3, choppered into the racetrack to confer with LTC Gibler. Bill Schroeder recalled that when he entered Gibler’s command post at the racetrack, the Cottonbaler commander was heating a can of C-rations, and joked with Schroeder, “You sonofabitch, I just heated up my C-rations.” Schroeder told him, “You better put them aside because I’ve got a big one for you.”

  Schroeder and Gibler were friends from the days when Schroeder commanded the 4/12th Infantry. Schroeder passed the latest intelligence to Gibler. The ARVN were convinced that they knew the location of the Communist command post that was directing the attacks on Saigon. ARVN intelligence officers had informed their US counterparts that Major General Tran Do of the South Vietnamese People’s Liberation Forces was directing the offensive from the command post. Schroeder also revealed that the command post was located in a small village just three kilometers west of Gibler’s CP at the racetrack. According to the ARVN, the enemy CP was housed in a concealed bunker and tunnel complex beneath the village.

  After pinpointing the location of the VC command post on his map, Schroeder told Gibler that the ARVN wanted to attack the Communist CP and had asked for the 3/7th to provide a blocking force for the operation. According to Schroeder, Gibler wanted the mission of attacking the CP. With the attached Dusters and quad-fifties, the Cottonbaler commander was confident that his battalion was better suited for the mission. Schroeder agreed to present Gibler’s proposal to General Ware and the Vietnamese authorities.

  Major General Ware convinced his ARVN counterpart to let Gibler’s task force lead the attack. The 33d ARVN Ranger Battalion was ordered to provide a blocking force south of the village. The Cottonbaler commander and his S3 quickly formulated a plan for the assault. Captain South’s Bravo Company was assigned the mission of blocking the area north of the village, while Captain Jeffrey Delia’s Charlie Company was ordered to sweep into the village from the east. A platoon from Delta Troop, 17th Cav, reinforced by two M42 Dusters with 40mm cannons, was ordered to move to positions west of the village to bloc that escape route.

  It was mid-afternoon on 11 February before Delta Company, Bravo Company, and the 33d Ranger Battalion were in position to begin the operation. In the sweltering heat of that Sunday afternoon, Captain Delia’s Delta Company crossed their line of departure, moving west toward the village.

  Brad Huffman was a rifleman with Delta Company. He wrote, “We were on patrols in the streets around the racetrack…about all the time and never got enough sleep. We were sent to a little village a couple of clicks out of town. I think maybe 6 or 7 hooches is all. We found nothing except old women and kids. We were about to turn around and go through again when all hell broke loose. The VC came out of the ground. They were in underground bunkers and tunnels and the entrances were very well hidden.”

  Chester Porter, who was assigned to Delta Company’s 3rd Platoon, wrote, “Second and third squads were sent to sweep the village, the French lady (a magazine reporter) came with us. We swept the village and found nothing. Both squads took a break while the officers planned the next move. The village had several large haystacks, and the reporter wanted some pictures of the men tearing down the haystacks. There were five men standing next to one of the stacks, and one of them picked up a long pole and attempted to stick it into the stack. The haystacks were camouflage for bunkers, and as soon as the grunt stuck the pole into the stack, a machine gun opened up.”

  Specialist-Five Ronald Bagen’s squad took the brunt of the fire. The 20-year-old Ohioan was wounded along with several men in his squad. Bagen moved forward to evacuate two of the men and was hit again. This time the wound was fatal. Twenty-year old Specialist James Tinsley from St Louis, Missouri, who was providing covering fire for his squad leader, was also shot and killed. Fire team leader, Sergeant Donald Colson was the third member of the squad to fall. The 24-year-old Louisianan was Regular Army, and had completed three months of his tour when he fell. As the squad withdrew, one of the grunts fired a burst into the haystack, setting it on fire. Two enemy soldiers fled from the burning haystack. Chester Porter, his buddy Barnes, and an M60 gunner cut down the fleeing VC as they ran toward 3rd Platoon’s positions. As the embattled squads withdrew to a rice paddy dike on the edge of the village, the enemy started firing from spider holes and trees in the village. The Delta Company grunts returned fire and managed to set several more haystacks and hooches on fire.

  Captain Jeff Dalia,
the Delta CO, repositioned his men to gain fire superiority. Brad Huffman’s squad took cover behind a rice paddy dike and began to return the enemy fire. An M42 Duster rolled up behind Huffman’s squad and began firing its twin Bofors 40mm cannon at the VC positions. The enemy fire began to slack off as the 40mm point-detonated HEIT projectiles slammed into the enemy bunker positions at a rate of 240 rounds per minute. The noise was deafening as the exploding rounds reverberated through the village. The insurgents returned fire with small arms and RPGs.

