Back in the House of Commons, MPs of all parties are alarmed when they hear the news. An Early Day Motion on 5 June receives forty-nine signatures, stating that ‘a full debate and vote should be held in Parliament’ before any decision is taken to supply the Syrian opposition forces with British arms.15 Little commented on at the time is a sentence saying that if Parliament is in recess it should be recalled ‘to debate any further involvement’. As MPs become increasingly agitated, the topic becomes the latest test of the PM’s relationship with the Conservative Party. The issue is about far more than the events in a country 2,000 miles away. Backbenchers are concerned by conversations that they have been having with the military, who are not reticent in sharing their dismay at the direction of British policy, and apprehensive that the sending of arms might not be sanctioned by international law. On 16 June, Nick Clegg tells The Andrew Marr Show that arming rebels is not ‘the right thing to do now’. To the irritation of Number 10, Boris Johnson says ‘this is not the moment to send more arms. This is the moment for a total ceasefire’.16 The Sunday Times estimates that two-thirds of Tory MPs oppose arming Syrian rebels.17
International caution is also building. A key impediment to any imposed Western solution in Syria is Russian opposition. Cameron has worked hard to build a good bilateral relationship with Putin, with some success. But the Russian president is angry with Cameron over Libya, believing that he highlighted the protection of Libyan civilians to ensure Russian abstention in the Security Council, as a cover for his real objective: regime change. He is in no mood to be hoodwinked again. Moreover, Syria is an ally of Russia, a purchaser of its military merchandise and host to a Russian naval facility at Tartus. All of this could be jeopardised if Assad is toppled and a Western-backed regime comes to power in Damascus. Cameron must work on Putin. On 10 May, he travels to Sochi to see him with the proposal of a Dayton-style peace conference (which had ended the war in Bosnia in 1995 by dividing the country between combatants). Cameron has a long bilateral with Putin, accompanied by National Security Advisor Kim Darroch and his Russian counterpart Yuri Ushakov. Cameron tries hard and, he believes, with some success to persuade the Russian leader that they both want the same end, i.e. neither of them have any interest in Syria falling apart. Cameron reassures him that the British understand the Russians want continuity, and want Assad and his military to remain in power. The British want to bring the Syrian leaders round the table and changes made on the ground. Putin is surprised and, the British feel, open to the PM’s argument that his aim is not regime change, but to deal with both sides in order to achieve a ceasefire and peace deal. Then the government and moderate opposition forces could combine to defeat the extremist Islamists. However, there is still a point of fundamental disagreement: Cameron insists that Assad must leave power once a deal is brokered; Putin is adamant that Assad must stay.
Talks between London and Washington have taken place to ensure the Obama administration is happy with what Cameron is proposing to Putin. Number 10 is disquieted to hear that US Secretary of State John Kerry had been in Moscow two days before his visit, which has the effect of diminishing Cameron’s pitch. The irritation is magnified because the PM’s party are not told exactly what the Russians and Americans have agreed. ‘Kerry felt he’d secured a version of a deal over Syria, but we felt we hadn’t been able to go into specifics to tie Putin to it,’ says one of Cameron’s team. It is a low point in the Number 10/White House relationship, especially coming just five months after the criticism by Philip Gordon, a senior State Department official, of Cameron’s EU referendum announcement. It is a long way from the bonhomie of Cameron’s visit to Washington in March 2012.
Syria becomes the hot topic at the G8 hosted by Britain at Lough Erne in Northern Ireland from 17–18 June 2013. Cameron has put great effort into the gathering, which has free trade, tax, and financial transparency as the main points on the agenda.18 He fights hard to stop Syria from sucking all the energy out of the discussions, but has to bow to the inevitable. Dinner on Monday 17 June is tense. After deliberating with his team, Cameron decides to seat Obama and Putin opposite each other. They spar throughout the dinner. Merkel is unusually quiet. Putin is imperious, and out on a limb while Cameron and Obama try to secure an agreement that some form of action is required in Syria to stop the bloodshed. A statement is agreed that all parties support a Syrian peace conference, but this fools nobody; the differences between the G8 leaders are enormous. ‘It is a papering over the cracks merely,’ says one.
