Mr. M[adison. did justice to the able and close reasoning of Mr. E. but must observe that it did not always accord with itself.] On another occasion, the large States were described (by him) as the Aristocratic States, ready to oppress the small. Now the small are the House of Lords requiring a negative to defend them agst the more numerous Commons. Mr. E. had also erred in saying that no instance had existed in which confederated States had not retained to themselves a perfect equality of suffrage. Passing over the German system in which the K. of Prussia has nine voices, he reminded Mr. E. of the Lycian confederacy, in which the component members had votes proportioned to their importance, and which Montesquieu recommends as the fittest model for that form of Government. Had the fact been as stated by Mr. E. it would have been of little avail to him, or rather would have strengthened the arguments agst. him; The History & fate of the several Confederacies modern as well as Antient, demonstrating some radical vice in their structure. In reply to the appeal of Mr. E. to the faith plighted in the existing federal compact, he remarked that the party claiming from others an adherence to a common engagement ought at least to be guiltless itself of a violation. Of all the States however Connecticut was perhaps least able to urge this plea. Besides the various omissions to perform the stipulated acts from which no State was free, the Legislature of that State had by a pretty recent vote positively refused to pass a law for complying with the Requisitions of Congs. and had transmitted a copy of the vote to Congs. It was urged, he said, continually that an equality of votes in the 2d. branch was not only necessary to secure the small, but would be perfectly safe to the large ones whose majority in the 1st. branch was an effectual bulwark. But notwithstanding this apparent defence, the Majority of States might still injure the majority of people. 1. they could obstruct the wishes and interests of the majority.
2. they could extort measures, repugnant to the wishes & interest of the majority. 3. They could impose measures adverse thereto; as the 2d branch will probly exercise some great powers, in which the 1 st will not participate. He admitted that every peculiar interest whether in any class of citizens, or any description of States, ought to be secured as far as possible. Wherever there is danger of attack there ought be given a constitutional power of defence. But he contended that the States were divided into different interests not by their difference of size, but by other circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly from climate, but principally from [the effects of] their having or not having slaves. These two causes concurred in forming the great division of interests in the U. States. It did not lie between the large & small States: it lay between the Northern & Southern. and if any defensive power were necessary, it ought to be mutually given to these two interests. He was so strongly impressed with this important truth that he had been casting about in his mind for some expedient that would answer the purpose. The one which had occurred was that instead of proportioning the votes of the States in both branches, to their respective numbers of inhabitants computing the slaves in the ratio of 5 to 3. they should be represented in one branch according to the number of free inhabitants only; and in the other according to the whole no. counting the slaves as [if] free. By this arrangement the Southern Scale would have the advantage in one House, and the Northern in the other. He had been restrained from proposing this expedient by two considerations; one was his unwillingness to urge any diversity of interests on an occasion when it is but too apt to arise of itself—the other was the inequality of powers that must be vested in the two branches, and which wd. destroy the equilibrium of interests.
Mr. Elseworth assured the House that whatever might be thought of the Representatives of Connecticut the State was entirely federal in her disposition. [He appealed to her great exertions during the War, in supplying both men & money. The muster rolls would show she had more troops in the field than Virga. If she had been delinquent, it had been from inability, and not more so than other States.]
Mr. Sherman. Mr. M[adison] had animadverted on the delinquency of the States, when his object required him to prove that the Constitution of Congs. was faulty. Congs. is not to blame for the faults of the States. Their measures have been right, and the only thing wanting has been, a further power in Congs. to render them effectual.
GENERAL DEBATE FOLLOWING DECISION FOR
EQUALITY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE SENATE
JULY 16, 1787
MR. RANDOLPH. THE VOTE OF this morning (involving an equality of suffrage in 2d. branch) had embarrassed the business extremely. All the powers given in the Report from the Come. of the whole, were founded on the supposition that a Proportional representation was to prevail in both branches of the Legislature—When he came here this morning his purpose was to have offered some propositions that might if possible have united a great majority of votes, and particularly might provide agst. the danger suspected on the part of the smaller States, by enumerating the cases in which it might lie, and allowing an equality of votes in such cases. But finding from the preceding vote that they persist in demanding an equal vote in all cases, that they have succeeded in obtaining it, and that N. York if present would probably be on the same side, he could not but think we were unprepared to discuss this subject further. It will probably be in vain to come to any final decision with a bare majority on either side. For these reasons he wished the Convention might adjourn, that the large States might consider the steps proper to be taken in the present solemn crisis of the business, and that the small States might also deliberate on the means of conciliation.
