by Toland, John
Konoye introduced his mistress as “the daughter of the house”; she alone would serve them dinner and they could converse freely. For the next three hours Konoye and Grew talked “with the utmost frankness,” with Ushiba and Dooman interpreting. Konoye assured Grew that both General Tojo and Admiral Oikawa wanted a peaceful settlement.
What about Hull’s four principles? Grew asked.
Konoye said they were generally acceptable. “However, when it comes to applying them practically, various problems will arise, and to solve them I must have a meeting [with the President].” He admitted that he was to blame for the “regrettable state of relations” between America and Japan—he took the responsibility for the China Incident and the Tripartite Pact—and therefore was determined to take any personal risk to settle the differences between the two countries.
He and Roosevelt, face to face, could surely come to an agreement, but only such a meeting in the near future could accomplish this. Negotiations using the ordinary diplomatic channels would take a year. Konoye couldn’t reveal, of course, that he had less than five weeks before the October 10 deadline. “A year from now,” he said, “I’m not sure that anything can be done to solve our differences. But I can do it now. I promise that some agreement can be reached if I can only see him [Roosevelt]. I’ll offer him a proposal which he can’t afford to reject.” After this cryptic remark he turned to Dooman, who was born in Osaka of missionary parents and who had already spent almost twenty-three years in Japan: “You know the conditions in this country. I want to tell you something you must not repeat to Mr. Grew. You should know so you can impress him with your belief in my sincerity. You realize that we cannot involve the Emperor in this controversy, but as soon as I have reached a settlement with the President I will communicate with His Majesty, who will immediately order the Army to cease hostile operations.”
This was a bold plan, something never before attempted in Japan’s history. Although impelled to tell Grew, Dooman promised to keep it a secret.
Konoye reiterated that Generals Tojo and Sugiyama had already given their consent to the proposal he could make to the United States, and the former had promised to let a full general accompany him to the summit meeting. “I will talk to the President with two generals and two admirals standing behind me.” Admittedly, a certain group in the armed forces opposed peace negotiations, but with the full support of the responsible Chiefs of the Army and Navy, he was confident he could put down any opposition. He might be assassinated later, but if peace came, it would be worth it. “I do not care that much about my life.”
Grew, deeply impressed by Konoye’s obvious earnestness and willingness to abide by Hull’s four principles, said that he was going back to the embassy and send immediately “the most important cable” of his diplomatic career.ǁ
Though it was true that General Tojo had approved the summit meeting, he wasn’t giving it his full support, so Konoye asked Prince Higashikuni, uncle-in-law of the Emperor, to use his influence on the War Minister. The next morning Higashikuni summoned Tojo: “I hear the Emperor is very concerned over the Washington negotiations and is putting high hopes on the Konoye-Roosevelt meeting.” As war minister, Tojo should respect His Majesty’s feelings and take a more positive view of this meeting as well as of Japan’s problems with America.
“I am sorry indeed for the inadequate explanation given to the Throne,” said Tojo tightly. “In the future I will certainly see to it that the Army explains so His Majesty fully understands. I am quite aware of the Emperor’s views on the Japan-U. S. negotiations and the Konoye-Roosevelt meeting.” He promised to do his best as war minister to bring about the meeting, although he personally didn’t think it had more than a 30 percent chance of success. “Nevertheless, if there is the slightest hope of success, I believe we should conduct the negotiations.” He became more agitated and vowed that if the diplomatic settlement turned out to Japan’s future disadvantage he would have to “remonstrate with His Majesty,” and if the Emperor refused to heed this advice, he would be forced to resign. “That is the only way I can fulfill my loyalty to His Majesty.”
Higashikuni let Tojo speak without interruption. Now he said reminiscently, “While I was in France, Pétain and Clemenceau told me, ‘Germany was an eyesore to the United States in Europe and it did away with her in the Great War. In the next war it will try to get rid of another eyesore, this one in the Orient, Japan. America knows how inept Japan is diplomatically, so she’ll make moves to abuse you inch by inch until you start a fight. But if you lose your temper and start a war you will surely be defeated, because America has great strength. So you must bear anything and not play into her hands.’ The present situation is exactly as Petain and Clemenceau predicted. At this time we must persevere so that we won’t get into war with America. You’re a member of the Konoye Cabinet. In the Army, an order must be obeyed. Now the Emperor and the Prime Minister want to bring about the negotiations. As war minister, you should either follow their line of policy or resign.”
