by Mark Zuehlke
Young, meanwhile, had sent his new brigade major, Major George Hees, driving forward with instructions to direct the first tanks encountered towards Fontenay. Young also ordered the South Saskatchewans’ Lieutenant Colonel Clift to send men to relieve the pressure on the Camerons. Hees happened across Major D’Arcy Marks of the 1st Hussars and led ‘C’ Squadron to Rocquancourt. Here the tankers married up with two companies of infantry. Still ignoring his shrapnel wound, Clift climbed onto Marks’s Sherman while the infantry started marching. Suddenly, Marks spotted a large force of German infantry about six to eight hundred yards distant on the southern skyline. Advancing twenty yards, Marks opened up with his machine guns. As he sprayed the entire field, Germans began popping up to surrender. Leaving the prisoners to the two Saskatchewan companies not joining the march to Fontenay, ‘C’ Squadron went to the rescue of the Camerons.57
The rescue force circled in from the north and cleared the slopes of Verrières Ridge, which broke the siege in Fontenay. By noon, the counterattacks were lessening. With the tanks and Saskatchewan troops ranging the countryside around Fontenay, the Camerons easily secured the village. Both battalions started reeling in prisoners as the 89th Division began losing its fighting spirit. The Camerons had four hundred prisoners by mid-afternoon.
As the crisis in Fontenay passed, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal formed for another attempt on May-sur-Orne. The Fusiliers, Major J.M.P. Brochu later wrote, were “now seriously depleted.” But they had support from four Crocodile flame-throwing tanks and that boosted morale. ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies, with a combined total of sixty men, were to advance down the right side of the road from Saint-André, while the ninety men of ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies would be to the left.
The Fusiliers counted on the Crocodiles to break the Germans. Although fitted with a flame projector, these adapted Churchills still retained 75-millimetre guns and machine guns. This gave them substantial firepower and flexibility. The fuel for the flame-thrower was towed behind in a trailer and piped along the underside of the tank to the projector.
Two infantry sections moved closely behind each Crocodile. “As the tank approached a house it would fire, knock a hole in the house, then squirt the liquid flame into the opening thus created. Immediately the section directly behind … would dash for the doorway and clear the house as quickly as possible,” Brochu wrote. “This sounds very dangerous but the fire once ignited is not dangerous. The thing to beware of is getting in the path of the flame thrower itself for everything touched by the liquid is ignited. The tank meanwhile moves [forward] down the line to a second house.” In this way, the two sections leapfrogged forward.
The companies on the right soon reached the church in the centre of May and realized the Germans had fled rather than deal with the Crocodiles. To the left, with fewer buildings to clear, the Crocodiles contented themselves with setting fire to the “few trees remaining in the battle-scarred orchards.” By the time the Fusiliers and Crocodiles were finished, most of May was on fire, and “the buildings blazed all night and some … continued to burn all the next day,” Brochu reported. The Fusiliers were elated by how easily they had won this round. “The infantry were not disturbed by the problem of having to clear houses ablaze, but were very glad to have such effective [support] even at the costof a lot of extra sweat.” Better sweat than blood.58
When heads were counted, the Fusiliers were surprised to find that casualties had been relatively light: eight men killed and seventeen wounded. Clearly, a significant number of men had gone to ground—a fact indicative of how worn out 6th Brigade’s battalions were. The South Saskatchewans were harder hit, with sixteen men killed and forty-two wounded. Worst off were the Camerons, who lost thirty dead and ninety-six wounded.59 But 6th Brigade had finally broken the German hold on the fortified villages along the Orne, and this win meant that the second phase of Operation Totalize could begin.
[ 20 ]
Many Anxious Moments
NEITHER MAJOR GENER AL George Kitching nor Major General Stanislaw Maczek agreed with Lieutenant General Guy Simonds’s plan to combine the final two phases of Operation Totalize. Kitching was particularly concerned about the insistence that each division attack on a narrow, thousand-yard front. When they asked for wider frontages, Simonds refused. He envisioned a narrow, mailed fist punching through to Falaise. Kitching feared that instead the Germans would be free to concentrate and block their divisions. Both generals also opposed the long pause between phases. Simonds held firm.1
Ultra decryptions still mistakenly situated 1st SS Panzer Division holding a line crossing the Caen-Falaise highway at Cintheaux. This misinformation reinforced Simonds’s determination to advance the armoured divisions side by side.2 Correctly, Simonds knew that 12th SS Panzer Division lurked somewhere north of Falaise and that 89th Infantry Division remained potent—particularly its heavy artillery. Consequently, the scheduled bomber strike remained essential to his plan.
