4 on choosing optimal: ibid., 158, 493n54
5 Attash dry run/no visas/he learned: ibid., 158–, KSM SUBST
6 box cutter/knife: CR, 159, “Charge Sheet, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,” 4/15/08, www.findlaw.com
7 toothpaste/art supplies: CR, 493n59
8 ploy worked: ibid., 159.
9 condominium in K.L.: ibid. It remains unclear who exactly may have been with the trio at the condominium, which belonged to a former Malaysian army captain named Yazid Sufaat. Their comrade from the training period, Abu Bara al Tai’zi (see notes for Ch. 24), was there. So, too, reportedly, was Riduan Isamuddin, an Indonesian terrorist leader known as “Hambali.” In his insightful book The Looming Tower, Lawrence Wright wrote that a dozen terrorist associates came and went from the condominium. There have also been unconfirmed reports that KSM and Ramzi Binalshibh joined the group. The claim that KSM was present is unsupported by any available evidence. A senior German police official has referred to evidence, apparently credit card receipts, indicating that Binalshibh was there (Tai’zi/Sufaat: CR, 156–; Isamuddin: New Straits Times [Malaysia] 2/10/02, Time Asia, 4/1/02, CR, 158; dozen: Wright, 311; KSM: e.g., Newsweek, 7/9/03; Binalshibh: LAT, 9/1/02, NYT, 8/24/020).
10 boarded UA flight/“tourists”: Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel,” CO, 13–, Timeline, “Hijackers Primary Docs, AA77, 2 of 2,” & FBI 302 of Special Agent [redacted], 9/12/01, “Hijackers Primary Docs, AA77, 1 of 2,” B50, T5, CF. After 9/11 it would emerge that U.S. intelligence had been aware, even before it began, that suspected terrorists were to meet in Kuala Lumpur. The men were surveilled while they were there and an attempt was made to follow them afterward, when they left for Thailand. Most stunning of all, the CIA knew even before Mihdhar reached Kuala Lumpur that he had a current visa to enter the United States. Within months, moreover, it learned the equally alarming fact that Hazmi had entered the United States. Agency spokesmen have claimed that, even so, the CIA took no action until just before 9/11. Why not? The issue is of enormous significance and will be covered in Ch. 31 (e.g., Staff Statement 2, CO, CR, 353–, FBI IG).
11 no “facilitator”: KSM SUBST
12 Commission not believe: CR, 215
13 no trace: CR, 514n8, Staff Statement 16, CO, MFR 040204580, 6/23–24/04, CF.
14 chauffeur/“two Saudis”/“an apartment”/tour: int. of Qualid Benomrane, FBI 302, 265A-LA-228901, 4/6/02, INTELWIRE. The statements of the driver, a Tunisian named Qualid Benomrane, contain unresolved issues. He did not, for example, have an official taxi driver’s license until several months after Hazmi and Mihdhar’s arrival. Benomrane said it was Fahad al-Thumairy, an imam at the King Fahd mosque, who asked him to drive the two Saudis around—at the request, in turn, of someone at the Saudi consulate. At one point, however, he said the “two Saudis” were sons of a sick father seeking treatment in Los Angeles—which would not fit Hamzi and Mihdhar. Thumairy, for his part, denied knowing Benomrane but said he did know a “son and sick father.” Commission staff who interviewed Thumairy in Saudi Arabia, however, judged him “deceptive.”
9/11 Commission senior counsel Dieter Snell asserted in a 2004 memo that Benomrane’s information appeared to be of “uniquely significant value” to understanding the facts behind the 9/11 attacks. Benomrane had by then been deported from the United States, however, and the Commission never did interview him. Journalist Judith Miller reported in 2007 that Los Angeles Police Department detectives were convinced that “Benomrane and al-Thumairy were militants in the al Qaeda support network and that Benomrane’s passengers were, in fact, the two hijackers” (license: e.g. MFR 04018787, 4/19/04, MFR 04018782, 4/21/04; Thumairy: CR, 515n14, Line of Inquiry: Qualid Moncef Benomrane, B36, T1A, CF; sons of sick father: int. Qualid Benomrane, FBI 302, 265A-LA-228901, 4/6/02; Thumairy denied: MFR 04019362, 2/23/04; “deceptive”: Dieter Snell et al. to Philip Zelikow, 2/25/04, Summary of Interview Conducted in Saudi Arabia, ARC Identifier no. 2610841, CF; “uniquely”: Dieter Snell to Pat O’Brien, 1/16/04, “Benomrane Folder,” B37, T1A, CF; deported/never interviewed: CR, 515n14; LAPD convinced: Judith Miller, “On the Front Line in the War on Terrorism,” Summer 07, www.city-journal.org).
