by John Nichol
The causes of the massacre were clear. The Air Ministry’s Night Raid Report states: ‘An unexpectedly strong westerly wind scattered our aircraft, and cloud dispersed beyond Belgium, leaving them exposed in bright moonlight … German fighters achieved considerable success on this night, helped greatly by the weather … Nearly all the losses were caused by fighters. They destroyed at least 50 bombers between Aachen and the turning point near Fulda.’
Given the scale of the losses, some might find it surprising that there wasn’t an official inquiry into what went wrong. It had been a costly operation, the worst yet, but there was nothing for it but to carry on. Bomber Command’s Operational Research Section conducted a post-mortem a few days after the raid, as they did into every raid. Its conclusions were similar to those of the Night Raid Report, though they examined in greater detail the movements of the night fighter force. Despite only four stations being employed, fighter opposition was described as ‘unusually stiff’.
‘Fighters were given instructions to enable them to find the stream at three separate points on the outward journey, and moonlight above the cloud and the presence of persistent contrails in conditions of excellent visibility made their task easy.’84
Intriguingly, the report goes on to address the vexed question of why so many of the bombers were caught by surprise, rather than having sight of their attackers, and what manoeuvre the enemy must have employed to avoid being seen. ‘From the high proportion of damage caused by surprise attacks, by comparison with cases in which the fighter was sighted, it is to be presumed that most of the bombers destroyed in fighter attacks have been taken unawares.’
They were still unaware of the viciously upward-slanting Schräge Musik, the reason so many bombers exploded without their crews even knowing they were in the enemy’s sights. It would be some months – and many more lost bombers and crews – before the secret of ‘jazz music’ was discovered.
What of the men responsible for orchestrating such a disastrous raid? Winston Churchill makes only a brief mention in his comprehensive History of the Second World War, even though smaller and less significant operations are given more detailed analysis. In Volume V he does say of Nuremberg: ‘This was our heaviest loss in one raid, and caused Bomber Command to re-examine its tactics before launching further deep-penetration attacks by night into Germany.’ But he declines to mention the pivotal part he played in developing those tactics.
Sir Arthur Harris does not mention Nuremberg in his account of his war years, even though it signalled the end of the Combined Bomber Offensive and his ambition to win the war by destroying German morale via a saturation bombing campaign.
The brutal winter was over, Germany remained fully engaged in the war, their night fighter force had proven itself more than equal to the tactics of Bomber Command, and Nuremberg remained largely untouched. The nights were getting shorter, spring was on its way and preparations for Operation Overlord – the Allied invasion of Europe – were taking precedence. Nuremberg would prove to be the end of the Battle of Berlin. Thousands had died in the skies and there had been no decisive victory. Harris’s dream was over.
Harris never spoke publicly about Nuremberg. But according to Joan Dally, the WAAF Corporal in the Met Office of Bomber Command’s High Wycombe underground HQ, he was deeply affected by the scale of the losses that night. ‘I’m sure Harris was upset. He didn’t say anything, but you could tell from his demeanour and the whole atmosphere that surrounded him.’
Later in life he would refer to it as the ‘one real disaster’ of his time in charge of Bomber Command. In a letter written to Geoff Taylor, the author of The Nuremberg Massacre, he admitted to his errors that night, but also issued a passionate defence of his tactics. It bears quoting at length, because the argument he constructs is forceful and compelling:
‘It was a perpetual source of astonishment to me during my three and a half years as Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command, that we did not suffer many more heavy reverses of the Nuremberg type and I cannot understand why the German defences did not improve much more rapidly and effectively as the bomber war developed over three long and terrible years.
‘In Bomber Command we had to lay on and, more often than not, carry through, at least one and occasionally more than one major battle every twenty-four hours. That was a situation which no naval or military command has ever had to compete with. Navies fight two or three major battles per war. Armies, maybe a dozen. We had to lay on, during my three and a half years, well over a thousand. Naturally enough, we occasionally got a badly bloodied nose – but nothing like what we gave the Boche.
‘There was a limit – and a small one – to the choice of tactical changes which we could introduce from time to time and occasionally such tactical changes had therefore to include doing something which the enemy would probably think so obvious that it would be the last thing we would ever choose to do.
