Colonel Sam Raines, CO of the 7th Engineer Brigade, captured in his journal a lot of what we were all thinking: "Looking in the faces of my soldiers, I see some fear; but overwhelmingly I see determination and seriousness. These are the same faces that were in landing craft off Omaha Beach, 6 June 1944, on Iwo Jima, at Pork Chop Hill, the base of Hamburger Hill, or in a C-141 aircraft just prior to the airborne drop on Grenada. It is a serious, anxious look, no horse-play, just pure professional dedication to the task at hand. In every heart there are prayers. . . . All of us are now wearing cumbersome chemical protection suits and rubber boots over our regular uniforms. They are uncomfortable, very hot; and the charcoal filter lining turns hands, face, and neck sooty black. . . . We live in the miserable chemical suits for several days."
207TH MI BRIGADE. To ensure we had continuous coverage as we attacked north, then east, Colonel John Smith, CO 207th, had formed Task Force Sand Hawk to move his UAV platoon closer to the Iraqi border. The next day they displaced forward into the 1st CAV sector to operate off a 188-by-60-foot aluminum runway built by the 527th Engineer battalion. There they flew a total of fifteen missions, totaling just under sixty-one hours (ten further missions were canceled because of bad weather, and one aircraft crashed and was destroyed). Their contribution was important, for they located for attack Iraqi artillery battalions, FROG batteries, infantry trench lines, and other targets. And the UAV platoon also would capture 303 prisoners. Because I had concerns that the platoon needed some firepower (there was nothing between them and the Iraqis), I had ordered them to be provided with a platoon of tanks (3rd Platoon, Company B, 3rd Battalion, 77th Armor, from the 8th Infantry Division).25 Our soldiers and leaders did all this after getting them in theater just three weeks earlier, with no prior experience with UAVs. It was remarkable, and a great tribute to our soldiers and leaders.
AFTER Stan's update, I was satisfied that we were doing what we had planned and that, as I read the Iraqis, no adjustments were necessary so far. I planned to stay at the TAC a little while longer, then go visit commanders, starting with Don Holder in Iraq and working my way around. I wanted to confirm what I had just heard, see it with my own eyes, and get the face-to-face judgments of my commanders.
Meanwhile a lot was going on in the theater outside of VII Corps, but I knew very little about it at the time. Tom Clancy now brings us up to date on some of these events.
ATTACK
On G-Day, at 0400, on a front running from the Gulf to about 400 kilometers deep into the desert, a force of 620,000 soldiers, Marines, and airmen from close to forty different nations took part in launching the most massive attack since World War II against an Iraqi force of approximately 540,000 men.
* In the Gulf near Kuwait, a Marine amphibious group thrust toward the coast, threatening the seaborne invasion for which the Iraqis had prepared mightily . . . and that never came.
* The Saudi-led Arab JFC-East force attacked up the coastal highway toward Kuwait City.
* Just to their west, in the Kuwaiti boot heel, Lieutenant General Walt Boomer's two divisions, the 1st and 2nd Marines, started their breaching operations into the Iraqi minefields and other static defenses a few kilometers inside Kuwait. The 1st CAV's "Tiger" Brigade (as part of the 2nd Marine Division, on the west flank of the Marine attack) followed close behind, to give the Marines additional heavy M1A1 punch. (The Marines also had a battalion of M1A1s.)
* To their west, the Egyptian-led JFC-North continued to prepare to launch their 25 February attack into the Iraqi security zone.
* To their west, in VII Corps, the 1st CAV, now under CENTCOM command, continued their deception into the Ruqi Pocket.
* To their west, 1st INF attacked into the Iraqi security zone, to take out reconnaissance and observation posts, and the 2nd ACR moved twenty kilometers into Iraq to their west.
* And, finally, to their west, XVIII Corps launched their attack toward the Euphrates with their light infantry and air assault elements.
There were three initial phases to Gary Luck's attack plan to cut off the RGFC escape routes and supply corridors along Highway 8:
First, elements of Major General Peay's 101st Airborne Division were to airlift to an objective about 150 kilometers from their launch point and set up there what was known as FOB (Forward Operating Base) Cobra, which would be their logistics and operational anchor for their second phase.
Second, the next day, another helicopter assault by the 101st would establish an airhead near the Euphrates.
Third, Major General Barry McCaffrey's 24th MECH and 3rd ACR would drive east of the 101st, toward Highway 8.
Meanwhile, on the western flank of XVIII Corps, the French division, beefed up by the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne and the American 18th Field Artillery Brigade, attacked toward Objective Rochambeau, fifty kilometers into Iraq. When that was taken, they were to move on toward Objective White, the town of as-Salman, and the airfield north of town.
To say that all of these attacks went well is an understatement. The Iraqi frontline defenses crumbled. The fearsome Iraqi defensive barriers proved to be far less fearsome than everyone believed, or dared to hope for (though they still weren't easy, and there were casualties and deaths). Some Iraqi troops and entire Iraqi units surrendered without a fight, while others fought back. Predictions of U.S. casualties into the tens of thousands never happened. No chemical or biological attacks were detected. Such a result had been far from a sure thing only hours before.
