308 Falls Vol. 2 pp. 64–5
309 Unidentified sailor, IWM 10448
310 Falls Vol. 2 pp. 65 & 77; Hüsnü Part 3 Chapter II
311 Falls Vol. 2 p. 68
312 Sgt W.M. Town IWM 15018 (all quotations by Town from this source)
313 Allenby’s Despatch
314 For Ottoman intentions, see Dudley Ward 53rd Division p. 126, for a conversation a divisional staff officer had with Kress von Kressenstein in 1920
315 Hüsnü pp. 143–4
316 Wavell p. 106
317 Dudley Ward 53rd Division p. 128
318 Dudley Ward 53rd Division p. 136
319 Verner IWM 12581
320 Dalbiac pp. 126–7
321 Verner IWM 12581
322 Hüsnü pp. 150–1
323 Borton pp. 136–7
324 Hendry IWM 6873
325 Gough IWM 13595
326 Verner IWM 12581
327 Falls Vol. 2 pp. 108–9
328 Falls Vol. 2 p. 75
329 Milson IWM 5826
330 Hüsnü p. 182
331 Hüsnü pp. 155 & 167
13
PURSUIT
WITH THE OTTOMAN Army forced from the heavy defences it had been preparing for six months or more and out in the open, General Allenby’s campaign was just starting. The emphasis now switched fully to XXI Corps in the coastal region, and the retreating 8th (OT) Army. The 7th (OT) Army had the refuge of the Judean Mountains to fall back into, and would be able to find endless strong positions in which to dig in and defend. The 8th (OT) Army had far fewer such natural positions to exploit, while pushing them north offered several important strategic advantages. Having the sea, controlled by the Royal Navy, on their flank would allow a certain amount of supplies to be landed; this would not be much, as ship’s boats would have to ferry the supplies in through the surf onto the beach, but every little would ease what would become an increasingly taut logistical chain. Eventually, the coast would also lead to Jaffa. Although the harbour there was little more than a sheltered anchorage, without quays where a ship could tie up to unload directly onto land, the calm waters would allow the faster and safer use of boats. Advancing up the coast would also allow the British to outflank many of the 7th (OT) Army’s lines of defence, and offer a shorter route through the mountains towards Jerusalem from the west.
Ideally, Allenby wanted not just to pursue, but to cut off and destroy as much of the 8th (OT) Army’s surviving forces as possible. The cavalry divisions now gathered around Sharia were placed ready to launch north-westward, behind the bulk of the retreating Ottomans. If they struck as near the head of the retreating army as possible, where the defeated troops would still be in some disarray, they could cut through and block the path north. This would allow the infantry just north of Gaza to spring north, overwhelm the relatively well-ordered Ottoman rearguard, and destroy or capture the forces before them. El Medjel, a village around 24km (15 miles) further up the coast from Gaza, had been identified as the best place to mount such a interception, but it became clear on 7 November, while the cavalry were still waiting for the infantry to complete the breakthrough at Sharia, that such a move would not be possible. The Ottomans were falling back too fast, the British forces were too exhausted to undertake a rapid advance, and the water supplies between Sharia and El Medjel simply would not support the numbers of cavalry needed. Still, on that day the three Mounted Divisions of the Desert Mounted Corps were ordered to proceed in that general direction at their best pace, although the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade (from the A&NZ Mounted Division) was ordered to take up position with the 53rd (Welsh) Division north of Beersheba. At the same time, the Yeomanry Mounted Division, which had been on the eastern flank, was still switching from one side of the offensive to the other, and would lag a day behind the other two divisions.332
As the cavalry moved to cut the Ottomans off, the 52nd (Lowland) Division pushed forward to keep the retreating enemy moving. Eleven kilometres (7 miles) north of Gaza was the Wadi Hesi, a major water-course along the northern bank of which the Ottomans had already prepared some basic defences. Rapid action was needed to stop the Ottoman rearguard strengthening this line, and at dusk on 7 November the 157th Brigade managed to establish a bridgehead across the Wadi near its mouth. The 155th Brigade followed overnight, and preparations were made to attack to the east at dawn, where, about 5.6km (3.5 miles) inland, a tall ridge ran north-south along the main Gaza–Jaffa road. Ottoman forces were already in position along this, known to the British as ‘Sausage Ridge’, and needed to be evicted in order to clear the path for the rest of the army. This ridge proved to be longer, higher and indeed a kilometre (three-quarters of a mile) further east than it appeared on the divisions’ maps, and some delays were encountered in finding it and organising the attack by the two brigades, which went in on the morning of 8 November. Hard fighting continued until well after dusk, with the ridge changing hands at least four times until, at around 9 p.m., it finally fell to the Lowlanders.333
