by Mark Zuehlke
It was a chaotic, wild, charging battle that the officers barely controlled. Platoons and individual sections fought in isolation. Potvin found it difficult in the fog to maintain direction and retain contact with the tanks, resulting in “the battle-crazed infantry fighting like hell without tank support, while the tanks suffered the same fate, having to fight it out without infantry protection. In sum, not what the Book teaches. The Fog of War!” In the middle of this confusion, Potvin heard Tellier on the radio calling for his tanks. Having driven far ahead of the assigned objectives, ‘A’ Company was now pinned down in a murderous crossfire. Advancing in an arrowhead formation when it ran into the ambush, the platoons were badly separated and each now fought alone.
On the left, Lieutenant Alfred Letarte slowly advanced No. 8 Platoon forward until opposing fire suddenly escalated and a burst struck the officer and killed him. Sergeant J.P. LePage immediately took over the platoon and continued the advance. Meanwhile, No. 7 and No. 9 platoons also encountered stiff resistance. When No. 9 Platoon tried advancing up a narrow road, it ran into a strong enemy section guarding a crossroad and a wild hand-to-hand melee ensued. Lance Sergeant J.F. Blanchette and his platoon commander, Lieutenant L.A.R. Des Rosiers, leapfrogged from one point of cover to another to close on the enemy trench line. When they were only feet away, Des Rosiers and Blanchette plunged into the trench together and quickly knocked out two machine guns, capturing the crews. Des Rosiers, now aided by Corporal J.F. Appleby, rushed along the trench line while Blanchette took charge of the platoon and brought covering fire to bear. German resistance suddenly collapsed when Appleby knocked out another machine gun. No. 9 Platoon dug in and soon No. 7 Platoon, under Lieutenant R. Dusseault, set up on its right flank. In hard fighting, this platoon had suffered six casualties, but had a half dozen prisoners in tow.
When an attempt to establish contact with No. 8 Platoon was made, heavy mortar fire caught the small patrol in the open. Lance Corporal F.T.D. Viau was killed and three men were wounded. Company Sergeant Major B. Michaud, attempting to go to the aid of the wounded men, was himself wounded. Without tank support, it was obvious the rest of ‘A’ Company could not reach No. 8 Platoon and LePage could not withdraw his men from their embattled position.8
Back on the hill, Potvin had his map out and was frantically trying to figure out from Tellier’s radio pleas where ‘A’ Company was so he could send the tanks to its relief. Just then, three wounded men from Tellier’s company escorted about ten German prisoners into Potvin’s position. Potvin later wrote that, “One volunteers to guide the lost tanks back to the company, despite his wounds! This brave lad, who seems not to give a darn about bullets and shells flying about, jumps on the rear deck of a tank and points out the direction to the tank commander. They are on their way to ‘A’ Company.”9 The time was 0830 hours and the tanks reached Tellier twelve minutes later. Tellier’s men, supported by the tanks, quickly outflanked the German machine-gunners and at 0908 hours reported being in control of the situation. The company had suffered twenty-five casualties, almost one-quarter of its full strength.10
Potvin continued leading his company toward its assigned objective, coming across the body of Lieutenant Alfred Letarte of ‘A’ Company en route. Just past the dead officer, Potvin’s leading platoon came under machine-gun fire. The Van Doos responded with a hail of small-arms fire and Lieutenant R.L. St.-Onge led his platoon out to one flank and struck the Germans from behind. About a dozen Panzer Grenadiers surrendered. When Potvin brought the rest of the company up, he found a dead German officer in the gun position. Lying beside his body was a briefcase containing maps and documents. Potvin closed the briefcase and carried it with him. When two soldiers from ‘D’ Company came back with several German prisoners, Potvin turned his company’s prisoners and the briefcase over to them with instructions to see that the documents reached Allard. Soon ‘B’ Company was on its objective and the men started digging in. About ten minutes later, however, the sound of a German halftrack personnel carrier was heard coming up a road toward them. St.-Onge’s platoon opened fire on the approaching vehicle, while a two-man PIAT team slipped into brush at a bend in the road. When the half-track approached the team, they fired a round into its tracks. The vehicle spun around and crashed into the ditch. Two dazed Germans staggered out of the wreck and were taken prisoner.11
With R22e Regiment’s objectives now secured, the West Nova Scotia Regiment jumped through the Van Doos’ positions, continuing 3 CIB’s advance. As had been the case with the Van Doos, the West Novas’ attack formation had ‘A’ and ‘D’ companies in the lead with ‘B’ and ‘C’ following close behind. Since Major W.C. Allan had been wounded when the regiment was caught by German counter-artillery fire just before the attack, command of ‘B’ Company had devolved to Lieutenant R.N. Knowles. As soon as the leading companies set out, they started accepting the surrender of German soldiers who came out of well-concealed holes yelling, “Kamerad, Tommy.” A few small groups, mostly those dug into the shell-battered farmhouses, offered a fight, but they were overrun or blasted out of their positions by the tanks of ‘C’ Squadron, Three Rivers Regiment. Surrounding the small wheat fields were densely leafed trees in which the Germans had scattered snipers. These harassed the West Novas’ advance, but failed to slow it. The main opposition the regiment faced was increasingly heavy mortar and artillery fire.12
