In November 2013, the pace accelerates dramatically when the S&D group name their Spitzenkandidat, Martin Schulz himself. The EPP holds its congress in Dublin on 6–7 March 2014. The British Conservative Party are not represented at it, and Juncker emerges as its favoured candidate.5 Cameron’s own grouping, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), very much the third power block with representatives from fifteen countries, is unable to assert a strong voice in the debate. The Conservatives are not the only UK party alarmed by the power grab by the European Parliament, and by the activism of its main political families. Labour are panicked at the prospect of Schulz as a candidate. Its relations with the S&D are not strong and its own efforts to block the Spitzenkandidaten process fail. The Conservatives continue to maintain that their position is not weakened by not being a member of the EPP, while the Liberal Democrats are the only major party to enjoy close relations with European parties. But even they oppose the Spitzenkandidaten and yet are unable to stop the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) putting one forward. Conservatives eye Juncker with particular alarm as he is no lover of the UK. He favours a social model of Europe, entirely out of tune with the direction that Cameron wants to see the EU take. He is described as ‘an old-school dealmaker and schmoozer’ who is felt to be past his best: born in 1954, and PM of Luxembourg since 1995, he is one of the world’s longest-serving democratic leaders.
Cameron knows he has very few cards left that he can play. He believes Juncker will take Europe in a direction that will create even more hostility amongst the mainstream in Britain, and will not be open to looking sympathetically at Britain’s case for a renegotiation. He knows he must block him. The strongest card in his hand is whipping up other European leaders to see that Juncker will not set a good precedent for the modern era, and that ceding so much to the European Parliament will both create an irreversible momentum, and run counter to the EU treaties; indeed this is the prime minister’s principal reason for opposing Juncker. In his back pocket he hides his trump card, albeit a weak one, which is that if Juncker is elected, it will make it less likely that Britain will remain within the EU. Several EU leaders are worried by this prospect, including Mark Rutte of the Netherlands, Fredrik Reinfeldt of Sweden, and above all his old friend Angela Merkel. On her broad shoulders he pins his principal hopes. He is later to be blamed for being essentially a one-trick pony by relying too much on her, but it is doubtful if he has other options: and it is hard to know what else he can do but dig in hard against Juncker’s appointment. Standing by passively and witnessing Juncker take the presidency without a fight would be an even weaker strategy. Moreover, other European leaders silently hope that Merkel will stop the appointment.
Happily Merkel is in London on Thursday 27 February for her grandest visit of the five years. It boasts the ‘top three’ ingredients that the capital can offer: a personal audience with the Queen, an address to Parliament, and a private meeting in Downing Street. Merkel is much impressed with Her Majesty, and her entourage are cock-a-hoop that the meeting, at forty-five minutes, lasts longer than scheduled. They are transfixed by the idea that not a word of what is spoken will ever be divulged, envying the discretion around the British head of state. Discussion at Number 10 begins with a bilateral meeting upstairs in Cameron’s private flat. Very rarely for Merkel, no aides are present. They talk about Juncker and she strongly advises Cameron not to go in too hard or too quickly against him: get the European elections out of the way first, and then make the case, she says. He comes downstairs with the distinct impression that she ‘gets it’, that she accepts Juncker is not the right man for Commission president, and that they will find a way of killing off his candidacy. Her message, as he reports it, is ‘Don’t worry, David. I’m not a fool. I know Juncker isn’t the right answer. I will find a way of dealing with that after the elections.’ She is equally adamant that the Commission president cannot be Schulz. The pre-meeting over, they have lunch in Number 10’s state rooms, joined by their aides. Cameron is in a visibly good mood and the conversation moves to the areas that he feels will need to change for Britain in any EU renegotiation. He is most definitely not in favour, he says, of ‘ever closer union’ and wants to see reform to the eurozone and the single market, more subsidiarity and constraints on European institutions, and a greater role for national Parliaments. She listens attentively and appears sympathetic to his concerns.
