28 ritual/“spiritual manual”: FBI report, “The 11 September Hijacker Cell Model,” Feb. 03, INTELWIRE. The “spiritual manual” and the ritual it called for is described at length on pp. 161–64
29 “noticed large amounts”: MFR 04020636, 2/2/04, CF, “Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE. Similar evidence had been found at locations used by the terrorists involved in the bombings of the U.S. embassy in Kenya in 1998 and of the USS Cole in 2000 (New Yorker, 7/10 & 7/17/06)
30 “the mutual pledge”: see sources for Ch. 14
31 “God willing”: Fouda & Fielding, 109, translation of Binalshibh audiotape by Naouar Bioud, authors’ collection
32 green: e.g. Slate, 6/9/09, “The Prophet’s Mosque,” www.sacred-destinations.com.
33 When the news started: translation of Binalshibh audiotape by Naouar Bioud, in authors’ collection. The tape was obtained by reporter Yosri Fouda, and the material is used with his permission.
Part VII: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
CHAPTER 30
1 Le Figaro story/picked up by press/According to report: Le Figaro, 10/21/01, Reuters, 11/14/01, NYT, 11/1/01, Guardian (U.K.), 11/1/01 int. Alexandra Richard.
2 medical tests: Rumors long circulated that bin Laden suffered from serious kidney disease requiring dialysis. His son Omar refuted that allegation in the 2009 memoir written with his mother, Najwa—both of whom had intimate contact with bin Laden until well into 2001. Omar conceded, however, that his father—along with others in the extended family—“had a tendency to suffer from kidney stones. Those stones caused immense pain until they had passed out of his body, but his kidneys were strong otherwise.” Interviewed by the Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir on November 8, 2001—the only post-9/11 newspaper interview—bin Laden himself said, “My kidneys are all right” (rumors: e.g. Gunaratna, 48, Eye Spy magazine, no. 57, 2008; Omar: bin Ladens & Sasson, 172; “all right”: ed. Lawrence, 144)
3 Callaway declined: Le Figaro, 10/21/01
4 Koval denied: NYT, 11/1/01
5 Mitchell told: int. Alexandra Richard & authors’ int. with Dubai source
6 possible OBL did visit Dubai: In the November 2001 interview cited above, bin Laden said, “I did not go to Dubai last year.” The meeting with the CIA, of course, is not alleged to have happened the previous year—2000—but in July 2001 (ed. Lawrence, 144).
7 Chouet: int. & corr. Alain Chouet, 2009 & 2011, Chouet int. for Le Monde, 3/29/07, http://alain.chouet.free.fr. In the furor after initial publication of the story, a New York Times article suggested that the allegation of the Dubai meeting was planted by French intelligence “to suggest a continuing covert linkage between the CIA and bin Laden.” In her description of how the story developed, however, reporter Alexandra Richard made clear that she first learned of it from a private source she had long trusted—in Dubai. As described in the text, moreover, she firmed it up with further research. Another French journalist, Richard Labévière, meanwhile, told the authors he received corroboration of the Dubai meeting from three other sources. (NYT, 11/1/01, Guardian [U.K.], 11/1/01, ints. Richard Labévière)
8 contacts with Taliban/improved cooperation/assistance/threats: Guardian (U.K.), 9/22/01, Le Monde Diplomatique, 1/02, Nation, 7/12/02, BBC News, 9/18/01
9 Simons pressed: Guardian (U.K.), 9/22/01, Le Monde Diplomatique, 1/02, Nation, 7/12/02, BBC News, 9/18/01
10 Rice “whether any”: CR, 204.
11 major stories re Atta: e.g. Chicago Tribune, 9/16/01
12 “had been trailing”: corr. Kate Connolly, 2009
13 German intelligence interest/CIA/Joint Inquiry aired: Report, JI, 29–, 183–
14 Commission Report ignored: CR, 495n81
15 sequence of events/Zammar/Darkazanli/card/phone tapped: ibid., CR, 164, 495n81, McDermott, 71–, Chicago Tribune, 10/5/03, “Germany’s Imam Mamoun Darkazanli,” Vol. 1, No. 8, www.jamestown.org. See earlier references to Zammar and Darkazanli in Chs. 24 and 27 and their related notes
16 incoming call/“Marwan”/second/third calls: “Memorandum, Investigative Proceedings Against Mohmammed Haydar Zammar,” 11/19/01, Bundeskriminalamt ST 23–067–256/01, authors’ collection, Report, JI, 185–, Der Spiegel, 11/23/06, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagzeitung, 2/2/03, CR, 495n81
17 “particularly valuable”/CIA “didn’t sit”/“uncertain”: NYT, 22/24/04, 2/25/04, Testimony of George Tenet, Hearings, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2/24/04, www.intelligence.senate.gov, Report, JI, 185–, Staff Statement 11, CO, Graham with Nussbaum, 61
18 Volz: McDermott, 71–, 75–, 278n11, Stern (Germany), 8/3/03, & see Chicago Tribune, 11/16/02.
19 Landesamt: Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz translates in English as the State Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Each of Germany’s sixteen states has such an office, which in turn answer to the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, the federal body. Together, they function as Germany’s domestic intelligence service.
