That our programme has been adequately completed is clear. But we must not [15] omit to notice what has happened in regard to this inquiry. For in the case of all discoveries the results of previous labours that have been handed down from others have been advanced bit by bit by those who have taken them on, whereas the original discoveries generally make an advance that is small at first though much [20] more useful than the development which later springs out of them. For it may be that in everything, as the saying is, ‘the first start is the main part’; and for this reason it is the most difficult; for in proportion as it is most potent in its influence, so it is smallest in its compass and therefore most difficult to see—but when this is [25] once discovered, it is easier to add and develop the remainder. This is in fact what has happened in regard to rhetorical speeches and to practically all the other arts; for those who discovered the beginnings of them advanced them in all only a little [30] way, whereas the celebrities of to-day are the heirs (so to speak) of a long succession of men who have advanced them bit by bit, and so have developed them to their present form, Tisias coming next after the first founders, then Thrasymachus after Tisias, and Theodorus next to him, while several people have made their several contributions to it; and therefore it is not to be wondered at that the art has attained considerable dimensions. Of the present inquiry, on the other hand, it was not the [35] case that part of the work had been thoroughly done before, while part had not. Nothing existed at all. For the training given by the paid professors of contentious arguments was like the practice of Gorgias. For he47 used to hand out rhetorical speeches to be learned by heart, and they handed out speeches in the form of question and answer, which each supposed would cover most of the arguments on [185a1] either side. And therefore the teaching they gave their pupils was rapid but unsystematic. For they used to suppose that they trained people by imparting to them not the art but its products, as though anyone professing that he would impart [5] a form of knowledge to obviate any pain in the feet, were then not to teach a man the art of shoe-making or the sources whence he can acquire anything of the kind, but were to present him with several kinds of shoes of all sorts—for he has helped him to meet his need, but has not imparted an art to him. Moreover, on the subject of rhetoric there exists much that has been said long ago, whereas on the subject of [184b1] deduction we had absolutely nothing else of an earlier date to mention, but48 were kept at work for a long time in experimental researches. If, then, it seems to you after inspection that, such being the situation as it existed at the start, our [5] investigation is in a satisfactory condition compared with the other inquiries that have been developed by tradition, there must remain for all of you, our students, the task of extending us your pardon for the shortcomings of the inquiry, and for the discoveries thereof your warm thanks.
**TEXT: W. D. Ross, OCT, Oxford, 1958
1See Topics VIII 5.
2I.e. in the Topics.
3Aristotle’s Greek ambiguities rarely translate neatly into English ambiguities: on this and the following pages the translation sometimes presents a stilted but fairly literal version of the Greek, and sometimes offers English parallels to Aristotle’s examples.
4Reading ἐμάνθανεν and omitting ἃ ἐπίσταται.
5They emend oὗ to oὐ, ‘Part of which decays in the rain’ to ‘It does not decay in the rain’ (Iliad XXIII 328).
6Agamemnon’s dream occurs at Iliad II 1–35; but in our texts the phrase Aristotle cites appears not there but at XXI 297.
7See Topics I 9.
8Omitting ἀλλὰ (ἄλλως, Ross) after ἔλεγχoς.
9Omitting ὀνόματoς.
10Omitting μὶαν (inserted by Wallies).
11ὀ λόγoς is apparently used here to mean ambiguity: see 169a22.
12Reading δόντας.
13They are called παραλoγισμoὶ because they occur παρά τoῦ λόγoυ τἡν ἔλλειψιν.
14See Chh. 24 and 28.
15Reading τρόπoι for τόπoι.
16See 168a25.
17Ross accidentally omits μἡ.
18Retaining δυάδες.
19Retaining πρός.
20Retaining ἄγειν.
21See Topics 111b32.
22See 165b16.
23See 165b20.
24See Topics 155b26–157a5.
25Probably a dialogue by Speusippus.
26The text and the punctuation of this long sentence are in many places uncertain.
27See Topics VIII 7.
28I.e. the classification of fallacies.
29Retaining ἔτι (ἐστι Ross).
30Reading ὀρός (Uhlig).
31Reading ὅσoν δὲ μἡ ἔχει ἢ ὅσα.
32See 177b31.
33Reading ἀδύνατoν (δυνατόν Ross).
34Reading ὲὶτ’ ἀληθὲς ὲὶτε ψεῦδoς.
35Retaining the MSS order.
36The arguments discussed in this paragraph turn on the various functions of the genitive case in Greek: they have no natural translation into an uninflected language.
37Retaining ἀγαθόν (βέλτιoν Ross).
38Retaining νικᾶ (νικᾶται Ross).
39See 167a21.
40See 165b20ff. The solecisms Aristotle discusses have no exact English counterparts, for they depend on the inflected nature of Greek.