  Chester Porter’s platoon used the covering fire from the Dusters to work their way around to the west side the village where they gained a foothold. One of the platoon’s machine gunners, PFC Waller, laid down a base of fire for his platoon’s advance until an RPG round exploded in front of his gun, spraying his face with tiny bits of white-hot shrapnel. After checking that his M60 was still capable of firing, the wounded machine gunner loaded another belt of ammo and resumed firing. According to Porter, 3rd Platoon’s advance stalled when “we found ourselves pinned down by an NVA soldier in a well. We hit the well with LAWs, but he kept us pinned down till dark when we pulled back to the dike.”

  Under heavy fire, small groups of enemy soldiers attempted to flee to the north where they ran into Captain South’s Bravo Company. Other more diehard VC fought it out in their bunkers in the village. The Delta Company grunts were taking out the enemy bunkers one by one, using fire and movement, but it was costly work. Sergeant Jerry Bowling and Specialists Gary Vickery, Adalberto Caceres, and James Tinsley from Delta Company were killed as the heavy fighting continued.

  Enraged by the enemy’s stubborn resistance, the Delta Company grunts continued pouring fire into the village, burning up magazine after magazine of the their basic load of ammo. When he learned that his rifle squads were almost out of M16 and M60 ammo and grenades, Captain Dalia radioed for an emergency resupply of ammunition. The battalion resupply helicopter was enroute to Long Binh when it was diverted back to FSB Zinderneuf to pick up a load of ammo for Delta Company. The headquarters troops loaded the Huey with crates of small arms ammo, grenades, and LAWs, and the pilot lifted off the resupply pad en route to the embattled Delta Company.

  First Lieutenant Gerard Doiron’s platoon held the right flank of Bravo Company’s blocking position. A group of fifteen heavily armed enemy soldiers ran right toward Dorion’s platoon. Specialist Dennis Spearman spotted the VC first, and moved his fire team into a position to take them under fire. He had his men hold their fire until the VC were within 30 meters of his team’s position, and then they delivered a deadly volley. When Lieutenant Dorion saw his right flank was about to be overrun, he fired his grenade launcher into a group of five VC, killing or disabling all of them. Then he ran toward the platoon’s endangered flank, distributing ammunition to each position. More fleeing VC ran directly into Dorion’s platoon as they attempted to break out of the encirclement. Two of Dorion’s men, Specialist Ronald Woody and PFC Richard Acker, were wounded, but the platoon managed to kill seven VC and take one prisoner. When the lieutenant moved forward to check the enemy bodies and recover their weapons, three of the VC who were feigning death opened fire on him. Doiron, who was wounded, managed to kill all three.

  Ron Whelan was on one of Bravo Company’s radios calling in medevacs for the wounded when a group of NVA attempted to break out of the village. Whelan estimated that a hundred or so uniformed NVA fled across the open rice paddies toward Bravo Company’s blocking position. He wrote, “Thankfully, some helicopter gunships showed up to attack them in the open paddies to help us out.” While the gunships cut down a number of the fleeing enemy, a number of others rushed right toward the dike where the Bravo Company grunts were positioned.

  Bill Plains, another Bravo Company soldier, spotted “four or five” NVA running out of the village “with AK’s in both hands.” The enemy soldiers were headed for a patch of woods that stretched along Bravo Company’s flank, then bent around to the company’s rear. Seizing the initiative, Plains moved down the dike toward the flank to cut them off. He wrote, “I headed down the dike knowing if they made the woods we would be in deep shit, they would be behind us. I know none of them made the woods.”

  Back at the village, Brad Huffman’s squad was ordered to send a five-man detail to the LZ to retrieve the ammunition which was inbound on the resupply bird. Staying low, PFC Huffman and four other men headed for the LZ, accompanied by two of the company’s wounded. On the way they captured a VC who was running from the village. After tying up their prisoner, the detail continued on to the LZ, where they popped a smoke grenade signaling the resupply Huey where to land. As the ship touched down, it drew fire, and the S4 troops began tossing the ammo crates out the doors as quickly as they could, unloading the chopper in record time. The two WIAs and the POW were then put aboard, and the Huey lifted off for the 3d Field Hospital in Saigon. Huffman and his resupply detail then made their way back to the village and distributed the badly needed ammo to the rest of the company.

