by Peter Taylor
2. Provos, op. cit., p. 21.
3. Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to consider authorised procedures for the interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism. Chairman: Lord Parker of Waddington, HMSO, Cmnd. 4901, March 1972, p. 12.
4. Ibid., p. 3.
5. Ibid., p. 12.
6. Ibid., p. 3.
7. Beating the Terrorists? Interrogation in Omagh, Gough and Castlereagh, Peter Taylor, Penguin Special, 1980, p. 20.
8. Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to consider authorised procedures for the interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism, op. cit., p. 12.
9. Provos, op. cit., p. 92.
10. European Commission of Human Rights. Application no. 5310/71. Ireland against the United Kingdom. Report of the Commission (Adopted on 25 January 1976), p. 185.
11. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 116.
12. Ibid., p. 36.
13. Report of the enquiry into allegations against the security forces of physical brutality in Northern Ireland arising out of events on 9th August 1971, Chaired by Sir Edmund Compton, GCB, KBE, HMSO, Cmnd. 4823, November 1971, p. 22.
14. Ibid., p. 16.
15. Ibid., p. 12.
16. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 38.
17. Report of the enquiry into allegations against the security forces of physical brutality in Northern Ireland arising out of events on 9th August 1971, op. cit., p. 71.
18. Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to consider authorised procedures for the interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism, op. cit., p. 5.
19. Ibid., p. 22.
20. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 115.
21. Ibid., p. 127.
Chapter Six: Aftermath
1. An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Northern Ireland 1969–1993, Malcom Sutton, Beyond the Pale Publications, 1994, p. 6.
2. In Holy Terror, op. cit., p. 168.
3. Provos, op. cit., p. 114.
4. ‘Bloody Sunday: An Open Wound’, Peter Taylor, Sunday Times Magazine, 26 January 1992, p. 16.
5. ‘A Soldier’s Tale’, BBC documentary, transmitted 7 August 1994.
6. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 42.
Chapter Seven: ‘Bloody Sunday’ – The Build-up
1. Future Military Policy for Londonderry. An Appreciation of the Situation by CLF, 14 December 1971. ‘SECRET’. This is a critically important memorandum marked ‘Secret’ written by Major-General Robert Ford, Commander Land Forces (CLF), Northern Ireland, to the GOC, Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Tuzo. It was revealed by the Saville Inquiry, the judicial tribunal set up by the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, on 29 January 1998 to re-examine the events of ‘Bloody Sunday’. This chapter contains new material uncovered by the Inquiry.
2. Provos, op. cit., p. 115.
3. Ibid., p. 112. More details of the circumstances in which Cusack and Beattie were killed are contained here.
4. Future Military Policy for Londonderry, op. cit.
5. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 88.
6. Future Military Policy for Londonderry, op. cit.
7. Ibid.
8. Northern Ireland 1968–73. A Chronology of Events. Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 145.
9. Daily Telegraph, 28 March 2000.
10. Northern Ireland 1968–73. A Chronology of Events. Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 145.
11. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 135.
12. The Situation in Londonderry as at 7 January 1972. Memo from Major-General Robert Ford to the GOC, Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Tuzo. Marked ‘PERSONAL and CONFIDENTIAL’. Revealed by the Saville Inquiry.
13. Irish Times, 30 March 2000.
14. In Holy Terror, op. cit., p. 189.
15. Northern Ireland 1968–73. A Chronology of Events. Vol. 2. 1972–73, Richard Deutsch and Vivien Magowan, Blackstaff Press Ltd, 1974, p. 151.
16. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 143.
17. Irish Times, op. cit. Statement provided by Edward Heath to the Saville Tribunal.
18. On 1 February 1972, the Minister of State for Defence, Lord Balniel, confirmed to the House of Commons that ‘the arrest operation was discussed by the joint Security Council after decisions had been taken by Ministers here’. Cain Web Service, Bloody Sunday and the Report of the Widgery Tribunal – Summary and Significance of New Material, Points 111–150, text by Irish Government, p. 1. This internet site is a valuable repository of much of the ‘Bloody Sunday’ archive (http//cain.ulst.ac.uk).
