ment, make extortion, and agitate social disorder?” Zhang reported to his
superiors that the American minister acted “quite guilty” and “emphasized
the friendly relationship between China and Amer i ca.” Still the vio lence
continued.22
Frustrated by the seeming inability of the U.S. to protect Chinese
nationals, Minister Zheng Zaoru wrote to his Foreign Office from Wash-
ington, D.C., proposing a new solution in the spring of 1886. To his mind,
China did not have the military might or po liti cal clout to enforce its treaty
rights, so the government had to find other means to protect overseas Chi-
nese and, with them, China’s reputation. Minister Zheng suggested that
China impose its own ban on the emigration of Chinese laborers to the
United States.23 A self- imposed prohibition, he reasoned, could save igno-
rant Chinese workers both exploitation by labor brokers and expulsion by
American citizens. And if these workers no longer competed with American
laborers, Zheng hoped that Chinese merchants would face less resentment
and hostility in the United States. For Zheng, the fate of Chinese merchants,
THE EXCLUSION CONSENSUS
177
and the international trade they promoted, was a higher priority than the
lives of peasants. China could sacrifice the migration of the lower classes to
protect the prospects of the upper. The workers, Zheng reassured the court,
could go instead to Hawai‘i, Mexico, or Panama.24
Zheng assured the Foreign Office that his self- restriction treaty would ap-
pease the Cleveland administration while ending the humiliating anti-
Chinese vio lence in the U.S. West. He explained, “This plan is not intended
to help the Americans mistreat us, but to save Chinese from misfortune.
The United States is unable to stop the undesirable type of Chinese from
coming, so we must stop them from leaving.” Zheng believed a program
of self- restriction would lay blame on the United States for “being unable to
protect the Chinese.” He predicted that the American response would be
deep self- reflection and, ultimately, the end of discriminatory immigra-
tion laws “in order to avoid the ridicule of the nations of the world.” Self-
restriction, then, promised to shame the United States and save face for
China.25
Prohibiting emigration from China was not without pre ce dent. Since the
Qing conquest in 1644, the Imperial Court had discouraged, restricted, or
barred Chinese emigration to prevent po liti cal adversaries from amassing fol-
lowers abroad. But as Qing power diminished in the nineteenth century,
the prohibition became little more than rhe toric. “The old prohibitory law
has not been repealed,” one Chinese envoy observed, “but it has repealed
itself.” Without officially rescinding the prohibition, China signaled its sup-
port for emigration, starting with the Burlingame Treaty in 1868. Indeed,
when Chinese diplomats began protesting U.S. immigration restrictions in
the 1870s and 1880s, they were tacitly condoning emigration once again.26
With the upsurge of vio lence against overseas Chinese, the Foreign Of-
fice returned to the idea of prohibiting emigration, although such a policy
would be nearly impossible in practice. The Imperial Court did not have a
tight grip on the mobility of its subjects. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office
accepted Zheng’s proposal, recommending it to the Imperial Court, and fi-
nally sent it to Denby in Beijing in August 1886.27 After bitterly com-
plaining that the U.S. government had failed to stop “outrages” or punish
the offenders, the Foreign Office’s dispatch outlined the proposed treaty. Like
the Chinese Restriction Act of 1882, the new treaty would continue to
al ow the unfettered movement of Chinese merchants, students, or diplomats.
178 EXCLUSION
However, it would “strenuously prohibit Chinese laborers who have never
visited the United States . . . from proceeding therein” and bar returning
Chinese workers “who have no families, valuables or property” in the United
States. This mea sure of self- exclusion would help Chinese workers avoid
“treading whence the source of danger springs.”28
Negotiating Chinese Exclusion
When Minister Denby received word of China’s proposal, he tried, with little
success, to contain his excitement, fearing that appearing “too eager” could
tip Amer ica’s hand. “If China of her own volition enlarges the restrictive op-
eration of the treaties,” he wrote to Bayard, “she will be doing exactly the
best thing for the United States.” Such a treaty could achieve exclusion of
Chinese workers with China’s blessing. If this came to pass, Denby realized,
U.S. congressmen would no longer be legislating with their hands tied by
diplomatic agreements.29
Like Bayard, Denby believed that Chinese exclusion was imperative. If
the United States did not find a way to stop the invasion of Chinese, Denby
later wrote in his memoir, he believed that “the pacific slope would be sub-
merged, and its civilization would be wrecked. The ‘yellow peril’ would at-
tack our institutions, our customs, and habits, and overwhelm them.” He
allowed that the Chinese “unquestionably” had “good traits”— including
industry, honesty, and admirable temperament— but these attributes only
made them more threatening to white workers. Furthermore, the Chinese
were “excessively stubborn” in maintaining their “own peculiar customs” and
“never assimilate with any other people wherever they are.” He further noted
that in the years following emancipation, “we are having a sufficiently dif-
ficult task in managing the black race,” which should “cause us to pause in
undertaking to make citizens of the people who belong to the yellow race.”
