Despite his policy speech, despite his efforts to avoid annoying the electorate, the results were as bad as could have been expected. In Carlow-Kilkenny, Fianna Fáil’s Martin Medlar retained the seat of his late party colleague Thomas Walsh. His vote, at 58 per cent, was up 12 per cent on the last general election, while Fine Gael support was down 6 per cent and Labour dropped 1 per cent. Dublin South-West was much worse. The deceased deputy, Peadar Doyle, was a member of Fine Gael, so that party supplied the sole inter-party candidate, Edmond Power. He took 40 per cent of the vote—compared to the 53 per cent won by inter-party candidates in 1954. Fianna Fáil’s Noel Lemass took 60 per cent, an increase of 20 percentage points.
Costello had aimed to change the political mood, and had failed. He put on a brave face, saying the losses were not unexpected and rejecting Fianna Fáil’s clamour for a general election. The Taoiseach high-mindedly told an audience in Rathmines that “the Government of a country is not a game to be played by political Parties for Party purposes”. He pointed out that Fianna Fáil had argued in 1953 and 1954 that no country could be governed if by-election defeats inevitably led to general elections. Of course, Fianna Fáil had only said that because Jack Costello had been arguing the exact opposite. But now, he suggested, there was a difference: while the inter-party Opposition had rejected the Fianna Fáil government’s policy, and outlined an alternative, the same was not true now.101 It was an ingenious if rather thin argument. It probably fooled nobody, least of all the Taoiseach. His private mood was revealed in a letter to Tom Bodkin, who had again declined an offer to take over the Arts Council: “I have had so many frustrating disappointments that one more does not make any difference.”102
The voters may not have been particularly impressed, but at least Seán MacBride and his two colleagues appeared to be back on board after the October policy speech. In November, the Clann leader wrote to Costello with some “brief” (nine pages!) suggestions about economic policy in the light of the Suez Crisis. He concluded his letter with an offer to secure more information if required, telling the Taoiseach, “I shall be entirely at your disposal.” A further “brief memorandum on the need for a ten year economic development plan”—which ran to 26 pages plus appendices—was prepared by MacBride for Costello at the end of November.103 As late as 12 January, MacBride was sending advice to Costello on how to cope with the unemployment situation.104 There was no apparent reason for Costello to have any fears about MacBride’s continued support—but that was about to change, and the change had nothing to do with economic policy.
In Chapter 11, we saw Costello’s restrained response to Republican violence, particularly the raid on Roslea barracks, and his warning that if such violence continued, the Government would take action. A subsequent report by Chief Superintendent P.J. Carroll noted that there was “a temporary setback” to the IRA following the Taoiseach’s statement and a condemnation of violence by the Catholic hierarchy. However, these initiatives “had no lasting effect in deterring persons from joining the IRA or taking part in its militant activities”. The Gardaí continued the policy of “observation” of IRA activities until May 1956, when the Government ordered a clampdown on IRA training camps and arms dumps. By then, though, “the IRA had changed their tactics … and gave no opportunity for effective police action”.105
The IRA had not made tactical changes simply to frustrate police action; the organisation was planning a major push against Northern Ireland, Operation Harvest, more popularly known as the Border Campaign. This opened on the night of 11 November with the destruction of six Customs posts, a raid on Gough Barracks in Armagh and the destruction of a BBC transmission station in Derry.106 A month later, the campaign escalated, with attacks on RUC barracks. Unionists condemned the Dublin Government for failing to stop cross-Border attacks.107
On 14 December, the Government decided to use the Gardaí and the Army to deal with the IRA. A statement agreed at a Cabinet meeting referred to Costello’s warning in 1955. “Since these organisations have again arrogated to themselves powers and functions that belong to the duly elected representatives of the people … the Government have now determined to take … such steps as the Government deem necessary and appropriate to prevent activities which, if they were allowed to continue, would inevitably cause loss of life and would involve the danger that civil war might ensue.”108 The Irish Times said there was no need to underline the gravity of the statement—but observed that it was now up to the Taoiseach and his government “to demonstrate the sincerity of their words by immediate and vigorous action”.109 This was done by deploying the Army to assist the Gardaí on the border. That weekend, 13 men were arrested at a farm outside Scotstown in Monaghan.110