The desperation of the Japanese should have been obvious to the Americans when Hull’s cool reception of their offer to get out of Indochina and abide by his four principles was followed by two more Japanese proposals the very next day. One, submitted to Grew, promised to resort to no military action against any regions lying south of Japan and to withdraw troops from China once peace was achieved. In return America would rescind the freezing act and suspend her own military measures in the Far East and southwest Pacific.
This was an official offer, but the second was not. Without informing Tokyo, Nomura handed Hull a long statement drafted months earlier, during the days of Colonel Iwakuro; apparently the admiral thought the old formula would appeal to Hull. All it did was confuse him. With two proposals in hand, covering entirely different points, he quite rightly wondered just where Japan stood.
It took about a week to straighten out the tangle and answer the official proposal. Hull told Nomura it “narrowed down the spirit and scope of the proposed understandings,” and handed over half a dozen pages of objections.
The delay and the apparent reluctance to come to a quick agreement convinced the militarists in Tokyo that Hull was playing for time. They turned on Konoye in public as well as in private. Widespread vocal criticism was climaxed by a physical attack on the Prime Minister on September 18. As he was leaving his quiet, rural refuge in Ogikubo, a suburb about forty-five minutes’ drive from the center of Tokyo, four men, armed with daggers and swords, leaped up on the runningboards of his car. But the doors were locked and before the would-be assassins could break the glass they were seized by plain-clothes men.
Konoye was less concerned with violence than with the approaching deadline—he had less than three weeks to make a peaceful settlement and Roosevelt still declined to set a date for their meeting. Grew knew nothing about the deadline but sensed the urgency, four days after the assassination attempt, when he was summoned to the office of the Foreign Minister. Toyoda said he couldn’t understand Hull’s remark that the latest proposal narrowed the scope of the negotiations—on the contrary, it was widened. Toyoda was willing to go further, and set forth the peace terms Japan was now prepared to offer China: fusion of the Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei governments; no annexations; no indemnities; economic co-operation; and withdrawal of all Japanese troops except those needed in certain areas to help the Chinese fight the Reds.
Grew dispatched this new offer to Hull, and in view of the critical situation decided to make a special appeal of his own. Presuming on his long friendship with Roosevelt (they had served together on the staff of the Harvard Crimson), he wrote directly to the President:
I have not bothered you with personal letters for some time for the good reason that letters are now subject to long delays owing to the infrequent sailings of ships carrying our diplomatic pouches, and because developments in American-Japanese relations are moving so comparatively rapidly that my comments would generally be too much out-of-dat
e to be helpful when they reach you. But I have tried and am constantly trying in my telegrams to the Secretary of State to paint an accurate picture of the moving scene from day to day. I hope that you see them regularly.
As you know from my telegrams, I am in close touch with Prince Konoye who in the face of bitter antagonism from extremist and pro-Axis elements in the country is courageously working for an improvement in Japan’s relations with the United States. He bears the heavy responsibility for having allowed our relations to come to such a pass and he no doubt now sees the handwriting on the wall and realizes that Japan has nothing to hope for from the Tripartite Pact and must shift her orientation of policy if she is to avoid disaster; but whatever the incentive that has led to his present efforts, I am convinced that he now means business and will go as far as is possible, without incurring open rebellion in Japan, to reach a reasonable understanding with us. In spite of all the evidence of Japan’s bad faith in times past in failing to live up to her commitments, I believe that there is a better chance of the present Government implementing whatever commitments it may now undertake than has been the case in recent years. It seems to me highly unlikely that this chance will come again or that any Japanese statesman other than Prince Konoye could succeed in controlling the military extremists in carrying through a policy which they, in their ignorance of international affairs and economic laws, resent and oppose. The alternative to reaching a settlement now would be the greatly increased probability of war,—Facilis descensus A verno est—and while we would undoubtedly win in the end, I question whether it is in our own interest to see an impoverished Japan reduced to the position of a third-rate Power. I therefore most earnestly hope that we can come to terms, even if we must take on trust, at least to some degree, the continued good faith and ability of the present Government fully to implement those terms.…
The letter had as little effect as earlier recommendations (in fact, it merely provoked a bland acknowledgment five weeks later) and Konoye felt so desperate at the finish of the September 25 liaison conference, where the Supreme Command demanded an irrevocable deadline of October 15, that he refused to eat the lunch prepared at Imperial Headquarters and instead invited the Cabinet to accompany him to his official residence. Here, he applied pressure on Tojo. Was the October 15 deadline a demand or a request on the part of the Supreme Command?
