If we look back at the kind of relationships described between people in this book, we will notice a startling pattern: many of the stories that have been told are about the inability of various people to agree on a common interest and achieve it.
Sergei Kvitko’s appeal to Putin to gasify his home was made after all attempts to solve the problem together with his neighbours and local government officials had failed. The residents of Pikalevo blocked a highway when negotiations between workers and managers, managers and owners, owners and the local administration, had broken down.
Law enforcement officers described in Part II used their positions of power to solve personal, individual goals of enrichment, and conflicts inevitably arose among officers in their pursuit of enrichment because the only governing mechanism was one’s closeness to power.
The young activists who joined pro-Kremlin groups did so because, given a staggering lack of community in their own towns, the government was their only venue for activism. The protesting creative class failed to find a common language with many of those who eagerly joined the Kremlin’s campaign for traditional values.
Those who visit Russia and travel beyond the confines of Moscow are often struck by the vast expanses. But among those expanses, they also see newly-built houses surrounded by high, impenetrable walls, as if their whole objective is to isolate themselves from their neighbours and from outsiders.
The roads, meanwhile, and the poorer homes, will often be dilapidated, broken and desolate. Inside the walls of the rich, the lawns will be groomed and gardens will be planted, but outside, just a few metres away, one will often find a sprawling heap of rubbish.
When one looks for a Russian national identity, one will find more factors dividing society than unifying it. When an August 2013 survey asked 1600 Russians what group they identified themselves with the most, 32 percent said they were “their own person and didn’t identify with any group.” The next category – 11 percent – identified themselves not as Russians, but as the middle class. Just four percent identified themselves as ethnic Russians.296
Interpersonal trust among Russians, while not at the bottom of the list, is still considerably lower than in other countries. According to the Levada Centre, only 27 percent of Russian respondents said that they believed other people should be trusted. That figure was 69 percent in Sweden, 42 percent in the United States, and an average of 45 percent among 29 countries.297
More striking still were statistics on how likely Russians were to get involved in voluntary work to help strangers in their community. According to two studies in 2011 and 2012, between 1 and 3 percent of Russians said they had volunteered through NGOs in the past year. When informal voluntary work was factored in, a 2011 Gallup poll found that less than 15 percent of the Russian population volunteered. That was far below third world neighbours like Turkmenistan (58 percent) and Uzbekistan (46 percent).298
Far from collectivist, these figures – and the view from any rural window – paint a society that is atomized and even individualistic. Lack of communication – which leads to lack of community – emerges as a central problem.
Soviet attempts at collectivization tried to remedy this problem. Note that the very word “collectivization” presumes the lack of a collective, implying one that needs to be imposed by force. Collectivization attempts during the end of Stalin’s rule – in the late 1940s and early 1950s, when a majority of the population lived in the countryside – faced a crucial hurdle: the lack of roads connecting communities. In autumn and spring, dirt roads were impassable; even today, this is the case for some federal highways, which become impossible to navigate during the autumn rains and the spring thaw. Lack of roads has been both a cause and an effect of lack of community. (As one study suggests, some farms took advantage of the lack of roads to remain out of the government’s reach and expand their holdings.299)
There are also the centrifugal forces resulting from twenty-one internal, non-Russian ethnic republics, some of whose residents do not speak Russian. The various ethnic, economic and social interests, sprawled out over one sixth of the world’s landmass, led Russia scholar Natalia Zubarevich to conclude that we are dealing not with one Russia, but with four.300
Putin’s state has particularly struggled to find a unifying factor: forging a national identity, and preparing for the 2014 Winter Olympics as a goal that everyone, from construction companies to schoolboys playing hockey, could strive for. But that left a big question of what would unify the country after the Olympic Games – not that the preparation efforts, riddled with corruption and embezzlement, have had much success. The recent official resurgence of Orthodox Christianity is the latest development in a perennial quest to keep the country together.
If we are dealing with an atomized society, divided by space, ethnicity, climate and economics, if we are dealing with broken communication between individuals and small groups, then what does that say about the relationship with supreme power?
