I do not seek to do more than make a contribution to history from the standpoint of the British Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. In this, my directives, telegrams and minutes, written at the time and not in the afterlight are my stepping stones.3
With hindsight, he can be said to have underestimated the influence his history would exercise on the work of subsequent historians, both official and revisionist.
Due perhaps to the very scale of British disasters in the spring of 1942, Turkish friendship rose high once again on Churchill’s agenda. On 17 April he invited the Turkish ambassador to accompany him to Washington, to facilitate the movement of American Lease-Lend matériel and equipment to Turkey.4 DIR files came to him there from ‘C’ at the rate of two and sometimes three a day. Turkey was deeply impressed by German successes in the Balkans and south Russia and by 21 April the FO read with some scepticism that Turkey would offer to mediate between Britain and Germany if Germany won the spring offensive towards the Caucasus.5 Military talks were going on between the Turks and British in Ankara. The British learnt that Marshal Chakmak’s deputy was pro-Axis, but none the less the Turks would not want either Germany or Britain to invade the Dodecanese, though they would accept a Greek takeover from the Italians. On 21 April the FO explained why it was hanging on to Turkey:
Turkey’s position is of extreme delicacy and complexity. A fundamental factor is Turco-Soviet relations, and the bearing thereof on Anglo-Soviet relations, a subject outside the sphere of the Minister of State [Harold Macmillan]. Turco-American relations become increasingly important, and the complete picture is only visible in London.6
Throughout April BJs track Turkish reactions to Axis successes and to counteract these a party of Turkish journalists, fresh from a visit to Germany, was invited to Britain in May. The project was Eden’s, and Hugessen was hesitant. Dixon thought the idea ‘excellent’ if the prime minister would agree to be part of the programme. The Turkish party was impressed by the Minister of Food, Lord Woolton, and the RAF, as well as factory managers in Glasgow. The audience with Churchill, however, was a disappointment. He reminisced in his atrocious French about the First World War with a veteran Turkish journalist and failed to notice his audience, all of whom were fluent English speakers. But on their return they said they were sure the Allies would win and Menemencioğlu thought they came back too pro-British.7
Deringil observes that it was essential for Germany to neutralise Turkey when attacking Russia.8 The main Axis offensive did not start until 28 June, when the Germans defeated the Russians in the Kharkov offensive, and the Anglo-Soviet 20-Year Mutual Assistance Treaty was signed in London by Eden and Molotov, so Turkey realised that if she had to fight Russia she would have to fight Britain too.9 The Portuguese ambassador in Ankara, who thought that a Russian victory entailed the Bolshevisation of Europe, reported that ‘to avoid the triumph of Russia Turkey would sacrifice everything, even the British alliance’.10 But the Turkish Foreign Ministry the same day assured its diplomats abroad that ‘everyone is friendly, despite the recent bomb trial. [The attempt on the Papens’ lives]. Our country is completely calm, united round our national leader.’11
Churchill, now at odds with Eden and the FO, wanted to offer matériel – ‘a large, simple offer’. He roundly attacked Eden’s foreign policy.12 Both the Southern Department and Churchill were following Turkish sensitivities day by day, and the record showed he was wavering himself. Though he wrote to Eden, ‘I have proposed a practical and hopeful policy towards Turkey and I should be grateful if you would address your mind to this’, an intercept on 22 May bears Churchill’s comment that he was ‘not too sure of the Turks’.13
HW1/596–9 of 25 May all show diplomatic speculation on Britain and the USA planning the invasion of Turkey but whether this was based on hope, or fear, or disinformation, or a successful war of nerves by Germany or a combination of all is difficult to determine. Certainly there is no evidence that the COS ever developed even a feasability study of a full-scale invasion, which would have gone against all their instincts. And equally certainly the Turks themselves were not unduly alarmed: when the Turkish ambassador in Madrid was warned by his Italian colleague about British designs on Turkey with the words ‘the British will start a military action against our country’, his reply was ‘propaganda’.14
British reverses remained top of the diplomatic agenda. On 21 June Tobruk fell, with a resonance throughout all the Mediterranean countries, not least Turkey, who had always admired German military success and now began to doubt the wisdom of unconditional friendship with the British. The Chinese ambassador in Ankara reported that ‘Turkey’s desire was to remain neutral and independent. The British lost control of the Mediterranean so the Axis powers could get to Suez without using Turkey.’15 At the same time the Portuguese ambassador in Ankara reported on the problems facing Turkey if Germany conquered Egypt. ‘The Turks are great realists.’ The Axis had not decided about Turkey but ‘Turkey must declare herself soon’.16 On 3 July Rommel halted his 400-mile advance at El Alamein in the face of the Eighth Army’s fierce resistance, but Turkey was by now feeling the full weight of German pressure. On 7 July the Japanese ambassador in Istanbul (Kurihara) reported on Turkish relations:
Turkey is shilly-shallying and heading for friendlessness . . . Since the fall of Tobruk Turkey was dismayed at the sudden change in the war situation, and seemed to be considerably agitated, and it is generally thought that there would be some change shortly.17
Neither Churchill nor the FO would have been pleased to read Kurihara reporting that:
I think we [the Japanese] should lean on Turkey because the PM and Chakmak [marshal of all Turkish armed forces] have for a long time advocated co-operation with Germany, so Turkey getting closer to the Axis may not be difficult.