20 “had knowledge”/“turned”/tried approaching: Chicago Tribune, 11/16/02. In an extraordinary episode right after 9/11, German police raided Mamoun Darkazanli’s apartment only to find it empty of documents. The raid was followed, however, by the mysterious delivery to the authorities of a bag of Darkazanli’s papers—by a man claiming to be a burglar who had stolen them from the suspect. The “burglar’s” account, however, appeared to be bogus. In light of the earlier CIA insistence on trying to persuade Darkazanli to become an informant, one German investigator remembered, “We all thought, ‘CIA.’ ” As of this writing, Darkazanli was reportedly still in Hamburg and at liberty (Chicago Tribune, 11/16/02).
21 Jarrah stopped Dubai/“It was”: Corbin, 179–
22 “because his name”: McDermott, 294n3
23 learn fly/spread Islam: Corbin, 180, McDermott, 186
24 “What happened”: McDermott, 187.
25 item redacted: Ziad Jarrah chronology, “03009470—ACS Download Documents, Packet 6,” CF. The FBI’s “Hijackers’ Timeline [redacted]” has also been heavily censored at that point. Because the episode was first reported as having occurred in January 2001—not, as was in fact the case, in 2000—U.S. sources were initially able to deny that Jarrah had been questioned at Dubai in response to a CIA request. They also denied ever having been told about it. Vanity Fair reported in 2004 that the CIA had merely asked foreign border agencies to “question anyone [authors’ italics] who may have been returning from a training camp in Afghanistan.” While acknowledging that U.S. officials said it was untrue that Jarrah had been stopped specifically because his name was on a U.S.-supplied watchlist, investigative reporter Terry McDermott noted in 2005 that Washington had abandoned its initial denial it had been advised of about the Jarrah stop. “The United States,” McDermott wrote, “has acknowledged in internal documents and in communications with German investigators that the Emiratis did contact them.… They decline to say what they told the Emiratis” (Timeline: “Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE; reported as 2001: CNN, 8/1/02, McDermott, 294n3, Corbin, 179–; deny: CNN, 8/1/02, Statement of Eleanor Hill, 9/20/02, JI; McDermott: McDermott, 186, 294n3).
26 DIA/disquieting claim/four on radar: Statement of Mark Zaid, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 9/21/05, MFR 04021341, 7/13/04, CF, MFR [names & number redacted], Defense HUMINT Service Officers, Bagram Base, 10/21/03, CF; WSJ, 11/17/05, NYT, 8/9/05, 8/11/05, Fox News, 8/28/05, Lance, Triple Cross, 330–
27 “data mining”/“use of high-powered”/visa records: Anthony Shaffer, Operation Dark Heart, NY: Thomas Dunne, 2010, 17–, 164–, 245–, 272–, Bergen Record (N.J.), 8/14/05.
28 evidence destroyed: Though the Able Danger claim had not yet emerged when Congress’s Joint Inquiry was at work, its staff did question Major Keith Alexander of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, and twice visited the unit from which much of the Able Danger material reportedly originated. On both occasions, asked whether they knew of a
ny evidence that the government had prior knowledge or should have had prior knowledge of the attack, military personnel said they knew of none.
A Defense Department report, and a Senate Intelligence Committee review, were to conclude in 2006 that the Able Danger claims were unsupported by the evidence. It is clear from both documents that witnesses’ memories were confused, as one might expect so long after the fact. Relevant documentary material that existed in 2003 now does not. Some was inadvertently destroyed during an office move. Some duplicate documentation Shaffer kept at his office, his attorney told the Committee on the Judiciary, was “apparently destroyed—for reasons unknown—by DIA in spring 2004.” The DOD report says no such documentation was found at Shaffer’s office (Joint Inquiry: corr. Miles Kara, 2011; claims unsupported: Defense report: “Alleged Misconduct by Senior DOD Officials Concerning the Able Danger Program & Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer,” U.S. Dept of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, 9/18/06; Senate review: Roberts & Rockefeller to colleagues, 12/22/06, www.intelligence.senate.gov; had Commission followed/destroyed?: Statement of Mark Zaid, Judiciary Committee, U.S. Senate, 9/21/05, Shaffer, 164–, 246–, Kean & Hamilton, 114, 294–, MFR 04021341, 7/13/04, CF, Zelikow Afterword, CR (abridged), NY: W. W. Norton, 2011, 602–).
