Most of Greece was severely lacking in forestation in antiquity, as Plato for example noted; and yet the cities of Greece required large supplies of timber for their building activities, and especially for their crucial ship-building. Here again Macedonia was particularly favored: the slopes of the Pindus and Rhodopi foothills, and of the Cholomon range in the northern Chalcidice, were heavily forested, particularly in the varieties of evergreens suited to ship-building purposes. Macedonia was, thus, one of the most important suppliers of timber to classical Greece, and the only one in Greece itself. The timber resources of Macedonia were by tradition a monopoly of the ruler, who determined what timber might be extracted and by whom, and who derived a potentially large income from this. Under strong rulers, then, timber was a source of wealth and strength. But timber could also be a curse: it was the timber resources of Macedonia that led the Athenians to intervene constantly in the internal affairs of Macedonia, and to seek to control (often very effectively) the ports along the Macedonian coast. These ports—Pydna and Methone on the western shore of the Thermaic Gulf, and Therme on the eastern side—were in any case not strictly Macedonian cities, but colonies founded from southern Greece, in part no doubt with access to timber in mind. Thus the very timber that was a valuable resource to the Macedonians, was also a contributing cause of the weakness of most Macedonian rulers and their inability to control Macedonia’s coast and ports.
Another important natural resource of Macedonia was metals: iron and copper, silver and gold were all mined in various parts of Macedonia and its immediate environs, offering a significant source of wealth to the ruler strong enough to assert control. The utilitarian metals iron and copper were mined in a number of places throughout Greece. In the Macedonian region, mining in the Cholomon range of the northern Chalcidice was particularly significant for these metals, but not much is known about it, unfortunately. We are better informed about the sources of the precious metals which, in the form of coinage, played a crucial role in the economic life of ancient Greece. Mining silver and gold was, like the extraction of timber, controlled by the ruler of Macedonia, and was a key source of wealth (and thus potentially of power). The suggestively named Echedorus (literally “gift-holder”) River was a significant source of gold, which was panned from its sandy bed. Important silver mines were located in the nearby Dysoron mountain range from which Alexander I drew an income, as Herodotus tells us (5.17), of one silver talent per day. The Cholomon range in the northern Chalcidice was an important source of silver and gold: mining there seems to have been begun by the mid-fourth century, though it is not clear whether it pre-dated the reign of Philip II. Silver was also mined extensively in the region of Mount Pangaeum, between the rivers Strymon and Nestus, where the Thasians had founded a colony named Crenides. Philip II later re-founded this city as Philippi and began extensive and highly remunerative gold-mining operations in the region in addition to the silver. Access to, and ideally control of these mines and the wealth they produced would enable a strong Macedonian ruler to fund a variety of projects, such as building forts and cities, and building up his military forces. It was clearly this wealth which helped Alexander I to extend the boundaries of Macedonia during his reign, and enabled Archelaus to build fortifications and roads, and to better equip his army.
Macedonia, then, had the potential in manpower, in agricultural resources, and in wealth derived from timber and mining, to be a powerful state; and yet it remained until the advent of Philip II a weak and unimportant backwater, peripheral to the history of the Greek and near-eastern great powers. The cause of this weakness was clearly the Macedonian way of life: like their neighbors to the south, the Thessalians, the Macedonians never developed large cities and the city-state way of life that was found elsewhere in Greece. Instead, as we have seen, a traditional landed aristocracy maintained dominance over the region—socially, economically, and politically—with a way of life that centered around horse rearing and riding, hunting, and warfare: hence the popularity noted above of names associated with horses, victory, and war. We are told, for example, that though the Macedonian aristocracy adopted the city-state Greek custom of reclining on couches at dinner, only men who had achieved the feat of killing a wild boar without using a hunting net were permitted to recline. Those who had not achieved this feat had to sit at dinner, as women and children did (Athenaeus 18a). Since we know that the symposium—the upper-class drinking party with groups of men reclining on couches after dinner, drinking wine and entertaining each other with talk, song, and party games—was a key part of Macedonian social life, men whose hunting skills were deficient had this fact rubbed in their faces at every social occasion, with the couches debarred to them. Further, Aristotle informs us (Politics 1324b) that in early Macedonia a man was not permitted to wear a belt until he had killed an enemy in war. In this emphasis on riding, drinking, hunting, and fighting, the Macedonian aristocracy was similar, to be sure, to many other aristocracies known to us: in classical Greece, the Spartiates had the same interests, for example; in more modern times, the English aristocracy of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries could be pointed to.
