by Bing West
18 two on the south side, and one in the middle: Dept. of the Army, Memorandum for the Record, AFZC-BCT-AD, 21 Sept. 2009, Subject: AR 15-6 Investigation, Colonels R. D. Hooker, USA, and J. F. Werth, USMC, Exhibit II-1. To wit: The next afternoon, an informer reported that Taliban commanders Faqir and Ismael had entered Ganjigal on 7 September. An informant inside the Border Police had tipped them off about the Key Leader Engagement mission. A Wikileaks entry from the JTF spot reports re the Ganjigal ambush read as follows: “Already 20 T [Taliban] were in the village. Hanifullah, Haji Mamiran and Niam were the three chief planners. Mamhullah Khadim had 15 Taliban in his group; Zia Ur Rahman had 15. AAF [Anti-Afghan Forces] were staging in Pakistan. Faqir brought in 20 more and set up in five positions; two on north side and two on south side and one in middle.”
19 two kilometers northeast of Ganjigal: Mirc Chat, 2343 Zulu, Actions in Contact, Appendix c4 (Swenson).
20 served as a major supply point in the war against the Russians: Cols. R. D. Hooker, USA, and J. F. Werth, USMC, Exhibit L (D.1). In his statement, Capt. Kaplan was furious because Ganjigal was never estimated to hold in excess of twenty to thirty military-aged males, yet reporting immediately prior to the battle “indicated 45-60 AAF [anti-Afghan forces],” prepared to ambush CF (coalition forces). Kaplan was not informed of the updates after midnight by the Joyce TOC as he moved to his OP position. The TOC was not keeping Kaplan, the intel officer on the patrol, up to date with the Mirc Chat reports of enemy reinforcements.
CHAPTER 8: INTO THE VALLEY
1 the house of an imam, one of the village elders: Fabayo statement, Feb. 2, 2010, DA Form 2823.
2 They had a dozen fixed positions: An estimate of the positions plotted in different sworn statements numbered between eight and eleven.
3 returned fire, killing the enemy gunner: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit AC. (Note not listed in the Index of Exhibits.) Statement by Cpl. Norman, 17 Sept. 2009.
4 Kaplan, and Cpl. Norman would duel with PKM and AK gunners: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit L (D.1). Also statements by Kaplan to West.
5 “Kilo Echo 3070. Will adjust”: See CJTF-82 Memo for Record, Timeline of Events: Ganjigal, 23 Nov. 2009. See, for instance, entries for 0537 and 0546. There is confusion among Mirc Chat, the Werth/Hooker Investigation, and statements of participants about the exact sequence of the fire requests. Regardless of which KE was called first, the results were the same: only a few rounds were fired. According to Werth/Hooker, upon Granger’s order, the artillery stopped completely around 0630, to include any rounds intended to obscure the battlefield.
6 The southern ridgeline was so high that Swenson’s radio: Swenson brief to West at FOB Joyce, 13 Oct. 2011.
CHAPTER 9: PARALYSIS
1 Valadez, up on the northern ridge—answered on the net: Rodriguez-Chavez statement, Tab N. (All references to Tabs are found in the Medal of Honor packet of Cpl. Meyer, cited in “Request for Copy of Documents contained in Medal of Honor Recommendation,” Military Awards Branch, U.S. Marine Corps, 28 Oct. 2011.)
2 “Fox 9 says you are to stay at your present location”: Valadez statement, Tab P.
3 four hundred meters to the east: Fabayo statement, Appendix e 14 of Medal of Honor packet assembled for the recommendation for Capt. William Swenson attached to a Letter of Lateness from USFORA Afghanistan signed by Col. Chevallier, USA, on 11 Aug. 2011.
4 the enemy’s heavy guns were firing: JTF-82 Memo for Record, Timeline of Events: Ganjigal, 23 Nov. 2009, 0556.
5 I may not make it out of here: Swenson extended conversations with West, 14-17 Oct. 2009, at Camp Joyce and while riding around the district.
6 higher on the ridge, at least seven times: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit L (D.1).
7 “The fucks won’t shoot the arty”: Kaplan discussion with West at Joyce, 15-16 Oct. 2009.
8 Swenson had identified enemy positions at four grid positions: The grids were 992 521, 983 512, 981 509, and 957 493. 101 “I’m making the decision, not them”: Swenson conversation with West at Joyce, 15 Oct. 2009.
9 “KE 3365, Hill 1485”: JTF-82 Memo for Record, Timeline of Events: Ganjigal, 23 Nov. 2009, request at 0556.
10 called in a polar mission: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibits AE and AF (Shadow statements).
11 “hit from the north, east, and south”: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit K (C.1).
12 “twenty questions”: Summers Shadow 4 Appendix G6, Werth/Hooker Investigation.