So far, so good. But Number 10 then brief out that Merkel has given qualified support to Cameron’s renegotiation stance on the EU. This irritates her and her staff brief that this is not the case. More pointedly, her remarks in the Royal Gallery of the House of Commons contain a blunt message. The great and good of the UK throng to hear her speak, only the second time a German chancellor has addressed Parliament, the first being Willy Brandt of West Germany at the request of Harold Wilson in 1970. She talks about her respect and admiration for Britain, and its sense of history as proof of its European identity. But she also gives a brief passage in English:
Supposedly, or so I have heard, some expect my speech to pave the way for a fundamental reform of the European architecture which will satisfy all kinds of alleged or actual British wishes. I am afraid they are in for a disappointment. I have also heard that others are expecting the exact opposite and are hoping that I will deliver the clear and simple message here in London that the rest of Europe is not prepared to pay almost any price to keep Britain in the European Union. I am afraid these hopes will be dashed, too.6
She wants to manage the expectations of those investing powers in her, which she is either unwilling or unable to exercise on behalf of Britain. Advice has been coming into Number 10 for a year or more from both Brussels and Whitehall that ‘whatever she may say, she may not be able to deliver’. Nevertheless, to Cameron himself, well grounded or not, she remains the one person who can help Britain, both on negotiations, and in ridding him of his Juncker problem. Two weeks after her London visit, they meet in Hanover for a trade fair, and have dinner together in the Guest House of Lower Saxony. Again, she conveys the clear impression to him that she will be able to handle Juncker, if not immediately.
Cameron feels the need to make the case for renegotiation again in an article in mid-March. Deploying almost exactly the same arguments he used to Merkel in Number 10 over lunch two weeks before, he writes ‘No to ever closer union. No to a constant flow of power to Brussels. No to unnecessary interference. And no, it goes without saying, to the euro, to participation in eurozone bailouts or notions such as a European Army.’ He argues for powers to flow back from Brussels to national Parliaments, for businesses to be liberated from red tape, and for the criminal justice system to protect British citizens unencumbered by the European Convention on Human Rights. He writes that he is happy with EU enlargement, but wants ‘new mechanisms in place’ to prevent vast migrations. His primary passion is that the EU should be an economic powerhouse: ‘So, yes to the single market. Yes to turbo-charging free trade. Yes to working together where we are stronger together than alone.’7
He heeds Merkel’s advice to cool it on Juncker until after the European elections in May; but behind the scenes, he is working the telephones hard, speaking in particular to both Rutte and Reinfeldt: ‘If we let this happen, the European Council will never get another top job: they will be decided by the European Parliament,’ he tells them. On 22 April, he has Herman Van Rompuy, president of the Council, to Chequers for an overnight stay. Over dinner, Cameron is pleased to hear his guest criticising the Spitzenkandidaten process, and still more to hear him say that he thinks that neither Juncker nor Schulz are right as Commission president. They agree there is a need to place other candidates on the table.
The European elections are held on Thursday 22 May. Like many across the EU, Cameron assumes that the EPP and the S&D will achieve roughly the same number of seats. Merkel tells Cameron not to worry: that if it’s a dead heat between the two main parties, it won’t be a problem, because neit
her Schulz nor Juncker will be the answer.’ But when the results are declared on 25 May, the EPP emerges as the largest single party, winning 24.2% of the vote and 221 out of the 751 MEPs. The S&D are second with 191 seats while the ECR, to which the British Conservatives are affiliated, come third with seventy seats. In the UK, UKIP emerges as the largest single party, with twenty-four seats and 27.5% of the vote: the Conservatives are third with nineteen seats behind Labour with twenty. The victory for the EPP is a major blow to Cameron, bigger even than the predicted UKIP victory. The EPP’s unexpected victory is thought to be because voters in Central and Eastern Europe swung to the right after the Russian intervention in Ukraine.