Disrupting the advance far more than the Germans were the poor maps, which little reflected the actual terrain. What were supposed to be open fields were in reality choked by a maze of oak stands, olive groves, vineyards, and thickets of brambles. Maintaining a coherent line became impossible and companies were soon badly separated. ‘D’ Company’s No. 16 Platoon on the far right flank drifted so far off course that it finally blundered into the left-hand flank of the British 78th Division.13
About 300 yards from the start line, the advancing troops bumped into the headwaters of Spalla Bassa. ‘C’ Squadron’s tanks had been charging ahead so recklessly that several had already managed to sink into pockets of bog. Now several more plunged into the creek and were hopelessly mired. Only seven tanks eventually found a crossing and set off after the infantry, which had already disappeared into the thick brush beyond.14
Worried about the fate of ‘D’ Company, which seemed to have strayed far from its objective and might have even overshot it, West Novas commander Lieutenant Colonel Ron Waterman ordered the regiment’s scouts and snipers under Captain D.I. Rice to find it. He sent the carrier platoon under Lieutenant C.H. Smith, meanwhile, to secure the small knoll that was ‘D’ Company’s objective. Leaving their Bren carriers behind, the platoon advanced on foot up a rough cart track and reached the knoll without meeting resistance. On top of the objective stood several farm buildings, which the men rushed. Smith burst into one house with his revolver drawn and caught a machine-gun crew completely by surprise. He accepted their surrender, noting that one soldier was even in the middle of having a shave. Several other machine-gun teams were found in dugouts constructed under the buildings. These also surrendered without firing a shot. Rice’s scouts and snipers came in a few minutes later, having seen nothing of the lost company.15 Shortly thereafter, however, Captain J.K. (Dusty) Rhodes led the two ‘D’ Company platoons that were still with him onto the objective from the west. In their haste to keep pursuing the Germans, they had not only overshot their destination but had also charged into the middle of a friendly artillery barrage. Luckily the barrage, intended to soften up the forward ground in preparation for the scheduled leapfrog by the Carleton and York Regiment, had failed to inflict any casualties on the hapless company.16
Although the West Novas’ attack had been fairly confused, it had succeeded beyond 3 CIB commander Brigadier Paul Bernatchez’s expectations. He noted that the regiment “went for the enemy like wildcats.”17 Showing almost careless disregard for their own safety, the men had rolled right over the German opposition. Many wounded soldiers refused to leave their units. A s
hell knocked Corporal D.K. Carroll unconscious and tore his uniform to tatters, but on waking up he calmly rejoined his platoon and continued the fight. Waterman boosted the élan of his men by roaring around on the battlefield in a Jeep equipped with a sandbagged floor to blunt the effect of any mine he might encounter. Driving the Jeep himself, Waterman raced back and forth between companies, urging them on and helping the commanders determine their bearings. Minutes after ‘A’ Company reached its objective, Waterman pulled up in his Jeep with Bernatchez in the passenger seat. As German machine-gun fire zipped over their heads, the two officers calmly consulted a map to determine if this was the spot from which the Carleton and York Regiment should continue the brigade attack.18
At 1700 hours, the Carleton and York Regiment passed through the West Novas with orders to reach the eastern bank of the Forme d’Aquino and establish a bridgehead on the other side. Supporting the regiment was Three Rivers’ ‘B’ Squadron. By this time, the opposing Panzer Grenadiers were so disorganized and worn down by casualties and men captured that they offered only the slightest resistance, most just melting away as the Canadians approached. By 1900 hours, the three leading companies were on their objectives overlooking the deep gully of the Forme d’Aquino in which a shallow flow of water moved sluggishly. Carleton and York commander Lieutenant Colonel Dick Danby ordered ‘C’ and ‘D’ companies to get across the gully and establish a firm bridgehead on the other side. Under cover of darkness, the two companies descended into the gully, splashed across the stream, and climbed the other bank. After moving a short distance forward, they dug in to wait for morning.19
In one day’s determined fighting, 3 CIB had punched a hole almost six miles into the German line. Things had not, however, gone equally well for either 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade on its left or 78th British Division on the right. Both lagged well behind 3 CIB, leaving its flanks exposed.