19. Provos, op. cit., p. 117.
20. Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the events on Sunday, 30th January 1972, which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day, by the Rt Hon Lord Widgery, OBE, TD, HMSO, 18 April 1972, p. 7.
21. Ibid., p. 7.
22. These are documents released by the various political and security authorities to the Saville Inquiry.
23. Provos, op. cit., p. 119.
24. Ibid., p. 118.
25. Ibid., p. 116.
26. Ibid., p. 118.
27. Ibid., p. 119.
Chapter Eight: ‘Bloody Sunday’ – The Killing Zone
1. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 149. See also Those Are Real Bullets, Aren’t They?, Peter Pringle and Philip Jacobson, Fourth Estate, London, 2000, p. 92. At the time of writing, this is the most comprehensive and up-to-date account of ‘Bloody Sunday’. It contains not only the personal experience of the writers, who investigated ‘Bloody Sunday’ at the time as members of the Sunday Times Insight team, but important material uncovered by the Saville Inquiry.
2. Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the events on Sunday, 30th January 1972, which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day, by the Rt Hon Lord Widgery, OBE, TD, op. cit., pp. 12–14.
3. Those Are Real Bullets, Aren’t They?, op. cit., p. 119. The authors make a clear connection between the shooting of Donaghy and Johnson and the shot fired by the Official IRA. They believe that it was fired in retaliation for the shooting of the two men. The Paras, however, insist that the single shot came first.
4. Eyewitness Bloody Sunday. The Truth, edited by Don Mullan, Wolfhound Press, 1997, pp. 86–8. This contains much of the new evidence in the form of witness statements that was an important factor in Tony Blair’s decision to set up the Saville Inquiry.
5. This is confirmed by Lord Widgery in Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the events on Sunday, 30th January 1972, which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day, op. cit., p. 13.
6. Ibid., p. 11.
7. Provos, op. cit., p. 121.
8. Ibid.
9. Interview from full transcript of interview with ‘Phil’ for BBC documentary ‘Remember Bloody Sunday’, transmitted 28 January 1992.
10. Provos, op. cit., p. 122.
11. Eyewitness Bloody Sunday. The Truth, op. cit. Many of the details of those killed are taken from here and from Those Are Real Bullets, Aren’t They?, op. cit.
12. The suggestion has been made on the basis of forensic and eye-witness evidence in Eyewitness Bloody Sunday. The Truth, op. cit., and by Channel Four News in its investigation of 17 January 1997. Shots from the walls were also noted in the Brigade radio log, pirated by an amateur radio enthusiast in the Bogside area. See also Those Are Real Bullets, Aren’t They?, op. cit., p. 209.
13. Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the events on Sunday, 30th January 1972, which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day, by Lord Widgery, O.B.E., T.D., op. cit., pp. 8 and 14, respectively.
14. ‘Remember Bloody Sunday’, op. cit.
15. British Irish Rights Watch ‘Bloody Sunday’ – Submission to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary Executions, British Ir
ish Rights Watch, London, 1994.
16. Provos, op. cit., p. 123.
17. Those Are Real Bullets, Aren’t They?, op. cit., p. 224.
18. Provos, op. cit., p. 124.
19. Cain Web Service, Bloody Sunday and the Report of the Widgery Tribunal – Summary and Significance of New Material, op. cit., p. 6.
20. Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the events on Sunday, 30th January 1972, which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day, by Lord Widgery, O.B.E., T.D., op. cit., p. 38.
21. Ibid., pp. 35 and 37.
22. House of Commons Official Report. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 29 January 2000, columns 501–3.
23. Guardian, ‘The Bloody Sunday Inquiry: Special Report’, John Mullin. Taken from the Guardian news unlimited website. The intelligence documents were revealed by the Saville Inquiry, Guardian, 7 April 2000.
