5 · But since ‘friendly’ is also used more universally, as was indeed said at the beginning, by those who take in extraneous considerations—some saying that the like is friendly, and some the contrary,—we must speak also of the relation of [10] these friendships to those previously mentioned. The like is brought both under the pleasant and under the good, for the good is simple, but the bad various in form; and the good man is ever like himself and does not change in character; but the bad and the foolish are quite different in the evening from what they were in the morning. Therefore unless the bad come to some agreement, they are not friends to one [15] another but are parted; but unstable friendship is not friendship. So thus the like is friendly, because the good is like; but it may also be friendly because of pleasure; for those like one another have the same pleasures, and everything too is by nature pleasant to itself. Therefore the voices, habits, and company of those of the same [20] species are pleasantest to each side, even in the animals other than man; and in this way it is possible for even the bad to love one another: ‘pleasure glues the bad to the bad’.
But opposites are friendly through usefulness; for the like is useless to itself; [25] therefore master needs slave, and slave master; man and woman need one another, and the opposite is pleasant and desired qua useful, not as included in the end but as contributing towards it. For when a thing has obtained what it desires, it has reached its end and no longer desires the opposite, e.g. heat does not desire cold, nor [30] dryness moisture. Yet in a sense the love of the contrary is love of the good; for the opposites desire one another because of the mean; they desire one another like tallies because thus out of the two arises a single mean. Further, the love is accidentally of the opposite, but per se of the mean, for opposites desire not one another but the [35] mean. For if over-chilled they return to the mean by being warmed, and if over-warmed by being chilled. And so with everything else. Otherwise they are ever desiring, never in the mean states; but that which is in the mean delights without desire in what is naturally pleasant, while the others delight in all that puts them out of their natural condition. This kind of relation then is found also among inanimate [1240a1] things; but love occurs when the relation is found among the living. Therefore some delight in what is unlike themselves, the austere in the witty, the energetic in the lazy; for they reduce each other to the mean state. Accidentally, then, as has been said, opposites are friendly, because of the good.
[5] The number then of kinds of friendship, and the different senses in which we speak of ‘friends’ and of persons as ‘loving’ and ‘loved’, both where this constitutes friendship and where it does not, have now been stated.
6 · The question whether a man is a friend to himself or not requires much inquiry. For some think that every man is above all a friend to himself; and they use this friendship as a canon by which to test his friendship to all other friends. If we [10] look to argument and to the properties usually thought characteristic of friends, then the two kinds of friendship are in some of these respects opposed to one another, but in others alike. For this friendship—that to oneself—is, in a way, friendship by analogy, not absolutely. For loving and being loved require two separate individuals. Therefore a man is a friend to himself rather in the sense in [15] which we have described the incontinent and continent as willing or unwilling, namely in the sense that the parts of his soul are in a certain relation to each other; and all problems of this sort have a similar explanation, e.g. whether a man can be a friend or enemy to himself, and whether a man can wrong himself. For all these relations require two separate individuals; so far then as the soul is two, these [20] relations can in a sense belong to it; so far as these two are not separate, the relations cannot belong to it.
