4: SWORD SHEATHED, BUT GLEAMING IN ITS SCABBARD
32 Ieyasu Tokugawa “The right use”: Wolfe, 89.
33 Churchill, Montgomery, and Brooke: James, 657; Marshall: Kelley and Ryan, 18.
35 Toshikazu Kase: The last name is pronounced KAH-zay (in Japanese, all syllables end with a vowel sound).
36 “There were few men . . . Our journey”: Kase, 5.
36 “Were we not sorrowing men”: Ibid., 4.
37 “a majestic array . . . mighty pageant”: Ibid., 5.
38 “I suggest”: Mashbir, 322. Mashbir in his book cites the translation as “nonchalant face,” which surely was not his intention for such a momentous occasion. Obviously he was the victim of poor translators.
38 “in this particularly”: Ibid.
38 “diplomats without flag”: Kase, 6.
39 “like penitent boys”: Ibid., 7; Steinberg, 145.
39 “The whole scene”: Sakamoto, 58.
40 Vandenberg and greatest speech since Gettysburg Address: MacArthur, 289.
41 “Here is the victor . . . an altar of peace”: Kase, 5.
41 “Sutherland, show him”: Kenney, 188.
42 the six pens: Accounts vary as to the number of pens and who got them; some accounts say five, some say six, some say Truman got a pen, some say the battleship Missouri got a pen, and so on, all of which goes to show that even with hundreds of witnesses, eyewitness testimony varies and history—no matter how well recorded—is often less than 100 percent accurate, making the story of MacArthur’s pens resemble a game of three-card monte.
43 “Start ’em up, Bill,” Lee and Henschel, 194.
46 “Is it not rare”: Kase, 12; Duffy, 16.
46 “If ever a day”: Halsey, 283.
46 “We were not beaten”: Kase, 14.
5: “DOWN BUT NOT OUT”
47 “If we allow”: Toland, 870.
47 Hiroshima and Nagasaki deaths: The original statistics come from the highly regarded U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey of 1946. Over the years the Japanese Ministry of Health has increased these figures substantially by including early deaths of the survivors. Because these estimates involve a high degree of subjectivity, no firm number can be agreed upon. According to historian and Pulitzer Prize winner John Dower, the best number to use is a general total for both cities: “over 200,000” (Dower, Ways of Forgetting, 145–56).
48 mid-1944 war lost: Irokawa, 29–31. Had Japan surrendered in mid-1944 following the fall of Saipan and defeat in Burma, 1.5 million Japanese lives would have been saved.
48 “You are not the enemy”: Schaffer, 142.
49 “It’s very simple . . . Women don’t want war”: Toland, 863.
50 “Give me bread”: MacArthur, 307.
50 “The Japanese are”: Sheldon, 40.
50 “onion-skin economy”: Harries, 25.
50 Nagasaki . . . Osaka housing devastation statistics: Kelley and Ryan, 150.
50 “This city now”: Gayn, 47.
51 Even in Hiroshima: MacIsaac, 17.
51 “Dempsey damage”: Perry, 117.
52 “joyfully surprised”: Shigemitsu, 376.
52 “Should the government”: James, 37.
53 “General Eichelberger, have our”: Eichelberger, 265; PRJ, 423.
53 “Well, Bill . . .”: Schoor, 32.
53 “We are home now . . . moved me”: Hunt, 407.
53 “I’ll never forget”: Murray Sanders, in Williams and Wallace, 132.
54 “Never underestimate”: Beech, 56.
54 “Oh, we washed her”: Chase, 133.
54 Halsey signing the check as “Hirohito”: Thomas, 343.
55 “But I was thinking of”: Halsey, 287, 290.
55 “Grew sat in this”: Mashbir, 67.
55 “We do not exclude”: Grew, vol. 2, 1426. President Truman had two problems with Grew’s advice about keeping the Japanese monarchy. During the war numerous blunt comments had been made about the emperor; suddenly to turn around and grant him immunity was seen as too much of a reversal. Even more important, the Battle of Okinawa had been raging for two months now, with no end in sight. (Truman got the memo on May 28; the Battle of Okinawa, which started on April 1, would not end until June 22.) The president, unsure if the Japanese were truly serious, feared that making a major concession at this time would be construed as an act of weakness. See Stimson and Bundy, 619–27.
56 “would not want”: Emmerson, 252.
56 “We shall have”: Bishop, 518.
56 “to report at once”: Mashbir, 280.