Overnight, Juncker’s claim appears to have become far stronger. Nevertheless Cameron clings onto the hope he will carry the day. Van Rompuy scraps the European Council in May because of the elections, but convenes a dinner at the Justus Lipsius building in Brussels on 27 May to discuss the top jobs. Cameron is on the phone intensively in the preceding days, and believes he has secured general agreement at the dinner that the leaders will reject the Spitzenkandidaten process. Merkel talks about addressing the gender imbalance when choosing their recommendation for the next Commission president: she advocates ‘a broad tableau’ of contenders.8 Female candidates being courted at the time include Christine Lagarde from France, Helle Thorning-Schmidt from Denmark, and Dalia Grybauskaite from Lithuania.9 Van Rompuy sums up by saying: ‘Clearly there is a strong feeling that the process shouldn’t be concluded quickly and that we should look at other names.’ Merkel is transparent in her post-dinner press conference that this is her view, as carried in the Financial Times and other papers across Europe.10 However, Cameron’s use of his trump card at the meeting is leaked, and German magazine Der Spiegel says that ‘Cameron declared to fellow leaders that “If Juncker, a federalist, is appointed Commission president, the chances would increase that the British people would vote to leave in a planned 2017 referendum on EU membership.”’11 A reaction against Cameron is sparked, with some European leaders claiming to have felt ‘blackmailed’ by him.12
Merkel returns home to a hail of protest. ‘For days now,’ says Der Spiegel, ‘furious politicians on the editorial pages of newspapers have called on Merkel not to put up with this “blackmail”.’13 Her own party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and its allies, the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU), are angry with her for reneging on previous understandings she had given about supporting Juncker. The CDU/CSU bloc themselves had endorsed Juncker as a candidate on 24 February, and have no sympathy for her volte-face.14 The Spitzenkandidaten had played a major part in the German European election campaign, and therefore the German public have a very different view of their validity. Merkel had agreed with Cameron before the dinner how they would handle the discussion and that she would say at a press conference that there is not just one candidate. Her team cannot blame the British this time for briefing the press, as they themselves briefed the German press just after the dinner. The force of the pro-Juncker reaction against Merkel takes Number 10, and Merkel herself, by surprise: the tabloid Bild, owned by Axel Springer, the largest German newspaper group, is unrestrained in its enthusiasm for his candidacy, publishing an article entitled ‘Juncker must be president’.15 She changes her mind very quickly. Her main objective had been to block Schulz: tribalism returns with a vengeance. It is clear that Merkel is going to cave in: ‘It is a rare occasion that Merkel loses a domestic political fight,’ says a figure in Number 10. ‘Merkel had to choose between domestic politics and European statesmanship: in those kinds of situations, she would always choose German domestic politics,’ says another. On 30 May, she goes public with the announcement that she wants Juncker to be the new European Commission president.16
Cameron is left high and dry, along with Rutte and Reinfeldt. The advice from British officials in Brussels is emphatic: barring a fluke, he will not win. ‘You will end up in a position where you will be outnumbered.’ Despite this, Cameron insists on standing his ground, ‘intent on going down in flames’, according to one official. Number 10 provide a number of reasons why he does not want to back down: with the renegotiation in mind, he wants to show the EU he will stick to what he says; taking a resolute position will not jeopardise (and might even help achieve) British success in obtaining a good portfolio in the other top jobs at the Commission; he hopes it will strengthen Britain’s voice in the nomination of the other president post, for the Council; finally, he believes that the Commission can do better for its president than Juncker. He knows full well the disparaging remarks made by fellow leaders about the Luxembourger’s lack of drive and vision. ‘He regards it an example of the egregious way that the EU can operate, where the leaders say one thing in private and another in public.’
Cameron knows his lonely stance will call forth scorn in the UK. Ken Clarke is one of many voices dismissive of his Merkel-or-bust strategy: ‘She is the best European leader by a street, but she doesn’t walk on water. What she can deliver in European and German politics has constraints … She wants to keep us in the EU, but they misjudged it.’17 ‘Mr Cameron’s team has sometimes shown a tin ear for German domestic politics’, reflects the Telegraph a few months later.18 On 8 June, in an article in the Sunday Telegraph, Boris Johnson causes predictable anger in Number 10 when he dismisses the attempt to block Juncker as the ‘quintessence of turd-polishing pointlessness’.19
Cameron remains determined to fight to the end. He sees Merkel in Brussels on 4 June at the G7 summit, and invites her for a late-night drink at Rue Ducale, the elegant residence of the British permanent representative. She tells him that she had to look to her own position at home, but now the game is up. ‘Look, David, I’ve got to be blunt,’ she tells him. She thought she could stop it but admits she was wrong and it’s almost certain now that Juncker will get the Commission job. ‘I don’t accept that,’ Cameron replies, pushing back very hard, ‘we shouldn’t give in.’ Their tone is calm and friendly but underneath it, Cameron is very aggravated, feeling that he has been given undertakings in good faith that she has not delivered upon. Shortly before she leaves at 1.30 a.m. she concedes there is an outside possibility it will be somebody else. ‘But I have to say there is no realistic alternative to Juncker,’ he recalls her saying, before she sweeps off in her waiting convoy.
