Northern Ireland enjoyed its most peaceful five-year period since the 1960s, due in part to Cameron’s June 2010 acknowledgement of the culpability of the British army on Bloody Sunday in 1972. In mainland Britain, despite cuts, austerity and high unemployment, civil unrest and trade union disruption were largely avoided, with the notable exceptions of the protests over student tuition fees in November and December 2010, and the riots in London and other cities in the summer of 2011. Fusilier Lee Rigby in May 2013 was the only British citizen to be murdered due to Islamist terrorism on British soil during the five years, despite a considerable rise in threat levels. Many plots, including some of 7/7 proportions, were foiled, through the skill, resourcing and legal powers of the intelligence services and police, together with a degree of good fortune. The London Olympics proceeded without incident in the summer of 2012. Cameron spoke forcefully about combating terrorism in February 2011, and would have wanted to go further in these five years to combat the threat both in the UK and abroad. He determined to do more if he secured a second term, perhaps recognising that not enough had been done to engage with leaders in the Muslim community. But throughout 2010–15, his close personal alertness to the threat of terrorism on the streets of Britain, and his wish to reduce the risk, was forensic.
Cameron’s record as a leader abroad, however, is much more mixed. He seized the initiative over British troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, and worked hard to try to ensure that the handover to the Afghans was smooth. Credit is due for the timely and orderly way he brought Britain’s involvement in this long-running war to an end. Another lesson he learnt from Blair’s government was to avoid any hint of ‘sofa government’ as seen during the Iraq War in 2003. He thus set up the National Security Council soon after the general election in 2010, which met weekly and which he himself chaired. The organisation’s first great test came over British intervention in Libya. This was driven by Cameron personally, backed by all members of the NSC and in Cabinet, and additionally supported by a United Nations resolution. The conclusion of the war and the downfall of Gaddafi in the autumn of 2011 brought Cameron short-term acclaim. He hoped, along with many others in the heady initial days of the Arab Spring, for a new dawn of democracy sweeping across the Arab world. This optimism faltered during the following years as it became clear that Libya had descended into violence and tribal infighting, and with Syria falling into civil war. His attempt to involve Britain militarily against Assad in August 2013 after he used chemical weapons against his own people produced his biggest foreign policy reversal of these years. The Commons defeat, and the deteriorating position in Libya, the two big question marks of his premiership, contributed to a loss of assertiveness by him in the final year and a half leading up to the general election in 2015. Humanitarian instincts drove him to intervene in Libya in 2011, and to try to intervene in Syria in 2013. He was not the first British leader whose aspirations in the region were to be thwarted by forces far more powerful than anything they could control. He can be criticised certainly for acting; equally, inaction would have resulted in opprobrium, and possible risk.
The recovery of the British economy and Cameron’s relationship with President Obama, trumpeted again in a late visit to Washington in January 2015, were significant in countering the widespread narrative about a loss of British influence on the world stage. Britain’s standing in the world in 2015 was certainly no higher than it had been in 2010, with many arguing it had diminished. It is thus hard to discern a consistent shape and intent of Cameron’s foreign policy during these five years, though he succeeded in keeping Britain safe, improving the relationship with the US after the Brown years and in promoting the British brand abroad. But it was not a time of heroes. Other national leaders in the West struggled to assert themselves on the world stage. Obama, Hollande, and leaders across the EU all experienced difficulties given the economic climate, the rise of China and India, Putin’s aggression in Ukraine, and militant Islam’s success in Syria and Iraq. Only Merkel in Germany emerged with credit from these difficult five years, though continuing difficulties facing the eurozone dented her authority.
If Cameron is seen to have succeeded on his big challenges during 2010–15, and to have introduced some important reforms along the way, then it follows that his team in Number 10 is unlikely to have been poor, as commentators frequently alleged over the five years. Number 10 went through a steep learning curve after May 2010, at times anarchic and ill-disciplined with Hilton there, but operating with increasing efficiency and effectiveness from 2012–13, for which Cameron’s three principal lieutenants – Ed Llewellyn, Kate Fall, and Craig Oliver – must take credit. All three eschewed becoming figures in their own right, unlike many in the courts of Thatcher and Blair. If this was in part a dual premiership with Osborne, it was also equally to some extent a collective premiership.