Most similar to the Macedonians, though, were clearly their contemporary neighbors, the Thessalians. There too the landowning aristocracy were great riders of horses, great cavalry fighters, keen hunters and symposiasts. There too, cities developed only late (in the fifth and fourth centuries) and never achieved the autonomous status of city-states. And in Thessaly too, warfare centered around the aristocratic cavalry, with the heavy infantry hoplite phalanx failing to develop. Which meant that Thessaly, like Macedonia, was weak compared to the southern Greek city-states, despite its size and wealth. In the city-states of southern Greece and the eastern Aegean, economic and social advances in the sixth and fifth centuries produced a large and well-to-do middle class of independent small farmers, tradesmen, and artisans. These men could afford to equip themselves with the expensive panoply of the hoplite (heavy infantryman), and had free time to devote to military training and warfare on an intermittent basis. For the Greek hoplite was a citizen militiaman who served his community as a warrior at his own expense and only when needed; and this duty of military service was intimately bound up with his rights as a participating citizen in his community. Such an independent and well-to-do middle class was lacking in Thessaly and Macedonia; and it is for this reason that these regions lacked hoplite phalanxes. We know that in Thessaly the majority of the population lived on the landed estates of the aristocracy, farming those lands for their aristocratic lords, and existing in a slave-like status akin to that of the helots of Sparta or the serfs of medieval Europe: these Thessalian serfs were known as penestai. It seems clear that the majority of the Macedonian population, too, lived in a serf-like condition, as dependants on the estates of the aristocracy: it has been estimated that as many as three in five Macedonians were essentially serfs like the Thessalian penestai, and that may even be an underestimate. Even those Macedonians outside the aristocracy who were free and independent were for the most part not well-to-do, if we can believe our sources.
This, then, was the land over which Philip II became ruler in the winter of 360/59, and the task he set himself was to raise Macedonia out of this weakness, and to realize at last the potential strength and power that the size and resources of Macedonia had always promised. He was to succeed in this task more spectacularly than even the wildest hopes of his supporters can have imagined, with incalculable consequences for subsequent Greek and western history, as we shall see.
CHAPTER 2
Philip’s Childhood
HIS FULL NAME WAS PHILIPPOS AMYNTA MAKEDON, THAT IS, PHILIP, son of Amyntas, the Macedonian. He was born in the year 383, and became famous as king Philip II of Macedonia, the king who re-organized his country and built it into a great power dominating Greece and the Balkan region. Yet he can have had little expectation, when growing up, of ever ruling his native land. His father Amyntas was ruler of Macedonia for so
me twenty-four years (393–370), but Philip was only the youngest of three sons of Amyntas by his wife Eurydice: his two older brothers, Alexander and Perdiccas, had prior claims to succeed to their father’s power. In addition, in the polygamous tradition of Macedonian rulers, Amyntas also had three more sons by another wife named Gygaea: Archelaus, Menelaus, and Arrhidaeus. The likelihood of the young Philip ever succeeding to the position of ruler must have seemed remote—but not impossible. For during the opening decades of the fourth century, as we have already seen, Macedonia went through a series of succession crises and disputes, during which any descendant of the foundational ruler Alexander I could—and many did—make a claim to the rulership. As a member of the Argead ruling clan, then, and a descendant of Alexander I, the position of ruler was always a possibility for Philip; but as the youngest of three brothers, and to all appearances a loyal brother at that, he must have expected to play a secondary role. And the weakness and instability of Macedonia, and of his father’s rule, can have done little to encourage high expectations.