56 “Those authorized”: Ibid., 281.
56 “The best we can”: May 28, 1945, FRUS, vol. 6, 545.
6: HARRY TRUMAN THROWS A FIT
58 “Wait a minute”: Arthur Krock, New York Times, September 23, 1945, E3.
59 “the occupation forces”: Ibid; Acheson, 126.
59 “a political statement”: James, 18.
59 “to do something”: Ibid.
59 “I’m glad the general”: Presidential news conference, September 18, 1945, in U.S. National Archives, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States . . . Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President (20 vols.); Truman 1945, 326.
59 United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy for Japan: All seven versions are available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/022shoshi.html.
60 “The authority of the Emperor”: Seventh and final version, page 2, item 2, line 1.
61 “It seems funny”: Eichelberger Diary, October 20, 1945, Eichelberger Papers; Marshall to MacArthur, October 12, 1945, Record Group (RG) 5, MacArthur Archives.
61 “to receive . . . the extraordinarily dangerous”: Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1, 520–21.
62 “Your authority is supreme”: “You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis but on unconditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain questions on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.” U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur, September 6, 1945; State Department Publication 2671, Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress, Appendix 16; also in PRJ, 427.
62 “General MacArthur told Sutherland”: Harvey, 313.
62 “greatest possible aid”: James, 27.
63 “The most satisfactory”: Ibid.
64 “consult and advise”: Sheldon, 61.
64 “I welcome you”: April 5, 1946, address to the Allied Council for Japan.
64 “Now there’s a man!”: Whitney, 306.
65 “quit and go home”: Kelley and Ryan, 156.
65 “Baron Shidehara . . . Too clear”: Hunt, 422; Leary, 253–54.
65 Bismarck and Polybius: The two quotes are from Willoughby, Maneuver in War, 2.
65 “the world’s greatest laboratory . . . Military occupation was not new”: MacArthur, 282.
7: THE PHOTOGRAPH THAT SAVED A THOUSAND SHIPS
68 “As Emperor and acknowledged”: Gallichio, 79; Kelley and Ryan, 145.
68 “would be comparable”: Gallichio, 79.
68 “I am honored”: Toland, 875.
69 “frightened to death”: Harvey, 15.
70 “To avoid the frontal attack”: Ibid., 244.
71 “To do so”: MacArthur, 287.
71 “lover of peace”: Bix, 542. Fellers had met one of the two Japanese Quakers when he was a college student in Indiana, and the other on a trip to Japan in 1920.
72 “freely expressed will”: Potsdam Declaration.
72 Japanese Army chief of staff advice: Haruo Iguchi, “The First Revisionists: Bonner Fellers, Herbert Hoover, and Japan’s Decision to Surrender,” in Gallichio, 72.
72 Theodore Roosevelt “You must listen”: Harvey, 107.
72 “I come to you”: MacArthur, 288.
73 “A tremendous impression”: Ibid.
73 “To see someone”: Faubion Bowers Papers (Columbia University Oral History Project), 20; Bowers, 166; Okamoto,
36.
73 “The peace party”: Bergamini, 148. The most complete report of Hirohito’s conversation with MacArthur is given in the Far Eastern Commission, Australian Delegation, Interim Report, February 11, 1946.
74 “without peer”: Kelley and Ryan, 149.
8: WHAT TO DO WITH THE EMPEROR AND THE MILITARISTS?
75 “erased the words”: Schoor, 39–40.
76 “There must be”: Harvey, 314–15.
77 “Did I think”: Thorpe, 208.
77 “I told Matsudaira . . . How could that be done?”: Ibid.
78 “Otherwise we would”: Harvey, 400.
78 “I could have humiliated him . . . I was born”: Bowers, 166.
78 “I don’t trust”: Ibid., 95.
78 “The Emperor called”: Harvey, 18.
79 “Hirohito was so controlled”: Kelley and Ryan, 153.
79 Emperor needing permission to travel: Terasaki, 222.
79 “American woman of cultural background”: Sheldon, 141.
79 “the real reason”: Schaller, 129.
80 “the State Department report”: Time, Sept. 17, 1945, 20–21.
82 13 percent of Americans: Cohen, 27; Perry, 28; Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 108; 33 percent of Americans: Schaller, ibid.
82 “savage apes” . . . “bestial”: Harries, 11.
82 “If you in the United States will forget”: Brines, 124–25; Sheldon, 309.