By 1800 on the twenty-fourth, the two Marine divisions had advanced through the two Iraqi defensive belts. The 1st Marine Division had gone about forty kilometers, and the 2nd, on the west, had gone twenty kilometers. As the official Marine Corps history states: "During the night of 24-25 February, both divisions assumed defensive postures. . . .
"In the early afternoon, Lieutenant General Walter Boomer received a call from General Schwarzkopf concerning the allied main attack with VII Corps and the Joint Forces Command-North immediately to MARCENT's left"--i.e., to the left of the Marine divisions. "The Marines' speedy progress caused Schwarzkopf to worry aloud about possible exposure of I MEF's left flank once they became abreast of Manaquish, where the border turned due west. . . . General Boomer recommended that the main attack begin as soon as possible. Shortly after this conversation, General Schwarzkopf ordered the main attack to commence. Although ARCENT's VII Corps crossed its line of departure at 1500, the Joint Forces Command-North attack on MARCENT'S left was delayed until after 1800. It stopped just inside their breach for the night."
Thus, the wheels were set in motion for an early attack by VII Corps--much, as it turned out, to Fred Franks's surprise.
EARLY ATTACK SUNDAY 24 FEBRUARY VII CORPS TAC CP
At 0930, John Yeosock called.
"Fred, John, CINC wants to know if you can attack early."
"Say again." I was not sure I heard this right.
"The Marines have been having success, and the CINC does not want to wait until tomorrow to attack. He wants to know if we can go early, today."
I was genuinely surprised--shocked maybe was more accurate. We had considered every other possibility except this. In a flash, my brain went from the reflective, intensely focused, get-ready pace of a moment before to "warp-speed" active. Before I replied to John, dozens of thoughts flashed through my head, along with dozens more about what I would have to do to make it all happen.
What is the CINC really asking? was the first mental question. I quickly concluded that it wasn't actually "Can you attack early?" but "How soon can you attack?" I quickly ruled out telling John we could not do it, because I had no doubt that we could.
Other questions shot through my head.
What about unit positions in relation to one another? Would they have to move? What about artillery preparations, logistics (especially fuel), the British move forward, and the orders already disseminated and rehearsed? And how would an early attack affect day and night operations, and operations forty-eight hours from
now?
I told myself, Whatever you do, keep it simple. I knew that success early on in an attack builds its own momentum. I had seen that many times before. So, given this go-early situation, I did not need to put additional barriers in front of the corps by making some sudden change of plan. If we could simply back everything up to today that we had planned to do tomorrow at BMNT, then that would be the best way to do it.
All this raced through my brain in nanoseconds. OK, I decided, keep it simple and continue with what we've already set in motion, but with some major time and tactical adjustments. Now I had to see whether that was possible.
"Yes, we can do it," I told John, after a pause of no more than a second or two. "Tell the CINC yes, but I still want to talk to my commanders."
"XVIII Corps said they could go on two hours' notice," Yeosock answered. "How does that sound to you? Based on how soon the Egyptians can get ready, it looks like 1500 at the earliest. Take that as a warning order, with a confirmation at 1300, for a 1500 attack."
"Sounds OK to me, but I still want to talk to my commanders."
THAT call, and the cease-fire decision four days later, turned out to be the biggest surprises of the war for VII Corps. We had been over the plan with Third Army and with CENTCOM so many times that I thought we had considered every possibility. And now came one that we had never considered; it was that unexpected.
Why did the CINC want us to go early? What had brought on this very large, very sudden change? Except for John's remark that the Marines were doing well in the east, I was without a clue. The best understanding I could come to in the first moments after John's call was this: Since the Marines were going faster than expected, the fixing operation to our east was now going to take much less than a full day; this would allow us to attack today instead of tomorrow. Thus, as I understood it, the call from John Yeosock was primarily a matter of moving up the attack timetable fifteen hours.26
If that was the case (and I had no indication from John of anything else; he hadn't mentioned any change of missions or different methods of attack), I figured that the CINC was making no other changes in the plan. Nothing in my own intelligence indicated that the Iraqis in our sector were doing anything different from what we expected. There was no release of the 1st CAV Division from theater reserve, which would have signaled that all was well in the east, and that the Iraqi situation was so well known that early commitment of the reserve was a good choice. There was no "go as soon as you are ready." There was only "go early," but in coordination with XVIII Corps and the Egyptian Corps, just as the original plan said.
On the other hand, if the Iraqis were totally crumbling and we were now involved in a rout of the Iraqis and were in (technically) a pursuit, then there would be no need for flank protection or any coordinated attack. We could all go as soon as ready and get immediately in pursuit of a broken enemy.
If the enemy situation is completely known, then you have no reason to keep a reserve for contingencies. In other words, reserves are insurance policies against unexpected enemy actions or to exploit enemy vulnerabilities by piling on at a decisive location. Thus keeping a reserve signaled--at least to me--that the CINC still needed an insurance policy.