Very often, Russian authoritarianism has been explained as an extension of Russia’s intrinsic collectivism. The political philosopher Hannah Arendt, meanwhile, identified “the primary concern of all tyrannical governments” as an attempt to bring about isolation, writing that tyrannies strive to sever political contacts between men.301 But perhaps authoritarianism, and the patrimonial state in particular, is merely what arises in the absence of political bonds between people?
That kind of state, with tendencies towards absolutism, reflects not just the vulnerability of the people in the face of state power, but also the people’s own implicit expectations of what state power should be like. If there is so little to unite a society apart from language and culture – which, incidentally, is not shared by a number of ethnic republics – people will look to state power to fulfil that role. The harder it is to establish horizontal networks and bonds, the more one is tempted to conflate God and Caesar, looking to his powers to step in where society has failed.
Separateness and atomization – and the compensatory, often dysfunctional collectivization that these factors produce – should not be viewed as a disease that needs to be fixed, but as a circumstance that needs to be understood and accepted. Russia may never have the close-knit communities that helped foster the kind of democratic and legal institutions that flourished, over hundreds of years, in Europe. Or, it could be that, in a digitalized world, new, unforeseen avenues of community-building will arise – because they are already arising. Russian society may continue looking to the state to play a central, unifying role – as, in times of crisis, will other societies. The use of one’s public office for self-enrichment might never be eradicated in Russia, because it has not been eradicated anywhere, but it may be accepted and regulated in order to avoid catastrophic human rights violations like the death and trial of Sergei Magnitsky or the corruption scandals we have related in this book. It could well be that Russia might eventually come to terms with itself as a feudal, fragmented state – stopping the cycle of revolution and despotism that have largely been the key forces fighting feudalism and fragmentation. Russia might never have the rule of law in the Western sense, but it could, perhaps, find a better equilibrium between the legal-rational and the patrimonial states.
Or it may simply fall apart and go the way of empires that grappled with similar problems before it: Byzantium, the Ottomans, and Austro-Hungary, giving way to an entirely new kind of Russian state.
For now, however, the Russian is in many ways rather alone, gazing upward, willingly giving up his powers to a higher being that he looks to for answers, because finding answers alone is too difficult.
Moscow. November, 2013.
Acknowledgements
I AM INDEBTED to a great number of people who helped make this book possible. The following are just a few.
My husband, Mikhail Vizel, not only encouraged me to write this book, but inspired the idea when he told me, one day in 2007, that I should try to see past the politics at what was really happenin
g in Russia.
Anthony Louis spent an enormous amount of time advising me on the text, an editor and a critic at once.
Karl Sabbagh, of Skyscraper, made me look at this book from the reader’s perspective as he edited the manuscript.
Vladimir Sharov and Vladimir Shlapentokh, in different ways and from different continents, inspired and encouraged this work.
Stanislav Konunov traveled with me to Pikalyovo and helped gather interviews for this book.
Andy Potts, Tim Wall and Natalia Antonova gave me support and advice, reading earlier versions of the draft.
My agents, Julia Goumen and Natasha Banke, put their faith in this project when it was just beginning. The phrase “make it happen” was made for them.
Finally, I would not have had the strength to write this book without the support of my family.
* * *
The people who agreed to speak to me and share their thoughts and experiences make up much of the content of this book. Some requested to remain anonymous. I am grateful for all their help, because a lot of these stories are their stories, as varied, contradictory and multifaceted as all people and books are.
Notes
1 During a Q&A session with youth groups at the Seliger forum in August, 2011, Vladimir Putin fielded such a question.
A girl who identified herself as Natalia told Putin, demurely, that she wanted to marry a military officer and asked what her “outlook” would be if she did so. “You’ll have two or three children, that’s for certain,” Putin told her.
From an official transcript and video on the prime minister’s website. http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/16080/
2 An oprichnik was a member of Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s secret police during the 1560s. In modern Russia, the term is often used negatively to describe security officers.
3 Ignatius, Adi. “A Tsar is Born.” Time. December 19, 2007. American journalists were so enthralled by Putin’s stare that they devoted the leading paragraph to it.
4 If US President George Bush saw Putin’s soul, then Russian President Boris Yeltsin, upon anointing his successor, described his eyes as “interesting”.
