Before the time of Philip Macedonia had virtually no cities: there was the old seat of the Argead clan, Aegae, though it seems to have been little urbanized; and there was the new capital Pella, founded by Archelaus. Philip fostered the development of cities, both within Macedonia proper and in the extended borderlands he added to Macedonia. In Macedonia, cities were developed around such settlements as Dion, Beroea, Edessa, Europus, Heracleia Lyncestis, and Argos Oresticon, while existing cities like Pella, Pydna, Therme, and eventually also Amphipolis were strengthened. When Philip extended the border of Macedonia westward, annexing western Thrace as far as the River Nestus, he re-founded the settlement of Crenides as Philippi and strengthened it with Macedonian colonists. When he further annexed south-central Thrace up to the Hebrus valley, he founded the city of Philippopolis (modern Plovdiv) and established fortified military settlements at Beroi (modern Stara Zagora), Kabyle (Kabile, near Yambol), and Bine. To strengthen his southern expansion into Thessaly he established a Macedonian colony at Gonnoi on the Thessalian side of the Vale of Tempe, and he may have established Macedonian garrison-settlers elsewhere in Thessaly too, for example at Oloosson. These are the foundations we know of: there may well have been more. As we have seen, Alexander was later to claim that Philip “made you (i.e. the Macedonians) city-dwellers and organized you with proper laws and customs” (Arrian Anabasis 7.9.2).
An effect of this urbanization was, of course, economic development. We learn further that Philip had marshes drained and lowland forests cleared for agriculture. He extended and improved Macedonian mining operations, for example making the gold and silver mining in the Pangaeum region around Philippi much more thorough and efficient, eventually deriving an annual income of a thousand talents (a stupendous sum: the Athenians at the height of their power in the fifth century received less than half of that in tribute payments from their subject-allies) from mining operations there. This enabled him to produce an abundant, well-made silver coinage to fund his activities (see ill. 7). Since our sources are simply not interested in economic policy and development, there is not much to be added to this in detail. But overall it is clear that Philip revolutionized Macedonian economic life. The establishment of internal peace and security, the process of urbanization, the development of trade through properly controlled and improved harbors, the more thorough and efficient exploitation of timber and metals, above all the clearing and draining of land and extension of agriculture: all of this made Macedonia a far wealthier land and the Macedonians for the first time a prosperous people. Again to quote the words attributed to Alexander: “When Philip came to power over you, you were indigent wanderers, most of you wearing animal hides and herding a few sheep in the mountains … he gave you cloaks to wear instead of hides, brought you down from the mountains into the plains …” (Arrian Anabasis 7.9.2). It is for these reasons that Philip was fondly remembered by the Macedonians for generations afterward as the father of his people.
That brings us to Macedonia’s most important resource: the Macedonian people. In some sense everything Philip did was in service to the Macedonian people, but not to all of them evenly. The impression we get of the Macedonians before Philip is of a powerful aristocracy, a large serf class working for the aristocrats, and not much in between. This is why Macedonian military strength had always been based on cavalry supplied by the aristocracy, with infantry forces few in number: usually not more than perhaps four or five thousand, who were ill-trained, ill-equipped, and undisciplined. In realizing that a strong and secure Macedonia required a large and effective infantry army, Philip knew that he needed a free warrior class of “citizens.” Much of his reforming activity was aimed in large part at bringing that warrior class into existence. That he succeeded is made clear by the following army statistics. At the beginning of his reign, in 358, absolutely needing a victory over the Illyrians and therefore mobilizing the largest force he could muster, Philip managed to gather an army of ten thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry. Just after the end of Philip’s rule, when his son Alexander invaded the Persian Empire in 334 with what was still Philip’s army, we learn that twelve thousand Macedonian infantry and eighteen hundred cavalry marched with Alexander, while another twelve thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry were left behind in Macedonia for home defense. The number of available infantry was thus twenty-four thousand—two and a half times those available in 358—while the number of the Macedonian cavalry had multiplied more than fivefold, from six hundred to three thousand three hundred. Moreover, despite the fact that Alexander did nothing during his thirteen-year reign to supplement Macedonian manpower—instead siphoning it off constantly for his wars of conquest—we find that at the end of Alexander’s reign there were more than fifty thousand Macedonians under arms, another near doubling of the number. This growth seems to have been entirely due to the policies put in place by Philip.
