As a preparatory move on July 16, IGHQ ordered General Suetaka to concentrate his 19th Division near Changkufeng, but to take no further action without specific orders. When news of this Japanese troop concentration reached Khabarovsk, Marshal Blyukher put his 40th Infantry Division near Poset Bay on combat alert and ordered two of its regiments to the threatened area. This force was commanded by Colonel V. K. Bazarov.13
While Litvinov and Shigemitsu continued their talks unproductively in Moscow, AGS in Tokyo prepared to launch a probing attack at Changkufeng. Anticipating prompt Imperial approval of the plan, on July 19 AGS brought in General Nakamura, who had not yet left Tokyo for his new command in Korea, and gave him a detailed briefing. Nakamura was told that the 19th Division was to seize and hold Changkufeng; but important restrictions were imposed. It was hoped that the Red Army would not make a determined counterattack. If the Soviets did counterattack, the 19th Division was to hold Changkufeng with the minimum requisite force. Under no circumstances was Chosen Army to expand the scope of operations beyond the immediate vicinity of Changkufeng Hill. If the Soviets broadened the field of battle, authorities in Tokyo would take appropriate steps. To further avoid the danger of escalation, no Japanese aircraft were to be allowed near the combat zone, even if the Soviet side brought air force units into the action. Finally, to ensure that Chosen Army would clearly understand and faithfully implement all orders from Tokyo, AGS would assign several staff officers as liaison with Chosen Army Headquarters in Seoul and 19th Division. These instructions were communicated to General Suetaka, who rushed preparations for his 19th Division to launch a night attack against Changkufeng on July 21. But before the attack could begin, an unforeseen obstacle arose that seemed to cancel the entire operation.
On Friday morning, July 20, Army Minister Itagaki Seishiro went to the Imperial Palace in central Tokyo to obtain permission from the emperor to use force at Changkufeng. This was considered a purely formal, almost ritualistic procedure, for although the supreme command of Japan’s armed forces rested ultimately with the emperor, it was a prerogative that the throne rarely exercised in modern times. However, unknown to the army leaders, Foreign Minister Ugaki and Navy Minister Yonai had already conveyed to the emperor their strong opposition to the proposed Changkufeng operation. The emperor told his aide-de-camp to advise the army chief of staff and army minister that the emperor “unofficially” had decided not to approve the operation, so they need not approach the throne on that matter. Accounts differ as to where and how communications broke down, but all agree that General Itagaki, unaware of the changed situation, was eventually granted an Imperial audience in which he requested permission to mobilize troops for the Changkufeng operation. The emperor, annoyed at his army minister’s persistence in a matter on which the throne had already indicated a negative attitude, pointedly asked Itagaki about the opinions of the Navy Ministry and Foreign Ministry. The general replied that both ministries had been consulted and had agreed to the use of force at Changkufeng. The emperor, feeling that Itagaki intentionally was deceiving him, began to upbraid his army minister in a most vehement and uncharacteristic manner. The Imperial ire was perhaps intensified by the fact that Itagaki had been one of the two chief conspirators behind the Mukden incident of September 18, 1931, that archetypical example of gekokujo that launched Japan’s seizure of Manchuria. The emperor branded as “abominable” the Mukden incident of 1931 and the Marco Polo Bridge incident of 1937, and warned, “Nothing like that must happen this time.” The general retreated from the Imperial presence with this admonition ringing in his ears: “Hereafter you may not move a single soldier without my command.”14
Itagaki was awed and mortified by this almost unprecedented display of Imperial anger. It took several days before he was fully convinced by knowledgeable court circles that the Imperial tongue-lashing did not require him to resign as army minister. One fact that was crystal clear to the chastened army minister was that General Suetaka’s attack, due to begin the following night, would have to be stopped. Orders swiftly were passed down the chain of command to Suetaka’s headquarters near Changkufeng countermanding the scheduled attack.