5 Sakwa, Richard. The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism, and the Medvedev Succession. Cambridge University Press: New York, 2011.
6 Shlapentokh, Vladimir. Rossiya kak feodalnoye obshchestvo. Stolitsa-Print: Moscow, 2008.
7 Pastukhov, Vladimir. Restavratsiya vmesto reformatsii. Dvadtsat let, kotoryie potryasli Rossiyu. OGI: Moscow, 2012, p. 229.
8 From a documentary about Putin aired on NTV on October 7, 2012. Tsentralnoye Televideniye. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c-0Y6FAxZ1E
9 Hertzen, Alexander. Byloye i dumy. From: Complete collection, Pravda: Moscow, 1975. Volume 4, pp. 159-160.
10 According to a Levada Centre poll conducted in September 2012, 20 percent of women said they would like to marry Putin. http://www.levada.ru/05-10-2012/20-rossiyanok-khoteli-vyiti-zamuzh-za-vladimira-putina
11 From an interview with Marina Razbezhkina, whose students produced a documentary film Winter Go Away, about the protests. “Rossiya na Marse, kuda ne doletet.”. Russky Reporter. October 2, 2012. http://rusrep.ru/article/2012/10/02/russia
12 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees officially expressed concern over the disappearance of Leonid Razvozzhayev in front of a UNHCR office in Kiev in October 2012. http://unhcr.org.ua/en/2011-08-26-06-58-56/news-archive/827-press-release-the-un-refugee-agency-is-deeply-concerned-about-the-disappearance-of-asylum-seeker-from-russian-federation
13 Barry, Ellen. “Russian Opposition Figure Says Abductors Threatened His Children.” The New York Times. October 24, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/25/world/europe/leonid-razvozzhayev-says-abductors-threatened-his-children.html
14 Svetova, Zoya. “Umalivshiye osnovu.” The New Times. June 11, 2012. http://newtimes.ru/articles/detail/53272/
15 The name has been changed at the request of the person.
16 Sologub, V. A. Perezhitye dni.Russky Mir, 1874, p. 117. http://az.lib.ru/w/were-saew_w_w/text_0130.shtml
17 Pushkin, A. S. Puteshestvie iz Moskvy v Peterburg. Sobraniye sochinenii v 10 tomakh. Russkaya Virtualnaya Biblioteka. http://www.rvb.ru/pushkin/01text/07criticism/02misc/1050.htm
18 “Premier vserossiiskogo teatra.” Gaze-ta.ru. http://www.gazeta.ru/culture/2011/04/29/a_3599681.shtml
19 See Sakwa, Richard. Putin. Russia’s Choice. Second Edition. Kindle Edition, 2009.
20 Based on an interview, conducted on conditions of anonymity, with a hotel administrator in the town of Pikalevo, May 2011.
21 Based on an interview with a driver at the Pikalevo minerals plant in May 2011. With reference to Putin’s staged performance, both the hotel administrator and the driver spoke in similar terms.
22 Cassiday, Julie A; Johnson, Emily D. “Putin, Putiniana, and the Question of a Post-Soviet Cult of Personality.” The Slavonic and East European Review. Volume 88, No. 4. October 1, 2010, pp. 681-707.
23 Gudkov, Lev. “Priroda putinisma.” Russian Alternatives conference, December 8, 2009.
24 The t-shirts were distributed by the Foundation for Effective Politics in the spring of 1999. The author used to have one; now, threadbare, it has retired to the spare clothes drawer of the family dacha.
25 Petrov, Nikolay. “Elections.” Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian post-communist political reform. Michael McFaul, Nikolay Petrov, Andrei Ryabov. Washington, 2004: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 48.
26 As quoted in: Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan. Kremlin Rising. Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the End of Revolution. A Lisa Drew Book/Scribner. New York, 2005. (Kindle Edition).
27 Based on an interview with one of several applicants in Moscow’s central Reception Office, conducted by the author in February 2011. All further information about Sergei Kvitko’s case is based on his own words, unless otherwise noted.
28 “Priyemnyie Putina ishyut istochniki finansirovania.” Kommersant. 13 (4068), January 27, 2009.