On 3 CIB’s left flank, 1 CIB had attacked with a two-battalion-wide advance. The 48th Highlanders of Canada were on the left, with the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment on the right. The Hasty P’s jumped off at 0800 hours with ‘C’ Company leading, followed in line by ‘B’ Company, the battalion headquarters, ‘A’ Company, and ‘D’ Company. Problems with radio communications between the companies and commander Lieutenant Colonel Don Cameron resulted in ‘D’ Company’s losing its way and straying off to the right. It eventually blundered into the 48th Highlanders and remained on that battalion’s right flank for the rest of the day.
‘C’ Company, commanded by Captain R.A. Danude, advanced aggressively, brushing aside the light resistance it met, and was soon well ahead of the rest of the battalion. When Danude’s company reached the edge of the gully through which Spalla Bassa flowed, he paused to let everyone else catch up. ‘B’ Company arrived and crossed the gully to anchor a position on the opposite side, but immediately German fire struck both its flanks and front. ‘C’ Company, which by now had also crossed the gully, came under intense fire in precisely the same manner. The Hasty P’s faced a dense, deep stand of trees. What the regiment would soon dub “The Battle of the Woods” was under way and it was as sharp an action as the Ontario men had ever fought.
The firefight broke out at 1000 hours and continued unabated for the next four hours, with the regiment winning only minimal gains against determined and well-positioned machine-gun and small-arms opposition. Mortar fire was heavy and frighteningly accurate. When Lieutenant N.J. Duder’s platoon from ‘C’ Company tried to close on several machine-gun positions, he was shot in the shoulder and arm. Captain Danude radioed Cameron that ‘C’ Company was in imminent danger of being cut off from the rest of the battalion. Meanwhile, Major F.J. Hammond’s ‘B’ Company was forced to go to ground, neither able to move to ‘C’ Company’s assistance nor withdraw. Cameron ordered Danude to pull his people back to the eastern side of Spalla Bassa and consolidate there. He then advanced ‘A’ Company up on its flank and established his battalion headquarters immediately behind that company. The persistent mortaring had killed four men and shrapnel had wounded Lieutenant B.A.C. Caldwell of ‘B’ Company.20
At 1400 hours, mortar and artillery fire was brought down on the German positions despite ‘B’ Company’s being intermingled with them. Before the concentration arrived, Hammond ordered his men to dig in deep so that only a direct hit on a slit trench might inflict friendly casualties. The firing had the desired effect. Hammond told Cameron on the radio that his men were fine and he could see German troops running to the rear. Hammond’s men gave chase. By 1700 hours, he reported that the Panzer Grenadiers had completely evacuated the position. Two hours later, the rest of the battalion was over the gully and digging in for the night. The price for winning a crossing over Spalla Bassa was high. The Hasty P’s had lost seven men killed and thirty wounded. They captured six prisoners and killed about thirty Germans.21
Cameron believed the regiment could have performed better had it had more training in close-quarters combat and had there been “more aggressiveness on the part of junior leaders.” He said: “There is always a hesitancy on the part of our infantryman when fired on, particularly by an MG34 or 42 to lie doggo and do nothing about it and for some time Jerry happened to have the initiative. Such fire must be returned with interest — and promptly. It shuts him off, then men are more easily encouraged to ‘Close with him.’”22
While the Hasty P’s were engaged in the Battle of the Woods, the 48th Highlanders had faced a stiff fight too. From the outset, the Highlanders’ plan was mired in confusion. Having moved forward in darkness to fill a gap between the Hasty P’s and the Royal Canadian Regiment on the brigade’s left flank, the Highlanders had only the sketchiest sense of where the front line was situated and had never managed to contact the RCR. When Brigadier Dan Spry issued written instructions after midnight to Highlanders commander Lieutenant Colonel Ian Johnston that his battalion was to advance on the left of the Hasty P’s, Johnston was uncertain whether he could implement the order without risking a friendly-fire situation between his battalion and the RCR. At 0300 hours, Johnston asked for clarification, but confirmation of his orders did not arrive until 0700 hours. The attack was consequently delayed, not getting under way until a half-hour after the Hasty P’s moved out.