‘In the Nuremberg show we chose wrong and the Boche, aided by unexpectedly bad weather, guessed right.
‘It is a wonder that coincidence did not occur more often during the thousand and more major battles which we fought …’
As indicated in the letter he sent to Martin Middlebrook quoted earlier, Sir Robert Saundby, Harris’s Deputy Commander-in-Chief, already held grave misgivings about the raid before it took place. He was later to describe Nuremberg as a ‘thorough shambles’.85 Had the weather not been against them, Saundby believed there would have been fewer casualties and the raid might have been more successful. He also confirmed the view of his chief: every time they sent a large force on a dangerous mission deep into German territory there was a chance there would be heavy losses. On this occasion – though thankfully on few others – the worst had happened.
Volume III of The Official History of the Royal Air Force, 1939–1945 wastes few words on Nuremberg, but all of them are scathing. It describes the raid as ‘a curious operation’ … blighted by ‘unusually bad luck and uncharacteristically bad and unimaginative planning’. This verdict summed up the opinion of Pathfinder chief Donald Bennett. ‘I opposed the long straight route because clearly the conditions were far too dangerous for such a tactic – particularly when we had been warned that there was a strong chance of there being bright moonlight. Nuremberg turned out to be an expensive raid. I believe it would still have involved high losses, even without the proposed route; but certainly they would not have been so high as those which were incurred.’86
The terrible losses of that night did lead to speculation that there was a more sinister reason for the Nuremberg disaster than bad luck, bad weather and bad planning. Captured RAF crew under interrogation were told by the Germans that they knew they were coming, which led to rumours that Bomber Command had been infiltrated by a spy who had informed the enemy in advance of the location of that night’s target.
The fact that many of the crews felt that the night fighters must have been waiting for them – because they flew almost straight into their path – gave this suspicion extra currency. And in 1963 the discredited revisionist historian David Irving alleged that a British wireless operator had been the one to disclose the target. But there is no evidence whatsoever that the Germans were tipped off, and they themselves have never subsequently claimed to have been. It was common for interrogators to tell captured servicemen their safety had been compromised by intelligence leaks, to destroy their morale and encourage them to believe there was little point in refusing to divulge their secrets.
The simple fact is that the designated route of the long leg took the bomber stream perilously close to two beacons where the night fighters had gathered, and that they were able to pick out the bombers clearly in the moonlight and radio their position to their comrades. The Germans were waiting for them, but only because of ill fortune and perfect night fighter weather.
Much has been made of the decision to send the stream so close to Ida and Otto, but others had done so; it was impossible to map a route across mainland Germany that av
oided every beacon. A combination of the hunter’s moon, the visibility of the contrails and the lack of cloud cover gave the Luftwaffe an advantage previously denied them, and they – and, arguably the entire German armed forces – did not enjoy a night like it for the remainder of the conflict.
As Sir Arthur Harris was the first to point out, the cost of a Nuremberg-scale raid was always likely to be high, given the relentless cycle of Bomber Command combat that winter. Their sustained offensive did help to stretch and weaken German defences over a crucial period, and though another hard lesson was learned that night – that the enemy could not be defeated solely from the air – they had been subdued, and a platform laid for the land campaign that followed.
30 March 1944 was a truly terrible night for Bomber Command. Yet those who ordered it were engaged in a relentless war, and seeking any means to hasten victory. And that meant sending brave young men, time after time, to risk sacrificing themselves for those they loved most.
Sir Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris, centre, in the Bomber Command bunker.
Alan Payne in 2012.
Andy Wiseman in 2012.
Members of Rusty Waughman’s crew relax before an operation. Rusty is above the tea urn with a flask and cigarette. On his left wearing a forage cap is his rear-gunner, Harry Nunn. On Harry’s left, wearing the gloves, is navigator Alec Cowan.
Rusty Waughman’s crew during a reunion in 2003. From left to right: Norman, Ted, Curly, Rusty, Alec, Taffy.
Alec Cowan, Rusty Waughman and Norman Westby at the Bomber Command Memorial unveiling ceremony.