They meet again on 9 and 10 June at Reinfeldt’s official summer residence in Harpsund, 90 km west of Stockholm.20 The meeting is Reinfeldt’s idea, emerging out of discussions with Cameron. He argues that if only they can get several countries to oppose Juncker, and if their fellow leaders then fear a public spat, they will back off.21 The discussion on the presidency is deliberately postponed until after dinner on the first day. Cameron’s team hope that it will just be the four leaders together ‘without hangers-on’. But Merkel ‘won’t have any of it: typically, she will almost never meet without a trio of her advisers’. Merkel keeps trying to focus the discussion on the programme for the new Commission once it takes up post, as well as on the identity of the new Council president. They sit up talking until two in the morning over several bottles of wine. Cameron keeps bringing their conversation back to first principles and the question of the legitimacy of the European Parliament’s action, but Merkel will not have any of this either. She is clearer than ever that it has to be Juncker.
The next morning, Cameron goes for a swim in the lake: ‘he likes wild swimming’, says an insider. He sets off enthusiastically, joined by some of his aides, while ubiquitous bodyguards look on nervously. Quarrels over Juncker aside, Cameron rates it as one of his most enjoyable short trips of the year. But discussions that morning confirm that the game is up, and Rutte and Reinfeldt know it. They will no longer be fighting Juncker, and in the press conference, Merkel gives no grounds for hoping that the Spitzenkandidaten process can be stopped.22 Cameron leaves Harpsund on 10 June, vowing to stop Juncker, but knowing he will lose.
Whether egged on or not, the British press now weig
h into Juncker. He is attacked for over-drinking (‘Junck the drunk’), as well as for having a father who fought for Hitler (an unjust accusation, given that his father had been conscripted during Germany’s occupation of Luxembourg).23 The personal onslaughts are read with anger and bemusement in Europe’s capitals.
Cameron knows that the hysteria of the domestic press will win him no favours in Brussels, and realises that he needs to turn it into a debate about principle and to focus on the powers that the Commission is giving away. Three days after the meeting in Harpsund, he publishes an article in several European papers outlining his thinking, deploying arguments honed over the previous weeks and months with his fellow European leaders. He dismisses Junker and the entire Spitzenkandidaten process:
We must focus on finding the best candidate for Commission president. Someone who can deliver reform; driving growth and creating jobs; and accepting that Europe’s needs may best be served by action at the national level. An honest and trusted broker able to re-engage Europe’s voters.24
He is immensely frustrated that European leaders have capitulated to the demands of the European Parliament, and is determined that they should vote on the Juncker appointment in order to face up to their actions, even though he knows that Juncker will win. With less than a week to go before the fateful European Council, Van Rompuy visits Cameron in Number 10 on Monday 23 June, towards the end of a long tour of European capitals. Cameron is at his most uncompromising: ‘I want to ensure we have a vote in the Council on the Commission presidency,’ he tells him. Somewhat taken aback at his directness, Van Rompuy replies as diplomatically as he can that this will not be possible: ‘Can you give me a proper vote?’ Cameron asks him three times. Three times Van Rompuy replies ‘No I can’t.’ ‘If you can’t guarantee me a vote I have nothing more to discuss,’ Cameron says, almost throwing Van Rompuy out of the room. His brusque treatment of the Council president is the talk of Brussels within the hour, and greatly heightens anxiety in the build-up to the Council.
Cameron at 10 Page 49