To the south-east, 60th (London) Division, supported by the Desert Mounted Corps, was also keeping the pressure on the retreating enemy. The infantry were tired from their previous days’ fighting, and were given the relatively limited objective of pushing on to Huj, where there was an Ottoman airfield and, more importantly, a large supply dump. Through the morning of 8 November the infantry brigades took a succession of ridges held by Ottoman rearguard forces. Some were routed easily while others, supported by concentrations of artillery, proved more costly to shift.334 Shortly after midday the 179th Brigade took the village of El Maharata, nearly 4.8km (3 miles) south of Huj, despite heavy artillery fire, and were forced to pause to reorganise their ranks. During this lull, General Shea, commanding 60th Division, arrived and personally drove north of the village to investigate the next area of advance. He found columns of mehmetçik straggling back towards another ridge, where a battery of field artillery was establishing its guns. Some machines guns were also being set up in support, and anywhere from several hundred to several thousand infantry were behind the ridgeline. Shea also discovered the equivalent of three squadrons of cavalry from the 5th Mounted Brigade – one and a half squadrons each from the Warwickshire Yeomanry and the Queen’s Own Worcestershire Hussars (QOWH), totalling 190 men and under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Gray-Cheape of the Warwicks. The commander of the Worcesters, Lieutenant Colonel Williams, had already ridden to find the 3rd ALH Brigade to enlist their support in assaulting the ridge. However, the cavalry of the DMC were well spread out, and it would take time to find and gather mounted support. Instead, Shea ordered Gray-Cheape to charge the ridge at once.335
The enemy positions lay nearly a mile away across a broad, open valley. However, Gray-Cheape led his force in a wide arc to the east, using natural cover to mask their approach for as long as possible. Unfortunately, this ran his troops into the fire of two more batteries which had been hidden from view, one of mountain guns and one of 6in howitzers. The force quickly split into three separate charges, each targeting a different battery. Gray-Cheape led two troops to the Warwicks to overrun and seize the howitzers, and Major ‘Toby’ Albright led ‘A’ Squadron QOWH directly at the closer mountain guns. Trooper Harry ‘Pat’ Crombie, recalled following Albright:
A shell exploded in the mouth of the gun temporarily blinding me, when I could see there was nothing between me and the gun, which was about six feet from me. Sitting under it was the gunner pointing a pistol at me, I punctured his neck with my sword and went on, following Sergeant Allen and followed by Dicky Dunn, when a shell burst overhead, my mare jumped and turned. Then I saw Dicky and his horse lying on the ground, Dicky’s wrist was shattered by a piece of shrapnel and his horse’s back was broken by another piece, there were some Turks with a machine gun beside us, they did not move, so I got Dicky onto my mare and headed back to where the survivors were gathered.336
The yeomen would tear through the gun line, losing half their number killed
(including the highly popular Albright) or wounded, before swinging to the left under Major Bill Wiggin to rejoin the attack on the main battery. This force, with ‘B’ Squadron of the Warwicks under Captain Rudolf Valintine and two troops of ‘C’ Squadron QOWH under Lieutenant J.W. Edwards, had charged directly across a narrow valley, briefly falling out of the direct line of fire as they crossed the bottom and climbed the far side. At the top they passed through a thin skirmish line of infantry, and faced 200m (220yds) of open ground before reaching the guns. Captain Oskar Teichman, medical officer of the QOWH, was lagging slightly behind:
The Worcester and Warwick Squadrons, already thinned out by casualties, swept on, and topping a rise, charged through the infantry screen and were lost from view. Suddenly the terrific din of shrieking and exploding shells ceased, and we knew that the end had come.337
The final stretch of ground saw the British formations shattered by the artillery and machine-gun fire, and all order melted away. Lieutenant W. Mercer recalled how:
A whole heap of men and horses went down 20 or 30 yards from the muzzles, the Squadron broke into a few scattered horsemen at the guns then seem to melt away completely; for a time I thought I was the only man alive.338
The survivors swept through the guns, hacking at the gunners, many of whom took shelter below their guns or limbers, and ran into machine-gun and rifle fire from the supporting troops behind. Sergeant J. Hayden of the Warwickshire Yeomanry:
We came into range of their guns which sounded like a roar of thunder, they seemed to have turned every gun they had onto us at one moment. Men and horses were pitch-polling on either side of me, I expected my time was coming every second. The dust was so thick we could not see the horse in front of us … By this time our squadron only numbered 25 unhurt … I was shot, it caught me in the face, within 30 yards of the guns, I thought to myself I am only hit slightly as I could still see out of both eyes, but after a few minutes my left eye stopped up with blood. We were 10 or 12 [left] by now and carried on without a check … I galloped round the guns like Lord Nelson with one eye blocked up … As we surrounded their guns there were Turks under each gun with all hands up, quite clear from the reach of my sword and all surrendered. I was then making for a bit of cover, and had only cantered about 30 yards from the guns when a machine-gun opened fire on me from the left rear, shooting my horse through the head and neck, as he dropped he fell across my leg and foot, pinning me down.339
Hayden and many others were lucky in that the shock of the charge had an effect on the Ottoman troops behind the guns out of proportion to the remaining numbers of yeomen. Most fled, and the few machine guns that remained were quickly overrun and the weapons turned to encourage the Ottoman retreat.
The cost had been high; of 190 officers and men, thirty-six were killed and fifty-seven wounded, while 110 horses had been killed or had to be destroyed. However, the potential cost to the infantry if they had advanced against these positions once they had been properly prepared was much higher still. The shock of the action also cleared the way to Huj, as the demoralised Ottoman forces fell back in disarray, destroying the valuable supply dumps as they went. By dusk, the 60th Division had advanced several miles north of the village.
The divisions of XX Corps – the 10th, 53rd, 60th and 74th – were now reaching the end of ten days’ hard marching and fighting, and, as predicted in the original planning, were becoming exhausted. A period of rest, or at least the army’s interpretation of what constituted rest, now began for them. In real terms this meant only limited and necessary movement, while troops repaired and attended to their kit and equipment and made themselves combat ready once again. But troops would also be assigned extra tasks. Working parties would aid the Royal Engineers (RE) in building or repairing roads and bridges. Others would help the specialists of the RE, Army Service Corps, Army Ordnance Corps and Royal Army Medical Corps in bringing up and sorting supplies (although units still often subsisted on short rations of both food and water themselves), and the clearing up of the battlefields. Equipment had to be recovered if reusable or destroyed if not, and munitions made safe. Perhaps most importantly, bodies from both sides would be located, recorded and buried. The 1/5th Essex even spent two days combing the area around Green Hill, searching for, and finding, men killed during the 1st Battle of Gaza, eight months before.340 As well as human bodies, the bodies of animals also had to be disposed of for the sake of sanitation. One officer of the 2/20th London Regiment recorded that from his unit’s rest camp:
We get some lovely views from the hills. The flies here are worse than ever, and we cannot eat without eating a few. There is also a plentiful supply of dead horses, which does not add greatly to the charm of the place! We are doing our best to bury them, though it is very hard work, and sometimes almost calls for the use of gas helmets.341
However, the scale of the task was great, and the army had other priorities. Acting Sergeant James Scott of the 2nd (London) Sanitary Company RAMC arrived in Gaza in late November, and ‘had to walk into the town which we found deserted, many houses wrecked, dead donkeys lying in the streets’ before moving north into the more recent battlefield. Even a month after the fighting he found that:
We had to immediately get to work cleaning up, burying and burning dead camels and donkeys. We had to re-bury a lot of dead human bodies which had been hastily buried and a few isolated ones which had not been buried. The camp site evacuated by the Turks was very dirty and filthy. Sheep skins and old clothing were all over the place full of fleas etc. A large store of grain had been set on fire and was a glowing mass.342
The pause also allowed the field ambulances and casualty clearing stations (CCS) regain some semblance of order. Due to the distances involved in evacuating casualties from the front all the way back to the field hospitals south of the Wadi Ghazze, and then back to Egypt, an ad hoc system had been set up to deal with the problem. Field ambulances with the forward troops were supposed to patch up the wounded to the extent that they were out of immediate danger and able to travel, before passing them back to a CCS for further treatment. However, the speed of the movement of the different divisions and the numbers of men needing treatment (up to 11 November, over 8,000 wounded were processed along with a roughly equal number of sick), meant that most field ambulances were unable to clear their waiting rooms before their parent brigades needed to move. Rump units had to be left behind to finish processing and then evacuate the wounded, and eventually these detachments began to double as rest stations, where the wounded could pause on their long, uncomfortable journeys back to a CCS. This had the knock-on effect of leaving the field ambulances under-manned at the front and even less able to cope with the influx of casualties, and the pause in operations allowed them to clear the backlog and reunite their units.343