15 photographs: CR, 515n14
16 “barely”/“instructed”: KSM SUBST
17 address in CA: CR, 150, 514n4, Guardian (U.K.), 11/12/06, Telegraph (U.K.), 11/7/06
18 CIA concluded: CR, 514n4
19 “possibly” Long Beach: CR, 157, 514n7
20 language schools LA: CR, 216
21 San Diego directories: KSM SUBST
22 “idea”: ibid.
23 Bayoumi 42: DHS Document Request 3, “Doc Requests, Entire Contents,” T5, B9, CF
24 rental application: San Diego Union-Tribune, 10/25/01
25 Bayoumi employee/mosque, etc.: ibid., FBI IG
26 “ghost”: CR, 515n18
27 Don/trip to LA/consulate/restaurant: MFR of int. Omar al Bayoumi, 10/16–17/003, “Staff Delegation International Trip, Tab 1,” T1A, MFR 04017552, 9/29/03, & MFR 04019254, 4/20/04, CF, FBI 302 of int. Caysan bin Don, 10/8/01, INTELWIRE, CR, 217–, 515n15, 17. Bin Don has also used the name Isamu Dyson. His birth name was Clayton Morgan (CR, 435)
28 newspaper: McDermott, 189
29 “description”/sought out/apartment: MFR of int. Bayoumi, MFR 04016481, 1/12/04, National Drug Enforcement Center for the FBI, “265D-NY-280350, TWINBOM-PENTTBOM, Biographical Report,”11/26/01, authors’ collection
30 pure chance: MFR 04019254, 4/20/04, MFR 04016231, 11/18/03, CF
31 “to pick up”: Report, JI, 173
32 contacts imam: Dieter Snell, et al., to Philip Zelikow, “Summary of Interviews in Saudi Arabia,” 2/25/04, MFR, CF
33 cell phone: MFR, 040175541A, 11/17/03, CF, CR, 516n26
34 jihad material/salary: Report, JI, 174
35 distinguishing mark: CR, 516n19
36 “We do not”: CR 218
37 “very suspicious”: int. Eleanor Hill.
38 “We firmly”: Newsweek, 8/3/03. As noted earlier in this chapter, KSM has denied that there were helpers in place in the U.S. He also specifically denied that he had ever heard of Bayoumi (CR, 516n19, CBS News, 8/3/03)
39 Aulaqi 29/imam: FBI Memo, “Ansar Nasser Aulaqi, IT-UBL,” 9/26/01, INTELWIRE
40 four calls: MFR 04017541A, 11/17/03 & MFR 04017531, 11/17/03, CF, “Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE, CR, 221, 517n33
41 attended mosque: CR, 517n33, MFR 04017542, 11/18/03, CF
42 “closed-door”: Report, JI, 178, NYT, 5/8/10, Jamie Reno, “Public Enemy #1,” www.sandiegomagazine.com
43 Hazmi respected/spoke: MFR of [name redacted], 4/23/04, CF—since reported to have been Abdussattar Shaikh
44 “very calm”: FBI Memo, “Ansar Nasser Aulaqi, IT-UBL,” 9/26/01, INTELWIRE
45 “spiritual advisor”: Report, JI, 27.
46 Aulaqi relocated/no contact: The record seems contradictory on this. The Commission Report quoted Aulaqi as denying having had contact in Virginia with Hazmi or his companion at that point, future fellow hijacker Hani Hanjour. A May 2004 Commission memo, however, states that Aulaqi “admits contact with the hijackers” at both the Virginia and San Diego mosques. (“List of Mosques,” MFR 04019202, 5/6/04, CR, 229–, MFR 04019202, 5/6/04).
