John Gargus receiving the Bronze Star. (John Gargus)
Nha Trang air base. (John Gargus)
‘The mission briefing started with Roy Thompson who stood in front of several chart filled easels placed in the front of the briefing room. He briefed the weather. It was going to be favourable for this flight with very few clouds on the east side of the mountains in North Việtnam and strong favourable WNW winds at drop altitude. A low level pressure was moving southeast from China, bringing some cloudiness into the target area in the Black River valley late in the morning.
‘Then, the mission briefing was turned over to Don Fisher who briefed the route and the drop sequences. He was followed by Frank Parker, who covered the enemy order of battle. He presented the latest SOG intelligence that included known numbers of different MiG interceptors available to North Việtnamese defences. As always, he mentioned the standard radio silence precautions. Minimum chatter on the intercom! He was going to run every one of his sophisticated tape recorders that registered all electronic signals generated by enemy radars and also captured crew’s intercom transmissions. This was going to be a special night for him to gather electronic intelligence signals for our future use. We should end up with a sizable amount of signals from all types of radars. These tapes would then be used by other crew EWOs interested in sharpening their listening and signal interpretation skills.
‘Frank’s briefing was followed by the Aircraft Commander Osborne. He briefed the crew assignments that had been previously reviewed with Lieutenant Colonel Tom Hines. He would fly the entire mission in the right seat. Van Buren would be in the left seat from the take off through the low level terrain following part of the flight. Charlie Claxton would map read from behind Van Buren during terrain following and then take the left seat at high altitude on the way home. Don Fisher would ride the radar navigator’s seat with the curtain drawn during terrain following and the leaflet drop. Gordie Wenaas would stand behind Osborne’s right seat and map read from there. Jack McCrary would fly the engineer’s seat during terrain following. Wayne Eckley would spend his time in the back playing the safety observer role and provide assistance to the loadmasters. Frank Parker and Gean Clapper were to man their console behind the bulkhead curtain and the two substitute loadmasters, Jim Williams and Ed Darcy, were to make sure they kept their restraining harnesses on during the drops. All crewmembers were to go on demand regulator oxygen upon entering North Việtnam and then on 100% oxygen during the leaflet drop.
‘There were a few standard questions from Lieutenant Colonels Rogers and Hines about everyone’s fitness and emphasis on safety. Finally, the crew was wished good luck.
‘After this the crew was sanitized. All personal effects, identifications, family photographs and even jewellery were placed into plastic bags and saved for the crew’s return. Each crewmember had only his dog tags and Geneva Convention card as identifying documents. That was the standard procedure for all combat missions.
‘Because the mission planners had to secure all the classified mission documents and personal effects, the crewmembers were already in their assigned positions running their pre-departure checklists when we rejoined them at the aircraft. We witnessed an orderly engine start and watched the ‘Blackbird’ taxi out to the end of the runway. From our vantage point we saw them take off and disappear into the darkness over the South China Sea.
‘About three hours later, I returned with Roy Thompson to our Operations Office to monitor the North Việtnamese portion of the mission. We had one of our radio operators monitor a special HF radio frequency over which Gean Clapper transmitted coded mission progress reports every 30 to 40 minutes when the aircraft reached a significant in-flight turning point. A radio station in an unknown location would broadcast continuous one letter Morse code at regular intervals. Our airborne operator would monitor the same frequency and at proper moments would insert a two letter Morse code signal which would let us know which point of the route was reached and gave us the status of the mission’s progress. This was such a short burst of transmitted energy that our enemy, who was sure to monitor the same frequency, would not have enough time to zero in his direction finders to locate the position of our aircraft. These transmissions were the only breaks in radio silence allowed during our combat missions.
‘Upon checking with our radio operator, we learned that the flight was already over North Việtnam and right on time. We did not have any mission documents with us other than the radio operator’s log with numbered points and corresponding estimated times of arrival over them, but we had a good mental picture of what must have been happening in the cockpit. So as we sat there, sipping on some very strong coffee that the radio operator prepared, we made occasional comments on what the crew must have been going through.