Another effect of the pause was to allow the divisions of XX Corps to restock their supplies, as keeping a continuous and sufficient flow of material into units that were moving and fighting was already proving problematic. There simply were not enough camels to go around, while motor transport continued to suffer severely, becoming either frequently bogged down in the marshy coastal regions, or worn out on the rougher country in land. As an example of the harshness of the ground, motor lorry tyres designed and tested to last 16,000km (10,000 miles) frequently wore out after less than 3,200km (2,000 miles) of use in Palestine.344 From the start many units were on short rations of both food and water, although even so vast amounts needed moving. Including the extensive logistical system, the EEF had some 250,000 British (less than half of which were front-line troops, the rest being involved in the lines of supply and communications), 100,000 Egyptian and 18,000 Indian personnel to feed, plus the smaller French and Italian contingents, plus around 150,000 animals.345 At least small amounts of food and water could be obtained locally by most units, and if the situation was bad enough then authorisation could be given for the use of the emergency ration that each man carried in his pack. Ammunition was more critica
l, though, and some 250 tons of it was sent forward from the vast dumps accumulated near the old front lines every day. As the army moved north, ammunition was increasingly transported by sea and landed on the beaches to keep adequate supplies flowing to front-line units.346 Very slowly through the early winter the Ottoman railway system was put back into use. However, the Ottoman and British lines were of different gauges, preventing them from being joined together, while few engines and little rolling stock had been left behind.
This left the burden of supplying the army laying mostly on the backs of the camels, and the shoulders of the Egyptian Labour Corps and Camel Transport Corps. Organised into ‘trains’ of different sizes, these ran in a near-continuous chain from the rear areas to the corps dumps, from which divisional trains collected their quota. It was a round-the-clock effort, with convoys travelling by day and night over unfamiliar and often poorly mapped ground, their directions usually not more than a simple compass bearing. Indeed, some directions were less even than that: on 10 November 1917 the staff captain of the 157th Brigade was preparing a camel train from the central 52nd Division dump near the mouth of the Wadi Hesi when he received the instructions that his brigade was now as Esdud, ‘fifteen miles up [the coast], three miles inland’. He found his unit, but only after marching all night and much of the next morning, collapsing with fatigue on arrival.347
Such movements were based on either knowing where the destination unit should be (or would be by the time the camel train arrived), or on selecting a point on the map and arranging for men and animals from the units to be supplied to rendezvous with the camels there. Both approaches could go seriously awry if the planned movements of front-line units were delayed or changed. The postponement of the final assault on Sharia almost led at least two camel trains into disaster, as they approached the town on the night of 6 November, by which time the station was supposed to be in British hands. One train, carrying supplies for the 10th Royal East Kent Regiment (The Buffs) penetrated 3.2km (2 miles) into the Ottoman lines in the darkness, and only realised their mistake after capturing a wandering mehmetçik. By some miracle, they managed to extricate themselves without being discovered.348 The other was the cavalry ammunition column which was supposed to set up a dump for the Desert Mounted Corps units to refresh their supplies from. It had set off on the morning of 6 November, and was scheduled to reach Sharia in the late morning of the next day. As it was, it arrived a little early, and soon after dawn was seen proceeding past the leading units of 60th Division as they moved in on the enemy. They stopped in time, preventing what would have been a severe blow to the cavalry divisions if the Ottomans had captured or destroyed the train, possibly even putting a halt to further operations until more ammunition could be brought up.349 As it was, they then became lost on the way home, and were unable to catch up with their corps headquarters for another twelve days, finally reappearing at Junction Station on 19 November.350 These are two extreme cases, but examples abound where troops had to wait, hungry and thirsty, for hours while camel trains that had gotten lost or been delayed (including by the units not being where they should have been) finally located them.
From Gaza to Jerusalem Page 24