7. Tetradrachm coin of Philip II from Amphipolis mint
(Wikimedia Commons public domain image by Jastrow)
How did Philip achieve this spectacular growth in military manpower? To some extent this was an effect of the social and economic policies outlined above: the establishment of peace and security, the development of cities and trade, the expansion of agriculture and consequent growth of wealth, will all have had beneficial demographic effects, raising the birth rate and the survival rate of infants, and thus increasing the Macedonian population. But there was clearly more to it than that: Philip had specific policies aimed at developing the “warrior class” I have spoken of. It is not at all clear how much of a population of free farmers, herders, and small craftsmen, suitable for mobilization and training as a close-order infantry phalanx, there may have been in Macedonia before the time of Philip. Our accounts of Macedonian warfare, with its lack of any well trained infantry formations, suggest that any such class of free men cannot have been very large, or much motivated to fight for Macedonia’s rulers. By various means Philip extended this segment of the population and established in them a warrior spirit and pride in Macedonian identity. One of his policies was population movement, or resettlement. Within Macedonia, it appears, settlers were moved from lower Macedonia to upper Macedonia, and vice versa, partly no doubt with the aim of further unifying Macedonia. But one suspects, given Philip’s need for military manpower, that some at least of these settlers may have been taken from the serf population, becoming free men eligible for military recruitment in the act of being resettled. More significantly, as new territories were added to Macedonia—for example the Chalcidice, and western Thrace between the rivers Strymon and Nestus—Macedonians were settled within these territories, becoming well-to-do farmers and serving as a permanent garrison and Macedonianizing element; but also, themselves and their sons, becoming eligible for recruitment into infantry service.
In such ways Philip clearly enormously expanded the segment of the population available for military service, as the army numbers presented above prove beyond doubt. Most crucial were the land clearing and consequent expansion of agriculture, the urbanization, and the resettlement program, particularly in the newly conquered territories. All of this gave Macedonia for the first time, so far as we can tell from our sources, a large class of men suitable for service in an infantry phalanx. Calling these men up for repeated spells of infantry training and service; teaching them through weapons drills and route marches; leading them on successful campaigns in which they won battles, conquered lands, and acquired booty; all of this fostered in this newly well-to-do and independent class of men the requisite warrior spirit and a fierce pride in their Macedonian identity that simply had not existed before. And it is worth noting that not all of these men were ethnically Macedonian to begin with: Philip certainly welcomed southern Greeks into Macedonia and into his service; it is quite likely that no small number of Paeonians, Thracians, even Illyrians living in the border territories absorbed into Macedonia were Macedonianized by the resettlement process and became part of Philip’s warrior c
lass.
The overall effect of Philip’s reforms on the Macedonian people is well illustrated by a characteristic anecdote revealing how Philip was remembered by his people. Plutarch in his “Sayings of Kings and Commanders” (Moralia 179d) reports that an old lady was importuning Philip to deal with a problem she had, and when Philip replied that he had no time to look at her case just then she responded, “Then you should stop being king!” Instead of being angry at this, Philip accepted the rebuke and dealt right then not only with her issue, but with those of other petitioners too. The point of the story is not that it actually happened just so, but that it was a story told about Philip by his people; that is, that this story reveals how the Macedonians viewed Philip, as a ruler who genuinely cared about his people, was approachable, and had their best interests at heart. By way of contrast, Plutarch tells another story of a later Macedonian ruler, Demetrius the Besieger, who instead of dealing with his people’s petitions properly threw them away, not wanting to be bothered (Plutarch Life of Demetrios 42). Plutarch says that, seeing this, the Macedonians were infuriated and reflected on “how accessible Philip had been and how considerate in such matters.” Thus Philip was fondly remembered by the Macedonians for many generations as a true father to his people, the epitome of what a good ruler should be.