Progress on Syria remains deadlocked for the next two months until the news comes through of the 21 August chemical attack. The year before, Obama had said that Assad’s use of chemical weapons would constitute a ‘red line’ that, if crossed, would demand a Western response.19
Cameron knows what it means the moment he hears. Interrupted summer holidays have become the norm and Samantha has learned to accept them. In 2011, they had to return from Italy to deal with the London riots, in 2012 the Olympics and Paralympics broke up any chance of a long rest together. Now it is Syria. Obama is on the secure line in Cornwall. They discuss what has happened. They agree they need to talk properly. Cameron returns swiftly to London, but for three days is unable to reach the president. The message comes back from the White House that Obama is unable to speak. ‘We had had this before from the White House, constant excuses when he didn’t want to talk,’ says an aide.
On the evening of Saturday 24 August, Obama eventually comes through. Cameron takes the call at Chequers, while Ed Llewellyn, Darroch and others assemble in Number 10. ‘It is typical uncompromising Obama style, not “What do you think?” as Bush might have said.’ Obama has spent three days with his staff deliberating the American response and is now simply informing Cameron what the US is planning to do. They will be making a strike on Syria on Monday, with an unspecified number of cruise missiles. The British are told they can’t tell anyone. Cameron says he supports the American action and welcomes ‘decisive action’ by the president. Cameron calls Clegg, who is staying with his parents-in-law in Spain. ‘He asked if I thought there was a case to join in American action,’ Clegg recalls. ‘I didn’t need long to think about it. If Obama thought it was right to remove chemical weapons from the battlefield, why would we not?’20 On Sunday 25 August, Cameron convenes a meeting of senior advisers at Chequers, including Llewellyn, Richards and Darroch. They explore how British forces might be able to support American action, and what might be possible with submarines and missiles. Fear of possible Syrian counterattacks is a consideration. The Russians are thought likely to block any proposed action in the UN. ‘It all looked pretty difficult for us in the time frame the Americans were giving to us,’ says one insider. The Americans are planning a short, sharp ‘command and control operation, targeting military installations’ (rather than Assad himself). Cameron decides to write a personal note to Obama.
It takes the form of a typed letter which he signs and which is sent down the secure line. It confirms that he is supportive of the American action, but for it to work for him, he would like reassurance on three points: that there is indisputable evidence about what has happened, a clear legal basis for military action, and that the UN is behind it, with a proper role. Cameron’s advisers are uncertain whether, after the letter is sent, the US will strike the next day. They agree that if their attack is delayed for a few days, given the Early Day Motion of the previous June, it will be necessary to recall Parliament, and that the NSC should be convened on the Wednesday, and Cabinet the following day. ‘We all knew our marching orders. The meeting then breaks up.’ Communications with Washington remain far from perfect. No one knows exactly what is happening in the White House. On Monday 26 August, reports are received that US Navy warships are positioned to strike Syria. But it becomes clear as the hours pass that they will not go into action that day. Over the weekend the Syrian government had announced that UN weapons inspectors, who had been despatched by the UN Security Council, would be allowed i
nto the country to inspect the site of the Damascus attack. Obama tries unsuccessfully to persuade Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to pull the mission back. The president realises he cannot launch air strikes while UN inspectors are in the country. Crucially, the delay opens the way for a parliamentary debate.