He had spoken to von Papen who observed that Turkey reacted badly to pressure, but would give some pledge to Germany ‘when a suitable opportunity arose’.18 In Sofia the same diplomatic reactions were expressed, as also in Madrid and Vichy, where the German representative pressed both Turkish and Hungarian ambassadors about their countries’ attitudes towards Axis Mediterranean successes.19 On 17 July the Turkish military attaché in Washington reported:
1942 was the year of the Axis powers. The British have been heavily defeated. The Americans have no experience of a shooting war, and there is no unified Anglo-US command.
The German offensive in the east looked unstoppable. The Portuguese ambassador in Stockholm reported that the Germans, whose summer offensive had begun on 28 June, were close to reaching the Volga, thus threatening the Caucasus through Rostov-on-Don and cutting off Russia from her oil supply. The ‘threatened people of Asia Minor (including the Turks) do not like this joining up of German armies in Russia with those in Egypt.’20 Would Germany go for a separate peace with Russia? Germany would in any event retain the territories captured from Russia (Churchill marked this with an exclamation mark). On 26 July the Turkish ambassador in Cairo reported to Ankara that British failures against the Germans put Alexandria under threat.21 The new ‘generation of [British] tank commanders were not as good as the old ones.’ In the event of defeat Britain would flood Egypt and withdraw to the Nile. On 30 July Kurihara reported the Turkish view of the Russian plight.22 He reported that the Russian army was said to be near to collapse. Stalin had gone to the front to shoot generals. Stalin meanwhile sent Maisky to Churchill to demand a second front immediately. A week later the Turkish ambassador in Kuibyshev reported to Ankara that the Russians were at last consolidating their positions behind the Don.23
On 29 July the new Italian ambassador in Ankara reported his talk with Saraçoğlu. Turkey intended to remain neutral despite the propaganda efforts of British agents. Saraçoğlu said Turkey will:
. . . defend her frontiers without asking for help from the Axis, if Britain decides to open up another front [on the coasts of Turkey]. Turkey could no longer be indifferent towards the Arab movement . . . Turkey would abandon
the policy of absenteeism towards the Arabs, adopted by Atatürk . . . Turkey shared common origins with Muslim Arabs . . . This need not worry the Axis.