29 Grenzfahndung: The two known to have been under border watch were Said Bahaji and Mounir Motassadeq (ints. Mounir el-Motassadeq, Motassadeq’s lawyer Udo Jacob, Dr. Manfred Murck, Dr. Herbert Müller, McDermott, 73–, 297n23, Stern [Germany], 8/13/03, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 2/2/03).
30 officials unhelpful: The two other organizations that declined interview requests were the Generalbundesanwalt, or Public Prosecutor’s Office—which has responsibility for terrorist cases—and the Bundeskriminalamt, the Federal Criminal Police Agency. The latter was the source of most German-related information in the 9/11 Commission Report.
31 Müller “Atta was”: Dr. Müller serves with the Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Baden-Württemberg—Stuttgart is the state capital of Baden-Württemberg
32 “Some countries”: Staff Statement 11, CO
33 intermittent friction: Executive Summary, “Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks,” Office of the Inspector General, 06/05, Report, JI, 186–, 274–
34 Polt: MFR 04016468, 10/9/03
35 “They lied”: int. Dirk Laabs.
36 coded conversation: MFR 04019350, 3/18/04 (re Moussaoui team briefing), CF, corr. Kristen Wilhelm, 2011, CR, 245–530n151–152, Staff Statement 16, CO. The exchange was referred to earlier on pp. 323–24.
37 CIA-FBI wrangling: www.huffingtonpost.co.uk.
38 intercept by Germans?: At one stage, in 2000, the Germans had repeatedly discussed applying for clearance to wiretap the Marienstrasse apartment, but at that point decided there was insufficient evidence to justify the request. The 9/11 Commission Report states: “Only after 9/11 would it be discovered that [KSM] had communicated with a phone that was used by Binalshibh … the links to Binalshibh might not have been an easy trail to find and would have required substantial cooperation from the German government” (discussed: Vanity Fair, 11/04, NYT, 6/20/02; “Only after”: CR, 277, & see 245).
39 Berlin visit: The German officials known to have spoken with the U.S. congressional delegation were Ronald Schill, minister of the interior for Hamburg, Deputy Minister Walter Wellinghausen, Reinhard Wagner, chief of the Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Hamburg, his deputy Manfred Murck, and Bruno Franz of the Hamburg police. (Contemporary information provided to the authors)
CHAPTER 31
1 Soon after 1:00 P.M./“Oh, Jesus”: Suskind, One Percent Doctrine, 3–, & see Tenet, 167. Tenet’s aide Michael Morell, the president’s CIA briefer, remembered of the videoconference on the afternoon of 9/11, “They had done name traces on the flight manifests. And when we got to Omaha, and we got to the briefing area, George Tenet briefed the President on the fact that we already knew three of these guys were al Qaeda.” Tenet has recalled that, when he told Bush the CIA had been aware of information about Mihdhar and Hazmi he “shot Mike Morell one of those, ‘I thought I was supposed to be the first to know’ looks.” The reference to three, as distinct from two, of the men on the planes being associated with al Qaeda presumably includes Nawaf al-Hazmi’s brother Salem (Suskind, 9; Tenet, 169).
2 manifest: Exhibit P200054, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui,; Tenet claimed/“CIA had multiple”: Tenet, 195–, 205
3 Tenet on oath/“like a grand”: Shenon, 256–
4 “We just didn’t believe”/outraged: New Yorker, 11/8/04.
5 NSA identified/Hada/“hub”: Bamford, Shadow Factory, 7–, FBI report, “PENTTBOM, Summary of Captioned Investigation,” 11/5/01, authors’ collection, transcript, Nova: The Spy Factory, 2/3/09, www.pbs.org, Wright, 275–
6 NSA did not share: Report, JI, 145, Atlantic, 12/04, Bamford, Shadow Factory, 16, 26–, & see Scheuer, Marching Toward Hell, 91–.
7 Hada phone/FBI/1998 attack/OBL phone/link: Report, JI, 129, 145, Wright, 277–, 343, Testimony of [unnamed] CIA Officer [accepted as Wilshire], 9/20/02, JI. Bin Laden stopped using his satellite phone in September 1998, apparently because he knew or guessed it was being intercepted (WP, 12/22/05, Report, JI, 69).