The changed plan had presented Kitching with a logistical nightmare that had to be resolved in little more than twenty-four hours. All objectives were reassigned, brigade centre lines changed and narrowed, assembly areas relocated, and everything carefully woven into a new design where no operational detail was left unmended.
Maczek, his Polish counterpart, had to not only prepare a new plan but move the Poles across the Orne, then through the congested rear areas of II Canadian Corps, and assemble them east of the Caen-Falaise highway behind 51st (Highland) Division. The highway served as the divisional boundary. Both divisions would advance from a road connecting Bretteville-sur-Laize to Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil. Running down the centre of the Canadian advance line, a railway paralleled the highway. It ran alternately along fifteen-foot-high embankments and through deep cuttings. Half a mile west of the highway, the ground sloped steeply to the wooded valley bordering the Laize River. The Canadian objectives were a series of hills between the highway and the river, six to seven miles south of the start line.3 The Poles had two sets of objectives—Point 140 to the south of Estrées-la-Campagne and thereafter Points 170 and 159 overlooking Falaise.4
Neither Maczek nor Kitching had previously led an armoured division into battle. But Maczek was more experienced. Born in 1892, he had first seen military service during the 1920 –1922 Polish-Bolshevik War. When the Germans invaded Poland, Maczek commanded 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade. With Poland’s defeat, Maczek fled to France and re-formed the brigade from expatriates before fleeing again to Britain in 1940. After two years commanding the armoured brigade, he was promoted to command 1st Polish Armoured Division.5
Maczek’s English was poor, so he often fell back on French. Kitching served as translator, although he suspected Simonds understood more French than he leton. In Kitching’s opinion, Simonds used this ruse to allow him time to muster arguments he could then deploy to dismiss Maczek’s concerns and opinions.6
Born on September 19, 1910, in Canton, China, Kitching had trained at Sandhurst before being commissioned into the British army. He served through the late 1920s and 1930s in Singapore, Malaya, and India before resigning his commission to move to Canada in 1938. With the war, he joined the Royal Canadian Regiment and went overseas in 1939. A slender man with a handlebar moustache and clipped British accent, Kitching had more experience with staff postings than with line units. He had risen rapidly on the staff track to the post of general staff officer, 1st grade, of 1st Infantry Division and served under Simonds during the Sicily invasion. In October 1943, he was promoted to brigadier and command of 5th Armoured Division’s 11th Infantry Brigade. He returned to Britain in March 1944 to take over 4th Armoured Division.7
Kitching had brought along a core group of Italian campaign veterans to fill key positions. Brigadier Jim Jefferson, previously commander of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment, headed up 10th Infantry Brigade, while Brigadier Leslie Booth took over the 4th Armoured Brigade. Brigadier J.N. “Herm” Lane controlled the division’s artillery. Kitching also leavened through the
division a small coterie of tank and infantry majors from Italy.8 Although this gave 4th Armoured Division some combat-experienced officers, the division still had never fought a battle. The same was true for the Poles.
On the morning of August 8, Kitching and Maczek were again of one mind and opposing Simonds. They wanted the air bombardment scrapped so their divisions could advance the moment they reached the start line. Kitching even invoked Lieutenant General Harry Crerar. “Whatever you do in this attack, don’t let the enemy get away, keep pushing, push, keep the mobility. Don’t stop,” Crerar had earlier insisted. Kitching thought it foolish not to advance until 1400 hours. “ Why do we have to wait before going forward?” he asked. Simonds cited his certainty that 1st SS Panzer Division held a strong line that must be broken by bombing. Until the air force struck, there could be no advance.9
As it turned out, Kitching and Maczek could not have advanced immediately, because 2nd Canadian Infantry Division and the 51st (Highland) Division were still fighting for final objectives that morning. As aresult, 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade made only slow progress through terrific congestion to a position in front of Ifs, while 10th Infantry Brigade similarly moved to a concentration area between Fleury-sur-Orne and Ifs. This put 4th Division about four miles north of its start line.
