Page 22 ‘a little uneasy’: Memorandum to Commander Denniston, 5 August 1941 (ibid.).
Page 23 cleared the matter up: Washington & E. Traffic, Notes on Correspondence, ‘Bombe Correspondence’; Memorandum for Director of Naval Communications, Subj: History of the Bombe Project, ‘Captain Wenger Memorandum’ (NACP HCC, Nr. 4419), 1–2.
Page 24 ‘No results are being passed out’: CSS to Washington, CXG 105–109, 1 December 1941 (PRO HW 14/45).
Page 25 Denniston … at once sent a message: personal from Denniston for Washington, CXG 139, 23 December 1941 (PRO HW 3/33).
Page 26 all sixteen bombes that were available: ‘Squadron Leader Jones’ Section’ (PRO HW 3/164), 4.
Page 27 Tiltman cabled to London: Travis from Tiltman, [18 (?) April 1942], ‘Bombe Correspondence’ (NACP RG 38 Crane Library, CNSG 5750/441).
Page 28 Travis informed OP-20-G: for OP-20-G from GC&CS, 13 May 1942, ‘Bombe Correspondence’.
Page 29 were concealing the fact: J. N. Wenger, Memorandum for OP-20-GM, Subject: Recent information on ‘E’, 6 August 1942, ‘Bombe Correspondence’.
Page 30 to build 360 four-wheel bombes: Memorandum for OP-20, Subject: Cryptanalysis of the German (Enigma) Cipher Machine, 3 September 1942, ‘Bombe Correspondence’; Wenger to GC&CS for Eachus, 4 September 1942, ‘Bombe Correspondence’.
Page 31 tried to head off the American move: Memorandum for Director of Naval Communications, Subj: History of the Bombe Project, ‘Captain Wenger Memorandum’ (NACP HCC, Nr. 4419), 4.
Page 32 only had about thirty bombes: ‘Squadron Leader Jones’ Section’, 4.
Page 33 overloaded the available bombes: Hut 6 Report of July and August 1942 (PRO HW 14/51).
Page 34 ‘most alarming’: Memorandum, 5 January 1943 (PRO HW 14/63).
Page 35 negotiated an agreement: Ralph Erskine, ‘The Holden Agreement on Naval Sigint: The First BRUSA?’, Intelligence and National Security, 14(2) (1999), 187.
Page 36 GC&CS memorandum in late 1942: memorandum, 21 December 1942 (PRO HW 14/62).
Page 37 Army was proposing to build its own machine: William Friedman, memorandum for Colonel Bullock THRU Colonel Minckler, Subject: Project in the Cryptanalysis of German Military Traffic in their High-Grade Cipher Machine, 14 September 1942, ‘Project 68003’ (NACP HCC, Nr. 3815).
Page 38 $530,000 contract: ‘Project X68003-Army Bombe’ (NACP HCC, Nr. 2723).
Page 39 Turing went to Dayton: visit to National Cash Register Corporation of Dayton, Ohio, ‘Bombe Correspondence’ (NACP RG 38 Crane Library, CNSG 5750/441), 3.
Page 40 Arlington Hall received permission: Frank W. Bullock, Memorandum for File, 4 January 1943, ‘Project 68003’ (NACP HCC, Nr. 3815).
Page 41 ‘had better get together’: author’s interview with Dale Marston, September 1998.
Page 42 Turing was shown the actual prototype: Major C. G. Stevens, Report on Visit to Bell Laboratories, ‘Project 68003’ (NACP HCC, Nr. 3815).
Page 43 Tiltman tactfully responded: William F. Friedman, Memorandum for Colonel Corderman, 8 February 1943, ‘GCHQ/US Cooperation’ (NACP HCC, Nr. 2820), 2.
Page 44 OP-20-G was involved in solving Enigma keys by hand: ‘OP-20GM-6/GM-1-C-3/GM-1/GE-1/GY-A-1 Daily War Diary’ (NACP RG 38 Crane Library, CNSG 5750/176).
Page 45 internal GC&CS memorandum: ‘Co-operation with US & Allocation of Tasks on “E” signals’, 8 January 1943 (PRO HW 14/63).
Page 46 followed up with additional pressure: Taylor to Clarke, 5 April 1943, ‘Army and Navy Comint Regs & Papers’.
