by Amy Knight
But the inherent instability of Kadyrov’s rule should not be underestimated. There was an assassination attempt on Kadyrov by disgruntled members of his extended clan in the early summer of 2016. Kadyrov even acknowledged the attempt during a televised news conference that September. And, according to Ekaterina Sokrianskaia of the International Crisis Group, attacks against Kadyrov forces by Islamic insurgents are again on the rise, with combined casualties on both sides rising a dramatic 43 percent in 2016. Also, Kadyrov’s brutal methods against his people—including, recently, his anti-gay campaign—are arousing an outcry in the West that the Kremlin is finding difficult to ignore. As Sokrainskaia describes the situation: “If Mr. Putin continues to give the Kremlin’s tacit approval to Mr. Kadyrov’s repressions, he is only storing up trouble for the Russian Federation. The Chechen conflict has not been resolved but merely contained by brute force and a personal bond between the two leaders. In the long run, such an unstable situation makes a deadly new conflict in Chechnya almost inevitable.”43
Power Politics
Against this backdrop, the changes that Putin instituted in the Russian law-enforcement agencies in April 2016 take on added significance. Viktor Zolotov, who was in charge of the MVD Internal Troops at the time of the Nemtsov murder and who has deep connections with both Putin and Kadyrov, is now Putin’s top security chief as head of the new National Guard. The apparent efforts of the FSB to bring Kadyrov to heel have been successfully thwarted by Putin, for the time-being at least. Both Zolotov and Kadyrov will be essential allies to Putin in the event that there is dissatisfaction with the Russian president among the political elite, or unrest among the general population, as there was in 2011 and 2012 and again in the spring of 2017, when Russians by the thousands took to the streets in some eighty cities in response to a call by Aleksei Navalny to protest against widespread government corruption.
That Putin dismissed his longtime ally Sergei Ivanov from his post as head of the Presidential Administration in August 2016 suggests that the Russian president is forming new alliances. Ivanov, who shares a background in the KGB with Putin, was viewed as the most powerful member of Putin’s inner circle, aside from Igor Sechin. From 2001 to 2007, he had been Russian Minister of Defense, and after that a first deputy prime minister, until he became Putin’s chief of staff in 2011. Ivanov, who is sixty-three, will retain his seat on the National Security Council but will play only a minor role in Putin’s government as a special envoy for transportation and the environment.
Ivanov’s replacement is Anton Vaino, forty-four, a former diplomat who later served as head of protocol for Putin. (Said to be an “absolute favorite” of Putin, Vaino is seen in one photograph carrying an umbrella over him.) Political scientist Tatyana Stanovaya observed that “Putin is gravitating toward those who serve him, and distancing himself from those who, by virtue of their resources, attempt to rule alongside Putin. He does not need advice, he needs people who will carry out his orders with as little fuss as possible.”44
While Putin appears to be taking an assertive stance in making these changes within his ruling circle, the problem of corruption could undermine public confidence in his leadership as the 2018 presidential elections loom on the horizon. In November 2016, the former first deputy chairman of the Russian Central Bank (the post Andrei Kozlov held when he was murdered), Aleksei Uliukaev, was arrested by the FSB on charges of soliciting a $2 million bribe in exchange for approving, apparently with great reluctance, the purchase of 50 percent of the shares of the state energy company Bashneft by the Russian oil giant Rosneft. The case against Uliukaev, Putin’s minister of economic development and a reputed reformer who encouraged privatization of state assets, was initiated by Bastrykin’s Investigative Committee. The arrest created shock waves in Russia, because it was the first to be directed at a current member of Putin’s administration.45 It was widely reported that Igor Sechin was behind the arrest and had set up Uliukaev in a sting operation. According to a source that follows the Russian energy sector, “Sechin’s role in the case bolstered his reputation inside the ruling elite as a feared Kremlin enforcer who wields an increasing amount of power within a system built up by Russian President Vladimir Putin.”46
Whether or not Uliukaev is ultimately found guilty, his case, in highlighting corruption within the ruling elite, could damage Putin, especially given that his government openly stated not ago that it will not be able to increase pensions to adjust to inflation. Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev explained cheerily to a pensioner in Crimea in August 2016: “There just isn’t any money now. You hang in there.”47 Ironically, Medvedev himself has now become the target of corruption allegations. In early March 2017 Aleksei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation released a video showing that Medvedev has amassed an empire of assets (including luxurious country estates, vineyards and yachts) through deals concealed by a web of false charities.48 The video, watched on YouTube by an estimated 11 million viewers in the first three weeks, was what inspired mass street protests on March 26.