When Denby forwarded the treaty proposal to Bayard, he did not feel the
need to reiterate these well- known reasons for prohibiting Chinese migra-
tion. “The Department,” he stated, “is already in full possession of my views
touching the question of Chinese emigration and the desirability of re-
stricting it in any proper and lawful manner.”30
Although Denby sent the State Department several letters and a tele gram
regarding the proposed treaty in August of 1886, he did not manage to reach
THE EXCLUSION CONSENSUS
179
Bayard, who was away from Washington, D.C. The secretary of state did
not learn of the Chinese proposal until months later when the new Chinese
minister at Washington, Zhang Yinhuan (Chang Yen Hoon), raised the
matter. The previous Chinese minister, Zheng Zaoru, had been forced to
abruptly retire when he suffered a paralyzing illness. His replacement was a
wealthy native of Guangdong Province. As a young man, Zhang Yinhuan
had failed his district examination so he purchased the title of student at
the Imperial Acad emy and later the rank of magistrate. He served briefly in
the Foreign Office before being dismissed in scandal, but still managed to
secure the position of minister to the United States, Peru, and Spain. In
Washington, D.C., Zhang became
known for his lavish parties, great love
of entertainment, and fierce determination to finish what his pre de ces sor had
started.31
When Zhang told Bayard of China’s proposal to ban emigration in Jan-
uary 1887, the secretary immediately began negotiations to make the idea a
real ity. Bayard drew up terms that would be ideal for the United States,
namely, a thirty- year prohibition of all Chinese laborers with automatic re-
newal if neither country abrogated the treaty. Zhang met Bayard’s ambitious
proposal with a new sense of empowerment. With the United States obvi-
ously eager to negotiate an exclusion treaty, he realized the time had come
to press again for redress. In his response to Bayard, Zhang stated it was
“premature” to negotiate a treaty when the matter of compensation had yet
to be settled. At their next face- to- face meeting, he reiterated to Bayard that
the U.S. government “should close the Rock Springs case as soon as pos-
si ble, if it wanted to maintain a friendly relationship between the two na-
tions. Other wise we cannot suppress our own people’s anger.” Much to
Zhang’s chagrin, Bayard refused to say a word in response.32
Following the awkward conversation, Zhang complained to the Foreign
Office, “This is just like someone in heavy debt, not thinking about how to
pay for it, but sparing no effort to make new regulations preventing debtors
from entering their home.” “It is a typical American way,” he wrote, “making
laws to adapt to their own needs.” In fact, although Bayard stayed silent in
person, he secretly began lobbying for redress, writing a confidential letter
to Perry Belmont, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the
House of Representatives, to urge him to push forward indemnity for China.
On February 24, 1887, President Cleveland signed into law a bill that granted
180 EXCLUSION
the Chinese government $147,748.74 in damages for the massacre in Rock
Springs. Bayard personally went to Zhang’s residence in Washington, D.C.,
to pres ent him with payment, with the hope that negotiations would then
go forward.33
One payout, amid continuing vio lence, could not silence the Chinese on
the matter of redress. Zhang offered Bayard a counterproposal a few days
later, but only after raising the matter of another expulsion (this one in Ju-
neau, Alaska) and complaining that the “population of the western Territo-
ries” now look on “acts of expelling and burning out the Chinese as sources
of plea sure.” Instead of Amer ica’s desired prohibition period of thirty years,
Zhang proposed that China prohibit labor emigration “from time to time
in such a manner as may be required by circumstances.” He then insisted
on making exceptions from this already lax proposal for Chinese laborers
who had family, property, or debts in the United States. In reply, Bayard
demanded more specific and restrictive terms: a prohibition of working- class
emigration for twenty years with a few exceptions for laborers who had “a
lawful wife, child or parent in the United States” or property valued at one
thousand dollars or more.34
Zhang acceded to Bayard’s terms on emigration, but the issue of anti-
Chinese vio lence continued to complicate negotiations. In May 1887, word
came that white miners had massacred dozens of Chinese on the Snake River
in Oregon.35 That same month, unknown arsonists burned the Chinatown
in San Jose, California, to the ground. Zhang wanted additional indemnity
paid and demanded that the new treaty contain stipulations for the protec-
tion of Chinese in Amer ica. Bayard explained that the U.S. federal govern-
ment had little power over the populace on the American frontier, so he could
offer no assurances. Incensed, Zhang told Bayard that the United States must
offer Chinese mi grants “the same mea sure of protection as is extended to
Americans in China.” After months of pleading letters, Zhang’s tone fi nally
turned scornful. “If this is impossible under [the American] system,” he con-
tinued, “then it must be inferred that the Government of the United States
is impotent to discharge its international obligations.” Bayard offered no re-
sponse to this irate letter. Negotiations stalled for six months.36
By this point, more than two years had passed since the vio lence in
Eureka, California, and the wave of expulsions that followed. In the interim,
Congress did not stand idle. Between 1885 and 1888, congressmen intro-
THE EXCLUSION CONSENSUS
181
Chinatown Fire in San Jose, California. Five thousand onlookers came to watch as
Market Street Chinatown burned on May 4, 1887. Following this act of arson, Chinese
residents relocated to the outskirts of the city, building Woolen Mills Chinatown and
Heinlenville Chinatown. History San Jose Photographic Collection, 1997-300-1683.