29 According to a document of the gasification programme posted on an official Tula region website. http://tula.news-city.info/docs/sistemsd/dok_ierizb.htm
30 From an official transcript of a speech by Putin dated September 25, 2008. http://archive.premier.gov.ru/visits/ru/6068/events/1975/
31 Ivanov, Maxim. “Overwhelmed with Pleas.” Kommersant. July 30, 2009.
32 http://blog-medvedev.livejournal.com/22187.html?thread=167595
33 http://yarik-kolosov.livejournal.com/642.html
34 Glavvrach RDKB: Godovaly Yaroslav Kolosov seichas na lechenii v Germanii. RIA Novosti. May 18, 2011. http://www.rian.ru/society/20110518/376193906.html
35 Lally, Kathy. “Medvedev meets the press.” The Washington Post. May 18, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/medvedev-meets-thepress/2011/05/18/AFQ6QX6G_print.html
36 From an official transcript on www.premier.gov.ru
37 From a telephone interview with a caseworker at the reception office in October, 2011. The caseworker spoke on conditions of anonymity.
38 Pushkin, Alexander. Boris Godunov. Kessinger Publishing, 2004.
39 Kolesnikov, Andrei. “Ne ukaraulili sem poselkov.” Kommersant. .138. July 31, 2010.
40 Ibid.
41 Sharov, Vladimir. Iskusheniye revolutsiyei (Russkaya verkhovnaya vlast). Moscow: Arsis Books, 2009, p 23.
42 See Arutunyan, Anna. “Is Russia Really that Authoritarian?” Foreign Policy in Focus, January 11, 2007. http://www.fpif.org/articles/is_russia_really_that_authoritarian.
43 “Despite Putin’s calls to bolster social order and implement federal laws over the entire country, the Kremlin allowed local leaders to see themselves as feudal lords as long as they remained loyal to the Kremlin and were prepared to support Putin in his fight against his enemies.” Shlapentokh, Vladimir. Rossiya kak feodalnoye obshchestvo. Stolitsa-Print: Moscow, 2008. See pp. 187-188.
44 Levinson, Alexei. “Nashe my: Vertikal, vid snizu.�
�� Vedomosti, 207 (2725), November 2, 2010.
45 Kolesnikov, Andrei. “Ne ukaraulili sem poselkov.” Kommersant. No 138. July 31, 2010.
46 According to Boris Sviridov, a legal expert at the Constitutional Housing Right Committee, a Moscow-based NGO, in an interview with the author.
47 From an interview with Sofyin in June 2011. These and subsequent interviews were conducted in Pikalevo by the author together with Stanislav Konunov.
48 “Vse budet Pikalevo.” Gazeta.ru, June 5, 2009. http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2009/06/05_kz_3207526.shtm. See also: Belton, Catherine. “Debt pressure rises for Deripaska.” Financial Times. February 23, 2009. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/627e2eac-01d6-11de-8199-000077b07658.html#axzz1TxYigXAL.
49 RBC St. Petersburg. March 27, 2009. http://spb.rbc.ru/free-news/20090327151015.shtm
50 Arutunyan, A. “Small town erupts.” The Moscow News. May 25, 2009. http://mnweekly.rian.ru/news/20090521/55377597.html
51 Courtesy of Mikhail Panfilov’s personal video archive.
52 The Public Opinion Foundation. From a poll of 2000 respondents across 100 residential areas in 44 Russian regions.
53 Ivanov, Alexei. Khrebet Rossii. Azbuka-Klassika, Moscow: 2010, pp 107-111.
54 Clarke, Simon. The Development of Capitalism in Russia.(Routeledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series). Kindle Edition. T & F Books UK. 2009.
55 Ibid.
56 Kononov, Nikolai. “Kollaps na troikh.” Forbes [Russian edition], 04.2009.
57 From an interview in June 2011. The day after the interview, we would learn that Sofyin had been fired by Basel management.
58 The name of the person has been changed to protect him.
59 Adapted and translated into English by Anna Arutunyan, from: Vladimov, Georgy. Verny Ruslan. Istoriya karaulnoy sobaki. Vagrius, Moscow: 2004.
60 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The New Nobility. The Restoration of Russia’s Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB. Kindle Edition. 2010.
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