Saraçoğlu begged his visitor to use discretion in relaying these far-ranging thoughts: ‘keep the whole conversation absolutely secret’.24 That interview gave the FO, and Churchill, new insight into the mind of the Turkish leadership: not just the frankness or the indiscretion, but the possibility of a recrudescence of panturanism – the longing for the great days of Turkish power, through a new approach to the Arab world, already half seduced by Hitler’s charm. Not surprisingly Cadogan noted something ‘rotten in the state of Turkey’.25
The FO had no divisions to implement its policy. It could only listen, ruminate, squabble and recommend in balanced paragraphs of faultless prose which infuriated Churchill, himself no mean stylist. On 24 August the Turkish ambassador in Berlin reported a renewal of Turco-German friendship over lunch with Hitler.26 Five days later Hugessen reported on the supply to Turkey of German war, industrial and railway matériel as bait for immediate attraction: ‘These developments suggest Turkey is insuring herself with Germany . . . The Turks are a hard-headed race and are doubtless trying to get as much as possible out of both sides.’27 On 28 August Churchill was told by his private secretary that ‘Turkish ciphers are known to be broken’ and Ismay was instructed to keep the COS on their toes about Turkey.28 On 31 August Clutton minuted that Turkish neutrality meant having a foot in both camps but with one more firmly placed than the other. ‘This is the policy which Bismarck called re-insurance and what Menemencioğlu calls active neutrality.’29
The Southern Department had known for at least five months that Turkey was being heavily bribed by Germany. As far back as 25 March the Chancery at Ankara had reported that the ‘Axis have been offering neighbouring territories to Ankara . . . Aleppo and some of the Greek islands’. A German diplomat in Ankara expected the Turks would demand Syria, Aleppo and Mosul. On 22 June Clutton wrote: ‘quite likely the Turks have territorial aspirations in the Aegean islands, but unless they play a more active part in the war they are unlikely to see them realised.’30 On 9 September the same official summarised Turkish territorial ambitions:
We may see Turkish claims to a rectification of the Turco-Persian frontier, and in Bulgaria similar adjustments south of Burgas. . . . The Turks undoubtedly expect to receive a major portion of the Dodecanese and would also like Mosul.31
They were, moreover, angry at British failure to deliver matériel as agreed, and Rauf Orbay, the controversial but long-serving Turkish ambassador in London, asked to see Churchill rather than Eden, since Churchill was seen to be the more emollient of the two. The ambassador expressed his worry that Turkey was not being treated as a full ally. There was straight talk of less than complete mutual confidence.32 On 12 September Orbay reported that London was at last expediting the war deliveries. Russian Ambassador Ivan Maisky, sitting next to him in the House of Commons Visitors’ Gallery, whispered, ‘There are new dangers facing Turkey.’33 This view was expressed more graphically by Oshima in Berlin cabling Tokyo that ‘the link between Europe and Asia must be perfected, opening the road over which Japan and Germany may mutually fulfil their economic duties’. The anti-British struggle in India was intensifying, as means to that end.34
On 14 September Berkeley Street intercepted, processed and circulated a brief report from the Turkish ambassador in Berlin to Ankara: ‘According to a reliable source Rommel [?is] going to attack in a week’s time. ARIKAN.’35 The same day36 the Greek chargé in Ankara talked with the former US presidential candidate Wendell Willkie and Erkin of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Willkie made six points:
• Importance of Turco-US relations.
• Allied victory certain.
• USA will be involved in the postwar settlement of Europe.
• Turkish foreign policy is approved of by the president.
• Allies victory in Egypt assured, despite setbacks.
• More matériel is to come to Turkey direct from USA under the Lease-Lend agreement.
This important démarche by a leading US politician, who travelled at the express wish of the president, did not include the Soviet Union. Erkin (Secretary General) was pleased and this was ‘a measure of Turkey’s distrust of Soviet designs’. The next day the Turkish foreign ministry distributed its observations on the Willkie visit to all Turkish diplomatic representatives abroad. Willkie had praised Turkish foreign policy as ‘straightforward and loyal’ (English word used). In London the Turkish ambassador noted that Churchill in parliament had lost ‘nothing of his influence and power’.37 The day after that Arikan reported from Berlin that ‘two persons, not German, said Germany may come to terms with Russia through Japanese mediation’.38 The source would be Japanese colleagues of Oshima. On 28 September the FO hinted at Turkish-related BJs in their telegram to Hugessen (which, they reminded him, must not be quoted, and burnt after reading); the Turkish ciphers were not only compromised but being read, and the progress of the Turco-German armament negotiations and about chrome were routinely read by all parties.39 On 30 September the Turco-German agreement, chrome for arms, was signed.