The 19th Division Headquarters and its commanding general burned with disappointment and frustration. General Suetaka was a professional soldier, a warrior who viewed his calling not as a necessary evil but as a noble and honorable pursuit. Suetaka was personally austere and a rigid disciplinarian. Those who served under him used such terms as “bullish,” “short-tempered,” and “unbending” to describe him.15 Up to that time, the 19th Division had never tasted combat. At a division commanders’ conference in Tokyo in late 1937, Suetaka had pleaded not to have his division left behind in Korea, but to be allowed to participate in the “real war” in China. He was frustrated by his continued assignment to the quiescent post in Korea. Suddenly, it appeared that the 19th Division might get a chance at “real war” at Changkufeng. This was what Suetaka had spent a lifetime preparing for; he desperately wanted to seize the opportunity. But then, orders from Tokyo indicated that the emperor himself had set his face against it.
General Suetaka’s frustration was shared by Colonel Inada and the activists at IGHQ. Despite the unmistakable negative tone of the Imperial audience of July 20th, the Operations Section of IGHQ sent a series of messages to Generals Nakamura and Suetaka stressing the “temporary” character of the postponement of the Changkufeng operation.16 Internal IGHQ documents show that some officers, frustrated by the Imperial Order, were “covertly” hoping that the local commander would attack “on his own initiative,” thereby relieving IGHQ of responsibility in the matter.17 Major Arao Okikatsu, IGHQ’s special liaison officer at 19th Division Headquarters, recalled, “I did not interpret the fact that Imperial sanction could not be obtained for the use of force at Changkufeng to mean the same as an Imperial Order forbidding the use of force. As far as I was concerned, I emphasized the importance of judging how best to deal with matters, given the suspension of the use of force” (italics in the original).18
General Suetaka came to share this view. In retrospect, some Japanese scholars have criticized IGHQ for failing clearly to convey the intention of the emperor to Chosen Army. They identify this sort of “communication by mental telepathy” as a prime cause for the outbreak of fighting at Changkufeng.19
The ambiguous signals that Chosen Army and 19th Division were receiving from Tokyo began to show effects immediately. On July 21 Suetaka radioed Chosen Army Headquarters for permission forcibly to evict the Soviet invaders “for the purposes of non-aggravation.” Nakamura rejected this proposal. That same day, Suetaka ordered the occupation of Chiangchunfeng, a smaller hillock some eight hundred yards west of Changkufeng. Nakamura, fearing that fighting might “spontaneously” erupt with the opposing troops so close, instructed Suetaka to withdraw from the hillock, which the 19th Division commander declined to do. After a day or two of wrangling over this issue, the new Chosen Army commander relented, issuing ex post facto permission for the occupation of Chiangchunfeng. These developments spurred Major Arao on July 23 to notify his superiors at IGHQ that Suetaka still was preparing to attack at Changkufeng. This brought forth a new Imperial Order on July 26, directing immediate withdrawal and suspension of offensive plans for Changkufeng. Suetaka obeyed this order. By July 28 the main body of the 19th Division was back to its normal peacetime positions. Suetaka left two infantry battalions on the west bank of the Tyumen River with instructions to keep the Soviets under observation—to wait and see.20
What these troops saw on the morning of July 29 was most disturbing. Soviet border troops, apparently concluding that the danger had passed with the withdrawal of the main body of the 19th Division, began digging in on Shachaofeng, a lesser hill on the same boundary ridgeline, about a mile and a half north of Changkufeng. It is not clear at what level of the Soviet command this decision was made. General Suetaka, who personally had remained in the troubled area despite the withdrawal of his division headquarters,
decided that his mission demanded the expulsion of the Soviets from Shachaofeng. Without consulting higher authority, he ordered an attack by part of his residual force. At 2:30 that afternoon, a two-prong Japanese assault routed the Soviet infantry squad on Shachaofeng Hill. The first blood had been drawn; all ten soldiers in Lieutenant Aleksey Makhalin’s squad on Shachaofeng were killed or wounded.21
The Soviet forces on nearby Changkufeng responded quickly. That same afternoon, they brought up reinforcements, shrouded by rain and heavy fog. At 5:00 p.m. two companies of Colonel V. K. Bazarov’s 119th Infantry Regiment, supported by several tanks, drove the Japanese assault force from Shachaofeng.22
That night, General Suetaka reported the outbreak of the “Shachaofeng incident” to Chosen Army Headquarters and requested permission to reconcentrate the 19th Division in the threatened area. By labeling these actions the Shachaofeng incident, Suetaka hoped to have it classified as an entirely new event, thereby circumventing the orders forbidding the use of force at Changkufeng.