13 A second string was running the show, and not well: The leaders in the TOC came from the second tier inside 1-32. The battle captain had been relieved of his platoon before the deployment began. Lt. Col. O’Donnell was on leave. His executive officer, a major, had a checkered reputation; in previous battles, platoon leaders under fire had decided to ignore his orders over the radio.
14 no more than four or five effective rounds: Fabayo, Exhibit BH.
15 an eight-round “splash”—with shells on target—inside ten minutes: JTF-82 Memo for Record, Timeline of Events: Ganjigal, 23 Nov. 2009, splash 0605.
16 fire mission requests were cascading in: See Fabayo, Appendix e11, Garza, Appendix e15, and CJTF-82 Timeline.
17 every four minutes: Mirc CHAT fire mission requests were logged in at 0537, 0541, 0546, 0550, 0556, and 0600.
18 Joyce allowed only twenty-one artillery shells to be fired: Werth/Hooker Investigation summary (four 155 shells, thirteen 120 shells, and five 120 WP shells).
19 “the next higher headquarters commander has approved”: ISAF Tactical Directive, 1 July 2009, p. 2.
20 “disposition of civilians in the area”: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit T.
21 Shadow 4 relayed the message to Joyce: CJTF-82 Memo for Record, Timeline of Events: Ganjigal, 23 Nov. 2009, 0550.
22 Sgt. Summers kept requesting air: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit AF. Summers statement.
23 Everyone was trying to talk to him, asking for guidance: Gunny Miller, JP Exhibit V. (The exhibit number was typed at the bottom of the page; it does not appear in the index.)
24 last four Social Security digits of each American in the valley: Summers, Appendix G6.
25 This had to be KE 3070: CJTF-82, MFR Timeline of Events, 23 Nov. 2009 (0600 entry: four HE 155mm fires splashed on KE 3070).
26 “We have to get out of here”: Rodriguez-Chavez, Tab N.
CHAPTER 10: LOST
1 The fight had been raging for over half an hour: Meyer on CBS interview, 60 Minutes.
2 Fabayo told Valadez to stay off the net: Valadez statement, Tab P.
3 “You’re supposed to stay where you are”: Valadez statement, Tab P.
4 urging them in Pashto to follow me: Valadez statement, Tab P.
5 “you have enemy at your nine o’clock, driver’s side”: Miller, Annex E, Appendix e18.
6 I could get at them easier in the fight ahead: Rodriguez-Chavez, Tab N.
7 “There are people out there dying”: Valadez statement, Tab P.
8 it would arrive in “fifteen mikes”: Fabayo, Appendix e14.
9 called the ops center at Jalalabad Air Base: Staff Sgt. Lantz called directly to the ops center of the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment at JAL. The problem was that 7-17 wanted clearance from the brigade level.
10 The squadron ops chief agreed to re-task the birds immediately: AR 15-16, Werth/Hooker Investigation, 25 Nov. 2009, Exhibit BJ.
11 close air support in addition to helicopters: Werth/Hooker Investigation, 25 Nov. 2009, Exhibit II-1 (P.6). (The TOC could get CAS by declaring an air TIC [Troops In Contact].)
12 another mission north of Ganjigal was of “higher priority”: AR 15-16, Werth/Hooker Investigation, 25 Nov. 2009, Exhibit C1 and Exhibit R (“The ANA and ABP leadership knew that they would have no CCA”) and Exhibit U (“The air is engaged in another mission”).
13 shouting that Ganjigal was “a heavy TIC”: AR 15-16, Werth/Hooker Investigation, 25 Nov. 2009, Exhibits AE and AF and MFR stating conclusions.
14 Captain Harting ignored Shadow’s plea: AR 15-16, Werth/Hooker Investigation, 25 Nov. 2009. See Exhibit K for the rationale by the battle captain in TOC.
15 “They said it was unavailable”: Fabayo, Exhibit BH.
16 laughing at how ridiculous the situation was: Miller, Annex E, Appendix e18.
17 “thirty to sixty AAF” (Anti-Afghan Forces) were attacking: Harting, Exhibit K.
18 “denied twice due to proximity of structures”: Werth/Hooker Investigation, JP Exhibit K.
19 wouldn’t authorize fire support: Werth Investigation, Exhibit II-1 (P. 5) (“complete absence of fires from 0639 to 1615”).
20 Swenson and Fabayo sat stunned: Fabayo, Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit BH.
21 Lt. Johnson again contacted Fabayo on the radio: Fabayo, Appendix e14. 112 “Get us smoke to get us out of here”: Miller, Annex E, Appendix e18.
22 the village was too close: Fabayo, Appendix e14.
23 “They didn’t have SA [situational awareness]”: Granger discussion with West at Joyce, 17 Oct. 2009.
24 “verified that no civilians are present”: Tactical Directive, Headquarters International Security Assistance Force, Kabul, 1 July 2009.