By a man’s attitude to himself the other modes of friendship, under which we are accustomed to consider friendship in this discourse, are determined. For a man seems to us a friend, who wishes the good or what he thinks to be such to someone, not on his own account but for the sake of that other; or, in another way, if he wishes [25] for another man existence—even if he is not bestowing goods67—on that other’s account and not on his own, he would seem most of all to be a friend to him. And in yet another manner he would be a friend to him whom he wishes to live with merely for the sake of his company and for no other reason; thus fathers wish the existence of their sons, but prefer to live with others. Now these various ways of friendship are [30] discordant with one another. For some think they are not loved, unless the other wishes them this or that good, some unless their existence or their society is desired. Further, to sorrow with the sorrowing, for no other reason than their sorrow, we shall regard as love (e.g. slaves grieve with their masters because their masters when in trouble are cruel to them, not for the sake of the masters themselves)—as [35] mothers feel towards their children, and birds that share one another’s pains. For the friend wants, if possible, not merely to feel pain along with his friend, but to feel the same pain, e.g. to feel thirsty when he is thirsty, if that could be, as closely as possible. The same words are applicable to joy, which, if felt for no other reason than that the other feels joy, is a sign of friendship. Further, we say about friendship [1240b1] such things as that friendship is equality, and true friends a single soul. All such phrases point back to the single individual; for a man wishes good to himself68 in this fashion; for no one benefits himself for some further reason . . .69 for he who shows [5] that he loves seems to want to be loved, not to love. And wishing the existence above all of the friend, living with him, sharing his joy and his grief, unity of soul with the friend, the impossibility of even living without one another, and the dying together [10] are characteristic of a single individual. (For such is the condition of the individual and he perhaps takes pleasure in his own company.) All these characters we find in the relation of the good man to himself. In the bad man, e.g. the incontinent, there is variance, and for this reason it seems possible for a man to be at enmity with [15] himself; but so far as he is single and indivisible, he is an object of desire to himself. Such is the good man, the man whose friendship is based on excellence, for the wicked man is not one but many, in the same day other than himself and fickle. So that a man’s friendship for himself is at bottom friendship towards the good; for because a man is in a sense like himself, single, and good for himself, so far he is a [20] friend and object of desire to himself. And this is natural to man; but the bad man is unnatural. The good man never finds fault with himself at the moment of his act, like the incontinent, nor the later with the earlier man, like the penitent, nor the earlier with the later, like the liar. Generally, if it is necessary to distinguish as the [25] sophists do, he is related to himself as Coriscus to good Coriscus. For it is clear that some identical portion of them is good; for when they blame themselves, they kill themselves. But every one seems good to himself. But the man that is good absolutely, seeks to be a friend to himself, as has been said, since he has within him [30] two parts which by nature desire to be friends and which it is impossible to tear apart. Therefore in the case of man each is thought to be the friend of himself; but not so with the other animals; e.g. the horse is himself to himself . . .70 therefore not a friend. Nor are children, till they have attained the power of choice; for already then the mind is at variance with the appetite. One’s friendship to oneself resembles the [35] friendship arising from kinship; for neither bond can be dissolved by one’s own power; but even if they quarrel, the kinsmen remain kinsmen; and so the man remains one so long as he lives.
The various senses then of loving, and how all friendships reduce to the primary kind, is clear from what has been said.
[1241a1] 7 · It is appropriate to the inquiry to study agreement of feeling and kindly feeling; for some identify these, and others think they cannot exist apart. Now kindly feeling is not altogether different from friendship, nor yet the same; for when we distinguish friendship according to its three sorts, kindly feeling is found neither [5] in the friendshi
p of usefulness nor in that of pleasure. For if one wishes well to the other because that is useful to oneself, one would be so wishing not for the object’s sake, but for his own; but goodwill seems like. . .71 to be not goodwill for him who feels the goodwill, but for him towards whom it is felt. Now if goodwill existed in the friendship towards the pleasant, then men would feel goodwill towards things [10] inanimate. So that it is clear that goodwill is concerned with the friendship that depends on character; but goodwill shows itself in merely wishing, friendship in also doing what one wishes. For goodwill is the beginning of friendship; every friend has goodwill, but not all who have goodwill are friends. He who has goodwill only is like a man at the beginning, and therefore it is the beginning of friendship, not friendship itself . . .72
[15] For friends seem to agree in feeling, and those who agree in feeling seem to be friends. Friendly agreement is not about all things, but only about things that may be done by those in agreement and about what relates to their common life. Nor is it agreement merely in thought or merely in desire, for it is possible to know one thing and desire the opposite,73 as in the incontinent the motives disagree, nor if74 a man [20] agrees with another in choice, does he necessarily agree in desire. Agreement is only found in the case of good men; at least, bad men when they choose and desire the same things75 harm one another. Agreement, like friendship, does not appear to have a single meaning; but still in its primary and natural form it is good; and so the bad cannot agree; the agreement of the bad, when they choose and desire the same [25] things, is something different. And the two parties must so desire the same thing that it is possible for both to get what they desire; for if they desire that which cannot belong to both, they will quarrel; but those in agreement will not quarrel. [30] There is agreement when the two parties make the same choice as to who is to rule, who to be ruled, meaning by ‘the same’, not that each one should choose himself, but that both should choose the same person. Agreement is the friendship of fellow citizens. So much then about agreement and goodwill.