The tide of war was beginning to swing towards the Allies, yet German relations with Turkey remained friendlier than Churchill and the FO intended, or than the Americans and Russians understood. This was because the Hitler/von Papen axis put forward a simple and acceptable theorem to the Turkish leadership, and stuck to it:
1) Stay neutral.
2) If you allow the British to persuade you to allow them air bases to bomb the Romanian oil installations, you will no longer be a neutral.
3) In that event we will retaliate by destroying Istanbul and its environs, and for you the war will be over.
By 12 October Churchill pushed for his personal intervention in Turkish affairs. He continued his pressure on Eden: ‘I am after the Turk: I am not after your chrome . . . I am much disappointed at the way the gift I got with so much trouble has been marred by this verbose ambassador [i.e. Hugessen].’40
Four days before, Churchill had written at length to his younger colleague about what he thought was Hugessen’s inept handling of the Turkish matter. ‘In the picture I make to myself of the Turk, comradeship and generosity, the impression of power and resources, are what will count.’ The chromite affair, conducted by the FO via the embassy at Ankara, had obscured this simple vision of a strong Turco-British war comradeship. ‘I took great pains to get the tanks etc . . . the gift of arms from Britain to Turkey is meant as a token of comradeship and comprehension.’ Later, on 5 November, Churchill again wrote sarcastically to Eden:
Although the world war is proceeding with diverse episodes of interest cropping up from time to time, the entire politics of the Foreign Office with Turkey are expressed in the one word ‘chrome’. I thought you told me you were going to wind this up but your pertinacious secretariat and your verbose ambassador continue to wear out the cipher staff and aggravate the paper shortage, to say nothing of wearing out my eyesight by endless disputation.41
He added in his own handwriting, ‘Don’t let the military get out of giving the 200 tanks on the score that the Turks can’t [sic] digest them. You know how my mind is working.’ He repeated his urgings to ‘press on’ and instructed: ‘we should send off 300 instructors for delivered tanks as fast as the Turks can take them, Middle East must face up to this.’
In Ankara, Hugessen and his team sang ‘chrome sweet chrome’.42 He represented the policy of the FO, which was proving inadequate for the job Churchill had in mind. Hugessen wrote regularly to ‘Moley’ Sargent about Turkey.43 He was having a difficult time, he was doing his best, he worked hard for Turkish trust and friendship, he liked, and was liked by, the Turks; but perhaps in a world of state presidents and large armies, of looming global disasters, of international operators like von Papen and Churchill, he was the weak Southern Department link in a chain drawing Turkey towards the Allied camp. Churchill’s a
ntipathy to Hugessen’s handling of the chrome issue may have been more influential in differentiating Churchill’s policy from that of the department than was outwardly apparent. But Hugessen was always on very good terms with his FO confrères, and many of his staff in Ankara had already served their time in the Southern Department, so Hugessen in Ankara was simply an extension of the FO’s Turkey policy, but more directly exposed than the Southern Department to Churchillian tantrums and Turkish wiles.44
Churchill records his own efforts to play the Turkey hand in his war memoirs. His most recent conference with the other Big Two (in Moscow, 12 August 1942) established an order of priority in order to win the war:
1) Knock Italy out of the war.
2) Bring Turkey into the war.
3) Give the Axis no respite for recuperation.
Since the first item was on-going and the third no more than a rallying cry, the high priority Turkey now assumed in Allied thinking confirms the thesis that Turkey was now playing a key role in Churchill’s European war picture. He records ‘a ceaseless flow of weapons and equipment to Turkey’. He informed Stalin he had told Roosevelt about Turkey and how he should play the Turkish hand, and Stalin responded appropriately, if unspecifically. ‘Now,’ he wrote, ‘I wished to clinch the matter’ by making a personal appearance on Turkish soil to force a Turkish imbroglio. Elisabeth Barker, that most sensitive of the Second World War diplomatic historians, said:
The exact shape of the project varied a little according to circumstances. When in January 1943 [Churchill] made an impromptu dash to Turkey to persuade the Turkish leaders to think hard about entering the war, and wanted to overcome their fears of the Russians overrunning the Balkans, he was inspired to set down his ‘Morning Thoughts’ and to communicate them to the Turks.45
Churchill's Secret War Page 13