TURNING my attention back to immediate practical matters, I knew we would have to make adjustments. According to the old saying, when you meet the enemy, the first casualty is your plan. Well, we went that one better. We had not yet met the enemy, and the plan was already a casualty.
As my first order of business, I wanted to do three things: to talk to my commanders to get their assessments, to determine what adjustments needed to be made to move our attack up by fifteen hours, and to determine if we needed to make any tactical adjustments from our planned maneuvers following this early attack. We were going to do it. That wasn't an issue. It was a matter of when and how.
The major factor for me was that each piece of the corps had to fit together to make a coherent whole. Coherence was necessary because of the confined space in which we were working and because we had a single corps objective: to destroy the RGFC in our sector. That meant coordinating the movement and positioning of all corps units toward that single, common objective, and staying balanced, so that several options were available when we attacked the RGFC. I wanted to go early in a way that preserved that balance. That was the key challenge on which I focused.
It would have been different if each of the VII Corps units had had its own individual objectives. If I could have lined up my units along the border, given them a zone or lane in which to operate, and then turned them loose to head north in their own lanes to their own individual objectives at their own speed, it would have been much easier. We were not in that situation.
Meanwhile, a question kept flashing in the back of my mind: What do we do in daylight and what in darkness? I knew that I'd have to adjust the day-night scheme we had worked out and rehearsed in training, but now that we were going early, would I be calling on units to perform operations at night that would get us either bogged down or else so tangled up that the RGFC focus could be jeopardized?
I had wanted the breach done, minefields cleared, and passage lanes marked in daylight. Then I wanted to pass through the follow-on forces under cover of darkness and move the enveloping force close to the RGFC at night. That way, I had reasoned, they wouldn't know what was coming at them either from the breach or from the envelopment, and the RGFC would have only the minimum time to react to our attack. Such a sequence also would make it more difficult for the Iraqis to target us and to employ chemical weapons, even if they were able to move artillery to replace what our two-hour prep had taken out.
Breaching a complex obstacle covered by enemy fire is the toughest attack mission a unit can get. By doing it in daylight, there would be much greater exposure to Iraqi direct-fire weapons than at night, but we would more than make up for it by greater speed, greater avoidance of blue-on-blue, and our greater ability to mark lanes for follow-on units to pass through. We also would have a better setup for the RGFC attack. I had discussed all this with Tom Rhame and his commanders over and over again, and they all had agreed. Daylight it would be. That meant a start at BMNT tomorrow.
Now that timing was out the window.
At that point, I intuitively felt that we were going to run out of daylight for our breach attack, even given our early success in moving through the Iraqi security zone. And I sensed that time was suddenly slipping through our fingers. We needed as much daylight as we could get.
If we could handle the early attack simply by moving up our attack time--and keeping all the other pieces of the operation about the same--then the sooner we attacked, the better. If we could move it up fifteen hours, we could move it up more. We were losing valuable time. You just sensed that.
Since I was coming to the conclusion that earlier was better, and that going earlier might even reduce some of the tactical risks, I knew I needed to talk to Tom Rhame and confirm it with him. As for my enveloping force, they could continue doing what they had already begun.
Stan Cherrie had heard my end of the conversation. So had Creighton Abrams.
"Stan," I said, "get a warning order out that we are going to attack early. Talk to the commanders and get their input. Get Butch Funk and Don Holder in here." Since the 2nd ACR would be pacing the corps advance, I wanted to talk to my covering force commander. Meanwhile, I'd had some ideas about a possible contingency operation on the east flank, so I wanted to talk to my reserve division commander about that. This contingency operation carried some risks with it. The issue, as I saw it, was that by going early, the enveloping force would be way out ahead toward the RGFC by the time the 1st INF could complete the breach and the British could pass through and move on to defeat the Iraqi tactical reserves to the east. That meant that my east flank would be exposed during that gap. What I was thinking of doing was committing Butch Funk in a shallower attack to the east than we had originally planned. If I did that, and used the 2nd ACR in between t
he two armored divisions, we could possibly protect our east flank and get to the RGFC faster, though at the cost of reducing our combat power. With that in mind, I wanted to brainstorm a quick maneuver adjustment with Butch and Don.
I then called Tom Rhame. No problem, he told me. They could go early around noon. Ron Griffith told me the same.
As I made these calls, Creighton Abrams was working on the adjustments he would have to make to the two-hour artillery prep fires planned before the breach. Two hours was impossible now; we could not get all the ammo into position in time. How much prep was enough? How much would kill the Iraqi artillery in range of the breach and their chemical delivery means? If two hours was the minimum necessary, and we did less today, were we risking chemical strikes?
Meanwhile, I needed someone to call the British. Since they had a liaison element with us at the TAC CP, they knew what I knew at that point. But I needed to find out if Rupert Smith could adjust his movement from Area Ray forward fast enough to be ready to pass through the breach once the 1st INF opened it up and cleared out of the way.
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