Ron and Shiela Auckland in 2012.
Roger Coverley, 2012.
Focke Wulf 190 fighters in action.
Reg Payne, 2012.
The ruins of Nuremberg, following the bombing.
George Prince, 2012.
Chick Chandler, 2012.
Harry Evans in 2012.
Messerschmitt 110 fighters in formation.
Tony Hiscock at a squadron reunion in 2008.
Avro Lancasters in formation above the clouds.
A Lancaster bomber flies over Hamburg during a night raid.
The author in the cockpit of Lancaster Just Jane at the Lincolnshire Aviation Heritage Centre.
Just Jane – the Lancaster Fred and Harold Panton maintain as a memorial to their brother and his thousands of colleagues, killed whilst serving on Bomber Command.
The giant bomb bay of Lancaster Just Jane.
On board Just Jane, looking back from rear door into tail gun turret. The cramped conditions are plain to see.
The letter sent by Sir Arthur Harris to the parents of Cyril Barton informing them that their son had been awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross.
Joyce and Cynthia Barton, Cyril’s surviving sisters, discuss his life with the author.
Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II with Air Commodore Malcolm White, chairman of the Bomber Command Association, at the unveiling of the Bomber Command Memorial statue in London, June 2012.
Bibliography
Bennett, D.C.T., Air Vice Marshal Pathfinder (Panther, 1960)
Bishop, Patrick Bomber Boys (Harper Perennial, 2008)
Boiten, Theo Night Airwar (Crowood Press, 1999)
Boiten, Theo Nachtjagd (Crowood Press, 1997)
Bowman, Martin and Boiten, Theo Raiders of the Reich (Airlife, 1996)
Butcher, Ron Been There, Done That (Trafford Publishing, 2006)
Campbell, James The Bombing of Nuremberg (Futura, 1974)
Cawdron, Hugh Based at Burn (578 Burn Association, 1995)
Chorley, W.R. RAF Bomber Command Losses of the Second World War 1944 (Midland Counties Publications, 1998)
Churchill, Winston The Second World War, Vol V. Closing the Ring (Cassell, 1952)
Connelly, Mark Reaching for the Stars: A New History of Bomber Command in World War II (Tauris, 2001)
Dally, Joan A WAAF in Wartime (self-published)
Delve, Ken and Jacobs, Peter The Six-Year Offensive (Arms and Armour Press, 1992)
Falconer, Jonathan Bomber Command Handbook (Sutton Publishing, 1998)
Feast, Sean Carried on the Wind (Woodfield Publishing, 2003)
Feast, Sean Master Bombers (Grub Street, 2008)
Ford-Jones, Martyn Bomber Squadron: Men Who Flew with XV (Kimber, 1987)
Harris, Sir Arthur Bomber Offensive (Greenhill, 1990)
Hastings, Max Bomber Command (Papermac, 1993)
Heaton, Colin D. and Lewis, Anne-Marie Night Fighters (Naval Institute Press, 2008)
Hinchliffe, Peter The Other Battle (Airlife, 1996)
Howell, Eric The OR’s Story (B J & M Promotions, 1998)
Jacobs, Peter Bomb Aimer over Berlin (Pen & Sword, 2007)
Lowther, W.W. Cyril Joe Barton VC (Wear Books, 1994)
McKinstry, Leo Lancaster (John Murray, 2010)
Middlebrook, Martin The Nuremberg Raid (Cassell, 2000)
Middlebrook, Martin and Everitt, Chris The Bomber Command War Diaries (Midland Publishing, 1985)
Muirhead, Campbell Diary of a Bomb Aimer (Ditto Publishing, 2002)
Nichol, John and Rennell, Tony Tail-End Charlies: The Last Battles of the Bomber War 1944–45 (Penguin, 2005)
Overy, Richard Bomber Command 1939–45 (HarperCollins, 2000)
Probert, Henry Bomber Harris (Greenhill, 2001)
Revie, Alastair The Lost Command (Purnell Book Services, 1971)
Richards, Denis and Saunders, Hilary St George Royal Air Force 1939–45, Vol III. The Fight Is Won (London, 1953)
Saward, Dudley Bomber Harris (Buchan & Enright, 1984)
Starkey, Richard (Dick) A Lancaster Pilot’s Impression on Germany (Compaid Graphics, 2004)
Thorburn, Gordon Bombers First and Last (Robson, 2006)
Verrier, Anthony The Bomber Offensive (Batsford, 1968)
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
The Means of Victory (Charterhouse Publications, 1992)
RAF News, special Bomber Command issue (2002)
List of Searchable Terms
The page numbers in this index relate to the printed version of this book; they do not match the pages of your ebook. You can use your ebook reader’s search tool to find a specific word or passage.