1. THE REIGN OF AMYNTAS III
Amyntas’ rule of Macedonia was interrupted on at least two occasions: around 392, shortly after he came to power, and around 383/2, just about the time of Philip’s birth. The details are sketchy and murky, like almost all of Macedonia’s history before the reign of Philip, and historians have debated endlessly whether and when and by whom Amyntas was driven from power and restored to power. The key evidence comes from the historians Diodorus and Xenophon, and while those two often disagree about the course of events, in this case their accounts are most likely complementary.
Diodorus tells us that shortly after Amyntas came to power, Macedonia suffered an Illyrian invasion which drove him out of the country entirely (Diodorus 14.92.3–4). He reports that, in an evidently futile attempt to gather enough support to hold onto his kingdom, Amyntas ceded border territories in the east to the Olynthian League. This is generally assumed to refer to the region of Anthemous in the north-west Chalcidice, though some scholars think rather of the Lake Bolbe region to the east (see map 1). Either way, it seems the grant was intended to be temporary, in return for some sort of aid. If the aid materialized, it did not work. Amyntas was forced to leave Macedonia, and was only restored to power some time later thanks to Thessalian help, presumably from the Aleuadae of Larissa in northern Thessaly, long-time allies of the Argead kings. Further Diodorus states that some sources alleged that another ruler named Argaeus held power in Macedonia for two years at this time: we are perhaps to imagine that he was installed with Illyrian support, since the Illyrians apparently dominated Macedonia at this time.
Who exactly this Argaeus was is unclear, except that he must have been an Argead descendant of Alexander I to be able to claim power. The name Argaeus is attested earlier in the list of Argead kings: the second ruler, after the founder Perdiccas, in Herodotus’ king-list was so named. Indeed, the clan name Argeadai presumably derives from the name Argaeus, meaning descendants of Argaeus—rather than the meaning “men from Argos” as implied by Herodotus’ story of Argive origins for the clan. Since Argaeus was to make another attempt on the Macedonian throne nearly thirty-five years later, in 359 (as we shall see), he must have been rather a young man at the time of his first period in power, or pretending to power as the case may be. Perhaps we should see in him a younger brother or son of Amyntas the Little, descending from Alexander I via Menelaus. The fact that he evidently ruled, to the extent that he did rule, under Illyrian patronage, will hardly have endeared him to the Macedonian aristocracy and people, however.
The Illyrians normally constituted more of a threat to raid and pillage upper Macedonia, rather than to occupy and dominate the realm. A loose agglomeration of separate, and at times mutually hostile, tribes inhabiting roughly what is now central and northern Albania, Montenegro, and parts of coastal Croatia, the Illyrians are little known to history: they produced no records of themselves, and are mentioned by our Greek sources only rarely and tangentially. Usually, split into numerous tribes and clans, they were no more than a nuisance to their Greek-speaking neighbors to the south. But at times a tribal leader of more than usual ability might succeed in uniting behind him enough of the tribes to become a regional power, and that is what happened in the 390s as a remarkable leader named Bardylis won control of much of Illyria. Bardylis ruled over the Illyrians for nearly forty years, from the 390s until the early 350s, and was powerful enough to pose a serious threat to Macedonia on a number of occasions. The first such occasion was his invasion of Macedonia in about 392, driving Amyntas III out and allowing Argaeus to rule at least part of Macedonia for a year or two.
When his Thessalian allies finally enabled Amyntas to recover the core part of his kingdom, probably in late 391 or early 390, he was able to drive out Argaeus and win back the support of most Macedonians: the Macedonians certainly objected strongly to Illyrian domination, and so to a ruler supported by Illyrian power. But he was left with two intractable problems: how to maintain himself against further Illyrian pressure, and what to do about the Olynthian League which now controlled part of Macedonia. On his own, Amyntas lacked the power to deal with these two threatening neighbors effectively, and his Thessalian allies had preoccupations within Thessaly. Amyntas was forced to negotiate with the Illyrians: in order to prevent another Illyrian invasion he was obliged to pay tribute to the Illyrian ruler. Buying off foreign enemies in this way is known to historians of early England as “paying the Danegeld,” after the tribute moneys sent by Saxon rulers to buy off their all-too-powerful Danish neighbors in northern Britain. As the Saxons discovered, the problem with “paying the Danegeld” is that the Danes always come back for more: it is not a satisfactory solution, and Amyntas was to find the same. But he had, in his weakness, little choice. To cement his agreement, most likely, Amyntas married an Illyrian wife, the daughter of an Illyrian chief named Sirrhas. Her original Illyrian name is unknown: she adopted a Macedonian name, Eurydice, and became the mother of Amyntas’ sons and successors. The oldest son of this marriage, Alexander, must have been born by 388 at the latest, as he was an adult able to assume rule of Macedonia at his father’s death in late 370.