47 had investigated/“procurement”: CR, 517n33
48 “potentially”: CR, 221
49 prison: WP, 2/27/08
50 terrorist attacks: (Fort Hood shooting/bomb on Detroit-bound plane/Times Square car bomb) Christian Science Monitor, 5/19/10, Fox News, 10/20/10, CNN, 1/7/10, Guardian (U.K.), 10/31/10, MSNBC, 11/1/10
51 Harman: Christian Science Monitor, 5/19/10;
52 KSM suggested: KSM SUBST
53 passes Zoo/SeaWorld: LAT, 9/1/02
54 bank accounts/car/ID: FBI IG, Staff Report, “Monograph on Terrorist Financing,” CO, MFR.
55 driver’s licenses/phone directory: CR, 539n85, Lance, Triple Cross, 349
. The two terrorists moved in May 2000 to the home of a man named Abdussattar Shaikh, and—though Mihdhar left that summer—Hazmi stayed until December. Shaikh, the subject of controversy not least because he was an FBI informant, will be covered in the notes for Ch. 33 (CR, 220, 516n28, MFR of [name redacted], 4/23/04, CF, www.scribd.com, Nawaf al-Hazmi timeline, “Hijacker Primary Documents,” B50, T5, CF, Graham with Nussbaum, Shaikh refs., Shenon, 53–)
56 sociable/“brooding”: Corbin, 174–, Newsweek, 6/10/02
57 soccer/“psychotic”: CR 220, MFR 04017531, 11/17/03, CF
58 “You’ll know”: Newsweek, 6/10/02
59 phone calls/computer/Yahoo: “Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE, Bamford, Shadow Factory, 25
60 KSM told: KSM SUBST
61 Hazmi enrolled/Mihdhar not start: ibid., Staff Statement 16, CO, CR, 221, 517n30, 36, FBI 302 of int. Omer Bakarbashat, 9/17/01, INTELWIRE
62 flight school/few lessons: CR, 221–, 517n36
63 praying: Corbin, 174
64 “They just”/“Dumb”: Newsweek, 6/10/02
65 flying not for them: WP, 9/30/01.
66 dropped out/flew back: KSM SUBST, CR, 220. Though Mihdhar supposedly went home to rejoin his family, he also went on to travel to Malaysia, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia. FBI director Mueller suggested to Congress’s Joint Inquiry that his role may have included helping to organize the so-called muscle hijackers. (CR, 222, Statement of Robert Mueller, JI, 9/26/02). 293 overruled/progressive: KSM SUBST.
67 shed clothing/beards: CR, 167, FBI report, “The 11 September Hijacker Cell Model,” 2/03, INTELWIRE.
68 31 emails/“We are”/“lost”/new passports: Testimony of George Tenet, 6/18/02, JI, CR, 168, 497n108, Transcript of Jury Trial, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, 3/7/06. Atta had entered a lottery for a U.S. visa as early as October the previous year, perhaps a further indication that he knew something of the bin Laden plan before heading to Afghanistan in November. He applied for and got a visa in the regular way, however, only in May 2000 (MFR 04019351, 12/10–11/03, Staff Report, “9/11 and Terrorist Travel,” CO, 15–).
69 Binalshibh: Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, CO, 17–, CR, 225, 519n52. Binalshibh applied for a visa three times in the year 2000, each time unsuccessfully
70 Shehhi/Atta to NY: Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, CO, 15
71 Bronx/Brooklyn: Staff Statement 16, CO, Report, JI, 136
72 calling card: “Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE, Bamford, Shadow Factory, 53
73 Jarrah arrives: Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, CO, 17
74 flight school: MFR 04019350, 3/18/04, CF, Herald-Tribune (Sarasota), 9/10/06
75 “He was”: Corbin, 160, & see MFR 04018408, 4/12/04, CF
76 “occasional”: Fouda & Fielding, 131
77 Private Pilot License/aviation mechanics: CR, 224, biographical note “Ziad Jarrah,” FBI 03212, JICI 4/19/02, www.scribd.com, “Airman Records for Jarrah,” B45, T5, CF
78 “He wanted”: Corbin, 161
79 Oklahoma school/FBI regional office: Statement of Eleanor Hill re “The FBI’s Handling of the Phoenix Electronic Communication and Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui Prior to Sept. 11, 2001,” 9/24/02 (as updated 10/17/02), JI.