Although the arrested men had to be released because no arms or incriminating documents were found,111 it was at least an indication that Costello was prepared to take action. The American Ambassador reported to Washington that there was a “violent cleavage” within Cabinet, with Norton opposing the Government action. Ambassador Taft speculated that the IRA might have been prompted to challenge the Government’s authority because of its “growing weakness … resulting from economic crisis and losses in recent by-elections”.112 The American Embassy was not impressed with the Government’s response, saying it was “still reluctant to arrest IRA leaders”, and that what had been done so far “does not represent what the police could accomplish if given a free hand”.113
The British were also sceptical of Costello’s efforts. On 12 December the Ambassador, Alexander Clutterbuck, expressed his government’s concern to Cosgrave. On the eighteenth, he followed up by delivering a formal communication from his government to the Taoiseach. This again expressed concern, and hoped that the promised action against the IRA would be effective and successful. Unusually, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden outlined the contents of this message in the House of Commons. Eden went on to stress that under the 1949 Ireland Act, Northern Ireland was “an integral part of the United Kingdom”, and therefore the safety of its inhabitants was a direct responsibility of his government.114 The Taoiseach told Clutterbuck that his Government “was making a mistake in delivering such a note and registering a protest … such action exacerbated Irish Government annoyance at Britain’s failure to treat partition as the point at issue, as well as giving rise to a resentful feeling that the British Government was interfering”.115
A formal written response followed on Christmas Eve. It pointed out that the Government’s attitude had been made plain in a number of public statements, and that the measures that might be required were “for determination by the Irish Government solely, in the light of their experience and judgment and in discharge of their responsibility to Dáil Éireann”. It reminded the British of Costello’s statement of November 1955, when he had pointed out that the root cause of violence was partition. “While fully sharing the desire of the British Government for a continuance of good relations, they find it a matter of the deepest concern that there has, so far, been no indication of any change of attitude on the part of either the British or the Six-County Government towards the problem of Partition.” Eden’s statement in the House of Commons that Northern Ireland was an integral part of the United Kingdom “is one that could never, in any circumstances, be accepted by an Irish Government … The Six Counties are part of the national territory of Ireland, and it remains the profound conviction of the Irish Government that the evils attendant on Partition can be eradicated only by the removal of their basic cause.”116
While this was fairly traditional nationalist fare, Cosgrave was also working on a new tack. In January, he sought Cabinet approval for an approach to the British Government to seek improvements in the treatment of nationalists within Northern Ireland. Cosgrave reported that, in the view of leading Nationalist politician Eddie McAteer, some senior Unionists recognised that the violence was due to the frustration of normal constitutional political activity. Therefore, he argued, the time might be right to ask the British to
take action, although the approach would have to be made in secret to avoid encouraging the men of violence.117
Enda Staunton has argued that this concentration on reform within Northern Ireland rather than on the removal of partition marked “the genesis of a new policy which, with some relapses, was to continue to the present day”.118 If it was an attempt to change the parameters of debate away from the sterile concentration on the Border, it didn’t work. London viewed the démarche as yet another attempt to remove partition, and rejected it on those grounds.119
Despite the lack of any encouragement whatever from London, Costello and his colleagues agreed to begin a study in each Department of the practical consequences of an end to partition.120 The Taoiseach announced his “positive policy” towards the North at the Fine Gael Ard Fheis on 6 February 1957. The British thought there was “nothing new so far as a united Ireland was concerned” in the speech, but recognised that his idea of carrying out preparatory work was “novel”.121 When he returned to office, de Valera recommended that Departments should continue these studies. The Department of External Affairs, however, reported that most Departments didn’t consider the matter urgent, and there are no further entries on the file, indicating that nothing was done about it.122 De Valera attempted to put out feelers to London through the former British Representative, Lord Rugby, but the new Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, wasn’t biting. “I do not think that a united Ireland—with de Valera as a sort of Irish Nehru—would do us much good. Let us stand by our friends.”123