3. SUBDUING THE BARBARIAN BALKAN REGION
If properly unifying and strengthening Macedonia internally was Philip’s number one priority, the second without a doubt was securing Macedonia against invasion, raiding, and even conquest by its barbarian neighbors to the north-west, north, and east. Throughout his reign, from his first days in power until almost his last, he campaigned again and again against Illyrian, Dardanian, Paeonian, Agrianian, Triballian, and Thracian peoples living in the Balkan region, roughly in modern-day Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, and Bulgaria. His ultimate success in this project of securing Macedonia is illustrated in maps 2 and 3, showing the extent of Macedonian power and control at the beginning and end of his rule. We have already seen above that two of Philip’s earliest campaigns, in 359/8, were against invading Paeonian and Illyrian forces in northern and north-western Macedonia, giving him two crucial early victories. He continued as he had begun.
To start with the Illyrian front, the defeat of Bardylis and his Dardanian Illyrians changed the balance of power among the Illyrian tribes: we hear of a certain Grabus becoming the strongest Illyrian ruler, and extending his power all the way to the Macedonian border. Grabus is perhaps a title rather than a name: he apparently ruled over a tribe called the Grabaei. Grabus recognized a serious threat in the rising power of Macedonia, and in 357 to 356 joined up with a northern coalition aimed at defeating Philip. The initiative seems to have come from a Thracian ruler: Cetriporis, son of Berisades and grandson of the great Thracian ruler Cotys, ruled over the westernmost of the three chieftaincies into which Cotys’ great kingdom had been divided at his death, sharing thus a border with Macedonia. He persuaded the Paeonian Lyppeius, son of Agis, and the Illyrian Grabus to form a grand northern alliance. While Philip himself moved east in 356, marching up to the River Nestus, founding Philippi, and then going to aid his allies the Chalcidians in the capture of Potidaea, he sent a large Macedonian force under Parmenio to deal with Grabus and his Illyrians.
Parmenio was from a great upper Macedonian family, most likely from Pelagonia, and so knew the Illyrians and their style of fighting well. He was some fifteen years older than Philip, and was one of Philip’s earliest supporters—impressed no doubt by Philip’s victory over Bardylis—and most important aides. The Athenians every year elected ten magistrates named strategoi, that is generals: Philip supposedly once jokingly congratulated them on finding ten generals every year, when he himself had only ever found one general in his lifetime: Parmenio. The point is that Parmenio was a capable and loyal general on whom Philip could rely to take command in campaigns he himself could not oversee: usually facing multiple threats in different regions, Philip needed reliable and loyal generals, and Parmenio was the best of them. In the summer of 356, Parmenio and his forces inflicted a serious defeat on Grabus’ Illyrians, news of which reached Philip just after he captured Potidaea in (it seems) early August.
The defeats inflicted on Bardylis and Grabus enabled Philip to annex to Macedonia Illyrian borderlands to the north and west of Lake Lychnitis (Ohrid), in the territories of the Dassaretae and the Deuriopi, perhaps also the Bryges further north (see map 3). This gave upper Macedonia a secure buffer zone against future Illyrian attacks, as well as opening up lands for Macedonian settlement. The expanded and enhanced Macedonian border, at Illyrian expense, did not of course end Illyrian hostility. Our sources unfortunately tell us little about Philip’s Illyrian warfare, but we do hear of further campaigning by Philip against Illyrians in 350, in 345 against the Illyrian dynast Pleuratus, and in 337 against another Illyrian dynast named Pleurias. The last was Philip’s last major campaign before his sudden assassination in 336, so that Philip ended his rule as he began it, with successful warfare against the Illyrians. It is noteworthy that whereas down to 358 warfare between Illyrians and Macedonians invariably occurred in Macedonia, as a result of Illyrian invasions, after 358 it was Philip’s Macedonian forces that invaded Illyrian lands, campaigned successfully there, and annexed Illyrian territories.