Navalny was among the more than 1,000 people in Moscow who were detained during the protests. He was released after a fifteen-day stint in jail, but has faced more obstacles. In early May an assailant threw poisonous green dye in his face, causing serious damage to one eye and forcing Navalny to go abroad for treatment. Navalny is not to be deterred and has continued to insist that he will run for the Russian presidency in 2018, despite the legal challenges to his candidacy. (He was found guilty of corruption in February 2017 and given a five-year suspended sentence. Though the charges were blatantly bogus, they apparently disqualify him by law from running.)
Even if he does not run, Navalny’s growing public prominence, his obvious charisma and his ability to draw impressive crowds in opposition to the regime pose a huge threat to the Kremlin. And Putin and his colleagues are obviously struggling to decide how to respond. When asked recently by a British journalist how he could be doing what he is doing and still be alive, Navalny said this: “‘Why haven’t they killed you, why haven’t they locked you up?’ People are always asking me this. Look, I have no answer to that question. I suppose the most likely is that they didn’t manage to lock me up when they could have done easily, and then after a certain point it became more difficult.”49 The tragic fate of other Kremlin opponents cannot be far from Navalny’s mind, but he apparently chooses to focus on one goal—the downfall of the Putin regime.
AFTERWORD
Putin is a serial killer.… Western leaders should be aware that when they shake hands with Putin, they shake hands with a murderer.
—Leonid Martynyuk, Russian filmmaker and opposition democrat, speaking at the National Endowment for Democracy, October 2016
Before he took office Donald Trump vowed that during his presidency America’s relations with Russia would improve and he and President Putin would become good friends. Now that Trump and his advisers must grapple with the reality of Russia pursuing its aggressive political and military agenda abroad, that goal probably seems challinging. The Kremlin has continued to insist that its 2014 invasion and occupation of Crimea was legitimate because Crimea historically belonged to Russia. Russia has maintained its military presence in Eastern Ukraine, supporting Ukrainian separatists and pursuing efforts to destabilize the government in Kiev. Moscow persists in backing the brutal regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, where casualties mount daily as a result of constant missile fire by both Assad and Russian forces, and the humanitarian crisis has reached epic proportions. In Afghanistan, Russia has been providing military aid to the Taliban, claiming the threat from ISIS there legitimizes its collusion with a group that is intent on overthrowing the U.S.-backed government. Also, in defiance of a 1987 treaty between Russia and the United States that bans testing of land-based intermediate-range missiles, Russia has recently deployed a new cruise missile, which could increase threats to NATO member and alter the strategic balance significantly.1
These developments, at the very least, sh
ould have dampened Trump’s expectations that Putin is a man he and his western allies can do business with. To be sure, a warming of relations between Washington and Moscow would, theoretically, be useful in furthering the West’s agenda. But the Trump administration faces a major obstacle in this regard—the fact that the Kremlin’s political legitimacy is largely based on its ability to stir up fear of external enemies among its people. Portraying the West as a hostile force that is bent on undermining Russia’s interests is a key element of Kremlin policy. Moreover, Putin and his colleagues, operating in a political vacuum with little input from those they govern, seem to believe what they say about the threat to Russia from the West.