24. Independent, 28 March 2000.
25. BBC News Web Site, www.bbc.co.uk 5 September 2000.
26. Daily Telegraph, 19 August 2000.
Chapter Nine: The ‘Funny People’
1. Provos, op. cit., p. 131.
2. Ibid., p. 131. Responsibility for the Abercorn bombing has never been satisfactorily resolved, although few have any doubt, despite Seán MacStiofáin’s denial, that it was the work of the Provisional IRA. The most likely explanation is that it was a Provisional bomb that went off prematurely.
3. Northern Ireland 1968–73. A Chronology of Events. Volume 2, op. cit., p. 161.
4. Provos, op. cit., p. 133.
5. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 168.
6. Memoirs of a Statesman, op. cit., p. 152.
7. Provos, op. cit., p. 135.
8. In 1952 General Templer, later Field-Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, was appointed High Commissioner and Director of Operations in Malaya with a brief to direct the civil and military aspects of the campaign against the communist insurgents.
9. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,475.
Chapter Ten: Talking to the Enemy
1. Northern Ireland 1968–73. A Chronology of Events. Volume 2, op. cit., p. 181.
2. Ibid., p. 185.
3. Before the Daum, op. cit., p. 198.
Chapter Eleven: Piratical Ventures
1. Who Dares Wins. The Story of the SAS 1950–1992, Tony Geraghty, Warner Books, 1993, p. 401.
2. Gangs and Counter-Gangs, Major Frank Kitson, MBE, MC, Barrie & Rockcliff, 1960, pp. 76ff.
3. Northern Ireland 1968–73. A Chronology of Events. Volume 2, op. cit., p. 177.
4. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 182.
5. Belfast Telegraph, 3 May 1973.
6. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 269.
7. Ibid., p. 275.
8. Ibid., p. 274.
Chapter Twelve: A Better Parachute
1. The ‘back-badge’ is a reference to the Gloucesters’ right to wear a small badge depicting a sphinx at the back of their berets in addition to the normal badge at the front The tradition stems from an engagement against the French in 1801 at the Battle of Alexandria. When the French cavalry attacked from the rear, the Gloucesters were given the order, ‘Rear rank, right about face!’ and, holding their fire until the last minute, shattered the enemy’s charge. The Gloucesters thus fought the enemy back to back and the battle was won. Today the ‘back-badge’ is worn by all members of the Regiment into which the Gloucesters were amalgamated, the Royal Gloucestershire, Berkshire and Wiltshire Regiment.
2. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 378.
Chapter Thirteen: Success
1. Provos, op. cit., p. 152.
2. Gerry Kelly was one of the 38 IRA prisoners who escaped from the Maze prison on 25 September 1983. He was subsequently arrested by Dutch police in a flat outside Amsterdam on 16 January 1986 following a tip-off from British intelligence. Another senior IRA figure and Maze escapee, Brendan ‘Bik’ McFarlane, was arrested with him. In the apartment keys were found to a container parked nearby in which were stored fourteen rifles, 100,000 rounds of ammunition and four huge drums of nitro-benzine, the basic ingredient of many IRA bombs. Kelly and McFarlane were subsequently extradited and returned to serve their sentences in the Maze prison.
3. Provos, op. cit., p. 156.
4. Provos, op. cit., p. 162.
5. Sinn Fein signed up to the ‘Belfast’ or ‘Good Friday’ Agreement of 10 April 1998 in which it agreed to participate in a power sharing Executive with David Trimble’s Ulster Unionists.
6. Loyalists, op. cit., pp. 127ff.
7. Ibid., p. 136.
8. Ibid., p. 131.
Chapter Fourteen: Changing the Course of History
1. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,476.
2. Northern Ireland 1968–74. A Chronology of Events. 1974 Volume 3, Blackstaff Press, p. 55.
3. For a more detailed account of the Dublin and Monaghan bombs see Loyalists, op. cit., pp. 125 ff.
4. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 259.
5. Provos, op. cit., p. 171.
6. Ibid.
7. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 480.
8. Ibid., p. 490.
9. The IRA, Tim Pat Coogan, HarperCollins, 1995, p. 518.
10. Error of Judgement. The Truth about the Birmingham Bombings, Chris Mullin, Poolbeg, 1986, p. 207.
11. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 245.