82 “The surrender terms”: Miller, Soldier-Statesman, 295.
82 Tojo’s dentures: After three months word got out in the military about what the two dentists had done; to avoid an official reprimand, they retrieved the dentures and polished off the message.
9: ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESS
85 “General MacNimitz”: Hellegers, 405, 719.
85 “Underground chaos”: Jansen, 669.
86 By 19590 the United States was ready: The Allied occupation officially ended with the signing of the peace treaty of September 8, 1951, but the treaty did not come into force until April 28, 1952.
87 “the happy soldiers”: Rinjiro, 50.
87 “Wherever Americans went”: Vining, 116.
87 “That was when we knew”: Manchester, 474.
88 “I fully agree”: Kelley and Ryan, 150.
88 “We Japanese were poorly led”: Kato, 263.
88 “The Japanese, accepting defeat”: Nishi, x.
88 “We are trying”: Shacklock, 38.
89 “From the moment”: MacArthur, 282.
89 Potsdam Declaration: http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html.
89 SWNCC 1590/4: http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/01/022/022tx.html.
89 JCS 13890/15: http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/036/036tx.html.
89 “one of the great”: Douglas MacArthur, “Comment on Far Eastern Commission Policy Decision,” 13 July 1947, PRJ, 774.
89 “Unless you deem it necessary”: JCS 1380/15, 3 November 1945, PRJ, 428–39; http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/036/036tx.html.
91 SCAP chain of command: Williams, 18.
93 “It is difficult”: “SCAP’s Denial of Friction with FEC,” 14 June 1946, PRJ, 751.
93 FEC opposition to food relief for the Japanese: Haley, 39.
94 “a debating society”: MacArthur, 293.
94 “a policy-making body”: MacArthur to McCoy, 13 April 1946, “Far Eastern Commission,” MacArthur Archives, RG 9, 3.
94 “We do not come”: Nishi, 27.
94 “extremely intelligent people”: Stimson to President Truman, “Proposed Program of Japan,” Truman Library, Naval Aide File, Box 4, 7.
94 number of SCAP civilian and military employees: Williams, 277.
95 “a boatload of New Dealers”: Harvey, 338.
96 “After about the third . . . We won’t do”: Gunther, 123.
96 278,594 pages to be translated: Mashbir, 225.
96 “It is by avoiding”: Puryear, 263.
97 “I’ve been looking”: Woodard, 22.
97 “With rare exceptions”: Ibid., 25.
97 “Such sophistry”: Williams, 265.
98 “a sharp businessman”: Toland, Occupation, 60; Hellegers, 489.
98 “A stuffed pig”: Harvey, 307.
98 “I want your reaction”: Gordon, 21.
98 “Everyone felt”: Hellegers, 760.
99 “made her weak at the knees”: S. J. Morris, 431.
100 “as easy”: Vining, 115.
100 “goggle-eyed”: Eichelberger, Dear Miss Em, 300.
100 “within a few days”: Ibid., xxi.
101 “I just wanted you”: Hunt, 427.
10: OCCUPIER AS HUMANITARIAN
102 “one of the two”: Tugwell, 348, quoted in Buhite, 21, and Larrabee, 305: MacArthur was the second; the number one most dangerous man was the populist governor of Louisiana and later U.S. senator, Huey Long. For a full understanding of this often misunderstood comment, see Freidel, 128. This remark was made by FDR shortly after he became president and there was concern that Americans, losing all hope during the Depression, might turn to a “man on horseback.” The president sent Gen. Hugh Johnson, a mutual friend, to check out MacArthur’s loyalty. Satisfied that MacArthur had no intention of quitting the army and running for political office, he took the unprecedented step of extending MacArthur’s term as army chief of staff. Later he rewarded MacArthur by sending him to the Philippines, a post MacArthur coveted. During World War II the two men developed a solid working relationship.
102 “Bury the dead horses”: Hellegers, 416.
103 “Political parties, elections”: John K. Emmerson, “Political Factors in the Present Japanese Situation,” 8 February 1946, U.S. National Archives 740.0019 Control (Japan)/2-2546, 1.
103 statistics on number of troops and citizens to be repatriated: “Summary of Achievements During the First Year of Occupation,” PRJ, 754.
103 number of Japanese ships: “Chapter VI: Overseas Repatriation Movements,” 148, 150, http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1%20Sup/ch6.htm.
104 “Japan’s Fanatics”: New York Times, August 25, 1945, E3.