80 toured school: Title: PENTTBOM, “Summary of Captioned Investigation as of 11/4/01,” 11/5/01, authors’ collection, CR, 224. The two hijackers’ visit was to Airman Flight School, where bin Laden pilot Ihab Ali had trained several years earlier. Zacarias Moussaoui, who was part of KSM’s wider operation and would be arrested shortly before 9/11, would also train at Airman, in early 2001 (Ali: CR, 224, “Paving the Road to 9/11,” www.intelwire.com; Moussaoui: “Paving the Road to 9/11,” www.intelwire.com, CR, 246, 273–).
81 Huffman: CR, 224. Daniel Hopsicker, an author who has concentrated on the hijackers’ Venice stay, has written extensively about Venice Airport and those who operated flight schools there in 2000. In a 2009 article, he reported having discovered “covert CIA and military operations dating back to at least 1959” involving the airport. Hopsicker has focused on information indicating that the airport has a history of narcotics trafficking. He refers, too, to the seizure in July 2000—the month Atta and Shehhi began flight training—of a Learjet co-owned by Wallace Hilliard, the financier behind Huffman Aviation, with a large shipment of heroin on board. Hilliard maintained that he was the “innocent owner” of the plane. Huffman’s Rudi Dekkers, for his part, had what the St. Petersburg Times termed “a checkered history” of bankruptcies, business problems, and visa issues (he is a Dutch national). According to the Times, he was cited by the FAA in 1999 for several violations, and his pilot’s license was suspended. In interviews with a law enforcement official and an aviation executive, the authors got the impression that Venice Airport has indeed seen much illegal activity over the years. A Commission staff memo suggests that Atta and Shehhi were accepted as students of Huffman without strict adherence to INS regulations—sloppy procedure that had the effect of legitimizing their continued stay in the United States. It may conceivably be of significance that Yeslam bin Laden, one of Osama’s half-brothers, had paid for an acquaintance’s flight instruction at the school—a bizarre fact that may be no more than a coincidence (Hopsicker: Daniel Hopsicker, Welcome to Terrorland, Eugene, OR: MadCow, 2004/2007; CIA: “Big Safari, the Kennedy Assassination, & the War for Control of the Venice Airport,” 9/9/09, “The Deep History of the Venice Municipal Airport,” 9/21 & 9/24/09, “Venice Was a Quiet Mena, Arkansas,” 4/16/10, www.madcowprod.com, Hopsicker, 128–; Hilliard: Orlando Sentinel, 8/2/00; Aircraft Bill of Sale, N351WB, U.S. Dept. of Transportation (FAA), World Jet, Inc., to Plane I Leasing—Wallace J. Hilliard, President, filed 11/15/99, Hearing on Motion of Forfeiture Proceedings, U.S. v. Edgar Javier Valles-Diaz, et al., U.S. District Court for the Middle District of FL, 11/3/00; Dekkers: St. Petersburg Times, 7/25/04; Commission/legitimizing: Kephart-Robert to Ginsberg, 2/26/04, “Hijacker Pilot Training,” B21, T7, CF; interviews: ints. Coy Jacobs & FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force agent; Yeslam: New Yorker, 11/12/01).