While Costello was rejecting British pressure for more robust action, he was also facing criticism for the action his Government had taken. Independent TD Jack McQuillan urged the Taoiseach to “discontinue immediately [the] use of Irish Army and Gardaí as instruments of British policy in helping to maintain Partition”. Costello reminded McQuillan that the right to determine issues of peace and war, and to maintain armed forces, was vested in the Oireachtas. The Gardaí and the Army were not being used as instruments of British policy, but to safeguard the institutions of the State. “I trust that you will appreciate the … magnitude of the evil that could ensue if any elected representative of the people were to lend his support to activities that are based on defiance of the democratic institutions of this State.”124
But as the year turned, the situation got much worse. On 30 December a 23-year-old (Catholic) RUC constable, John Scally, was killed in a raid on the barracks in Derrylin in Fermanagh.125 And on New Year’s Day, two IRA men were killed in a raid on the RUC barracks in Brookeborough, also in Fermanagh.126 The funerals of Seán South and Fergal O’Hanlon saw a massive show of public sympathy for the “martyrs”, and Clare and Dublin county councils passed motions of sympathy for them.127 Northern Nationalists reacted with even more emotion. As a 15-year-old from Tyrone, Austin Currie later recalled, “it was, in truth, satisfying to see someone putting the boot into the arrogant and dominating unionists”.128
McQuillan, along with Patrick Finucane (who had left Clann na Talmhan), called for the recall of the Dáil, the sending of United Nations observers to the North, and the release of seven men arrested in Cavan on New Year’s Eve.129 The arrested men, who had been charged under the Offences Against the State Act, included a future Chief of Staff of the IRA, Ruairí Ó Brádaigh.130 Costello rejected their demands out of hand,131 but recognised the need “to steady public opinion in these matters”.132 On the evening of Sunday 6 January he addressed the Irish people on Radio Éireann.
Three young Irishmen (he included the RUC man, Scally) had died in the past week; the Government was resolved to prevent further attacks. He and his colleagues believed that Partition “cannot, and never will, be ended by force”; but “a small group, with no basis of legitimate authority, is seeking to embroil our country in war”. He dismissed as a “wicked misrepresentation” the idea that the Gardaí and Army were being used to maintain partition. In fact, they were preventing actions which would make divisions between Irishmen permanent. “Neither appeals for sympathy with young men who have put themselves in danger nor natural sorrow for tragic deaths should be allowed to betray any of us into an appearance of encouraging these actions.”133
The British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, told Ambassador Boland that Costello’s statement was “extremely good”.134 The number of letters from Republican sympathisers, particularly in America, showed that it had greatly annoyed that constituency. But Costello remained defiant. One correspondent argued that “a lot of bloodshed” would be needed to end partition; the Taoiseach said bloodshed would “make the problem harder to solve and could very easily make it impossible to solve at all”.135
But was Costello serious about putting a stop to the IRA? The answer was yes—up to a point. The private secretary to the Minister for Justice recalled that the Government was determined to use the ordinary criminal code rather than special powers and internment, to which Costello and Everett, as well as their colleagues, were “temperamentally opposed”. Apart from anything else, Ireland didn’t want to be the first country to seek a derogation from the recently signed European Convention on Human Rights.136 However, the Offences Against the State Act was used, and two days after Costello’s speech arrests of suspects began in earnest. Most of the IRA Army Council and GHQ staff were quickly picked up and convicted.137 Responding to later criticism from MacEntee that the Government had used the ordinary courts to deal with the IRA threat, he said the fact that a military tribunal had not been needed was “a distinct contribution to the effective handling of a difficult situation”.138