‘For the leaflet drop, all the lights were at their dimmest and the radar navigator and EWO/radio operator compartment curtains were drawn to prevent any outside light to affect the night vision of the rest of the crew. All were on oxygen and their intercom voices were muffled by the oxygen mask microphones that registered and exaggerated the sound of every breath they took. The aircraft began its acceleration prior to the rapid climb. Maximum aircraft acceleration to 932-degree turbine inlet temperature was attained in relatively short level flight with aircraft shaking as if its four turbojets were ready to tear loose and leave the bulky aircraft carcass behind.
‘Then as the aircraft began its rapid climb, Frank Parker’s console surely began to light up. At first he would pick up a number of AAA and SAM radars, which would routinely scan their assigned areas. As they detected the ‘Blackbird’, they would focus their scan on their just discovered target and activate their height finders to establish the aircraft’s altitude. They would pass their acquired target data through their established notification channels. This would cause even more radars to come up and focus on this rapidly rising, but now slow moving target. The crew would hear Frank reporting the inevitable. Two or three AAA radars were tracking them, but from a safe distance. Of greater concern would be the SAM radars. These had longer reach, but were expected to be out of range. He would certainly be calling these to Osborne’s attention. Then would come the level off and the start of drop. Each man could tell when each cardboard box exited the aircraft. There was a whoosh sound to each exit as the departing load created an added vacuum in the rare atmosphere of the cargo compartment. The aircraft would seem to stand still, just hanging on in the thin air, being as high as it could climb on the thin cushion of available air. And as Frank watched for the emergence of a GCI radar and its tracking pattern in order to determine if there was an intent to launch a MiG, Gordie Wenaas must have struggled with the night vision scope looking for Yên Bái Air Base 30 miles away. This was the place from which the nearest MIGs could come. His night vision scope would certainly pick up the heat of an interceptor at take off. He would have to be pointed in the right direction. Others in the cockpit were getting the answer to whether they could see the lights of distant Hànôi now at their 3 o’clock position. Don Fisher must have had his face buried in the hood of his radar as he carefully traced every mile of ground covered by the aircraft. He had to know exactly where he was in case Frank reported radar or interceptor lock on which would demand an immediate descent to a safe terrain between the mountain peaks on the left.
‘We did not hear any interruptions to the monotonous ‘V’ sound on the radio, so we assumed that all was okay. All the leaflets were delivered. The aircraft was on its way down and proceeding westward to its turning point over the Black River. The next report came just as expected. All was still okay. The aircraft was now southbound running its checklist for the bundle drop by Highway 6.
While we waited for the next report, that would come when the aircraft turned southward along the western side of the Black River valley, we talked about some of the peculiar missions which we called ‘notional’ resupply drops. These were drops of resupply bundles into drop zones where we did not have
previously infiltrated South Việtnamese Special Forces teams. These bogus resupply bundles were designed to be discovered by the enemy who would then spend much time combing the area searching for non-existing infiltrators. Among the usual resupply items of food, ammunition, explosives and medicines would be false targeting plans and even points of contact with friendly supporters that would cast doubts on the loyalty of some local officials. Some bundles were booby trapped, designed explode during disassembly by those who discovered them. We knew that the two resupply bundles that were about to be delivered were not of this type.
At 0430 we received a coded letter signal that all was still normal. The aircraft was now headed southward and the crew was running the air drop checklist. The next report would be made after the drop when the aircraft headed for the Laotian border and from there, home at normal high altitude. We planned to return to the hotel right after the next report and get a couple of hours of sleep before coming back to greet the returning crew. But as we waited, nothing happened. There were no further reports from the aircraft. Our first assumption was that something went wrong with their radios. We would surely hear something once the aircraft emerged from radio silence over the Skyline TACAN in Laos. That is where the aircraft would report a small problem like that to our radar sites in Thailand. Once again, there was nothing. With that we returned to the hotel and reported our concerns to the Detachment’s Commander and the Operations Officer.