Chosen Army Headquarters tentatively agreed to treat the affair separately from the Changkufeng incident but continued to try to restrain Suetaka, instructing him that “enemy forces attacking our troops … will be defeated. However, you should be satisfied with just driving them back across the border.” Nakamura’s final injunction to Suetaka was to “take great care not to enlarge this conflict.” As the 19th Division redeployed near the Tyumen River, IGHQ sent a cautionary telegram, stating that “the Shachaofeng incident should be handled by adhering to the policy of non-aggravation.”23
The next day, General Suetaka made the decision for which the activists at IGHQ had been covertly hoping (and hinting) for ten days. On July 30 he ordered his most dependable line officer, Colonel Sato Kotoku, commander of the 75th Infantry Regiment, to launch an attack that night against the intruding Soviet troops.
Suetaka’s divisional chief of staff and most of the staff officers, attuned to Chosen Army’s stated policy of “nonexpansion” of the incident, argued against their commander’s decision. The general insisted, however, arguing that “the offensive which was suspended by Imperial Order, and this particular situation, are completely different matters. If we do not seize an opportunity such as this to hit the Russians and thus show the power of the Imperial Army, then the Soviet-Manchukuo border will hereafter be dominated by Soviet forces, and that will only leave roots for trouble in the future.”24
Suetaka forbade any of his officers to report this decision to Chosen Army Headquarters or to Tokyo, lest his attack plans be canceled again by higher authorities. Even liaison officers from Tokyo respected the general’s wish. Suetaka had decided to “act on his own initiative.”
The hollowness of Suetaka’s claim that he was now dealing with a new situation, completely different from the Changkufeng incident, is demonstrated by Colonel Sato’s decision, which Suetaka approved, that “in order to sweep the enemy out of the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, the foe on Changkufeng must be ejected also.” Only one infantry company was assigned to take Shachaofeng; the main body of the 75th Regiment prepared to assault the Soviets on Changkufeng.25
From the record of the divisional staff conference cited above, it seems clear that Suetaka’s primary motive was to “teach the Russians a lesson” and uphold the honor and prestige of the Imperial Army. This was quite different from Colonel Inada’s concept of a calculated reconnaissance-in-force. Inada was well aware of Suetaka’s attitude and sympathized with it to a certain extent. But he counted on Suetaka’s iron self-discipline to keep the situation under control when the fighting actually started. Inada later wrote that Suetaka’s decision was in “complete accordance” with IGHQ wishes at that time, in “arbitrarily” launching an offensive that IGHQ could not authorize formally because of the emperor’s prohibition.26
Thus, General Suetaka placed himself and the 12,000 men under his command in a position to be used in Colonel Inada’s probe. The cost of this operation, exacted on the slopes of Changkufeng Hill, would be higher than either officer anticipated, the results more questionable and controversial.
The Battle
This was to be the first real test between the Imperial Army and the new Red Army. Colonel Sato selected his finest battalions for the assault. The attack, at Inada’s suggestion, would be launched during the hours of greatest darkness, ensuring maximum tactical surprise and minimizing the effectiveness of Soviet tanks and artillery.27 Approximately 1,600 men would take part in the actual assault, relying on stealth as well as ferocity in the enshrined Japanese battle doctrine of the “human bullet.” The assault force began to deploy across the Tyumen River at 2:15 a.m. on July 31. Visibility extended only ten to fifteen yards.
The Soviet troops on the heights failed to detect the 75th Regiment crossing the river and were taken completely by surprise by the first wave of Japanese attackers sweeping up the slopes. The Soviet frontline troops called for artillery support, and while furious close combat raged along the high ground, Red Army gunners sent up illuminating flares and commenced artillery fire. But the attackers already had penetrated the defensive positions, and the issue was decided by the infantry, often in hand-to-hand combat, with the Japanese enjoying the advantages of surprise and superior numbers. By 5:15 a.m. Colonel Sato’s troops controlled the crest of Changkufeng, and by 6:00 the last Soviet defenders had been driven from the heights. A Russian NCO who took part in the action reported that nearly all the defenders were either killed or wounded, and those who could swim plunged into the frigid waters of Lake Khasan to save themselves. As the sun rose higher over the battlefield, it was greeted by the Hi no Maru, Japan’s own “Rising Sun,” fluttering triumphantly from a flagpole at the summit of Changkufeng.28
By modern standards the action was a small one, but it was a hard-fought and relatively prolonged affair conducted at close quarters. The defenders gave a good account of themselves before being driven from the heights, as shown by the number of Japanese casualties: 45 killed and 133 wounded out of 1,600 attackers, approximately one in nine. Soviet accounts admit to 13 killed and 55 wounded on their side, plus one tank and one field gun destroyed. This almost certainly under-states their losses.29
Within minutes of securing the crest of Changkufeng, General Suetaka notified Chosen Army Headquarters. Then and in many subsequent communications, Suetaka justified his actions by characterizing them as a counterattack against Soviet offensive action at Shachaofeng.30 This misleading information, along with the results of the night attack, were quickly passed along to the authorities in Tokyo.