  In the meantime, gunships and the M42 Dusters continued to pound the enemy positions. When movement was detected near a hootch a few meters away from Huffman’s location, a Duster slammed four rounds into it. Huffman’s buddy, nicknamed Cowboy, was wounded in the left arm and Huffman felt a burning sensation on his back. A piece of white hot shrapnel from one of the 40mm rounds had landed on his back and set his shirt on fire. His buddy, Cowboy, reached over and put the fire out, and the pair resumed firing. As Huffman described, “Seemed like there was NVA running back and forth in there, and we would send out a wall of lead in their direction, which must have been pretty effective…”

  In the failing daylight, Major MacGill landed just outside the village to take command of the operation. His ship was fired on as he touched down. MacGill leapt from the door and sprinted for the Delta Company positions amid a volley of small-arms fire. Jim MacGill recalled that the Dusters were positioned on the edge of the perimeter where they were blasting the enemy bunkers with round after round of 40mm cannon fire. The explosions were deafening.

  Major MacGill ordered Captain Dalia to prepare for a final assault on the VC positions. As darkness descended, the exhausted Delta Company grunts began their final assault to finish off the remaining enemy soldiers. When the fighting ended around 2000 hours, Delta and Bravo Company called dust-offs for their dead and wounded. Five Cottonbalers had been killed and 12 were wounded. A ghastly pall hung over the area, and the night had grown fully dark as the Cottonbalers began their search of the village.

  Twenty-four enemy bodies were pulled from the battered bunkers and tunnels. Only three enemy soldiers were found alive to be taken prisoner. Brad Huffman wrote, “We spent quite awhile gathering up bodies, weapons, papers, and I remember finding a lot of maps.” Chester Porter recalled, “There were numerous sacks of money…found in the bunkers.” Several of the enemy casualties were officers, indicating that the village had indeed been a command post. One of them appeared to be a senior officer. Huffman recalled, “We all had to check out this NVA General in his uniform, and then we burnt the whole place.”

  The Cottonbalers were later told that the body of the high-ranking officer was not that of Major General Tran Do. This was later confirmed by ARVN authorities after a full investigation and follow-on reports concerning General Do’s whereabouts. While they had failed to kill or capture the Communist general, the Cottonbalers did destroy his command post that had been directing the insurgent forces fighting in the Cholon area.

  The fight on 11 February was the last major contact for the Cottonbalers during the Tet Offensive and its aftermath. Of the 199th LIB’s three infantry battalions, the Cottonbalers suffered more casualties than the other two battalions combined. For actions in Cholon during the Tet Offensive, the 3/7th Infantry Battalion received the Army’s Valorous Unit award.

  The Cottonbalers remained in the Cholon area for another week, conducting sweeps and patrols. Snipers remained a constant threat during these operations.
On 18 February, the 3/7th Infantry was released from the operational control of Task Force Ware and returned to the 199th LIB’s control. Responsibility for the Cholon area was once again assumed by ARVN forces. The Tet Offensive of 1968 was at an end for the officers and men of the Cottonbaler battalion.

  CHAPTER 14

  APRIL 1968—A CRUEL MONTH

  The 199th Light Infantry Brigade’s participation in the Long Binh/ Saigon Tet Campaign ended on 18 February 1968, when the 3/7th Infantry ended operations in Cholon. In recognition of its role in defeating the Communist attacks on Long Binh and Saigon, the 199th LIB was awarded the Valorous Unit Award. When the Tet Campaign ended, no one anticipated that the Communists would launch another major offensive in less than three months.

  In the interim, the light infantrymen of the 199th LIB relentlessly pursued the Communist forces as they withdrew back to their jungle sanctuaries. During operations UNIONTOWN III, VALLEY FORGE, BOXSPRINGS, and WILDERNESS, the grunts searched for and destroyed NVA and VC units and their base camps in areas stretching from southern War Zone D to an area west of Tay Ninh along the Cambodian border. It was tough, demanding, and dangerous work without any major victories. There was little, if any, respite between these operations, and attrition took its toll on the rifle companies. More than 80 brave men were killed between the Tet Offensive of January–February 1968 and the May Offensive of that year. Hundreds more were wounded. Two of the most costly battles occurred in late April of 1968 during Operation TOAN THANG.

  On 11 April, the 199th LIB concluded its operations in the Tay Ninh area. The 3/7th Cottonbalers moved by air back to the brigade’s main base at Long Binh, while the 4/12th Warriors moved by land convoy. The 2/3d Infantry remained under the operational control of the US 9th Division south of Saigon.