105 “eggs”: Brines, 95.
106 “You cannot teach democracy”: Kawai, 181.
106 “Thirty million people”: Van Aduard, 59.
106 “ill-treatment including starvation”: Frank, 352.
106 “comparable to”: Ibid.
107 “Life Expectancy under the Occupation” statistics: Sams, 183. It should be pointed out that such statistics can be very difficult to compile and will vary, especially during postwar years when wartime injuries and disease may cause premature death. Willoughby, on page 63 in his book, cites 42.8 years life expectancy for men and 60.2 in 1951 (a 41 percent increase), and 51.1 and 64.8 years for women (a 27 percent increase). The Japanese Ministry of Public Welfare gives 46.9 and 49.6 years for men and women in 1936, compared to 58 and 61.5 years in 1950—a 24 percent increase for both men and women (Sato, 22). Because Crawford Sams was extremely thorough and professional, and had no ax to grind, we use his statistics. Whatever statistics one uses, they all tell the same story: an amazing achievement in improving life longevity.
107 Greater number of deaths from tuberculosis than from war: Ibid., 109.
107 Disease reduction statistics, 1946–1948: Van Aduard, 287.
107 Crawford Sams saving 3 million lives: Takemae, 413.
108 Food imports saving 11 million lives: SCAP, History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, 1945–1951 (typescript on microfilm), Introduction, 23. The three leading academic scholars of the occupation—John Dower, Clayton James, and Eiji Takemae—concur with this figure.
108 “As they increasingly”: Harvey, 343.
108 “Never have I seen”: Perry, 118.
109 “take measures”: Daniel Berrigan and W. I. Ladejinsky, “Japan’s Communists Lose a Battle,” Saturday Evening Post, January 8, 1949, 101.
109 “balanced on the tip
”: Harold Strauss, “MacArthur in the Paddy Fields,” The Nation, November 9, 1946, 521.
109 “I may be dumb”: T. Cohen, 184.
110 “could have done in China”: Schaller, 130.
110 “Dad would have liked”: PRJ, 760; Yoshida, 201–3.
110 Monuments Men: www.monumentsmenfoundation.org. The Monuments Men sent to Japan were Lt. Col. Harold Henderson, Sherman Lee, Maj. Laurence Sickman, Lt. Cdr. George Stout, Lennox Tierney, and Langdon Warner. Henderson, as discussed in the next chapter, also played a key role in helping arrange for the emperor to renounce his divinity.
111 “Curiously the idea”: Graves, 370.
112 “Few countries”: Havens, 66.
112 “should take no action”: Edwin Pauley, United States Representative Mission to Japan, November 1945 to April 1946, Report on Japanese Reparations to the President of the United States (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 6–7.
114 “Political activity”: Summation, September–December 1945, 26.
11: THE EMPEROR IS NOT A KAMI
115 “Ultra-nationalistic”: U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, September 6, 1945, part 3, paragraph 3.
115 “including the unrestricted”: PRJ, vol. 2, Appendix B, 463.
115 “Shintoism, insofar as”: October 11, 1945, telegram from U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes to George Atcheson, in Woodard, 55, 56–57, plate 2, http://news.google.com/newspapers
?nid=888&dat=19451007&id=EL4wAAAAIBAJ&sd=pU4DAAAAIBAJ&pg=6846,2844223.
116 “All propagation . . . the purpose . . . the doctrine”: SCAPIN 448: SCAP Shinto Directive, 15 December 1945, PRJ, vol. 2, Appendix B, 3a, 467, paragraphs 1c, 2a, 2f(1).
117 “The Emperor is a deity”: Gauntlett and Hall, 71, in Creemers, 123.
118 “the ‘secret history’ ”: This was the title given by Henderson to his private memorandum requested by General Dyke for the SCAP files in late 1946, “The ‘Secret History’ of the Japanese Emperor’s Renunciation of ‘Divinity’ 1946”; full text in Creemers, 223–25.
118 “Which hand”: Harries, 81.
119 “flabbergasted”: Woodard, 261.
119 “the opportunity being ripe . . . One or two persons”: Kakunoshin Yamanashi, June 22, 1965, “Memorandum on the Imperial Rescript of January 1, 1946,” Woodard, 255 (full text 320–21). Yamanashi was apparently unwilling to say anything more about “the secret history” than this, plus a tacit admission on his part that he knew about the paper and was relieved it had been burned per his instructions (Woodard, 261n).
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