8 · It is disputed why benefactors are more fond of the benefited than the [35] benefited of their benefactors. The opposite seems to be just. One might suppose it happens from consideration of utility and what is profitable to oneself; for the benefactor has a debt due to him, while the benefited has to repay a debt. This, however, is not all; the reason is partly the general natural principle—activity is more desirable. There is the same relation between the effect and the activity, the [1241b1] benefited being as it were an effect or creation of the benefactor. Hence in animals their strong feeling for their children both in begetting them and in preserving them afterwards. And so fathers love their children—and still more mothers—more than [5] they are loved by them. And these again love their own children more than their parents, because nothing is so good as activity; in fact, mothers love more than fathers because they think the children to be more their own creation; for the amount of work is measured by the difficulty, and the mother suffers more in birth. So much then for friendship towards oneself and among more than one. [10]
9 · But justice seems to be a sort of equality and friendship also involves equality, if the saying is not wrong that ‘love is equality’. Now constitutions are all of them a particular form of justice; for a constitution is a partnership, and every partnership rests on justice, so that whatever be the number of species of friendship, [15] there are the same of justice and partnership; these all border on one another, and the species of one have differences akin to those of the other. But since there is the same relation between soul and body, artisan and tool, and master and slave, between each of these pairs there is no partnership; for they are not two, but the first term in each is one, and the second a part of this one. Nor is the good to be divided [20] between the two, but that of both belongs to the one for the sake of which the pair exists. For the body is the soul’s natural tool, while the slave is as it were a part and detachable tool of the master, the tool being a sort of inanimate slave.
[25] The other partnerships are a part of the civic partnership, e.g. those of the phratries and priestly colleges76 or pecuniary partnerships.77 All constitutions are found together in the household, both the true and the corrupt forms, for the same thing is true in constitutions as of harmonies. The government of the children by the [30] father is royal, the relation of husband and wife aristocratic, the relation of brothers that of a commonwealth; the corruptions of these three are tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. The forms of justice then are also so many in number.
But since equality is either numerical or proportional, there will be various species of justice, friendship, and partnership; on numerical equality rests the [35] democratic partnership, and the friendship of comrades—both being measured by the same standard, on proportional the aristocratic78 and the royal. For the same thing is not just for the superior and the inferior; what is proportional is just. Such is the friendship between father and child; and the same sort of thing may be seen in partnerships.
[1242a1] 10 · We speak of friendships of kinsmen, comrades, partners, the so-called ‘civic friendship’. That of kinsmen has more than one species, that of brothers and that of father and sons. There is the friendship based on proportion, as that of the father to his children, and that based on mere number, e.g. that of brothers, for this [5] latter resembles the friendship of comrades; for here too age gives certain privileges. Civic friendship has been established mainly in accordance with utility; for men seem to have come together because each is not sufficient for himself, though they would have come together anyhow for the sake of living in company. Only the civic [10] friendship and its parallel corruption are not merely friendships, but the partnership is that of friends; other friendships rest on the relation of superiority. The justice belonging to the friendship of those useful to one another is pre-eminently justice, for it is civic or political justice. The concurrence of the saw and the art that uses it is of another sort; for it is not for some end common to both—it is like instrument [15] and soul—but for the sake of the user. It is true that the tool itself79 receives attention, and it is just that it should receive it, for its function, that is; for it exists for the sake of its function. . . .80 And the essence of a gimlet is twofold, but more properly it is its activity, namely boring holes. In this class come the body and a slave, as has been said before.