25 “a potential QRF [quick-reaction force]”: CJTF-82 Memo for Record, Timeline of Events: Ganjigal, 23 Nov. 2009, 0615.
26 he hadn’t been told how far he was to advance: CJTF-82 Memo for Record, Timeline of Events: Ganjigal, 23 Nov. 2009, 0630.
27 Maj. Williams handed his cell phone: Fabayo, Appendix e14.
28 asking him to call for an Afghan quick-reaction force: Fabayo, Appendix e11.
29 without any Americans from 1-32 joining them: Fabayo, Exhibit BH.
30 no effect on the enemy rate of fire: Garza statements, Annex E, Appendix e15, and telephonic interview 16 Sept. 2009, Annex E, Appendix e5.
31 from the ridges to the south, and from the terraces to the north: Swenson brief to West, 13 Oct. 2009.
32 requesting smoke “to conceal their movement”: Fabayo, Appendix e14.
33 The angle of the fire had shifted southeast: Fabayo, Appendix e11, 26 Feb. 2010.
34 more men were shooting at him from inside the town: Fabayo, Exhibit BH.
35 A woman in a red and purple dress: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit G.
36 another woman stacking rocks to make fighting position: Fabayo, Exhibit BH.
37 the far ambush was becoming a near ambush: Fabayo, Exhibit BH. “Our far ambush became a near ambush,” Fabayo said. “They start to maneuver around us, while we try to withdraw.”
38 an RPG exploded near him, throwing him to the ground: Garza statement, Annex E, Appendix e5, 16 Sept. 2009, MFR, AFZC-BCT-AD, Maj. Johannes Castro, USA.
39 ordered the Army platoon—Dog 3-2—to move forward: 15-6 Investigation, JP Exhibit F and Exhibit K, and Enemy Action Attack RPT Afghan war diary, 2009-09-08 ref. AFG20090908n2165.
40 “We’re surrounded”: Meyer, Annex E, Appendix e3.
41 Lt. Fabayo saw our Humvee: Fabayo, Appendix e14.
42 “You got to keep calm”: Fabayo, Exhibit BH.
43 “You must surrender”: Swenson email to West, 5 Jan. 2011.
44 I don’t want some kid to find it intact and blow himself up: Swenson discussion with West, 14 Sept. 2011.
45 “Where’s the reporter?”: Fabayo, Exhibit BH.
46 was dead: Swenson discussions with West, 17 Oct. 2009 and 14 Sept. 2011.
47 Swenson, who carried five hundred rounds for his M4: Swenson discussions with West, 14 Sept. 2011.
48 the notepad in his pocket had crumbled: Fabayo, Appendix e12 (Swenson).
49 handed them anti-infection pills: Fabayo, Annex E, Appendix e11, and Exhibit BH.
50 “You’ll get shot”: Garza statement, Appendix e15.
51 see one Askar stand up and take a bullet in the neck: Memo for the Record, CJTF-1-CJ1, Transcribed Sworn Statement of CPT Swenson, William D., 29 July 2011.
52 Fabayo dropped his first-aid bag: Fabayo, Annex E, Appendix e11.
53 two OH-58 Kiowas were en route to the valley: According to Memo for Record, JTF-82, 23 Nov. 2009, Timeline of Events Ganjigal Valley, 7-8 Sept. 2009, at 0720 the SWT Kiowas were wings up from FOB Fenty and they arrived on station at 0745; the official timeline is clear, but unofficially a Marine UAH, according to Swenson (Tab J), diverted without informing higher headquarters and provided initial gun runs around 0715.
54 he called for a medevac: Recorded in TOC at Joyce at 0738, Exhibit K.
55 “Is he Army or Marine?”: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Gunny Miller, Exhibit U.
56 grenades impacted behind them and to their right side: Fabayo, Annex E, Appendix e14.
CHAPTER 11: INTO THE FIRE
1 Lt. Johnson said he’d cover Hafez: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit AJ.
2 He didn’t see or hear Lt. Johnson after that: telecommunication West and Meyer et al. at Random House with Hafez on 11 Feb. 2012.
3 Hafez clawed at his gear and threw a smoke grenade: telecommunication West and Meyer et al. at Random House with Hafez on 11 Feb. 2012.
4 give a grid. Nine seven: Meyer, CBS interview, 60 Minutes.
5 Valadez came up on the net: Rodriguez-Chavez statement, Tab N.
6 “There are a lot of bad guys on both sides”: Valadez statement, Tab P.
7 suffered only mild bruises: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibits AD and AB.
8 crouched alongside a drainage ditch, not ten meters away: Meyer After Action Report for Ganjigal, 11 Sept. 2009.
9 “The gun won’t go down enough”: Statement of Rodriguez-Chavez, Tab O.
10 “expertise-induced amnesia”: Jeff Wise, Extreme Fear (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009), p. 50.