By mid-morning, the division’s artillery reconnaissance teams were working their way forward to scout allocated gun positions between Verrières and Rocquancourt.10 “After a sleepless n ight,” wrote the 23rd Field Regiment (Self-Propelled) official historian, “the recce parties [headed] for a deployment area south of Rocquancourt. As they inched along the road the first grim scenes of death met their eye—smashed equipment, battered buildings, sun-blacked bodies of Germans and British and Canadians who would fight no more and now lay side by side in the silent comradeship of death. No matter how one prepares for that sight, it still comes as a shock.
“The recce party ran into a heap of trouble in the form of an enemy 88-mm gun which had the road well covered. Major [Robert Ernest] Hogarth and Lieutenant [D.A.] Short had to make a fast gallop back to their vehicles after they had gone ahead to look the situation over and the whole column was backed up to a crossing where we turned east and then south to another area. Progress during the night had not been up to expectations so that the original deployment area could not be occupied without ending up dead or a POW.
“Towards noon the regiment finally got deployed near Verrières right in the middle of what seemed to be the main tank paths for the armoured attack.”11
When 15th Field Regiment’s reconnaissance personnel reached Rocquancourt, they huddled behind a stone wall, while the “whole area was being systematically shelled from three sides, snipers were everywhere, and anti-tank guns engaged any vehicle that moved over high ground. Nonetheless, battery and troop areas were allotted, gun platforms were selected, and survey was begun. This work was well under way when it was decided that the area was too exposed, and recce parties were ordered to withdraw north of the town where the regiment had lain for several hours awaiting the order to deploy, still in complete ignorance of what was going on in front and around it.” Not until shortly after noon were the regiment’s guns deployed in an orchard north of Rocquancourt.12
Because armoured divisions had only two inherent field artillery regiments, First Canadian Army’s 19th Field Regiment was attached for Totalize. Struggling through intense traffic congestion, these gunners didn’t reach their gun area near Rocquancourt until after noon and were not ready to fire until 1300 hours.13
Getting the guns positioned was just one problem besetting the division’s artillery headquarters staff. At 0930 hours, they suddenly learned it was their responsibility to mark bomb targets with red smoke. They assigned the task to 23rd Field Regiment, only to learn the gunners had insufficient shells of this type. At 1100 hours, a “priority” convoy rolled into divisional headquarters with the requisite shells, and Captain B.S. Saunders guided it to the regiment’s gun line. “After many anxious moments, [the regiment began] firing red smoke at correct places at the correct time,” the divisional artillery’s war diarist recorded.14
AT 1255, 680 American B-17 and B-24 bombers arrived. Their assigned targets were Bretteville-sur-Laize on the right, Saint-Sylvain to the left, Hautmesnil astride the Caen-Falaise highway, and the little hamlet of Gouvix immediately south of Bretteville.15 Approaching on a west-to-east trajectory crossing the Canadian and Polish front, the bombers were also exposed to heavy German flak, which caused considerable disorganization. Ten bombers were shot down and 294 sustained damage. Low cloud, lingering haze, and battlefield smoke hampered the ability to see assigned targets despite the red smoke. Consequently, a number of bombardiers released bombs onto Canadian, Polish, and British troops.16 Two twelve-plane groups veered far off course, and most of these dropped their payloads between Vaucelles and Cormelles.17
A 3rd Infantry Division column was just coming out of Vaucelles. The North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment was in trucks near its head. Major Robert Robichaud “saw a cloud of dust, smoke and fire rolling toward us.” Soldiers piled out of still rolling trucks to seek cover. “The bombing stopped right in front of my company … As soon as the air cleared up a bit I proceeded to the head of the column with [Company Sergeant Major] Roger Tremblay … Fires were burning all over the place and a continuous staccato of bursting shells filled the air, the artillery ammunition dumps had been set on fire. We saw several bodies in flames … This was a severe blow to the unit and we stopped for the night shortly afterward.”18 Twenty-three other ranks were killed, seventy-three other ranks and two officers wounded.19 This was about the same casualty rate the battalion suffered on D-Day.
