by Mark Zuehlke
While company and squadron commanders worked out details, Hay raced back to ‘A’ Company and told Captain Clark Robertson there were new orders. His company, along with the support company, was to go under command of the Governor General’s Foot Guards. The rest of the battalion, Hay said, would be operating elsewhere.6
Monk and his ‘B’ Squadron counterpart, Major J.H. “Johnny” Carson, walked to the latter’s squadron area. “We agreed that, as it would be impossible for me to read my map in the carrier in the dark, he would answer for direction, and I would keep ‘B’ Company on his tail.” Monk went back to his company and found that two detachments of the Algonquins’ 3-inch mortars had joined it.
At about 0230 hours, Worthington Force “crawled out … nose to tail, crossed the highway and started south … At first there were frequent halts. We were in waist-high wheat.” Going into their first action, the tankers chattered on the wireless. Monk tried “to figure out what was going on ahead … but between the excited voices and considerable static, it was difficult.”7
After thirty minutes, the column was fired upon by Germans to the east. These were bypassed in accordance with Worthington’s admonition to keep moving. As ‘C’ Squadron passed between Hautmesnil and Cauvicourt, it came under heavier fire from an anti-aircraft gun in an open field just north of Bretteville.8 Worthington suddenly faced a dilemma. Ahead, Halpenny Force was still fighting in Bretteville. Should he wait until it was cleared and pass through according to plan? This would ensure that the column followed its mapped course but might mean losing the cover of darkness. Worthington signalled: “Move on anyway, while we still have surprise.”9
‘C’ Squadron swung east to hook past the village and then cross to the west side of the highway to head for Point 195. As the column left the highway, it came under increasing fire from Cauvicourt, and the lead tanks replied with high-explosive shells while cutting back to the west to gain some distance from this hamlet. Buildings in Cauvicourt began burning. Fires broke out in the wheat, as the tankers slammed rounds into haystacks that might conceal German tanks or anti-tank guns. In their half-tracks and carriers, the Algonquins felt “very conspicuous. There was much small arms fire which seemed to be coming from all directions, but no heavy shells or 88s,” Monk wrote.
“With the tanks firing their machineguns as they moved, we began to move more and more rapidly, getting pretty well spread out and travelling generally south, over rolling country in waist-high wheat. Most of the enemy fire was directed at the tanks. We remained huddled down in our half-tracks, half-hidden in the wheat and moving in fits and starts.”10
Bearing eastward, the force crossed the Chemin Haussé du duc Guillaume—a dead-straight relic of William the Conqueror’s time—that angled to the southeast and away from the Caen-Falaise highway.11 Worthington Force rolled alongside this route. Pushing through a small wood south of Cauvicourt, the lead tanks “sighted enemy soft skin vehicles, armoured cars, and half-tracks. These were duly shot up as we proceeded and many … enemy were killed.”12
As the column gathered speed, it lost cohesion. ‘C’ Squadron, with Worthington’s headquarters, emerged from the wood and followed the Chemin Haussé. Dawn was breaking. The tanks were alongside a straight road; ahead high ground was visible. Assuming they were following the Caen-Falaise highway, the lead element dashed on. “The whole area shakes with blast, 88’s fire from all angles. The air is streaked with tracer, smoke rises, tanks brew, crews bail out. Orders are shouted over the wireless, crew commanders strain their eyes through binoculars,” the Dukes’ Captain Douglas Harker wrote.13
Through this gauntlet, the leading element gained the slopes ahead. At about 0650 hours, Worthington called a halt and deployed ‘C’ Squadron’s sixteen remaining tanks and his four headquarters tanks in a square formation on high ground that offered a commanding view.14 Over the wireless, Worthington reported to Booth that he was on Point 195. “No evidence of enemy occupation, but recent signs,” he said. “We are holding until our friends come forward to consolidate.”15
In fact, Worthington was about three miles east of Point 195. A hill to the southwest of where he stood was Point 140, a Polish first objective. Because of this wireless report, 4th Armoured Division assumed Worthington Force was where it should be.