However, the day before Costello lost office, a Garda report indicated that the results had been limited. Chief Superintendent P.J. Carroll estimated the active strength of the IRA at 943, and predicted that “the increase in numbers will tend to continue, as the militant activities in the Six Counties will attract youths and the emergence of Sinn Féin as an active political party will help to secure members for the IRA”.139 After he returned to power, de Valera adopted a tougher approach, introducing internment in July. The difference in treatment under the two governments is indicated by the experience of one Republican activist, jailed for two months in January under the Offences Against the State Act, then interned for 18 months in July. The same activist observed of Costello that he had been “straightforward, and restrained and dignified … Republicans could not complain that they weren’t given fair trial.”140 Although the internees were released at the end of 1958, sporadic continuing violence led to the reconstitution of the Special Criminal Court in November 1961.141 The Border Campaign was finally called off in February 1962.142
To return to the aftermath of Costello’s broadcast condemning IRA activities, he gratefully acknowledged the support given to him by de Valera.143 The leader of the Opposition was doing his best to be helpful, calling a meeting of the Fianna Fáil parliamentary party for 15 January which unanimously agreed a motion saying there could be no armed force except under the control of the Government. Less helpfully, the meeting also discussed the possible use of force by any future government to end partition. “While no definite decision was taken, the views expressed indicated that the employment of force at any time in the foreseeable future would be undesirable and likely to be futile.” The fact that “no definite decision” was taken on the future use of force indicates the underlying tensions in the party, as John Horgan has pointed out.144 Costello, however, looked on the positive side of the motion, telling Fianna Fáil TD Dan Breen that “with the assistance of your leader, public opinion has been steadied and is now behind the effort to uphold the legality of the Constitution”.145
If there was tension within Fianna Fáil over the Government’s crackdown on the IRA, it was nothing to the tensions within Clann na Poblachta. MacBride and Con Lehane advised against pulling the rug from under Costello’s government. The only alternative was the return of de Valera, who would be even tougher on the IRA. In the emotion of the moment, though, the Republican activists who domi
nated the Clann executive insisted that their three TDS should put down a vote of no confidence in the Government.146
On 28 January Clann na Poblachta announced that it was “impossible” to continue supporting the Government, and a motion of no confidence was put down in the names of MacBride and his two fellow TDS, John Tully and Kathleen O’Connor. The motion was carefully crafted to put economic problems first. The three reasons it gave for withdrawing confidence from the Government were the failure to produce a long-term economic development programme, the failure to anticipate the unemployment crisis and take effective measures against it, and finally the failure “to formulate and pursue any positive policy calculated to bring about the reunification of Ireland”.147 MacBride always insisted it was the economy which prompted the motion—a very lengthy statement to Dublin constituency representatives went into great detail on all the warnings he had given the Government on the subject, and doesn’t mention partition or the Border Campaign once.148 A statement by the party’s Ard Comhairle was more forthcoming; after a lengthy diatribe against the Government’s economic failings, it accused Costello and his colleagues of “acting as Britain’s policeman against a section of the Irish people”.149
On the day the Clann put down its motion, the Taoiseach happened to be discussing cross-Border relations with Trinity College senator William Bedell Stanford. He showed him MacBride’s letter, and “spoke sadly about the ‘dastardliness’ of this manoeuvre … he seemed greatly saddened by the ruthlessness of party politics, and disappointed at not having taken the gun out of politics as he had hoped in 1948. But he showed plenty of moral force and physical energy despite his rather slight build, and he still looked fit after his gruelling three years in office.”150 He wrote a rather hurt reply to MacBride, saying he had agreed to become Taoiseach with the aim of taking the gun out of Irish politics, and of helping to end “the bitterness between personalities and Parties that was poisoning the public life of the country. My first hope has not yet been fully realised. So far as the second hope is concerned, I do not intend, for my part, to permit recent events to add any further bitterness.”151 The British Ambassador reported to London that “to say that the Government are angered and disgusted at MacBride’s behaviour is to put it mildly. Another six months would, it is felt, have made all the difference … both on the political and economic fronts a new chapter might have been opened. To be compelled to go to the country at this moment, before they have had time to compete their work on either front, is hard enough; but to be forced to do so through the sheer opportunism of MacBride and his two followers is, they feel, the last word.”152
The Reluctant Taoiseach Page 55