On the outskirts of Cormelles, the 1st Hussars ‘B’ Echelon had eight men killed and ten wounded. A hit on the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade’s headquarters resulted in several casualties and the destruction of much equipment. The 3rd Division headquarters was also struck. Its signals office took a direct hit that killed or wounded everyone inside and knocked out all communication. Major General Rod Keller was critically wounded.20
The Fort Garry Horse’s ‘B’ Echelon was close by. Major Bruce Macdonald had just overseen loading eight Kangaroos with ammunition and fuel to take to the regiment’s tanks on the front line when a stick of bombs struck. Several Kangaroos were blown up, and a couple of others started burning. To prevent its ammunition and fuel from exploding in the congested area, Macdonald jumped aboard one burning Kangaroo and raced it out onto the adjacent road and into the midst of a passing Polish column. As the Kangaroo plunged through the column and out the other side, it sheered the rear end off a staff car. Snatching up an extinguisher, Macdonald smothered the flames. He was horrified to see the bodies of two Polish officers hanging out of the wrecked car. “Oh, my God,” he cried. A Polish soldier shook his head. “Do not worry,” he said. “They were already dead from the bombs.”
Macdonald staggered off, sick to his stomach but also dizzy. As he remembered all the inhaled extinguisher fumes, Macdonald passed out. When he awoke, he stared up at a movie camera manned by a Canadian Army cameraman. “What the hell are you doing?” he gasped. “Jesus,” the man said, “I thought I was filming one of the dead. Glad to see you’re not.” The cameraman offered a f lask of whisky and Macdonald took a grateful slug.21 Returning to the regiment’s harbour, he learned that ten Fort Garry Horse soldiers had died.22
A final casualty toll, including those of the Polish division, was estimated at 65 killed and 250 wounded. In addition, four Canadian medium and heavy guns were damaged and about fifty-five vehicles destroyed or damaged. Large quantities of ammunition and fuel were lost.23
“This misadventure in the rear did not affect the advance of [4th Canadian Armoured Division],” an army report later concluded. “Its troops were [instead] held up by the jammed traffic resulting from the difficulties around Rocquancourt.”24 This and other critical delays meant that most benefits accruing from the bombing
were lost, as the Germans gained several hours to recover and strengthen defensive lines.
While the targets at Bretteville, Hautmesnil, and Saint-Sylvain were heavily bombed, only one bomber dropped on Gouvix. Unable to identify that target, the other bombers assigned to it returned to base without releasing any bombs. Only 492 bombers in fact dropped their ordnance, for a total of about 1,848 tons.25
The bombers had arrived just as Standartenführer Kurt Meyer was launching a 12th SS Panzer Division counterattack. Although his tanks and infantry were rolling through open fields, not a single bomber altered course to engage them.26 The counterattacking force consisted of seven Tigers, a company of Mark IV Panzers, a mixed group of two companies fielding several anti-tank guns, a company of self-propelled guns, and a thinned-out infantry battalion. It advanced against the right flank of 51st (Highland) Division in front of Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil. While German artillery and mortars hammered the British troops, the Tigers led off from Cintheaux. SS Hauptsturmführer Michael Wittmann commanded the Tigers. A Knight’s Cross winner and minor German celebrity, Wittmann was the country’s top tank ace, having amassed 143 armoured vehicle kills during fighting on both the eastern and western fronts.
Wittmann directed the Tigers, several Mark IVs, some half-tracks carrying panzer grenadiers, and two SPGs straight up the highway on a trajectory passing immediately east of Gaumesnil.27 From positions south of Saint-Aignan, British tankers prepared to engage the Tigers, while ‘A’ Squadron of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers also zeroed in from next to Gaumesnil. Major Sidney Radley-Walters had established the squadron in the grounds of a large château, surrounded by a high concrete wall that ran alongside the highway. ‘A’ Squadron had eight Shermans, two of which mounted 17-pounders. The crews had cut holes in the walls to create firing ports for the main guns.