To inquire, then, how to behave to a friend is to look for a particular kind of [20] justice, for generally all justice is in relation to a friend. For justice involves a number of individuals who are partners, and the friend is a partner either in family or in one’s scheme of life. For man is not merely a political but also a household-maintaining animal, and his unions are not, like those of the other animals, confined to certain times, and formed with any chance partner, whether male or female; but [25] . . .81 man has a tendency to partnership with those to whom he is by nature akin. There would, then, be partnership and a kind of justice, even if there were no state; and the household is a kind of friendship; the relation, indeed, of master and servant is that of an art and its tools, a soul and its body; and these are not friendships, nor forms of justice, but something similar to justice; just as health is not justice, but [30] something similar. But the friendship of man and wife is a friendship based on utility, a partnership; that of father and son is the same as that of god to man, of the benefactor to the benefited, and in general of the natural ruler to the natural subject. That of brothers to one another is eminently that of comrades, inasmuch as [35] it involves equality82—‘for I was not declared a bastard brother to him; but the same Zeus, my king, was called the father of both of us’.83 For this is the language of men that seek equality. Therefore in the household first we have the sources and springs [1242b1] of friendship, of political organization, and of justice.
But since there are three sorts of friendship, based on excellence, utility, and pleasantness respectively, and two varieties of each of these—for each of them may imply eit
her superiority or equality—and the justice involved in these is clear from [5] the debates that have been held on it, in a friendship between superior and inferior the claim for proportion takes different forms, the superior’s claim being one for inverse proportion, i.e. as he is to the inferior, so should what he receives from the inferior be to what the inferior receives from him, he being in the position of ruler to subject; if he cannot get that, he demands at least numerical equality. For so it is in [10] the other associations, the two members enjoying an equality sometimes of number, sometimes of ratio. For if they contributed numerically equal sums of money, they divide an equal amount, and by an equal number; if not equal sums, then they divide proportionally. But the inferior inverts this proportion and joins crosswise. But in [15] this way the superior would seem to come off the worse, and friendship and partnership to be a gratuitous burden. Equality must then be restored and proportion created by some other means; and this means is honour, which by nature belongs to a ruler or god in relation to a subject. The profit and the honour must be [20] equated.
But civic friendship is that resting on equality; it is based on utility; and just as cities are friends to one another, so in the like way are citizens. ‘The Athenians no longer know the Megarians’; nor do citizens one another, when they are no longer [25] useful to one another, and the friendship is merely a temporary one for a particular exchange of goods. There is here, too, the relation of ruler and subject which is neither the natural relation, nor that involved in kingship, but each is ruler and ruled in turn; nor is it either’s purpose to act with the free beneficence of a god, but that he may share equally in the good and in the burdensome service. Civic [30] friendship, then, claims to be one based on equality. But of the friendship of utility there are two kinds, the strictly legal and the moral. Civic friendship looks to equality and to the object as sellers and buyers do; hence the proverb ‘a fixed wage for a friend’. When, then, this civic friendship proceeds by contract, it is of the legal [35] kind; but when each of the two parties leaves the return for his services to be fixed by the other, we have the moral friendship, that of comrades. Therefore recrimination is very frequent in this sort of friendship; and the reason is that it is unnatural; for friendships based on utility and based on excellence are different; but these wish to have both together, associating together really for the sake of utility, but [1243a1] representing their friendship as moral, like that of good men; pretending to trust one another they make out their friendship to be not merely legal. For in general there are more recriminations in the useful friendship than in either of the other two (for excellence is not given to recrimination, and pleasant friends having got what they wanted, and given what they had, are done with it; but useful friends do not dissolve [5] their association at once, if their relations are not merely legal but those of comrades); still the legal form of useful friendship is free from recrimination. The legal association is dissolved by a money-payment (for it measures equality in money), but the moral is dissolved by voluntary consent. Therefore in some countries the law forbids lawsuits for voluntary transactions between those who [10] associate thus as friends, and rightly; for good men do not have bonds of justice with one another; and such as these have dealings with one another as good and trustworthy men. In this kind of friendship it is uncertain how either will recriminate on the other, seeing that they trust each other not in a limited legal way but on the basis of their characters.
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