“It was a definitely set opinion but not a demand,” replied the War Minister. It was just putting into effect what had been previously decided at the imperial conference of September 6. “And that decision cannot be easily changed now.”
Against such resolve Konoye felt helpless and he told Marquis Kido that with the Army insisting on the deadline, all he could do was resign. Kido chastised him as if he were a child. Between Konoye and Kido, according to Ushiba, existed a unique informality. With the Privy Seal, Konoye showed a rare side of himself—he discarded all pretense. Now, since Konoye was responsible for the decision of September 6, it would be “irresponsible to step out by leaving things as they are.” Be “prudent,” Kido cautioned.
Konoye didn’t answer. Despondent, his mood aggravated by another intense attack of piles, he left and told his private secretary he had to think things over in peace and tranquillity. And so, on September 27, he quit the capital for the nearby seaside resort of Kamakura.
3.
To the people in the State Department, nine thousand miles away, Japan’s Prime Minister was an aggressor. Hull could not forget that Konoye had been prime minister when China was overrun and the Tripartite Pact consummated. And although Konoye expressed support for the four principles, did he mean it? For all these reasons any meeting with Roosevelt, without first working out the details, would be a fiasco.
Hull’s apprehensions chilled Roosevelt’s initial enthusiasm for the meeting, and on September 28 the President sent his Secretary of State a memo from Hyde Park:
I wholly agree with your pencilled note—to recite the more liberal original attitude of the Japanese when they first sought the meeting, point out their much narrowed position now, earnestly ask if they cannot go back to their original attitude, start discussions again on agreement in principle, and reemphasize my hope for a meeting.
In Tokyo, however, Ambassador Grew had not yet given up hope, and he was so certain that those in Washington lacked insight into the problems faced by Konoye that the following day he sent another report to Hull. It was as much a warning as an appeal:
… THE AMBASSADOR [Grew] RECALLS HIS STATEMENTS IN THE PAST THAT IN JAPAN THE PENDULUM ALWAYS SWINGS BETWEEN MODERATE AND EXTREMIST POLICIES; THAT IT WAS NOT THEN POSSIBLE UNDER THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES FOR ANY JAPANESE LEADER OR GROUP TO REVERSE THE PROGRAM OF EXPANSION AND EXPECT TO SURVIVE; THAT THE PERMANENT DIGGING IN BY JAPANESE IN CHINA AND THE PUSHING OF THE JAPANESE ADVANCE TO THE SOUTH COULD BE PREVENTED ONLY BY INSUPERABLE OBSTACLES….
THE AMBASSADOR STRESSES THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING JAPANESE PSYCHOLOGY, FUNDAMENTALLY UNLIKE THAT OF ANY WESTERN NATION. JAPANESE REACTIONS TO ANY PARTICULAR SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES CANNOT BE MEASURED, NOR CAN JAPANESE ACTIONS BE PREDICTED BY ANY WESTERN MEASURING ROD….
SHOULD THE UNITED STATES EXPECT OR AWAIT AGREEMENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, IN THE PRESENT PRELIMINARY CONVERSATIONS, TO CLEAR-CUT COMMITMENTS WHICH WILL SATISFY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BOTH AS TO PRINCIPLE AND AS TO CONCRETE DETAIL, ALMOST CERTAINLY THE CONVERSATIONS WILL DRAG ALONG INDEFINITELY AND UNPRODUCTIVELY UNTIL THE KONOYE CABINET AND ITS SUPPORTING ELEMENTS DESIRING RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES WILL COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE OUTLOOK FOR AN AGREEMENT IS HOPELESS AND THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS ONLY PLAYING FOR TIME.… THIS WILL RESULT IN THE KONOYE GOVERNMENT’S BEING DISCREDITED AND IN A REVULSION OF ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING, AND THIS MAY AND PROBABLY WILL LEAD TO UNBRIDLED ACTS….
He ended with the observation that unless America placed a “reasonable amount of confidence” in Konoye and his supporters to remold Japan, it was the end “to the hope that ultimate war may be avoided in the Pacific.”
The next day Grew wrote in his diary that he had done his “level best to paint to our Government an accurate picture of the situation in Japan.” He was upset by receipt from Hornbeck of a batch of recommendations he himself had earlier made to be firm with Japan.