11 the others ducked back into the ditch: Meyer brief to West at Monti, 17 Oct. 2009. (The notes read that Meyer said he “hit four.”)
12 firing an AK at us from his hip: Rodriguez-Chavez description to West, teleconference, 31 Jan. 2012.
13 the pilots couldn’t do enough to help us: Tab R. The first flight of pilots to arrive were CW2 Kristopher Bassett, CW2 James O’Neal, CW2 Ryan Neal, and CW2 Michael McClain.
14 ignoring the RPG shells exploding in the air: CWO Silano description to West, telecommunication, 3 June 2012.
CHAPTER 12: INTO THE WASH
1 six Afghan soldiers were dead and nine wounded: Werth/Hooker Investigation, 25 Nov. 2009, Exhibit II-1 (P.7).
2 Swenson brought back two dead jihadists, too: Swenson, Exhibit BI.
3 Fabayo got into our turret and Hafez got on the radio: Fabayo, Annex E, Appendix e12.
4 picked up Dodd Ali, and rolled his stiff body into the open back: Swenson wrote to me on 6 Jan. 2012: “At the time, Dakota was a Marine E-4; I did not know him. I was situationally aware of the location of those who fought at the battle, but putting a name to the role performed is different. You referenced football: I know where the QB [quarterback] was, but I do not necessarily recall his roster number. What I witnessed of Dakota’s heroism, I am certain of.”
CHAPTER 13: PRIMAL
1 Swenson got out to talk to the Army platoon leader: Swenson, Tab J.
2 four Americans were missing: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit BR.
3 “You’re not going back into the fight”: Meyer interview with CBS, 60 Minutes.
4 left the battlefield: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit II-1. (P.7), concluded that “the 2-8 ETT commander, the record shows that he performed capably and courageously.”
5 “Hold where you are”: Silano telecommunication with West, 7 June 2012.
6 move into the valley: Email Swenson to West, 6 Jan. 2011.
7 “Spot”: Meyer interview with CBS, 60 Minutes.
8 we pulled out about ten or twelve wounded: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit AJ.
9 waiting their turn to enter the valley: Bassett statement, Appendix e13, 14 Sept. 2009.
10 fire missions kept getting denied: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit U. “I
heard constant requests for fire support,” Sgt. Summers, up at Shadow 4, said.
11 fended off the endless questions from the TOC at Joyce: Summers, Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit C1, 17 Nov. 2009. “My feeling is that the Marines and Afghan forces were left out to dry,” Shadow 4—Sgt. Summers—said. “It’s a horrible feeling but that’s how I feel about it. QRF? Air? Nothing but endless questions [by the TOC].”
12 the pilots didn’t return fire: Silano telecommunication with West, 7 June 2012.
13 they were fighting the outsiders: This is unsurprising. See, for instance, Olaf Caroe, The Pathans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 437.
CHAPTER 14: TEAM MONTI
1 a PKM was still shooting at some Askars: Fabayo, Appendix e14.
2 fell into a deep, well-constructed trench: Swenson brief to West at FOB Joyce, 13 Oct. 2009.
3 villagers returning to Ganjigal: The Werth/Hooker investigation (JP, Exhibit A, Part 2, page 16) stated that “no Afghan civilians were either killed or injured during this operation.” In all due respect, this cannot be confirmed. Tens of thousands of bullets were fired over the course of the day. No one walked around keeping count of who was struck, whether Afghan soldiers, civilians who were not involved, civilians who were aiding the enemy, or enemy who were wearing civilian clothes.
CHAPTER 15: DAB KHAR
1 set the two dead aside for burial: Exhibits AI and J.
2 bloody handprints: Kerr reminded me of this in an email dated July 11, 2012.
CHAPTER 16: CHEERLEADERS
1 his command had made progress in eastern Afghanistan: DoD press briefing by Maj. Gen. Scaparrotti, 3 June 2010.
2 The Americans handed out Korans and prayer rugs: Regional Command East archives, 19 Dec. 2009, reprint of 3 Dec. 2009 story citing Capt. J. L. Saxe, 1-32.
POSTSCRIPT: SWENSON
1 “I am staring at the target”: Swenson, Appendix B1.
2 “I expect to be kicked out”: Swenson to West at Joyce, 18 Oct. 2009.
3 recommendation for the Medal of Honor in December of 2009: USFOR-A DCDR-COS Letter of Lateness: Medal of Honor Recommendation, Captain William D. Swenson, United States Army, signed by Col. J. H. Chevallier, USA, 11 Aug. 2011. (Swenson was part of a sixteen-man team advising seven Afghan Border Police units along a 480-kilometer stretch of the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. There was very little internal administrative support for the police advisor program. For fitness reports and ratings, Swenson was evaluated by Battalion 1-32 at Camp Joyce.)