The track taken by MC-130E 64-0547 ‘Romeo Charlie’ on 29 December 1967. (John Gargus)
‘Roy and I planned to return to the hotel right after the next report and get a couple of hours of sleep before coming back to greet the returning crew. But as we waited, nothing happened. There were no further reports from the aircraft. Our first assumption was that something went wrong with Clapper’s radio. We would surely hear something once the aircraft emerged from its radio silence over the Skyline beacon. That is when the aircraft would report a small problem like that to our radar sites in Thailand. Once again, there was nothing. With that we returned to the hotel and reported our concerns to Dow Rogers and Tom Hines.
‘There were anxious moments as the aircraft’s return time approached. Calls were made to find out if any landings were made in Thailand or at Đà Nẵng. Then the command at SOG was notified. The SOG took over all search and rescue efforts. Several F-4 Phantoms were launched to survey the area south of the last known reported position. The weather turned bad. The front moved in as expected and the F-4s could not see a thing on the ground. They monitored radios for signals from the aircraft’s crash position indicator and from any crewmember survival radios. They heard nothing. After several attempts, the search was given up. The crew of eleven was declared as missing in action (MIA).
‘At the time of the crash the crew was getting ready for the second drop. Eckley, Darcy and Williams were in the cargo compartment making sure that the load was properly positioned for the drop. They were moving about and did not yet have their restraining harnesses hooked on. Claxton and Wenaas were the other two crewmembers that were not fastened to any seats. Their map reading duties called for them to stand behind the pilots and peer outside through the side windows.
‘The first person on the scene of the crash was a twelve-year-old boy. He reported that the aircraft was in many pieces and that it was still burning. He saw several bodies, many of them burnt. He did not find any survivors.
‘After many years of silence, Major John Plaster authored a book, SOG - The Secret Wars of America’s Commandos in Vietnam, in which he described exploits of commandos who lost their lives on missions that had not been brought to public attention for numerous security reasons. The loss of this aircraft fits into that mould. It was, according to Major Plaster, our largest single aircraft loss over North Việtnam.’
Chapter 3 Endnotes
1 Later, the 15th Air Commando Squadron and finally the 90th Special Operations Squadron.
2 ‘Fan Song’ got its name from its horizontal and vertical fan scanning antennas and its distinctive sounding emissions, which could be picked up by the aircraft’s warning equipment. The ‘Spoon Rest’ radar detected incoming aircraft as far as seventy miles, providing location data to the system computer. The ‘Fan Song’ guidance radar performed two functions: target acquisition and missile guidance. It acquired as many as four targets before firing. After launch, it guided up to three SA-2s against one target. The North Việtnamese sometimes placed the radars away from the missiles to make the site harder to destroy.
3 ‘Notional’ resupply drops were drops of resupply bundles into drop zones where we did not have previously infiltrated South Việtnamese Special Forces teams. These bogus resupply bundles were designed to be discovered by the enemy who would then spend much time combing the area searching for non-existing infiltrators. Among the usual resupply items of food, ammunition, explosives and medicines would be false targeting plans and even points of contact with friendly supporters that would cast doubts on the loyalty of some local officials. Some bundles were booby trapped, designed explode during disassembly by those who discovered them. We knew that the two resupply bundles that were about to be delivered were not of this type.
Chapter Four
Haul On Call
We left for Ubon RTAB, Thailand on a C-130 transport. All of the pilots were on board, lined up on portable seats that were attached to each side of the aircraft. They were made of aluminium tubes and red nylon straps, kind of like lawn furniture and were very uncomfortable. The backrests were vertical, making it impossible to recline. Every time the aircraft would turn, accelerate, or decelerate, we would all be pushed forward or against each other, the last man in the row bearing the brunt of the weight.