THE ALGONQUINS HAD watched ‘B’ and ‘C’ Squadrons disappear “over the crest of a hill” as they had entered a dense wood. Trying to follow the tracks left by the tanks, their vehicles struggled over “stumps and fallen brushwood. Some … got stuck and had to be pulled clear with the carrier using … tow chains.” An 88-millimetre gun started sniping at the infantry trying to free the half-tracks. Breaking free of the woods, the Algonquins “sped up the steep slope.”
Clear of the crest, ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies raced along, following the track marks left by the tanks. Sporadically, they came under inaccurate small-arms fire, to “which we replied … by firing … Brens from our moving vehicles.” As the infantry came to a small village with a prominent stone church, Monk saw ‘B’ Squadron stopped ahead. The Algonquins also halted, and Monk sent No. 10 Platoon to reconnoitre the village. Then he and Major MacPherson of ‘C’ Company joined Major Carson, who was studying a map.16
Although Monk thought Carson was as disoriented as he was, the tank commander had managed to situate himself. Realizing that the village was Estrées-la-Campagne, Carson knew the force had lost direction. While still trying to establish wireless contact with Worthington, Carson ordered his No. 2 Troop to lead the squadron towards the actual Point 195. The troop was just leaving as the Algonquins arrived. Then Worthington came up on the wireless and ordered everyone to “advance to high ground in front.” Not recalling No. 2 Troop, Carson led the restof the squadron towards Worthington’s position with ‘C’ Company following.17
‘B’ Company remained in place to wait for No. 10 Platoon. Once it reported that Estrées-la-Campagne was clear, Monk rolled his men “into a valley, up the far slope, passing several orderly rows of trees and finally into a rectangular field surrounded by a shoulder-high hedge.”18 Gathered here were now sixteen ‘C’ Squadron tanks, eleven from ‘B’ Squadron, four from Worthington’s headquarters, and a reconnaissance troop Stuart.19 ‘C’ Company was already digging slit trenches along the southern hedge that ran to a finger of woods at the field’s southwestern corner. The mortar detachments set up in the northwest corner of the perimeter. Monk’s ‘B’ Company was directed to hold the east flank and about a hundred yards of the northern front. When ‘D’ Company arrived, Lieutenant Colonel Hay said, it would occupy the rest of the northern flank and the western front.
Monk realized, as he got his men digging, that No. 10 Platoon had gone missing. The platoon had come under fire from two 88-millimetre guns manned by about thirty Germans when it was four hundred yards short of the summit. Lieutenant Claire Dutcher charged the guns with the two half-tracks, and as they closed in, the platoon piled out with bayonets fixed. The five Germans not killed were taken prisoner. Dutcher’s men disabled the guns and proceeded to the summit.
Monk surveyed the situation. Because there was little cover, the half-tracks and carriers were positioned at measured intervals tight against the hedges. The tanks were arrayed so their 75-millimetre guns could fire in any direction. ‘D’ Company was still absent, its portion of the perimeter barely defended.20
At 0800 hours, a Tiger tank appeared in the distance. Worthington told ‘C’ Squadron’s Major Tom Baron to command the tanks while he controlled the entire force. By this time, everyone knew Worthington Force was out on a limb and about to fight for its life.
Worthington Force had been discovered by Obersturmführer Bernhard-George Meitzel of 12th SS Division’s headquarters. He had ventured east from Quesnay Wood in an armoured car to find the division’s Kampfgruppe Waldmüller. Instead, he saw Canadian tanks on a hill. Returning to the wood, Meitzel reported the news to Obertsturmbannführer Max Wünsche. Fearing the Canadian appearance signalled a dri
ve into largely undefended territory, Wünsche decided to attack. Five Tigers would strike from the west, while fifteen Panthers approached from the east.21 Anti-tank guns and infantry were also dispatched.
WORTHINGTON STILL HELD the forlorn hope that ‘A’ Squadron and ‘D’ Company would arrive. But by the time ‘A’ Squadron reached Estrées-la-Campagne, the approaches to where Worthington was, on Point 111, had been shut by German tanks and anti-tank guns. Lieutenant L.D. Stevens and No. 1 Troop in the lead lost one Sherman to a mechanical breakdown next to the village. Then Stevens saw tanks silhouetted on a nearby summit and recognized them as Shermans. As Stevens and his corporal’s tanks moved into the open, a Tiger immediately knocked them out.