Page 47 more acerbic internal memoranda: ‘Briefly stated the reasons why the British are averse to the Americans exploiting the intercepted German signals encyphered on their machine’, 4 May 1943 (PRO HW 14/75).
Page 48 Taylor advised: Taylor to Clarke, 5 April 1943, ‘Army and Navy Comint Regs & Papers’, 6–7.
Page 49 ‘never on God’s green earth’: Scope of E Operation – other than Personnel, excerpt from Cable V4772, 13 May 1943, ‘Col. McCormack Trip to London, May–June 1943’ (NACP HCC, Nr. 3600).
Page 50 Gordon Welchman urged moderation: Welchman to Travis, ‘The Americans and “E”’ (PRO HW 14/68).
Page 51 BRUSA Agreement: memorandum for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, ‘Special cryptanalytic Project in SIS ETOUSA, Project Beechnut’ (NACP HCC, Nr. 3049); the full text of the BRUSA agreement has also been published in ‘The BRUSA Agreement of May 17, 1943’, Cryptologia, 21 (1997), 30.
Page 52 Telford Taylor to select decrypts: Benson, US Communications Intelligence, p. 111.
Page 53 summary of State Department cables: memorandum for Colonel Clarke, 15 June 1943, ‘Army and Navy Comint Regs & Papers’ (NACP HCC, Nr. 4632).
Page 54 British were equally suspicious: signal. To Corderman from Fried from Bicher, 1 November 1944, ‘Clark Files’ (NACP HCC, Nr. 4566); Report IB 32164, ‘Clark Files’ (NACP HCC, Nr. 4566), 15.
Page 55 behind a plywood partition: author’s interview with Cecil Phillips, November 1998; Stephen Budiansky, ‘A Tribute to Cecil Phillips – and Arlington Hall’s “Meritocracy”’, Cryptologia 23 (1999), 97.
Page 56 on 24 March 1944 GC&CS cabled: memorandum for Director of Naval Communications, 30 May 1944, ‘History of the Bombe Project’ (NACP HCC, Nr. 4584), 10.
Page 57 ‘dudbusting’: C. H. O’D. Alexander, Dud-busting, ‘Capt. Walter J. Fried Reports/SSA Liaison With GCCS’ (NACP HCC, Nr. 2612).
Page 58 nearly automatic system for decryption: Stephen Budiansky, ‘Codebreaking with IBM Machines in World War II, Cryptologia, 25 (2001), 241.
CHAPTER 14 MIHAILOVIĆ OR TITO? HOW THE CODEBREAKERS HELPED CHURCHI LL CHOOSE
All references, except where otherwise stated, are to documents held at the Public Record Office.
Page 1 ‘extreme elements’: WO 208/2014, Enclosure 22A.
Page 2 pigeons: HW 19/53, ISOS 58952 and HW 19/137, ISK 60438.
Page 3 ‘decrypted about so little’: HW 11/10, 10.
Page 4 start time: HW 5/11, CX/JQ/822.
Page 5 monitoring station: Noel Currer-Briggs describes the operation in ‘Army Ultra’s Poor Relations’ in F. H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp (eds), Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park (OUP, Oxford, 1993), p. 209.
Page 6 somewhat smugly: HW 13/14.
Page 7 Brig. E. T. Williams: ‘The Use of Ultra’, WO 208/3575.
Page 8 identical to BP decrypts: e.g. an Abwehr decrypt of 17 August 1943, HW 19/60, ISOS 66091 is virtually the same as a decrypt of a Comintern message to Tito on 16 September, HW 17/51, ISCOT 1038.
Page 9 regular oral briefings: Davidson wrote notes for the Cabinet Office Historical Section in 1972. He referred to frequent telephone briefings to Churchill as well as visits to No. 10 and Chequers. Davidson papers, Liddell Hart Centre, King’s College London, Document F.
Page 10 Zwei Fischer: HW 19/51, ISOS 56939.
Page 11 attacks on railway lines: HW 19/11, ISOS 8537.
Page 12 Italian aircraft: HW 5/24, CX/MSS/79.
Page 13 law and order: HW 16/6, ZIP/MSGP/27.
Page 14 bodies mutilated: HW 19/12, ISOS 9699.