Having, for the time being, successfully bought off the Illyrians with tribute money and a marriage alliance, Amyntas needed to bolster his support within Macedonia. One of the most powerful men in Macedonia at this time was the head of the dynastic family which dominated the upper Macedonian canton of Elimea, Derdas. Known to us from southern Greek sources, Derdas controlled a cavalry force as large and of as good quality as that of Amyntas, and interacted with southern Greek powers at times as an essentially independent ruler. It has been suggested that it was Derdas’ support that helped Amyntas III seize power in the first place, that is, that the assassinations of Amyntas the Little by Derdas and of Pausanias by Amyntas III Arrhidaeou were part of a concerted plan to make Amyntas Arrhidaeou ruler. At any rate, good relations between Amyntas and Derdas are attested in this period, and with Derdas behind him, Amyntas had at least one solid base of support for his power. But he likely felt the need for more.
It may well have been at this time, then, that Amyntas entered into his second marriage, with the intriguingly named Gygaea. The name is attested as being used in the Argead clan: a sister of the foundational ruler Alexander I was named Gygaea, suggesting that Amyntas’ new wife may also have belonged to the clan. Indeed it has been suggested that she was the granddaughter of Alexander I’s son Menelaus, though it is not clear on what basis. If correct though, she may have been a daughter or niece of Amyntas the Little; and the marriage was likely intended to heal the breach between rival branches of the Argead line, shoring up Amyntas’ support within Macedonia. That the marriage belongs to the period of the early to mid-380s seems likely based on the likely time of birth of the oldest son of the marriage, Archelaus. Since Alexander, son of Eurydice, was able to succeed his father Amyntas in late 370 without opposition, he seems likely to have been th
e oldest son. Gygaea’s son Archelaus did eventually seek the rulership, but not until after the death of Eurydice’s second son Perdiccas in 360, as a rival to Eurydice’s third son Philip. Perdiccas was likely born about 385. It seems plausible that Archelaus was born about the same time, perhaps slightly later than Perdiccas, and so was old enough to mount an attempt at the rulership only after Perdiccas’ demise. That would likely place his parents’ marriage around 387 to 385, and would make sense in light of Amyntas’ need to win internal support in Macedonia at that time. For having settled matters, for the time being, with the Illyrians, he needed to deal with the threat posed by the Olynthians.
We have seen that under the threat of the Illyrian invasion ca. 392, Amyntas had ceded borderlands in the northern Chalcidice to the Olynthians in the hope or expectation of Olynthian aid, which either failed to materialize or was ineffective, as Amyntas was in fact driven out of Macedonia by the Illyrians. Restored to power in Macedonia by his Thessalian allies, Amyntas made a treaty with the Olynthian League, part of which survives in an inscription: both parties agreed to help each other against future attacks, and both agreed not to make any deals with three named Greek cities in the region (Acanthus, Mende, Amphipolis) or the Bottiaeans, without the other party’s consent; in addition the Chalcidians of the League received certain rights to import timber and pitch from Macedonia. The treaty seemed to favor the Olynthian League, and the Olynthians continued, as Diodorus tells us, to control and enjoy the revenues of the land that Amyntas had ceded under Illyrian pressure back in 392. When Amyntas now, in about 384/3, feeling more secure in Macedonia, attempted to redress the balance of power with the Olynthians and win back the ceded territory, the Olynthians responded by driving Amyntas out of eastern Macedonia and capturing various Macedonian towns including the new capital Pella, already the largest city in Macedonia. All this is reported by Xenophon, who alleges that by late 383 Amyntas had effectively lost control of his kingdom (Hellenica 5.2.12–13; 5.2.38).
Before and After Alexander Page 4