Still worrying about the location of the RCR, Johnston personally took the lead, moving cautiously forward. Finally, he encountered an RCR scout who reported that the battalion had moved during the night to a position behind his own regiment. The Highlanders were already in enemy territory. On the spot, Johnston quickly threw together an operational plan that called for ‘D’ Company to lead, followed by ‘C’ Company, then ‘A’, and finally ‘B.’ Each company had support from either a troop of British Churchills or Shermans. Johnston placed his regimental tactical headquarters immediately behind the leading company.
Major Jim Counsell’s ‘D’ Company set off with two platoons out front, moving up opposite sides of the road running from the Pignataro–San Giorgio a Liri lateral to Pontecorvo. To their right, a low ridge overlooked the advancing troops and Johnston had warned Major Ed Rawlings of ‘C’ Company to be prepared to sweep up onto this ridge at the first sign of any German activity there. All progressed smoothly until ‘D’ Company, which was passing through a field of two-foot-high grain, came under fire from machine guns positioned inside two houses bracketing the road. The two leading platoons attacked, the men plunging off the road and then slithering forward in a crouch through the grain. Lieutenant Norm Ballard, a divinity student before the war, rushed No. 16 Platoon toward the house on the left side of the road. In a quick fight, they captured two antitank guns and one armoured fighting vehicle, killed nine Germans, and took thirty prisoners. On the right side of the road, No. 17 Platoon under Lieutenant Doug Snively overran another two antitank guns, killed eight Panzer Grenadiers, and captured another seven. Both platoons pressed on despite having lost radio contact with Counsell and their supporting tanks.
Meanwhile, Johnston
had joined Counsell and ‘D’ Company’s reserve platoon in the shelter of a small gully. The two officers waited there for word on the outcome of the battle for the houses. For their part, the tankers of ‘C’ Squadron 142nd Royal Tank Regiment had lost sight of the Canadians the moment they dived into the grain and could establish radio contact with neither the platoon commanders nor Counsell.
The squadron of tanks moved out on the right side of the road and advanced on its own toward the houses, but tumbled into a German position missed by Snively’s platoon during its charge. The first the tankers knew of their danger was when a Panzer Grenadier popped up out of the grain and threw a grenade into the open turret of the commander’s tank. The explosion wounded the troop commander and jammed the turret in place. The Churchill hastily turned around and the entire squadron fled for safety.
Seeing the retreating tanks, Johnston ordered Counsell to take his reserve platoon and catch up to the rest of his men. He then sent ‘C’ Company to take out the Germans who had ambushed the tanks and clear the ridge overlooking the road. The German ambush position proved a formidable one, with Panzer Grenadiers dug in on the high ground on either side of a narrow gully through which Spalla Bassa flowed. As usual, the Grenadiers were well equipped with MG42 machine guns. Rawlings decided to move his men up the right side. Somehow his intentions were misconstrued by the tank troop supporting him. It crossed the narrow stream at a low point and set off up the left-hand slope.23 With 152-millimetre-thick frontal armour, the Churchills weighed thirty-nine tons and had a lumbering top speed of just 15.5 miles per hour. Although ponderous, they were not particularly well gunned, mounting only a 6-pounder gun and two machine guns.24 Moving through the tall grain without an advance screen of infantry, the tanks were terribly vulnerable and the Panzer Grenadiers fell on them ferociously.25 In seconds, all three were knocked out by direct hits to the more thinly armoured sides from a Faustpatrone, a new German antitank rocket launcher that fired a 5.5-pound projectile capable of penetrating armour 140 millimetres thick at a range of less than thirty yards.26 The troop commander was killed.