Page 15 pacification of Bosnia: HW 19/12, ISOS 9841.
Page 16 ‘to crush the rebellion’: HW 5/26, CX/MSS/265 and HW 1/82, C/7641.
Page 17 Italian divisions: HW 5/35, CX/MSS/364.
Page 18 German divisions: HW 5/37, CX/MSS/406.
Page 19 ‘clashes’: HW 5/38, CX/MSS/437 and HW 1/218, C/8072.
Page 20 ‘Russia would win’: HW 19/18, ISOS 148591.
Page 21 ‘caps over the fence’: WO 208/4604, CAB 79/15-COS(41)354.
Page 22 revolt could be maintained: WO 208/4604, Minute 31.
Page 23 ‘in human power’: quoted in F. W. D. Deakin, The Embattled Mountain (OUP, London, 1971), p. 144.
Page 24 situation reports: including HW 5/71, CX/MSS/784 and HW 1/402, C/8923.
Page 25 ‘only ones to be reckoned with’: HW 19/89, ISK 3514.
Page 26 becoming steadily worse: HW 5/76
, CX/MSS/823.
Page 27 time was right: WO 208/2014, Minute 11.
Page 28 all-out offensive: WO 208/2014, Enclosure D to Minute 11.
Page 29 movement of trains: HW 5/95, CX/MSS/1021.
Page 30 ‘smash the resistance’: HW 5/90, CX/MSS/976.
Page 31 Churchill commented: WO 208/2014, Minute 22.
Page 32 Italians wished to withdraw: HW 5/126, CX/MSS/1333.
Page 33 had seized control: HW 5/130, CX/MSS/1390.
Page 34 ‘really ticklish situation’: HW 5/132, CX/MSS/1394.
Page 35 ‘to do their part’: WO 208/2014, Minute 30.
Page 36 vigorous action: HW 5/138, CX/MSS/1458.
Page 37 under German command: HW 5/138, CX/MSS/1455.
Page 38 ‘needlessly sacrificing’: HW 5/139, CX/MSS/1468.
Page 39 clean up the Livno area: HW 5/148, CX/MSS/1559.
Page 40 antimony mine: HW 5/149, CX/MSS/1562.
Page 41 during the winter: HW 5/171, CX/MSS/1781.
Page 42 Operation Weiss and Operation Schwarz: HW5/182, CX/MSS/1891 and HW 5/191, CX/MSS/1986.
Page 43 surround the Partisans: HW 5/194, CX/MSS/2015 and HW 1/1332; HW 5/194, CX/MSS/2011; HW 5/196, CX/MSS/2031.
Page 44 operation in mid-winter: WO 208/2019, Minute 7.
Page 45 prestige and influence: WO 208/2026, Minute 3.
Page 46 ‘active and vigorous Partisans’: WO 208/3102. Minute 1.
Page 47 advancing on bauxite area: HW 5/208, CX/MSS/2156.
Page 48 left flank was exposed: HW 5/208, CX/MSS/2136.
Page 49 towns had fallen: HW 19/48, ISOS 53156.
Page 50 Löhr said he did not have: HW 5/207, CX/MSS/2141, 2144.
Page 51 to relieve: HW 5/210, CX/MSS/2174.
Page 52 thirteen and sixty: HW 19/49, ISOS 54524.
Page 53 Italian-officered Chetnik units: HW 5/216, CX/MSS/2236.
Page 54 German fire: HW 5/215, CX/MSS/2228.
Page 55 transporting them: HW 19/50, ISOS 55961.
Page 56 negotiation with the Partisans: HW 19/51, ISOS 56608, 56699.
Page 57 ‘current policy of supporting’: WO 208/2019, Minute 3.
Page 58 Partisans should be contacted: CAB 80/68: COS(43) 142(0).
Page 59 yet to play a decisive part: HW 1/1474, C/2604.
Page 60 Chetnik reinforcements: HW 19/50, ISOS 55961.
Page 61 Mihailović barely escaped: HW 19/51, ISOS 56734.
Page 62 said to have joined the Partisans: HW 19/52, ISOS 57654.
Page 63 captured large quantities: HW 19/52, ISOS 55915, 58191, 58888.