Whereas the Illyrians were a serious threat to Macedonian security, the Paeonians were more of a nuisance: inveterate raiders and looters, but nothing more. Our sources tell us even less about Philip’s pacification of Paeonia than of his Illyrian campaigns, but the result is clear. The campaign in late 359 (or possibly early 358?), shortly after the death of the Paeonian ruler Agis, ended any threat to Macedonia in that region for some years. In 356, however, Agis’s son and successor Lyppeius joined—as we have seen—with Cetriporis and Grabus in the northern coalition against Philip. How he was dealt with we are not told, but it appears that he once again became a problem to Philip in 353, after Philip’s defeat in Thessaly by the Phocian army of Onomarchus. Once again, we hear nothing of how Lyppeius and his Paeonians were dealt with, but four years later Isocrates (5.21) remarked that Philip had subjected the Paeonians. It appears that Paeonia was annexed as a tributary territory and settled with a few Macedonian fortress-colonies for security; but Lyppeius was seemingly allowed to remain as ruler, for we hear of his successor Patraus still ruling the Paeonians under Alexander in the late 330s (Demosthenes 1.13). In 340 Alexander, then sixteen years old and serving as regent of Macedonia during Philip’s absence in eastern Thrace, led an army west of Paeonia to engage the Maedi in the upper Strymon valley, whom he defeated and where he founded a fortress-colony named Alexandropolis after himself. Thus the boundary of Macedonia to the north was extended up the Axios and Strymon valleys to defensible and fortified mountain frontiers.
The Thracians represented a threat similar to that of the Illyrians: major Thracian incursions led by kings such as Sitalces in the time of Perdiccas II and Cotys at the start of Philip’s reign showed how unsatisfactory Macedonia’s eastern frontier was. It is no surprise, therefore, that as soon as Philip had established his rule over Macedonia securely, he began to extend his power eastwards into Thrace, at the expense of the Thracian successors of Cotys. At the death of Cotys, his kingdom had been divided among his three sons Berisades (western Thrace), Amadocus (central Thrace), and Cersebleptes (eastern Thrace). This created a weakness Philip was quick to exploit. It also helped that Berisades, whose westernmost Thracian realm bordered on Macedonia, only ruled for a year or two before dying and being replaced by his son Cetriporis, obviously a younger and less experienced ruler. It was Cetriporis who, by organizing the anti-Macedonian “northern Alliance” with the Paeonian Lyppeius and the Illyrian Grabus about 357/6, provided the occasion for Philip to begin his decades-long series of interventions in Thrace.
Philip’s first move was along the coast of the Aegean, crossing the River Strymon and marching east. He had received an appeal from the Thasian colony of Creni
des in the rich Pangaeum mining district. The people of Thasos had for generations had an interest in the mineral resources on the mainland across from their island, founding the colony of Neapolis (modern Kavala) on the Aegean coast and, much later around 360, the colony of Crenides inland in the Drama plain. The aim was to exploit the silver and gold mines of the region, but the Thasians lacked the resources to support the colony, which came under immediate pressure from the surrounding Thracians. Philip now provided the support the Thasians could not, taking over Crenides and refounding it with an addition of Macedonian settlers and the new name Philippi, after himself. The new settlement was fortified with strong walls, and the surrounding Drama plain was drained for agriculture, enabling the Philippians to feed and defend themselves. The silver and gold mines of Pangaeum were then exploited with vastly greater thoroughness and efficiency than ever before, bringing Philip a huge annual income and enabling him to strike a plentiful and attractive new coinage (see ill. x). Meanwhile Cetriporis saw his northern allies, the Illyrians and Paeonians, soundly defeated, leaving him powerless to deal with Philip. An alliance with the Athenians, always interested in controlling the north Aegean coast as much as possible, proved no help, and he had to acquiesce in Philip’s takeover of the Drama plain and the Thracian coast as far as the River Nestus.
In subsequent years, 355 and 354, Philip further extended his power along the north Aegean coast, more at the expense of the Athenians than of the Thracians. He had already seized Amphipolis at the mouth of the Strymon in 357, despite his earlier promise to the Athenians to regard it as theirs. The city was reinforced with a large contingent of Macedonian colonists and rapidly Macedonianized. The founding of Philippi posed a threat to Neapolis on the coast: it was clearly desirable for whoever controlled the Drama plain also to control Neapolis, the region’s outlet to the sea. Neapolis was seized by Philip in 355, apparently, and in 354 he moved further east to capture the southern Greek colonies of Abdera and Maroneia (see map x). In taking these coastal cities, Philip was posing a potential threat to Amadocus, the ruler of central Thrace whose territories lay immediately inland. Amadocus fortified the passes leading inland from the coast and barred Philip’s further progress. All the same, Philip was able to negotiate an agreement with Cersebleptes, the easternmost and strongest of the three Thracian rulers who had succeeded Cotys. That represented a threat sufficient to keep Amadocus quiet for the time being.
Before and After Alexander Page 9