41Reading τoῦτo for o꜋ τoς.
42Reading τoύτoυ for oὗ and τoύτoυ for τoύτo.
43Reading σoλoικισμός for συλλoγισμός.
44Reading σoλoικισμoύς for συλλoγισμoύς.
45Retaining πρoσκατασκευάζεται.
46Retaining ὡς … ὀύναται.
47Reading ὀ μέν (Solmsen) for oὶ μέν.
48Reading ἄλλo λέγειν ἀλλὶ (λέγειν ἤ Ross).
PHYSICS**
R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye
BOOK I
1 · When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, [184a10] causes, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge and understanding is attained. For we do not think that we know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary causes or first principles, and have carried our analysis as far as its elements. Plainly, therefore, in the science of nature too our first task [15] will be to try to determine what relates to its principles.
The natural way of doing this is to start from the things which are more knowable and clear to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and more knowable by nature; for the same things are not knowable relatively to us and knowable without qualification. So we must follow this method and advance from what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is more clear and [20] more knowable by nature.
Now what is to us plain and clear at first is rather confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by analysis. Thus we must advance from universals to particulars; for it is a whole that is more knowable to sense-perception, and a universal is a kind of whole, comprehending many things [25] within it, like parts. Much the same thing happens in the relation of the name to the [184b10] formula. A name, e.g. ‘circle’, means vaguely a sort of whole: its definition analyses this into particulars. Similarly a child begins by calling all men father, and all women mother, but later on distinguishes each of them.
2 · The principles in question must be either one or more than one. If one, it [15] must be either motionless, as Parmenides and Melissus assert, or in motion, as the physicists hold, some declaring air to be the first principle, others water. If more than one, then either a finite or an infinite plurality. If finite (but more than one), then either two or three or four or some other number. If infinite, then either as [20] Democritus believed one in kind, but differing in shape; or different in kind and even contrary.
A similar inquiry is made by those who inquire into the number of
existents; for they inquire whether the ultimate constituents of existing things are one or [25] many, and if many, whether a finite or an infinite plurality. So they are inquiring whether the principle or element is one or many.
Now to investigate whether what exists is one and motionless is not a [185a1] contribution to the science of nature. For just as the geometer has nothing more to say to one who denies the principles of his science—this being a question for a different science or for one common to all—so a man investigating principles cannot argue with one who denies their existence. For if what exists is just one, and one in the way mentioned, there is a principle no longer, since a principle must be the principle of some thing or things.
[5] To inquire therefore whether what exists is one in this sense would be like arguing against any other position maintained for the sake of argument (such as the Heraclitean thesis, or such a thesis as that what exists is one man) or like refuting a merely contentious argument—a description which applies to the arguments both of Melissus and of Parmenides: their premisses are false and their conclusions do [10] not follow. Or rather the argument of Melissus is gross and offers no difficulty at all: accept one ridiculous proposition and the rest follows—a simple enough proceeding.
We, on the other hand, must take for granted that the things that exist by nature are, either all or some of them, in motion—which is indeed made plain by induction. Moreover, no one is bound to solve every kind of difficulty that may be [15] raised, but only as many as are drawn falsely from the principles of the science: it is not our business to refute those that do not arise in this way; just as it is the duty of the geometer to refute the squaring of the circle by means of segments, but it is not his duty to refute Antiphon’s proof. At the same time the holders of the theory of which we are speaking do incidentally raise physical questions, though nature is not their subject; so it will perhaps be as well to spend a few words on them, especially as [20] the inquiry is not without scientific interest.
The most pertinent question with which to begin will be this: In what sense is it asserted that all things are one? For ‘is’ is used in many ways. Do they mean that all things are substance or quantities or qualities? And, further, are all things one substance—one man, one horse, or one soul—or quality and that one and the [25] same—white or hot or something of the kind? These are all very different doctrines and all impossible to maintain.
For if both substance and quantity and quality are, then, whether these exist independently of each other or not, what exists will be many.
If on the other hand it is asserted that all things are quality or quantity, then, [30] whether substance exists or not, an absurdity results, if indeed the impossible can properly be called absurd. For none of the others can exist independently except substance; for everything is predicated of substance as subject. Now Melissus says that what exists is infinite. It is then a quantity. For the infinite is in the category of [185b1] quantity, whereas substance or quality or affection cannot be infinite except accidentally, that is, if at the same time they are also quantities. For to define the infinite you must use quantity in your formula, but not substance or quality. If then what exists is both substance and quantity, it is two, not one; if only substance, it is [5] not infinite and has no magnitude; for to have that it will have to be a quantity.
Again, ‘one’ itself, no less than ‘is’, is used in many ways, so we must consider in what way the word is used when it is said that the universe is one.