About this time, ‘A’ Squadron was joined by ‘B’ Squadron’s No. 2 Troop. It had gone to within a mile of Point 195 before withdrawing. The two elements linked up just as Tigers inside Estrées opened fire. Three ‘A’ Squadron tanks and one of No. 2 Troop’s blew up.22 One observer noted that when the Tiger’s 88-millimetre shells sliced into a Sherman, there was usually an “immediate explosion and flames roared 20 to 30 feet out of the top of the turret. This was followed by two or three explosions of high octane gas and the high-explosive shells and the ammunition racks exploding.”23
‘A’ Squadron’s Major Geoffrey “Jeff” Sidenius ordered the surviving tanks to break through to Point 111. The running fight became completely disorganized. Two ‘ A’ Squadron’s No. 2 Troop tanks dashed desperately through fire and gained the Worthington Force perimeter. When Sidenius’s headquarters section and No. 3 Troop attempted to follow, three tanks “were hit within a few yards of their starting point. Major Sidenius was seen to start out of his turret and then fall back again.” The rest of the tanks, now consisting of a single one of ‘A’ Squadron and three of ‘B’ Squadron’s No. 2 Troop, were pinned down short of Point 111.
Lieutenant Harvey Allen McDiarmid, commanding ‘A’ Squadron’s No. 2 Troop, told Worthington that the “enemy armour and anti-tank guns had completely cut off our approaches and no further reinforcements from the original battle group could reach our position.”24
When the Tigers opened fire from Estrées, Sidenius had ordered the Algonquins’ ‘D’ Company to wait until the tanks opened a route for them. Standing next to his half-track, Major Keith Stirling then watched Sidenius die. Unable to raise Worthington by wireless, Stirling made for the hill, only to be driven back by anti-tank gun and mortar fire. Realizing ‘D’ Company could never get through, Stirling linked up with the Lake Superiors in Bretteville, and ‘D’ Company spent the afternoon fighting alongside them.25
Although he had brought it to the wrong place, Worthington was on good ground for a fight. The field was three hundred yards long by one hundred yards wide. It enjoyed good fields of fire. The edge was surrounded by a four-foot hedge. The eastern flank was also bordered by a thin line of tall trees inside the hedge. A thick wood extended from the western flank, and most of the slopes off Point 111 were covered in rough gorse. It was most vulnerable from the north and south, where wheat fields sloped gradually up to the hedge. Worthington had deployed most of his tanks to cover these two approaches. His headquarters tank was inside the cover provided by a few trees next to the northern hedge.26
At about 0800, Worthington stood alongside Major Monk and gazed with binoculars at their route of approach. “He was quite calm, but I think concerned over the non-arrival of the rest of our force. He told me we would stay and hold here, come what may.”27 Over the next hour, Worthington sent several signals reporting himself still on Point 195. At 4th Armoured Division headquarters, Kitching was increasingly uneasy. He ordered red smoke shells fired to the front of Point 195. “Where are you in relation to the red smoke?” Kitching asked. “I can’t see it. Where is the red smoke?” Worthington replied.28
When Worthington requested artillery against a target, brigade directed the fire against a reference point five hundred yards southeast of Point 195. “Are you getting required support now?” the brigade signaller asked. There was no answer. Worthington Force was off the air.29
Kitching suspected Worthington had swung behind the German front and was somewhere near Potigny, about a half-mile southeast of Point 195. Although both divisional and brigade headquarters could hear heavy fighting under way near Point 111, everyone thought this marked the Polish Division advancing to its objectives.