Authoritarian states make for difficult negotiating partners, and Putin, for the moment, seems firmly entrenched in power, despite the courageous efforts of those who oppose him, including Aleksei Navalny, Vladimir Kara-Murza and other democratic activists and journalists. Putin’s approval ratings in opinion polls continue to be over 80 percent. But all this could change. In fact, some argue that because Russians are often fearful of stating their political views openly, there may be hidden discontent with Putin that is not expressed to pollsters. Also, Russians traditionally look up to their rulers just because they are in power, as they did in tsarist times. As Olga Bychkova of Ekho Moskvy put it: “The approval rating we see is not for Putin, it is for the tsar, and if tomorrow they replace him with a different leader, who will soon have the same approval rating, the majority will vote for the tsar appointed to sit on the throne.”2 Although Putin’s party, United Russia, received over 70 percent of the seats in the September 2016 Duma elections, the turnout was below 50 percent, which suggests that a significant element of the population may be disenchanted with the current political regime, or at the very least indifferent.
Many of those Russians who protested on the streets in surprisingly large numbers this spring came out, not only against government corruption, but also against the stagnant economy. Although the Russian economy is on the upturn after a deep recession, it remains in serious trouble. According to Stratfor’s Market Watch, “Russia is a mess:” the average monthly wage dropped 8 percent in 2016, while the poverty rate reached close to 15 percent. And only ten of Russia’s eighty-five regions are financially stable.3 It is important to note that, even if oil prices rise further and the Kremlin can tackle its domestic and foreign debt, it still has the long-range problem of an economic infrastructure that is crumbling. Putin’s policy has been for the economy to rely on oil and gas resources, which has stifled technological innovation and efficiency in other areas of industry. At some point, the Kremlin will face a day of reckoning. Recall that Putin’s Soviet predecessors had the same approach and that economic stagnation was a major factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union.4
When Trump assumed the presidency, Moscow had good reason to be optimistic about its relations with Washington. Trump had earlier suggested flexibility on the issue of Crimea and Ukraine and questioned the viability of NATO. He had also expressed doubts that Russia had hacked the Democratic National Committee and dismissed the idea that Putin was a murderer. But congressional and FBI investigations of Russia’s interference in U.S. elections were a constraint on Trump in reaching out to Moscow. And the deadly chemical bombing attack in Syria on April 4 by Assad forces seemed to motivate Trump to take a stronger stance against Putin because it was clear that Russia was complicit in the strike. Trump told The New York Times the day after the attack: “I think it’s a very sad day for Russia because they’re aligned [with Assad].”5 Secretary of state Rex Tillerson a few days later said in no uncertain terms that the Assad era was “coming to an end,” warning Russia about continuing to support the Syrian leader.6 This was a sharp departure from the earlier position of the Trump administration, which was that it was inevitable that Assad would remain in power.
On May 2, Trump and Putin had their first telephone call since the Syrian bombing and it was reported to be productive, if not eventful. Both sides agreed that they should do all they could to end the violence in Syria, but, in contrast to his offers of hospitality to other world leaders, Trump did not invite Putin to visit the White House. Earlier that day German Chancellor Angel Merkel paid a personal visit to Putin in Sochi, her first in over two years. In contrast to Trump—and to Tillerson, who declined to meet with Russian opposition leaders on his first visit to Moscow as secretary of state—Merkel did not shy away from bringing up the issue of human rights. Indeed, she pressed Putin on the arrests of protesters in Russia, its recent ban on Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the persecution of gays in Chechnya. She also hardened Germany’s position on the implementation of the Minsk agreement, which is meant to end the conflict in Ukraine, and made it clear that sanctions against Russia would remain in place.7
Unfortunately, during his first meeting with NATO members later in May, Trump seemed to downplay the strategic importance of the NATO alliance, arousing deep concern among his European counterparts. Washington is still committed to maintaining sanctions against Moscow until it meets Western demands about Ukraine—at least for the time being. But Trump declined to specifically endorse the NATO mutual defense treaty, which has been the cornerstone of the alliance in protecting member countries from Russian aggression, and he scolded fellow NATO allies about their financial contributions to the alliance. Trump’s stance prompted Merkel to say that Europe should concentrate on its own interests and “take our fate in our own hands.”8
Merkel, who has been German chancellor since 2005, has years of experience with Putin and, as de-facto leader of the European allies, she speaks and acts with authority in dealing with Russia. Trump and his advisers would do well to look to Merkel as an example in their own relations with the Russian leader, especially given how important it is that the United States presents a united front with its European counterparts in shaping policy toward Russia. In a number of recent European elections, most recently in France, voters have come out forcefully against right-wing nationalist candidates (who were often favored by Putin). This suggests that Trump will have to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with Europe, even if his instinct, or some part of his nationalist base, would have him do otherwise.