Page 64 organizing in the towns and villages: HW 17/51, ISCOT 1040.
Page 65 headquarters near Foca: HW 19/53, ISOS 59368.
Page 66 Mihailović and his Chetniks: WO 208/2026, Minute 8.
Page 67 Hitler’s instructions: HW 5/255, CX/MSS/2627.
Page 68 Djurisić had fallen out with Mihailović: HW 19/54, ISOS 59683, 59969.
Page 69 providing transport: HW 19/54, ISOS 60020.
Page 70 protect as many of the Chetniks: HW 5/250, CX/MSS/2574.
Page 71 near Jajce: HW 19/127, ISK 51991.
Page 72 Partisan and Chetnik losses: HW 5/271, CX/MSS/2782 and HW 1/1765, C/3654.
Page 73 Churchill argued in a note circulated: Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Closing the Ring, vol. V (Cassell, London, 1952), pp. 736–7.
Page 74 report from the intelligence services: PREM 3/510/7 124298.
Page 75 ‘satisfied from information’: CAB 121/674.
Page 76 British efforts to unify the resistance: CAB 121/674.
Page 77 ‘of the highest importance’: PREM 3/510/7 124298.
Page 78 could be sent to the Partisans: ibid.
Page 79 ‘hunting in the next field’: CCAC, CHR/20/131.
Page 80 ‘the great disorder’: HW 1/1820 Personal Minute Serial No. 122/3.
Page 81 the marvellous resistance: CCAC, CHR/20/131.
Page 82 conserve his forces: HW 17/51, ISCOT 1048.
Page 83 ‘main object of an Allied attack’: HW 19/134, ISK 57401.
Page 84 ‘the first to be invaded’: HW 36/1, GERDI 0460.
Page 85 their attention on the Balkans: HW 19/136, ISK 59589.
Page 86 ‘must strengthen her defences’: HW 11/10, BJ 120793.
Page 87 Italians were withdrawing: HW 19/60, ISOS 65953.
Page 88 ‘a planned evacuation’: HW 5/229, CX/MSS/3126.
Page 89 Italians were offering arms: HW 19/135, ISK 59221.
Page 90 to seize Italian naval installations: HW 5/340, CX/MSS/3180.
Page 91 5,000–6,000 Chetniks: HW 19/61, ISOS 67118.
Page 92 Mihailović would act only: HW 19/237, ISOSICLE 5863.
Page 93 German troops were marching: HW 11/10, BJ 122406.
Page 94 ‘firmly in our hands’: HW 5/343, CX/MSS/3196.
Page 95 28,000 Italians: HW 19/62, ISOS 68601.
Page 96 ‘extremely bad effect’: HW 19/88, ISOS 64286.
Page 97 ‘major operations’: HW 5/363, CX/MSS/3299.
Page 98 actions of the Partisans: HW 19/141, ISK 66865.
Page 99 removed from Yugoslavia: HW 5/359, CX/MSS/3276.
Page 100 to seize Jews and others: HW 19/62, ISOS 69043.
Page 101 Partisan leader’s complaints: HW 17/51, ISCOT 1063, 1192.
Page 102 a shopping list: HW 17/51, ISCOT 1092, 1303.
Page 103 sole recipient: WO 208/2026, Minute 22.
Page 104 sent to the resistance: HW 5/366, CX/MSS/3313/3328, HW 1/2078, C/4555, HW 1/2085, C/4574.
Page 105 could soon be sent: John Ehrman, Grand Strategy Vol. V, August 1943 September 1944 (HMSO, London, 1956).
Page 106 provision of supplies: HW 1/2108, C/4643.
Page 107 threat to the major towns: ZIP/MSGP/50, GPD/1688–1905 and HW 5366/367.
Page 108 death of 3,200 Partisans: HW 5/381, CX/MSS/3431.
Page 109 ‘unsatisfactory’: HW 5/411, CX/MSS (Series 2) R11.
Page 110 ‘the more active body’: WO 208/4628, Appn/710/43/MI3b.
Page 111 Lukacevic treaty: HW 19/146, ISK 73795 and HW 1/2259, C/5058.
Page 112 should be intensified: Ehrman, Grand Strategy, p. 111.