Cameron comes back to Downing Street, and for two days is in back-to-back meetings. The legality of any action is a predominant concern. Cameron and his team are given legal advice by the Attorney General, Dominic Grieve, and by the Joint Intelligence Committee. By the time Cabinet meets, the legal position is thus clarified and each minister is given a carefully prepared portfolio reassuring them on the precise position, that military intervention could be justified on humanitarian grounds.21 As with Libya, the long shadow of the Iraq War, when the legality of British action was in dispute, is present. Ken Clarke, who had been Justice Secretary till the year before, says: ‘I was of the view that [Assad] was trying out the use of chemical weapons step by step, seeing if anybody responded [to] “punish” him in the international community. If we didn’t, he would start using his chemical weapons to the full. We were thus going to attack targets specifically [related to the] use of chemical weapons.’22 Clarke is so confident of parliamentary backing that he will return to his holiday in Portugal shortly afterwards, but ‘by the time the Labour Party decided to play silly games and vote against us, it was too late for me to get back’.23 Many assume that because parliamentary backing in Libya had not been difficult in 2011, support for limited action now in these extreme circumstances will be forthcoming.
Downing Street keep trying to understand when the Americans are planning to strike. Richards, who manages to talk to his US counterparts, is gung-ho at first, but becomes more cautious when the Americans begin to prevaricate. At first, a limited strike is the American plan, but everything hinges on its timing, and what they are expecting from the British. ‘We were struggling to understand what it was the White House wanted from us,’ says an official. It is clear, though, that it wants some sort of British military contribution in support of the American action.
The recall of Parliament is another key topic in Cameron’s in-tray. Cameron and Osborne favour a recall – the Early Day Motion in June requires no less – on the Thursday. (They consider Saturday or Sunday, in order to give MPs more time to plan their return, but rule it out in the likely event of early American action on Friday.) Cameron’s advisers meet and agree he should make the opening speech in the debate and Clegg wind it up. Osborne, the chief whip George Young, and Defence Secretary Philip Hammond are all broadly supportive. One dissenting voice is Hague’s. The assumption amongst all present is that there will need to be a precise motion and then a vote on it. Hague is not against it, but he urges caution. ‘Are you sure that we would win a vote?’ he asks. Everyone goes quiet. The chief proponent on the other side is Craig Oliver. ‘Look, you can’t just recall Parliament about going to war and merely have a conversation. You have to vote,’ he says. Hague reminds them that there are parliamentary devices to end the debate, which would avoid voting on the motion, though he advises against this.
On Monday evening, however, they are still debating whether Parliament needs to be recalled. There is no absolute need to do so, says Michael Gove. The final decision for recall is taken in a phone call between Cameron and Osborne. By that evening it becomes clear that the US timetable is slipping. But the likelihood of an early American strike remains. ‘If a military strike took place and we’d had a week’s notice and hadn’t bothered to recall Parliament, it would have caused us a big political problem,’ says one aide. On Tuesday morning, Cameron phones Commons speaker John Bercow about the crisis. At 12.36, on Oliver’s suggestion, he tweets: ‘Speaker agrees my request to recall Parliament on Thurs. There’ll be a clear Govt motion & vote on UK response to chemical weapons attacks.’24
The focus now shifts to Labour. Their support is crucial for the vote. Cameron’s team expect Ed Miliband to be wholly supportive. ‘It is probably fair to say that we started with the expectation that chemical weapons used against innocent people by a murderous regime was a pretty clear red line, so we were not expecting it to be difficult with them.’ It turns out to be far from easy.
Cameron’s first call to Miliband is on Tuesday afternoon. The Labour leader falls short of full support. ‘The evidence has to be clear,’ he tells Cameron, who mulls over with his team exactly what Miliband means. ‘He seemed to imply that he wanted to find a way to support military action,’ they conclude. Later on Tuesday, Miliband comes into Downing Street with shadow Foreign Secretary Douglas Alexander to see Cameron, Clegg and Hague. Cameron briefs them on what they know about the chemical attack on Damascus. He says there is still no final decision from Obama, who is asking the British to be ready to take part, ‘but we have yet to give our reply’. ‘We want to have a multilateral approach with the UN to ensure that any action would be proportional, legal and focused on deterring chemical weapons use, rather than having a wider role in the conflict.’ Cameron tells Miliband about the NSC meeting planned for the following day and Cabinet on Thursday. ‘I hope we can act on an all-party basis to deplore chemical weapons use and put pressure on the regime,’ Cameron says. Clegg backs him up: ‘I am thoroughly convinced that chemical weapons have been used. They have been outlawed since the 1920s. It is abhorrent. It is not about changing the wider conflict dynamic, but standing up to chemical weapons.’