8 1999 intercept/“Khalid”/“Nawaf “/Malaysia: The intercepted conversation also included a reference to “Salem” as making the trip, too—evidently Hazmi’s brother Salem, who was also to be one of the hijackers. Although the NSA had access to information indicating that the three first names were all linked to the surnames Hazmi and Mihdhar, they did not pass those names to the CIA and FBI—thus making the CIA’s task more difficult than it need have been (CR, 181, JI Report, 145–, 155–, Staff Statement 2, CO, Bamford, Shadow Factory, 16–).
9 “something more”: CR, 181
10 “operational”/“operatives”: ibid., Report, JI, 144
11 passport photographed: The Dubai stopover and the copying of Mihdhar’s passport was briefly mentioned earlier in Ch. 27, p. 319. “This is as good”: Mayer, 18
12 Mihdhar tracked/photographed/pay phones/computers: CR, 181–, Staff Statement 2, CO, Die Zeit, 10/2/02, FBI IG
13 directors/Berger/Clarke: Staff Statement 2, CO, CR, 181.
14 Bangkok: Staff Statement 2, CO. It would later be established that two suspects who had already, on January 6, made short trips out of Malaysia—for only a matter of hours—had also been Attash and Hazmi (Staff Statement 2, CO, CR, 159).
15 according CIA trail lost/Thai authorities responded/Jan. 15 to LA/cables: CR, 181–, FBI IG, Staff Statement 2, CO, Tenet, 196–. The two terrorists flew in aboard UA 002, arriving at 1:27 P.M. Bin Laden aide Attash had reportedly headed back to Afghanistan via Karachi to report to bin Laden (UA 002: “Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE; Attash: CR, 159)
16 “OBL associates”: Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05
17 “Action Required”: Report, JI, 147
18 “The threat”: CR, 176, 501n17
19 “It is important”: ibid., CTC Watchlisting Guidance, cited at Report, JI, 1
20 CIA did not alert State/FBI: Report, JI, 40–, 144–, Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05, FBI IG, Graham with Nussbaum, 7–, CR, 355
21 “promised to let”: Staff Statement 2, CO
22 “Michelle”/“to the FBI”: FBI IG, & see Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05
23 “James”/“as soon as”/“in the event“: Statement of Eleanor Hill, 9/20/02, JI, Report, JI, 81, FBI IG
24 refused interview: FBI IG
25 “Michelle” prevaricated: FBI IG
26 Wilshire/“did not know”: ibid. In the transcript of a hearing before a U.S. Senate subcommittee, the former deputy chief’s n
ame is rendered not as “Wilshire” but as “Wilshere.” The authors have used “Wilshire,” the spelling most commonly used. (“The Global Reach of al Qaeda,” Hearings, Subcommittee on International Operations & Terrorism, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., 12/18/01, 7–)
27 Wilshire deliberately/draft cable/Miller CIR/“pls hold”: FBI IG, & see Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05.
28 “Doug came”/“Is this a no go”: Bamford, Shadow Factory, 18–. In a detailed note for his book Disconnecting the Dots, published in 2011, author Kevin Fenton would note that Rossini was to resign from the FBI in 2008 after breaching regulations. He had, according to an FBI press release, used Bureau computers to find out information for personal purposes. Fenton argues cogently, however, that the lapse does not detract from Rossini’s credibility on the matter of the blocked CIR. The fact of its blocking, and that the agent saw relevant cables in 2000, is well documented (Fenton, proof copy kindly shared with the authors, 2011, 44n26).
29 “unable to locate”: FBI IG
30 Wilshire int. redacted: corr. Kristen Wilhelm, 2011.
31 Wilshire proposed: FBI IG. Wilshire’s actions in July 2001 were reportedly spurred by his review of the CIA cable and email traffic recording Mihdhar’s movements in January the previous year—including the information that Mihdhar had a valid U.S. multiple-entry visa. For reasons unknown, but perhaps because he feared discovery of the fact that he had been in the United States the previous year, Mihdhar had meanwhile obtained a new passport and a new visa in June 2001. He used this new visa when he reentered the United States on July 4. There is no evidence that Wilshire or anyone else at CIA was aware of the new passport and visa at the time the search for Mihdhar was renewed in July 2001 (Wilshire spurred: CR, 267–, FBI IG; new passport/visa: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 33–.)
The Eleventh Day: The Full Story of 9/11 and Osama bin Laden Page 72