Mr. Patterson, thought with Mr. R. that it was high time for the Convention to adjourn that the rule of secrecy ought to be rescinded, and that our Constituents should be consulted. No conciliation could be admissible on the part of the smaller States on any other ground than that of an equality of votes in the 2d. branch. If Mr Randolph would reduce to form his motion for an adjournment sine die,50 he would second it with all his heart.
Genl. Pinkney51 wished to know of Mr R. whether he meant an adjournment sine die, or only an adjournment for the day. If the former was meant, it differed much from his idea He could not think of going to S. Carolina, and returning again to this place. Besides it was chimerical to suppose that the States if consulted would ever accord separately, and beforehand.
Mr. Randolph, had never entertained an idea of an adjournment sine die; & was sorry that his meaning had been so readily & strangely misinterpreted. He had in view merely an adjournment till tomorrow in order that some conciliatory experiment might if possible be devised, and that in case the smaller States should continue to hold back, the larger might then take such measures, he would not say what, as might be necessary.
Mr. Patterson seconded the adjournment till tomorrow, as an opportunity seemed to be wished by the larger States to deliberate further on conciliatory expedients.
On the question for adjourning till tomorrow, [the States were equally divided.]
Mas. no. Cont. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. So it was lost. [Ayes-5; noes—5.]
Mr. Broome52 thought it his duty to declare his opinion agst. an adjournment sine die, as had been urged by Mr. Patterson. Such a measure he thought would be fatal. Something must be done by the Convention tho’ it should be by a bare majority.
Mr. Gerry53 observed that Masts. was opposed to an adjournment, because they saw no new ground of compromise. But as it seemed to be the opinion of so many States that a trial shd be made, the State would now concur in the adjournmt.
Mr. Rutlidgecould see no need of an adjournt. because he could see no chance of a compromise. The little States were fixt. They had repeatedly & solemnly declared themselves to be so. All that the large States then had to do, was to decide whether they would yield or not. For his part he conceived that altho’ we could not do what we thought best, in itself, we ought to do something. Had we not better keep the Govt. up a little longer, hoping that another Convention will supply our omissions, than abandon every thing
to hazard. Our Constituents will be very little satisfied with us if we take the latter course.
Mr. Randolph & Mr. King54 renewed the motion to adjourn till tomorrow.
On the question Mas. ay. Cont. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. divd. [Ayes—7; noes—2; divided—1.]
Adjourned
On the morning following before the hour of the Convention a number of the members from the larger States, by common agreement met for the purpose of consulting on the proper steps to be taken in consequence of the vote in favor of an equal Representation in the 2d. branch, and the apparent inflexibility of the smaller States on that point—Several members from the latter States also attended. The time was wasted in vague conversation on the subject, without any specific proposition or agreement. It appeared indeed that the opinions of the members who disliked the equality of votes differed so much as to the importance of that point, and as to the policy of risking [a failure of] a[ny] general act of the Convention by inflexibly opposing it. Several of them supposing that no good Governnt could or would be built on that foundation, and that as a division of the Convention into two opinions was unavoidable it would be better that the side comprising the principal States, and a majority of the people of America, should propose a scheme of Govt. to the States, than that a scheme should be proposed on the other side, would have concurred in a firm opposition to the smaller States, and in a separate recommendation, if eventually necessary. Others seemed inclined to yield to the smaller States, and to concur in such an Act however imperfect & exceptionable, as might be agreed on by the Convention as a body, tho’ decided by a bare majority of States and by a minority of the people of the U. States. It is probable that the result of this consultation satisfied the smaller States that they had nothing to apprehend from a Union of the larger, in any plan whatever agst. the equality of votes in the 2d. branch.
GETTING DOWN TO DETAILS
Resolutions Adopted by Convention (July 26, 1787)
PAGE 371
Draft Constitution (August 6, 1787)
PAGE 374
Debate on War Power (August 17, 1787)
PAGE 386
Debate on Treaty Power (August 23, 1787)
PAGE 387
Objections of Edmund Randolph, George Mason, and Elbridge Gerry (September 15, 1787)
PAGE 390
Benjamin Franklin: Concluding Appeal for Unanimity (September 17, 1787)
PAGE 392
ONCE THE KEY ISSUE of representation was solved on July 16, the delegates turned their attention to the second branch of government : the executive. They spent much of the next ten days wrestling with an array of questions relating to the election and tenure of the executive (eventually called the president). Then, after two months of deliberations, the convention recessed, instructing a committee of detail to convert the resolutions it had adopted thus far into a working constitution. Their report, delivered on August 6, set the framework for the remaining six weeks of debate.