12. Ibid., p. 96.
Chapter Fifteen: Structures of Disengagement
1. Provos, op. cit., p. 175.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 176.
4. Northern Ireland 1968–74. A Chronology of Events. Volume 3, op. cit., p. 179.
5. For further details of the Republican Movement’s minutes and an analysis of the ups and downs of the ‘truce’, see Provos, op. cit., chapter 13.
6. After his first arrest on 30 December 1972, Martin McGuinness admitted IRA membership. He made the following statement to the Court: ‘For over two years, I was an officer in the Derry Brigade of the IRA. We have fought against the killing of our people. Many of my comrades have been arrested and tortured and some were shot unarmed by British troops… I am a member of Oglaigh na hEireann [the IRA] and very, very proud of it … We firmly believed we were doing our duty as Irishmen.’ Provos, op. cit., p. 153.
7. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,475.
8. For more details of the activities of the ‘Shankill Butchers’ see Loyalists, op. cit., Chapter 13.
9. Real Lives, op. cit., p. 574.
10. Ibid., p. 588.
11. Ibid., p. 599.
12. Ibid., p. 568.
13. Extract from original Republican Movement minutes as viewed and noted by the author.
Chapter Sixteen: Enter the SAS
1. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 610.
2. 22 SAS is the Regiment’s operational wing and consists of four ‘Sabre’ Squadrons that do the fighting. They are known as A, B, D and G, each consisting of around seventy men. Each Squadron is divided into four ‘troops’ of sixteen men which in turn are divided into four four-man teams. To its members, the SAS is known as the ‘Regiment’ and to its men on the ground as the ‘Troop’.
3. Ambush. The War between the SAS and the IRA, James Adams, Robin Morgan and Anthony Bambridge, Pan Original, 1988, p. 76.
4. SAS Terrorism. The Assassin’s Glove, Father Denis Faul and Father Raymond Murray, personal publication, July 1976, p. 6.
5. Ambush, op. cit., p. 77.
6. The SAS in Ireland, Raymond Murray, Mercier Press, 1993, p. 172.
7. Ibid., p. 173.
8. SAS Terrorism, op. cit., p. 16.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 32.
11. The SAS in Ireland, op. cit., p. 178.
12. Ibid., p. 179.
Chapter Seventeen: Piling on the Pressure
1. Provos, op. cit., p. 199.
2. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 109.
3. Report
of a Committee to consider, in the context of civil liberties and human rights, measures to deal with terrorism in Northern Ireland, Chairman: Lord Gardiner, HMSO, Cmnd. 5847, January 1975, pp. 5, 7 and 34.
4. Provos, op. cit., pp. 198–9.
5. Author’s own calculation from statistics.
6. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 664.
7. Ibid., pp. 663–4.
8. Ibid., p. 665.
9. Paying the Price, Roy Mason, Robert Hale, 1999, p. 123.
10. Ibid., p. 171.
11. Ibid., p. 171.
12. Ibid.
13. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 115.
14. Beating the Terrorists? Interrogation in Omagh, Gough and Castlereagh, op. cit. This is a detailed account of the use of the emergency legislation and the consequences that led to the IRA hunger strikes of 1980 and 1981.
15. Beating the Terrorists? Interrogation in Omagh, Gough and Castlereagh, op. cit., p. 193.
16. Ibid., p. 194.
17. Ibid., p. 71.
18. Pig in the Middle, op. cit., p. 220.
19. Beating the Terrorists?, op. cit., p. 355. Under the Emergency Provisions Act suspects could be held for questioning for up to three days. Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, they could be held for up to seven.
20. Provos, op. cit., pp. 217–18. This gives the background to ‘Life Behind the Wire’ and the interview with Desmond Irvine.
21. Ireland. The Propaganda War. The British Media and the ‘Battle for Hearts and Minds’, Liz Curtis, Pluto Press, 1984, p. 58.
22. Ibid., p. 59.
23. Paying the Price, op. cit., pp. 205–6.
24. Beating the Terrorists?, op. cit., p. 286.
25. Paying the Price, op. cit., p. 213.