In the mid-morning, 4th Armoured Division’s chief artillery officer, Brigadier Herm Lane, went aloft in his small spotting plane. Circling over the battleground, he saw no signs of the lost force.30 At 4th Armoured Brigade headquarters, Brigadier Leslie Booth was also trying to locate Worthington. He sent Major N.A. Buckingham, the Governor General’s Foot Guards liaison officer, looking in a scout car. Buckingham passed Bretteville and made for Point 195. Soon Buckingham, his driver, and his bodyguard were creeping the scout car through open fields. No signs of fighting ahead. No tank tracks visible. “We couldn’t find anything or hear anything except noise [of fighting] to the right and left. It became awfully eerie and awfully quiet out in the right direction. I decided we had gone far enough and went back and told [Booth] how far we had gone and that we couldn’t find anything out there.”31
ON POINT 111, Major Tom Baron decided the best defence was an offence and sent Lieutenant William Harrison Bicknell with three tanks, including two 17-pounders, northward to engage the earlier spotted Tiger. He also directed ‘B’ Squadron to seize a wood to the southwest concealing anti-tank guns. The two tanks remaining in Lieutenant John Stock’s No. 4 Troop headed for the woods, while Lieutenant John Scudamore’s No. 3 Troop covered the move with fire and smoke shells. Stock’s troop reached the edge of the wood and found it “clear of the enemy.”32 Hoping to extend the fortress defences farther, Major Carson headed for the wood with his squadron headquarters. Crew commanders in the other two tanks were Captain Johnny Hope and Sergeant George Wallbank.33 Suddenly, the tanks that had ventured out from the fortress on either side “began to ‘brew up’ and none were able to return, even with the smoke provided by the remaining troops.”
Almost everyone in Bicknell’s troop, including the lieutenant, died.34 A Tiger round cut through Stock’s front right sponson and killed the co-driver. Ammunition and fuel exploded, the resulting blast blowing Stock and the rest of the crew out.35 In Carson’s group, only Captain Hope survived the destruction of his Sherman, emerging from the turret with an arm sheered off.36 Stock found Wallbank lying next to his burning Sherman “moaning, with one foot completely blown off and the boot lying about four feet from the stump with a long piece of Achilles tendon still attached.” A fine athlete, Wallbank pleaded with Stock to shoot him. Stock gave him a morphine injection instead. Suffering severe burns, Stock could do nothing more for Wallbank. Although a half-track reached the tankers, its crew could not recover all the injured. Wallbank and several others crawled painfully back to the perimeter.37
In the fortress, the situation kept deteriorating as the morning progressed. Mortar and artillery fire pounded it. Casualties mounted. Then two Typhoon fighter-bombers circled overhead before swooping down to fire rockets and machine guns. Recognition panels were thrown out and yellow smoke fired to signal they were friendly forces. The Typhoons rocked their wings in recognition. Thereafter, Typhoons came over at thirty-minute intervals to rocket and strafe the closing enemy. “They were heartily cheered many times during the day,” Monk wrote.38
One of the great puzzles in the Worthington Force debacle was why the RAF, which organized repeated support flights, never reported its activities to First Canadian Army. Had it done so, the missing force might have been situated and reinforced.
Air support alone could not drive off the Germans. At 0930 hours, an 88-millimetre shell exploded. Lieutenant Colonel Hay fell with part of one leg severed off—a wound that ultimately claimed his life in 1949. Company Sergeant Major Aldege Primeau fell dead. Major MacPherson’s back was riddled with gravel and shrapnel. The wounded com
mander of the half-track drivers from the Royal Army Service Corps, a Captain Lewis, suggested loading the remaining eleven half-tracks with wounded and breaking out. Worthington agreed.
MacPherson announced he would stay and command the Algonquins. He and Monk knew they were nowhere near Point 195, but had no idea of their true whereabouts. The two officers took Lewis aside. As it was daylight, they said, he should be able to fix their location and report it to 10th Infantry Brigade headquarters. Lewis agreed to try.39 The half-tracks made a “mad dash to safety.”40 Only one was knocked out.41 Disoriented during the escape, Lewis reported to brigade headquarters staff at 1030 hours that he thought Worthington Force was correctly on Point 195.42
At noon, MacPherson and Monk conferred again. MacPherson said Worthington had “given the same order to hold here come what may. We discussed the situation and although casualties were piling up, we were not unduly concerned. We felt that we could hold for the day and were confident that some of our troops would reach us before long. About seven tanks were still in action and these had been moved to the wooded west edge of our position.”
Two hours later, the embattled force watched German infantry forming a thousand yards to the east. The fortress position was suddenly subjected to heavy mortar and 88-millimetre gunfire that “would begin at one end of the field and sweep the length of it and back.”43 Then the infantry advanced through the wheat, but were driven back by small-arms and tank fire. Attacks continued through the afternoon, each “repulsed, due to infantry fire and concentrated fire from our tanks,” ‘ C’ Company’s No. 15 Platoon commander, Lieutenant Robert Saville, later wrote.44