Miliband listens carefully before responding with four prepared questions: ‘What about the UN inspectors and their efforts, and why not wait? What legal authority would we be acting on? What would be the military objectives? How would it be demonstrable that we’d be stopping something worse happening and avoiding escalation?’ Cameron replies that he is happy to share information on a Privy Council basis, meaning that Miliband and Douglas Alexander would be bound to confidentiality. He says that the legal advice is clear, that he will be hoping for support at the UN, and that it is important at least to try to stop chemical weapons. Both Labour politicians ask why they cannot try for a UN Security Council Resolution, and probe more about the timescale for action. Cameron replies that they are unaware of precise US intentions but do not anticipate any strikes before Thursday. Miliband responds: ‘I really don’t want to oppose this, but we have to take the public with us.’ Cameron promises to brief him on further evidence and on the precise military objectives. Miliband expresses concern that ‘the parliamentary time plan is very tricky’. ‘Yes, it’s all a tricky balance,’ agrees Cameron, adding ‘To be fair, this is only about action that would be legal and aimed at chemical weapons.’ ‘What if they keep using them? What can we do to build wider legitimacy?’ asks Alexander. The meeting serves only to confirm the sense among Cameron, Clegg and Hague that Labour want to find a way to support them.
Later that evening, Miliband phones the PM. Cameron’s team believe that Miliband has been talking to shadow Cabinet colleagues and is getting cold feet. ‘We can’t do this without a UN Resolution, or if a UN Resolution is vetoed by Russia,’ Miliband says. Further calls take place between their chiefs of staff that evening. Cameron decides that he must himself speak to Mark Lyall Grant, British Permanent Representative at the UN, to see what more can be done in New York. He realises that before any British decision is made, Labour will want to be reassured that every possible UN avenue has been fully explored. The White House is becoming worried about the situation in London, as they know there is little chance of agreement among the five permanent members on the UN Security Council. So further conversations take place late into the night between Llewellyn, Darroch and foreign policy private secretary John Casson in London with Lyall Grant and his team in New York, who agree to initiate informal consultations with the other members of the Security Council. Their joint endeavour to show that the British have been trying to establish the basis of a UNSCR is damaged when it becomes clear from these soundings that Russia is highly likely to exercise a veto. Clegg comes into the
PM’s study late that Tuesday evening. They recognise that they are in a very tight spot. ‘We can still thread the eye of this needle with something dramatic to convince the public that we have tried and hit a brick wall with the Russians,’ says Clegg.
Wednesday 28 August is a difficult day. ‘The mood changed in those little gatherings in the prime minister’s office on the Wednesday. It suddenly darkens because MPs are starting to flood back to their constituencies after the holidays and the Whips’ Office were talking to them. Suddenly there is a list of Tory dissidents, and it is quite long,’ recalls a senior official. Miliband is becoming more sceptical by the hour. Opinion divides in Cameron’s team between those who think he is being influenced by pressure from sceptical Labour colleagues, and those who believe his whole stance is part of a cynical ploy. Cameron himself is starting to wonder whether Labour are serious about action. Miliband’s team are adamant that at no point was he ever convinced about the need for action and neither did he ever convey that impression to Cameron. ‘Both the Conservatives and Labour had reasons to think that Miliband was consistent: more consistently playing a game, say the Conservatives, or more consistently doubtful, say Labour,’ as one observer puts it.
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