Cameron will leave office before 2020, and the ultimate verdict of history on him will depend on three principal questions: how he resolves Britain’s place in Europe, the continuing success of the economy, and resolving the Scottish (and English) questions. Reforming public services, and keeping Britain secure from the threat of terrorism, are other areas. But much can be said now about his achievement during 2010–15. He won two referenda, the first on AV and the second on Scotland, if not by a decisive margin on the latter, and with many questions left open. The startling resurgence of the Scottish National Party and its transformation of electoral politics north of the border sent shock waves through the British body politic, which he has yet to pacify and resolve.
He has led the Conservative Party for a turbulent nine and a half years; his three predecessors survived just eight years between them. The party is stronger and more unified after the 2015 election than it has been since Thatcher fell twenty-five years before, though it is questionable whether he has redefined modern conservatism in his image and whether the early journey to ‘detoxify’ the Tory brand will ever be completed. More pressingly, it remains to be seen how Cameron will manage the internal fallout from the EU referendum, whatever the result, and whether deep-seated divisions will return as damagingly as ever. If he can lead his party and the country into a new and settled accommodation with Europe, it will rank as the greatest of all his achievements.
Cameron’s mark on the nation is still taking shape, though the contours of his premiership between 2010 and 2015 are clear. At the outset of the book, we pondered whether Cameron had claim to be considered as the twenty-first-century Stanley Baldwin. While Baldwin’s place in history has been damaged by his failure to prepare the country sufficiently for war, he nevertheless bestrode the politics of the early twentieth century. He provided reassurance domestically during one of the most volatile and uncertain periods in British history. Though the circumstances of 2010–15 are markedly different, Cameron’s achievements in governing a country emerging from a major financial crisis, charting a course through a divided Europe and amid an international order rocked by terrorism and fundamentalism, rank alongside Baldwin’s. It will be a measure of the success of Cameron’s second term if he can provide the leadership for Britain on the world stage which Baldwin so spectacularly failed to do in the 1930s.
The government of 2010–15 compares favourably with Thatcher’s first term 1979–83, and comfortably outshines Blair’s from 1997–2001. While the achievements of the government of 2010–15 were uneven, by holding the coalition together, and providing stability at a time of economic renewal, he will be considered – whatever else may happen in the remainder of his premiership – as a figure of real historical interest and substance.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank above all the team of researchers who worked with us on the book. We were fortunate to have had our principal researchers Jonathan Meakin and Illias Thoms from start to finish. Illias concentrated primarily on domestic politics and policy including the economy, welfare and health reforms, while Jonathan handled US relations and foreign policy more genera
lly, including Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Russia and China. Both conducted some interviews, oversaw the production of briefs and incorporated feedback from readers, as well as contributing to the writing of the chapters themselves, both intellectually and factually. Hayley Carr, who worked with us for much of the writing phase, was critical in organising the office, facilitating the interviews and the throughput of work, and ensuring the successful completion of the book.
The team worked as a small and close-knit group putting in quite exceptionally long hours, seven days a week. We would also like to express our deep gratitude to, in order of length attached to the project, Jennie Doyle and Khurram Jowiya, Beth Oppenheim, Mark Davies, Ruari Hutchinson and Alison Warrick. We have always said to research teams we have worked with in the past that, in order to be successful, we must work at least as hard as Number 10. Each individual rose to this challenge and more. We are sure they will all go on to remarkable careers and we wish them every success.
We would also like to thank those (necessarily anonymous) ministers, aides and officials, Conservative and Liberal Democrat politicians, staff members and activists for interviews and for reading either the whole book or specific sections and providing comments to ensure the accuracy of the story.