Page numbers in italics indicate photographs.
Aachen, Germany 56, 102, 116, 260, 272
Air Ministry xvii, 4, 11, 22, 23, 52, 62, 215, 230, 249, 272
Airborne Cigar (ABC) 62, 98, 111
Alderson, Dr J. Bain 227
Alexander, Wing Commander Bob 201
area bombing xvii, 6–7, 17, 18, 273–4, 277 see also under individual area of raid
Arndell, Idris ‘Taffy’ 34
Auckland, Ron 27, 28, 44–7, 45, 163–4, 205–6
Auckland, Sheila 44, 45–6, 45, 205–6
Augsburg, Germany 23
Australian troops xv, 16, 17, 39, 87, 165, 178, 189, 216, 247
B–17 53
Babbacombe, Devon 31–2
‘Baby Blitz’ 51–2
Ball, Fred 106
Bamberg, Germany 150, 217, 260–4, 265
Barnes, Alan 44–5, 46
Bartlett, Les 135
Barton, Pilot Officer Cyril 1, 3, 67
ambition to be a pilot 2–3, 4, 28
childhood 2, 3, 4, 61
death 210–12
faith 70–1, 193
family 1–2, 4–5, 61, 71, 210–12, 222–4, 226–7, 230–2, 234–5, 256–7
funeral 223–4
‘last letter’ 69, 84, 222–3
letter from Sir Arthur Harris to family of 231–2
letter from Wing Commander
Williamson to family of 213–14
Nuremberg raid, 1944 131, 146, 147, 148–9, 170, 171, 172, 176, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 209, 210–12, 213–14, 217, 218
reaction to bombing of German civilians 5–7
training 7
Victoria Cross 230–2, 234–5, 256
volunteers for RAF 4–5
Barton, Ken 2, 3, 69, 213, 222,
234, 256
Barton, Pamela 3, 5, 7, 71, 99, 224, 234
Barton, Roy 210
Batten-Smith, Pilot Officer Jimmy 84, 155, 165–6
Battle of Britain, 1940 xvii, 27–8
Becker, Oberleutnant Martin 110, 133, 173–4
Beetham, Pilot Officer Michael xx, 38, 105, 134, 135
Bennett, Air Vice-Marshal Donald 16–17, 55, 190–1, 275–6
Berlin, bombing of/Battle of xvii, xviii, 18, 19–21, 35, 38, 45, 56, 65, 70, 74, 75, 80, 83, 105, 110, 145, 203, 226, 237, 251–2, 274
Bicester, RAF 248
Biel, Albert 112
Birmingham 41
Blitz, 1940–41 xvi, 11, 28, 30, 110
Bomber Command, RAF:
age of recruits xvii, 32, 35
alcohol use in 43–4
area bombing of German cities xvii, 6–7, 17, 18, 273–4, 277 see also under individual area of raid
benefits of membership of 30
casualties/losses xvii, 21, 25, 27, 35, 116–17, 141, 142, 187–91, 200, 205, 214, 225–6, 230, 256–7, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276
clothing 84–5, 158, 163, 176
Combined Bomber Offensive 22, 23, 273–4
Committee of Adjustment 40, 42, 65, 242, 252
corkscrew evasion tactics 105–6, 120, 121, 127, 136, 138, 146, 147, 150, 174, 186
crewing up 33–5
death rate 27
foreign recruits 30–1
graves of war dead 259–64, 265
ground crews 58, 88–9, 94, 95, 165, 179, 180, 183–4, 202