Page 113 ‘to overcome certain difficulties’: HW 17/51, ISCOT 304/1459 (a signal of 28 September 1943, decrypted on 28 December 1945).
Page 114 alleged by a number of commentators: e.g. Michael Lees, The Rape of Serbia (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1990); David Martin, Web of Disinformation: Churchill’s Yugoslav Blunder (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1990).
Page 115 ‘agent of influence’: Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West (Allen Lane, London, 1999), p. 167.
Page 116 Ralph Bennett … and others: Ralph Bennett et al., ‘Mihailović or Tito’, Intelligence and National Security, 10(3) (1995), 526.
Page 117 addressed the House of Commons: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Fifth Series, 397, House of Commons, 22 February 1944, 692–7.
CHAPTER 15 TRAFFIC ANALYSIS: A LOG-READER’S TALE
The author was given access to ‘The Sixta History’. This unpublished source is retained by GCHQ under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958.
Page 1 ‘My Y Service exists to produce intelligence …’: Michael Smith, Station X: The Codebreakers of Bletchley Park (Channel 4 Books, London, 1998), p. 24.
Page 2 ‘a difficult and dangerous art’ etc.: J. E. Cooper, memorandum, 24 June 1941, ‘Relationship of Cryptography and W.TL’ (PRO WO 208/5125).
Page 3 inference ‘solely based upon radio studies …’: W. F. Friedman, ‘Report on E Operations of the GC&CS at Bletchley Park’, 30 (NACP HCC, Box 1126, Nr. 3620).
CHAPTER 16 BLETCH LEY PARK, DOUBLE CROSS AND D-DAY
Page 1 Jones said: Eric Jones, Memo to All Hut 3 Personnel, 6 June 1944 (PRO HW3/125); Brig. E. T Williams, The Use of Ultra, 6 June 1944 (PRO WO 208/3575).
Page 2 Jellyfish information: Hinsley et a
l., British Intelligence, 3(2): 777–80; Michael Smith, Station X: The Codebreakers of Bletchley Park (Channel 4 Books, London, 1998), pp. 157–8.
Page 3 Allied assessments of German defences fairly good: F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations (HMSO, London, 1988), 3(2): 771–6.
Page 4 Codebreaker’s memories of Oshima message: Carl Boyd, Hitler’s Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and Magic Intelligence, 1941–1945 (University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 1993), p. 106.
Page 5 Japanese military attaché’s message: Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, 3(2): 18.
Page 6 Japanese naval attaché report: see Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, 3(2): 787–92.
Page 7 Bennett on location of German divisions: Peter Bate interview with Ralph Bennett, for the Channel 4 television series Station X (Darlow Smithson Productions, 1999).
Page 8 White proposal: Tom Bower, The Perfect Englishman (Heinemann, London, 1995), pp. 37–8.
Page 9 Details of Snow: Summary of the Snow Case (PRO KV 2/452), 1–3; Transcript of shorthand notes taken at Scotland House, London SWl, on 24 September 1938 at the interrogation of [Arthur Owens] by Col. Hinchley Cooke (KV 2/452), 6, 21–2.
Page 10 Details of code sent to GC&CS: Robertson to Vivian, 19 September 1939 (PRO KV 2/453).
Page 11 Alert operator and GC&CS scepticism: [John Curry], The Security Service 1908–1945: The Official History (PRO, London, 1989), pp. 206–7.
Page 12 Broken by Gill and Trevor-Roper: ibid., pp. 178–9, 206–7.
Page 13 Setting up of GC&CS Abwehr section: ibid., pp. 178–9.
Page 14 Use of Pear codename: Report entitled ‘ISOS’, 25 September 1945 (PRO ADM 223/793), 1.
Page 15 Astor on MI5 and MI6 responsibilities: author’s interview with Hugh Astor, 23 January 1998.
Page 16 Twenty Committee set up: J. C. Masterman, The Double Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (Pimlico, London, 1995), pp. 10–11.
Page 17 Astor on Robertson, Masterman and White: author’s interview with Hugh Astor.
Page 18 Workings of the Double Cross system: Masterman, The Double Cross System, pp. 1–35; Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Volume 5 – Strategic Deception, HMSO, London, 1990), 5: 8–9; Report entitled ‘ISOS’.
The Bletchley Park Codebreakers Page 54