Now we say that the continuous is one or that the indivisible is one, or things are said to be one, when the account of their essence is one and the same, as liquor and drink.
If their One is one in the sense of continuous, it is many; for the continuous is [10] divisible ad infinitum.
There is, indeed, a difficulty about part and whole, perhaps not relevant to the present argument, yet deserving consideration on its own account—namely, whether the part and the whole are one or more than one, and in what way they can be one or many, and, if they are more than one, in what way they are more than one. (Similarly with the parts of wholes which are not continuous.) Further, if each of [15] the two parts is indivisibly one with the whole, the difficulty arises that they will be indivisibly one with each other also.
But to proceed: If their One is one as indivisible, nothing will have quantity or quality, and so what exists will not be infinite, as Melissus says—nor, indeed, limited, as Parmenides says; for though the limit is indivisible, the limited is not.
But if all things are one in the sense of having the same definition, like raiment and dress, then it turns out that they are maintaining the Heraclitean doctrine, for it [20] will be the same thing to be good and to be bad, and to be good and to be not good, and so the same thing will be good and not good, and man and horse; in fact, their view will be, not that all things are one, but that they are nothing; and that to be of such-and-such a quality is the same as to be of such-and-such a quantity. [25]
Even the more recent of the ancient thinkers were in a pother lest the same thing should turn out in their hands both one and many. So some, like Lycophron, were led to omit ‘is’, others to change the mode of expression and say ‘the man has been whitened’ instead of ‘is white’, and ‘walks’ instead of ‘is walking’, for fear that [30] if they added the word ‘is’ they should be making the one to be many—as if ‘one’ and ‘is’ were always used in one and the same way. What is may be many either in definition (for example to be white is one thing, to be musical another, yet the same thing may be both, so the one is many) or by division, as the whole and its parts. On this point, indeed, they were already getting into difficulties and admitted that the [186a1] one was many—as if there was any difficulty about the same thing being both one and many, provided that these are not opposites; for what is one may be either potentially one or actually one.
3 · If, then, we approach the thesis in this way it seems impossible for all things to be one. Further, the arguments they use to prove their position are not [5] difficult to expose. For both of them reason contentiously—I mean both Melissus and Parmenides. [Their premisses are false and their conclusions do not follow. Or rather the argument of Melissus is gross and offers no difficulty at all: admit one ridiculous proposition and the rest follows—a simple enough proceeding.]1 [10]
The fallacy of Melissus is obvious. For he supposes that the assumption ‘what has come into being always has a beginning’ justifies the assumption ‘what has not come into being has no beginning’. Then this also is absurd, that in every case there should be a beginning of the thing—not of the time and not only in the case of [15] coming to be simpliciter but also in the case of qualitative change—as if change never took place all at once. Again, does it follow that what is, if one, is motionless? Why should it not move, the whole of it within itself, as parts of it do which are unities, e.g. this water? Again, why is qualitative change impossible? But, further, what is cannot be one in form, though it may be in what it is made of. (Even some of [20] the physicists hold it to be one in the latter way, though not in the former.) Man obviously differs from horse in form, and contraries from each other.
The same kind of argument holds good against Parmenides also, besides any that may apply specially to his view: the answer to him being that this is not true and that does not follow. His assumption that ‘is’ is used in a single way only is false, [25] because it is used in several. His conclusion does not follow, because if we take only white things, and if ‘white’ has a single meaning, none the less what is white will be many and not one. For what is white will not be one either in the sense that it is continuous or in the sense that it must be defined in only one way. Whiteness will be different from what has whiteness. Nor does this mean that there is anything that [30] can exist separately, over and above what is white. For whiteness and that which is white differ in definition, not in the sense that they are things which can exist apart from each other. But Parmenides had not come
in sight of this distinction.
It is necessary for him, then, to assume not only that ‘is’ has the same meaning, of whatever it is predicated, but further that it means what just is and what is just one. For an attribute is predicated of some subject, so that the subject to which ‘is’ is attributed will not be, as it is something different from being. Something, therefore, [186b1] which is not will be. Hence what just is will not belong to anything else. For the subject cannot be a being, unless ‘is’ means several things, in such a way that each is something. But ex hypothesi ‘is’ means only one thing.
If, then, what just is is not attributed to anything, but other things are [5] attributed to it, how does what just is mean what is rather than what is not? For suppose that what just is is also white, and that being white is not what just is (for being cannot even be attributed to white, since nothing is which is not what just is), it follows that what is white is not—and that not in the sense of not being something [10] or other, but in the sense that it is not at all. Hence what just is is not; for it is true to say that it is white, and we found this to mean what is not. So ‘white’ must also mean what just is; and then ‘is’ has more than one meaning.
The Complete Works of Aristotle Page 56