We would like to thank professors Vernon Bogdanor, George Jones and Dennis Kavanagh for reading an early stage of the full book, and Christopher Everett, Mike Finn and Anthony Goodenough for reading the proofs. Philip Collins and James Naughtie provided useful insights towards the end of the project. A final thanks to Professor Stuart Ball, as ever, for advice on Conservative history.
We were very fortunate to have Cameron at 10 published by William Collins. In particular we would like to thank our editor, Martin Redfern, for guiding us through the project with such professionalism, skill and attention to detail. We are hugely grateful for the sterling work by our copy-editor David Milner, and to the indexer, David Atkinson. Also at William Collins we would like to thank the stellar Kate Tolley, Katherine Patrick, Caroline Crofts and Minna Fry for their expertise. From the outset, we had a very clear image of what we wanted Cameron at 10 to offer, and we would like to thank Andrew Parsons and Saddika Ozkan at I-Images for providing some of the superb photographs that illuminate the story. Andrew Enston also deserves credit for assisting with photographic selection.
Our final thanks go to Susan Thomas for co-ordinating the safe storage of all the research material at the Bodleian Library, and the British Academy/Leverhulme small-grants team, including Dr Ken Emond, Claire McDonagh and Ratha Saravanakumar, for supporting our primary research to further the field of humanities and social sciences.
Peter Snowdon in particular would like to thank Anthony Seldon. From mentor to collaborator, Anthony has been a great source of wisdom and encouragement for nearly twenty years. Andrew Gordon, at David Higham Associates, has been exemplary, offering sound advice from the outset. I am grateful to all my colleagues at the BBC for their support, in particular Jamie Angus, Victoria Wakely and Ollie Stone Lee at the Today programme, as well as Nick Robinson, Norman Smith and other colleagues in Westminster. Malcolm Balen provided valuable and insightful comments from start to finish. As on many other projects, Daniel Collings has been a constant source of wisdom and encouragement. Finally, I would like to thank my family and especially my wife Julia, for her love, heroic patience and support. My son, William (nearly two years old at the time of writing), will be relieved that Cameron at 10 will not feature in his selection of bedtime stories – at least for a while!
Anthony Seldon in particular would like to thank the following: first and foremost Peter Snowdon, whom I have known since he was an A level student. I have watched his career progress with pride as he has developed into a fine writer and shrewd political judge. At Wellington College I would like to thank my outstanding PAs Angela Reed and Hani Edwards, and all my colleagues, governors and students. I would like to thank the vast numbers of contacts in and outside Whitehall and academic life with whom I have worked for thirty years on these inside books. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Joanna, and my three children, Jessica, Susannah and Adam. Without them, the writing of this book would have been impossible.
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Documentaries
Boris Johnson: The Irresistible Rise, BBC film, Michael Cockerell, 25 March 2013
The Liberal Who Came to Power, BBC Radio 4, 17 February 2014
Under Attack: The Threat from Cyberspace, BBC Radio 4, 8 July 2013
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Notes
Interviewees who agreed to be quoted by name are referred to below, in addition to other published sources. To avoid endlessly repeating the words ‘Private interview’ and ‘Private information’, off-the-record references are not cited individually.
Introduction
1. For an analysis of the policy record of the coalition government, see Anthony Seldon and Mike Finn (eds), The Coalition Effect, 2010–2015 (2015)
2. Benedict Brogan, Daily Telegraph, 5 October 2011
3. Stuart Ball, Portrait of a Party: The Conservative Party in Britain (2013), p. 468
4. Interview, Stuart Ball
5. Interview, Vernon Bogdanor
6. Anthony Seldon, ‘Chumocracy’, Sunday Times, 5 May 2013
Chapter 1
1. Interview, Tom Fletcher
2. Interview, Sir Simon McDonald
3. Interview, Tom Fletcher
4. Interview, Ed Llewellyn
Cameron at 10 Page 61