I don’t quite know just what was in Stanley Hornbeck’s mind in sending me those excerpts, unless it was in the belief, and with the purpose of calling attention to that belief, that I am now advocating so-called “appeasement” in contradistinction to my former recommendations for a strong policy. In the first place, “appeasement,” through association with Munich and umbrellas, has become an unfortunate, ill-used and misinterpreted term. It is not appeasement that I now advocate, but “constructive conciliation.” That word “constructive” is important. It connotes building, and no one is going to be foolish enough to try to build any structure, if it is to be a permanent structure, on an insecure foundation.… What the eventual outcome will be, I do not know; nobody knows; but defeatism is not within my philosophy.
Hornbeck was right about Grew to a certain extent. Perhaps he was too trustful of the Japanese. Nor was he intellectual or even particularly keen. He did have three great assets: a sensitive wife with a rare sympathy for Japan; an adviser (Dooman) born in Japan with an equally rare understanding of that country’s flaws and virtues; and finally, his own overriding sense of honor and duty. Moreover, his beliefs and convictions were shared by a canny British colleague, Ambassador Craigie. At four-twenty the next morning he telegraphed Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden:
… I DO NOT QUESTION THE VIEW THAT JAPAN’S MOTIVES MAY BE MIXED, BUT IS THIS IN ITSELF A REASON FOR DOING NOTHING TO ENCOURAGE JAPAN ALONG THE NEW PATH ON WHICH THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT HAVE NOW ENTERED? EVEN ASSUMING JAPANESE POLICY TO BE ACTUATED SOLELY BY THE IDEA THAT IDENTICAL AMBITIONS CAN FOR THE MOMENT BEST BE SERVED BY A CHANGE OF TECHNIQUE (A VIEW TO WHICH I DO NOT ALTOGETHER SUBSCRIBE), THERE IS NO CHANCE OF JAPAN’S EXPANSIONIST AIMS BEING REAL
IZED IN THE IMMEDIATE POSTWAR FUTURE, ONCE GERMANY HAS BEEN DEFEATED. FOR THIS REASON AND BECAUSE TO KEEP JAPAN NEUTRAL WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY, I VENTURE THE OPINION THAT POST-MORTEM ON OUR HORIZON [This telegram was in code and a few words in the copy made available to the author were not decoded. HORIZON probably meant “part”] MAY LEGITIMATELY BE BOUNDED BY LIMITS OF WAR….
Since Matsuoka’s departure a radical change had occurred in the political situation and there was now a steady swing from the Axis.
THE ALL-IMPORTANT QUESTION AT THE MOMENT IS THE DISCUSSION NOW PROCEEDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. THE MAIN DIFFICULTY APPEARS TO BE THAT, WHILE THE JAPANESE WANT SPEED AND CANNOT YET AFFORD TO GO BEYOND GENERALIZATIONS, THE AMERICANS SEEM TO BE PLAYING FOR TIME AND TO DEMAND THE UTMOST PRECISION IN DEFINITION BEFORE AGREEING TO ANY CONTRACT FOR A STEP OF RAPPROCHEMENT … IF PERSISTED IN, IT BIDS FAIR TO WRECK THE BEST CHANCE OF BRINGING ABOUT A JUST SETTLEMENT OF FAR EASTERN ISSUES, WHICH HAS OCCURRED SINCE MY ARRIVAL IN JAPAN.
MY UNITED STATES COLLEAGUE AND I CONSIDER THAT PRINCE KONOYE IS TELEPHONE [probably “most”] SINCERE IN HIS DESIRE TO AVERT THE DANGERS TOWARDS WHICH HE NOW SEES THE TRIPARTITE PACT AND THE AXIS’ CONNECTION (FOR WHICH HE NATURALLY ACCEPTS HIS SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY) ARE RAPIDLY LEADING JAPAN … DESPITE THE EMPEROR’S STRONG BACKING, I DOUBT IF HE AND HIS GOVERNMENT BRITISH CONSULAR OFFICER [probably “can”] SURVIVE IF THE DISCUSSIONS PROVE ABORTIVE OR DRAG ON UNDULY.
He admitted that any agreement might make Chiang Kai-shek suspicious and discouraged, and that America’s interest in the Far East was not wholly identical with Britain’s.
… BUT THE RISKS MUST BE FACED EITHER REPAIRED [probably “in any case”], AND MY UNITED STATES COLLEAGUE AND I ARE FIRMLY OF THE OPINION THAT ON BALANCE THIS IS A CHANCE WHICH IT WOULD BE ILLEGIBLE [probably “inexcusable”] FOLLY TO LET SLIP. CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED, BUT AN EXCESSIVE CYNICISM BRINGS STAGNATION …