What should western policy toward Russia be? First and foremost for America and Europe alike, there should be no expectation of a breakthrough with Russia on the urgent problems that plague the international order. As the authors of a recent study for the Carnegie Foundation put it: “the focus should be on managing a volatile relationship with an increasingly emboldened and unpredictable Russian leadership.”9 Russia’s brazen interference in Western electoral processes through cyber attacks is a case in point. This new, aggressive form of geopolitical warfare is testing vulnerable democracies everywhere. According to a U.S. intelligence officer: “It’s not that the Russians are doing something others can’t do. It’s that Russian hackers are willing to go there, to experiment and carry out attacks that others countries would back away from.”10 The challenge of Russia’s cyber attacks and its increasing use of disinformation and fake news to discredit political figures in the West calls for a forceful and concerted response. The West needs a comprehensive strategy to protect its telecommunications infrastructure and coordinate punitive measures in retaliation for these attacks.
Secondly, the West should not cave in to the idea that it shares common cause with Russia in the struggle against terrorism. (Ironically, Trump is borrowing from Putin as he cites the threat of terrorism to justify what many see as his undemocratic policies toward Muslims and other ethnic minorities.) The Kremlin has used the fight against terrorism as an excuse for its military presence in Syria and its collusion with the Taliban in Afghanistan, whereas in reality its aim is to extend its sphere of political and military influence.
Russia is deeply entrenched in Syria for several reasons. It has a history of close ties with Syria that go back to the early Cold War and since 1971 has had a naval base in Syria at Tartus on the Mediterreanean that i
s of major strategic importance. Syria provides Russia with a crucial foothold in the Middle East, and the Assad regime is seen by Moscow as essential for maintaining it. The Kremlin recently came up with an initiative to create four separate “deescalation” zones in Syria, where civilians could supposedly move freely and get aid relief without the threat of bombs. The plan was supported by Iran, Turkey and Assad. But observers have criticized it because the first priority of the plan was to protect the Assad regime from rebel forces and to have the rebels fight ISIS instead. The West, short of introducing ground troops in Syria, needs to insist to Russia that the murderous al-Assad regime has to go and that the bombing campaign that is directed against rebels who oppose Assad has to stop.
As for the situation with Ukraine, Russia is deeply invested in holding on to Crimea, in large part for domestic reasons. Putin has used the annexation of Crimea to portray it as a symbol of Great Russia, a return to the glorious days of the Russian empire. Immediately after the annexation, Putin’s ratings, bolstered by Russians’ feelings of national pride, soared to ninety percent. The Kremlin is no doubt convinced that any capitulation on the Crimea issue would have a negative effect on Putin’s image as a defender of Russian national interests as he puts himself forth for re-election in the spring of 2018. The continuation of Western sanctions against Russia is highly unlikely to convince the Kremlin to give up Crimea. So perhaps Western allies should consider using recognition of Crimea as part of Russia to extract concessions from Moscow on other issues, in particular the resolution of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine.
The Minsk II agreement, brokered in 2015 to end the fighting in Ukraine, has been largely a failure, given Moscow’s refusal to enforce the cease-fire and remove its heavy weapons from Eastern Ukraine. The sticking point is the status of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions and how much autonomy they would have from Kiev. Also, Kiev is demanding that it get full control over its eastern border with Russia. Apart from wresting concessions from Russia, the West, and the U.S. in particular, should continue its political and diplomatic engagement in Ukraine as it restores its economy and addresses the problem of rampant government corruption.