The most significant development during this final phase was the gradual enlargement of executive power. Into early August, the future presidency remained largely a cipher. It was the Senate, for example, that was expected to make treaties and appointments to other major executive and judicial offices. But once the convention took up the report of the committee of detail, it began to augment executive power. Two debates of August 17 and 23—the first concerned with the power to initiate war, the second with the negotiation of treaties—illustrate this development.
By early September, the exhausted delegates were prepared to complete their work. Forty-two members from twelve states were still in attendance. Three of these—George Mason and Edmund Randolph of Virginia, and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts—had indicated they were unwilling to sign the completed Constitution. Their objections soon provided significant inspiration for the Constitution’s opponents, the Anti-Federalists. It was to overcome their scruples that the convention’s and the country’s great sage, Benjamin Franklin, made a characteristically witty but politically futile appeal for unanimity.
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY CONVENTION
JULY 26, 1787
1. RESOLVED That the Government of the United States ought to con sist of a Supreme Legislative, Judiciary and Executive.
2. RESOLVED That the Legislature of the United States ought to consist of two Branches.
3. RESOLVED That the Members of the first Branch of the Legislature of the United States ought to be elected by the People of the several States for the Term of two Years to be of the Age of twenty five Years at least to be ineligible to and incapable of holding any Office under the Authority of the United States (except those peculiarly belonging to the Functions of the first Branch) during the Time of Service of the first Branch.
4. RESOLVED That the Members of the second Branch of the Legislature of the United States ought to be chosen by the Individual Legislatures to be of the Age of thirty Years at least to hold their Offices for the Term of six Years; one third to go out biennially to receive a Compensation for the Devo tion of their Time to the public Service to be ineligible to and incapable of holding any Office under the Author ity of the United States (except those peculiarly belonging to the Functions of the second Branch) during the Term for which they are elected, and for one Year thereafter.
5. RESOLVED That each Branch ought to possess the Right of originat ing Acts.
6. RESOLVED That the Right of Suffrage in the first Branch of the Legis lature of the United States ought not to be according to the Rules established in the Articles of Confederation but according to some equitable Ratio of Representation.
7. RESOLVED That in the original Formation of the Legislature of the United States the first Branch thereof shall consist of sixty five Members of which Number New Hampshire shall send three Massachusetts eight Rhode Island one Connecticut five New. York six New- Jersey four Pennsylvania eight Delaware one Maryland six Virginia ten North. Carolina five South Carolina five Georgia three.
But as the present Situation of the States may probably alter in the Number of their Inhabitants, the Legislature of the United States shall be authorised from Time to Time to apportion the Number of Representatives; and in Case any of the States shall hereafter be divided, or enlarged by Ad dition of Territory, or any two or more States united, or any new States created within the Limits of the United States, the Legislature of the United States shall possess Authority to regulate the Number of Representatives in any of the foregoing Cases, upon the Principle of the Number of their Inhabitants, according to the Provisions herein after men tioned namely Provided always that Representation ought to be proportioned according to direct Taxation: And in order to ascertain the Alteration in the direct Taxa tion, which may be required from Time to Time, by the Changes in the relative Circumstances of the States
Resolved that a Census be taken, within six years from the first Meeting of the Legislature of the United States, and once within the Term of every ten Years afterwards, of all the Inhabitants of the United States in the Manner and according to the Ratio recommended by Congress in their Resolution of April 18th. 1783 And that the Legislature of the United States shall proportion the direct Taxation accordingly.
Resolved - that all Bills for raising or Appropriating Money, and for fixing the Salaries of the Officers of the Government of the United States shall originate in the first Branch of the Legislature of the United States, and shall not be altered or amended by the second Branch; and that no money shall be drawn from the public Treasury but in Pursuance of Appropriations to be originated by the first Branch.
RESOLVED that from the first Meeting of the Legislature of the United States until a Census shall be taken, all Monies for supply ing the public Treasury by direct Taxation shall be raised from the several States according to the Number of their Representatives respectively in the first Branch.
8. RESOLVED That in the second Branch of the Legislature of the United States each State shall hav
e an equal Vote.
RESOLVED That the Legislature of the United States ought to possess the legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confeder ation; and moreover to legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation.
RESOLVED That the legislative Acts of the United States made by Virtue and in Pursuance of the Articles of Union, and all Treaties made and ratified under the Authority of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the respective States so far as those Acts or Treaties shall relate to the said States, or their Citizens and Inhabitants; and that the Ju dicatures of the several States shall be bound thereby in their Decisions, any thing in the respective Laws of the in dividual States to the contrary notwithstanding.
Founding America: Documents from the Revolution to the Bill of Rights Page 44