‘When we arrived, the C-130 pilot, who must have been a frustrated fighter pilot decided to pitch-out the Hercules and land like a fighter. He aligned the aircraft with the runway at fifteen hundred feet and when he reached the approach-end, made a fast 360 degree left turn, using about sixty degrees of bank, losing altitude during the turn. While still in a slight bank, the giant aircraft crunched down on one wheel and the pilot placed all four engines in reverse, stopping in about three thousand feet - less than the first half of the runway. He probably thought his manoeuvre would thrill the troops. It was a thrill all right. Most of us were thrown on the deck, completely out of our seatbelts and were probably lucky not to have been hurt. Welcome to Thailand. Our war had begun.
Memories Of Ubon Thailand: A Fighter Pilot’s Journal by Richard E. Hamilton
Two airlift operations were notable in 1968; the first, in April, was Operation ‘Delaware/Lam Son 216’, the air invasion of the A Shau Valley, one of the main North Việtnamese infiltration routes into the South. The A Shau Valley, west of Đà Nẵng /Huế and south of Khê Sanh was an old supply route and arms depot for the Việt Công and the North Việtnamese Army which the US had gone into and cleared out several times before. In early 1968 reports started coming in to indicate that new roads were being constructed in the A Shau Valley. Operation ‘Delaware’ started on 19 April to contest an enemy build-up in the A Shau Valley after preparatory B-52 and tactical bombings of PAVN anti-aircraft and troop positions. Troops of the 1st Cavalry Division were inserted into the north of A Shau Valley by helicopter, as the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division; the 3rd Regiment, 1st ARVN Division; and the 3rd ARVN Airborne Task Force provided the blocking force on the southeast fringe of the valley on both sides of Route 547 that lead to Huế. Poor weather and anti-aircraft fire made flying very dangerous. On the 25th the 1st Cavalry landed at the abandoned airstrip at A Lưới. For nine days, beginning on the 26 April, the C-130s flew 165 sorties, dropping 2,300 tons, most of it ammunition. Despite bad weather and Communist ground fire, the Hercules flew daily airdrops to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), the 101st Airborne Division and ARVN units at A Lưới. Ground radar was unavailable so the Hercules’ crews had to navigate up the cloud-filled valley using their radar and Doppler eq
uipment, breaking out of the overcast just before visual release of their cargo.
C-130E 64-0542 Haul On Call was delivered to the 314th TCW in February 1965 and served eight other units before being assigned to the 317th TAW at Pope AFB in 1978. It is now used by the Technical Training Centre, Sheppard AFB, Wichita Falls, Texas.
Such was the urgency that the C-130s continued to fly during one period when the weather was so bad that it grounded even the helicopters. On 26 April C-130s from Cam Ranh Bay, Biên Hòa and Tân Sơn Nhứt dropped supplies to the troops on the A Lưới airstrip. The airdrops were made under a low overcast without the benefit of air strikes, which had been cancelled due to the low cloud. Seven C-130s were hit by ground fire during the first twenty airdrops but on the 21st mission as the C-130B 60-0298 in the 773rd TAS, 463rd TAW flown by Captain James J. McKinstry and Major John Lewis McDaniel from Tân Sơn Nhứt broke out through the cloud it was hit by .50 calibre and 37mm ground fire. The crew tried to jettison the load, which had caught fire in the cargo bay. The aircraft turned towards the airstrip to attempt a landing but it then hit some trees and crashed and exploded. All on board, including six crew and two USAF photographers were killed. No more airdrops were attempted at A Lưới on the 26th although they were resumed with more success the next day.
Captain John Dunn’s crew went to the officers’ club for dinner ‘and’ wrote Captain Bill Barry, who had deployed with members of the Wing to Tachikawa Air Base in February 1968, ‘that’s where we found out that the airdrop the next day was scheduled to be in the A Shau Valley. Supposedly, the VC in the valley were dug into spider holes on the approach to the runway/drop zone. The spider holes had hatched camouflaged covers so that they could not be seen from the air beforehand. The VC opened the holes up and emerged to fire at a plane as it came in for the drop at slow speed and low altitude.
C-130 Hercules Page 10