That General Suetaka and Colonel Sato were aware of having violated at least the spirit, if not the letter, of an Imperial Order, is shown by this entry in the 75th Regiment Combat Diary: “It was a truly awe-inspiring thing, since we have heard that, in accordance with the Imperial Will, it was decided not to use force against Changkufeng.” Sometime later, after the true circumstances surrounding the night attack were more widely and accurately known, a revised version of the justification was circulated. This version held that while there had been no Soviet attack on July 30 or 31, “Colonel Sato judged that the enemy had an attack in mind … and therefore he decided to stage a preventive night assault against the enemy facing him.”31
News of Suetaka’s night attack stirred mixed reactions that morning in Tokyo. The Army High Command acknowledged that Suetaka’s action implemented their intentions and broke open the impasse. But there was the problem of the emperor’s admonition against the use of force at Changkufeng. Colonel Inada felt a heavy sense of responsibility for Suetaka’s seeming violation of an Imperial Order and wanted to intercede on the general’s behalf at the palace. However, staff colonels were rarely granted Imperial audiences and it fell to General Tada, deputy chief of AGS, to inform the emperor. Tada, a supporter of the use of force at Changkufeng, approached this task with apprehension.
That same afternoon, July 31, at the Imperial villa at Hayama, General Tada nervously explaine
d to the emperor what had transpired. Tada took great pains to emphasize that the 19th Division had acted to keep within the guidelines of the “nonexpansion” policy by refraining strictly from crossing the boundary line into the USSR in pursuit of the enemy. Based on Tada’s somewhat misleading report, the emperor expressed his satisfaction that the frontline troops had acted with restraint under trying circumstances, and, noting that what had been done could not be undone anyway, gave his sanction for the night attack. Tada, immensely relieved, withdrew from the Imperial Presence and returned to Tokyo with “face beaming.” Such was the emotional importance attached to the emperor’s judgments that, according to the diary of Colonel Saito, 19th Division chief of staff, when word of the emperor’s approval of the night attack reached General Suetaka, “tears glistened in the eyes of the division commander, and he quickly retired to his room. I too could not control my tears and sobbed, despite the fact that other people were present.”32
And so, to the immense relief of the officers at IGHQ, Chosen Army Headquarters, and 19th Division, there was no reprimand or chastisement from the emperor. The retribution that followed came from an entirely different quarter.
Later in the afternoon of July 31, Suetaka requested permission from General Nakamura to transfer the bulk of his division across the Tyumen River and onto the heights in case of a Soviet counterattack. The request was denied. Nakamura considered the border rectified and the incident closed. The Soviet command did not share that view.
On that same eventful July 31, in Khabarovsk, General Grigori Shtern was appointed commander of the 39th Corps of the Red Banner Far Eastern Army. This corps was strengthened to include the 32nd, 39th, and 40th Infantry Divisions and the 2nd Mechanized Brigade. The next day, Marshal Blyukher received orders from Marshal Voroshilov, Red Army chief of staff, in Moscow: “Destroy those who have intruded within the limits of our boundaries.” That responsibility fell to General Shtern. The new commander of the 39th Corps, a veteran of the Spanish Civil War, had just stepped into the shoes of a recently purged comrade. Scarcely acquainted with his new command, threatened by the Japanese before him and the NKVD at his back, Shtern must have regarded the impending test at Changkufeng with apprehension. This may help explain his clumsy handling of the tactical situation.33
Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army's Victory That Shaped World War II Page 10