82 No reliable source: McDermott, 195
83 “had an attitude”/“likeable”: transcript int. Rudi Dekkers, Four Corners: A Mission to Die For, 10/18/01, www.abc.net.au
84 “When you”/immaculate/“Generally”: int. Mark Mikarts
85 no better/another school/failed/argued: FBI 302 of int. Ivan Chirivella, 9/16/01, INTELWIRE, Corbin, 10–, “Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE, CR, 224, WSJ, 10/16/01
86 “a gesture”/Saudi/cushion: transcript of int. Ann Greaves, Four Corners: A Mission to Die For, 10/18/01, www.abc.net.au
87 “I don’t want”: “Mohammed Atta’s Last Will & Testament, Frontline: “Inside the Terror Network,” www.pbs.org, NYT, 10/4/01
88 “We had female”: int. Mark Mikarts
89 “very rude”: FBI 302 of Ivan Chirivella, 9/16/01, INTELWIRE
90 Outlook bar: int. Lizsa Lehman. Allegations that several members of the terrorist team—Atta included—indulged in heavy drinking at bars in Florida in the days prior to the attack are covered in Ch. 28, on p. 348. Reports of Atta’s heavy drinking are probably apocryphal. Lizsa Lehman’s firsthand recollection of Atta and Shehhi drinking beer in moderation at the Outlook, however, seems credible.
91 Jarrah License: MFR 04021445, 1/13 & 1/25/04, CF, Staff Statement 16, CO
92 fall trip/Paris/photographed: Aysel Sengün statement to Bundeskriminalamt, 9/15/01, authors’ collection, Hijackers Timeline [redacted], 11/14/03, INTELWIRE, Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, CO, 21–, [Name Redacted] to [Name Redacted], INS, 9/19/01, re Saeed A.A. Al Ghamdi, & attachments, “Inspector Interviews, UA 93, Notes & Memos,” B49, T5, CF
93 “I love you”: McDermott, 198
94 Mitsubishi: Jarrah timeline, “03009470, Packet 6, Ziad Jarrah chronology,” www.scribd.com
95 Baham
as: Report of Investigation, U.S. Customs Service, Case no. TA09FR01TA003, & Letter re plane piloted by Jarrah, N833OU, “Hijacker Primary Docs, UA 93,” B51, T5, CF
96 Atta/Shehhi licenses: MFR 04021445, 1/13 & 1/25/04, CF, Staff Statement 16, CO
97 Christmas trip: Aysel Sengün statement to Bundeskriminalamt, 9/15/01, authors’ collection, Hijackers Timeline [redacted], 11/14/03, INTELWIRE, Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, CO, 21–
98 abandoned plane: MFR 04021445, 1/13 & 1/25/04, CF, Testimony of Rudi Dekkers, Subcommittee on Immigration & Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Reps., 107th Cong., 2nd Sess., 3/19/02
99 videos: Indictment, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, 12/01
100 727 simulator/“They just”: Daily Record (Glasgow, Scotland), 9/15/01, NYT, 9/14/01, Hijackers Timeline [redacted], 11/14/03, INTELWIRE.
101 Some have argued: Skeptics have questioned whether Hani Hanjour had the piloting skill to fly American 77 into the Pentagon at almost ground level. While some flying instructors commented on his inadequacies, however, others recalled having found him competent. One, who flew with Hanjour in August 2001, went so far as to describe him as a “good” pilot. (Skeptics: e.g., Griffin, New Pearl Harbor, 78–; inadequacies/competent: e.g., CBS News, 5/10/02, Newsday, 9/23/01; “good”: MFR 0401840, 4/9/04—citing Eddie G. Shalev. Contrary to an assertion by skeptic Griffin, who questioned the existence of instructor Shalev, 9/11 Commission files contain the record of an interview of him by a commission staffer and an accompanying FBI agent. Shalev, moreover, is listed in various public records. Griffin, New Pearl Harbor, 286n99, & see, e.g., www.intelius.com.)
102 767 simulator: ibid., Statement of Robert Mueller, JI, 9/26/02, Transcript of Jury Trial, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, Vol. II-A, 3/7/06. Jarrah and Hani Hanjour, the other 9/11 hijack pilots, also trained on simulators (CR, 226–, Testimony of James Fitzgerald, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, 3/7/06).
103 OBL impatient 2000: CR, 251. The authors here cite the date used in the Commission Report, which in turn refers to KSM interrogations of 2003 and 2004. The longer account of KSM’s statements, the one generally used in this book, states that bin Laden tried in spring 2000 to bring the attacks forward—surely unlikely, as he well knew the hijack pilots had at that time barely embarked on their training (CR 250, 532n177, KSM SUBST).
The Eleventh Day: The Full Story of 9/11 and Osama bin Laden Page 67