Courtesy of History San Jose.
duced eight bills with the purpose of strengthening the Chinese Restriction
Act, but none earned widespread support. There were only a few legislators
ready to abandon the possibility of a diplomatic solution and the coopera-
tive open door. Senator John H. Mitchell, a Republican representing Oregon,
became the spokesman for congressmen who were unwilling to wait for the
long- promised treaty. Claiming to speak for the people of the Pacific North-
west, he introduced a bill “abrogating all treaties . . . [that] inhibit the
United States from absolutely prohibiting the coming of Chinese to the
United States.”
Mitchell was aware, he informed the Senate, that “men hold up their
hands in holy horror” at even the suggestion that Congress should violate
existing treaty agreements and the delicate trust built between the two na-
tions. But unlike his fellow statesmen, he did not hold high hopes for the
China Trade. Armed with financial reports, he argued that “the balances
182 EXCLUSION
are all against us and the benefits with China.” China produced many prod-
ucts that Americans wanted to buy, but the United States produced few
commodities that sold well in China. The result was an imbalance of trade
and power. While Amer ica could risk losing the transpacific trade, Mitchell
observed, China could not. Mitchell wagered that China would never close
its ports to American merchants, no matter what insults Congress inflicted,
because of these stark economic realities. Therefore, he urged immediate
unilateral exclusion and presented a bill to that effect. West Coast represen-
tatives echoed his opinion. In the summer of 1887, a Senate foreign relations
subcommittee heard evidence from five senators and seven representatives
from California, Nevada, and Oregon. The congressmen asserted, without
exception, that 90 percent of their constituents would abandon all commerce
with China rather than accept Chinese migration. Most of the West Coast
was willing to sacrifice the cooperative open door for the sake of Chinese
exclusion.37
Many other congressmen, however, viewed Mitchell’s assessment of the
China Trade as shortsighted and his call for abrogation reckless
. The Senate
referred his unilateral exclusion bill to the Committee of Foreign Affairs,
where it languished. Though white vio lence had convinced many skeptics
that exclusion was necessary, Congress remained committed to a diplomatic
solution. Senator John Sherman, an Ohio Republican and chair of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, had been one of the holdouts in 1882, urging
limited restriction and diplomatic caution. But Eureka, Rock Springs, and
Tacoma made him into a ready advocate for exclusion in 1886. “[I]n the
opinion of the committee [on foreign relations], and I may say in the opinion
of the Department of State and of the Trea sury Department as well,” he de-
clared, “the time has come when the exclusion must be absolute.” Still,
Sherman, along with the majority of Congress, believed that the burden fell
on the executive branch. Congress earnestly and repeatedly petitioned the
president for a new treaty “to absolutely exclude Chinese laborers from this
country.”38
After half a year of inaction, the looming presidential election of 1888
brought Bayard back to the negotiating table. President Cleveland was facing
an uphill battle for a second term. He was the first Demo crat to win a presi-
dential race since the Civil War and did so, in 1884, without carry ing any
western states. This time, Cleveland believed he needed a wider base of sup-
THE EXCLUSION CONSENSUS
183
port. In December 1887, he wrote to Bayard to complain, privately, that un-
lawful Chinese migration constantly made the national news. Such “frauds
and evasions” must be prevented, insisted Cleveland, “by us, that is our party. ”
Clearly, the president did not want Republicans like Senator Mitchell to pass
a bill excluding the Chinese and receive the po liti cal payoff. If Demo crats
could resolve the “Chinese question,” Cleveland believed, it would be
another impor tant “string to our bow.” In part, politics drove Cleveland’s anti-
Chinese stance, but so did his earnest belief that the Chinese could not as-
similate into American society. “Our immigration laws were designed to
invite assimilation,” he wrote to Bayard, “not to provide an arena for end-
less antagonism.” In order to end this antagonism and score a po liti cal win,
The Chinese Must Go Page 26
