With Brauchitsch gone as head of OKH, Hitler decided to take the position himself rather than entrust it to anyone else. Given his responsibilities elsewhere, Hitler was not on hand full time to act as head of OKH, so much responsibility fell to his deputy, Franz Halder. Like Jodl, Keitel and Brauchitsch, Halder came from a distinguished military family, though Halder was a Bavarian. Unlike the others, however, Halder was not handpicked by Hitler. Indeed, Hitler had been dubious about making Halder Brauchitsch’s deputy in 1938 due to Halder’s strict Catholicism and support for the old German royal family. Hitler would certainly not have appointed Halder had he known the general routinely referred to him in the mid-1930s as ‘the Austrian lunatic’. However, Halder was a good professional soldier who kept his private political opinions outside his job. This did not stop him from voicing his disquiet to Hitler at private meetings about the attack on Russia. In September 1942 Halder and Hitler disagreed openly about the strategy to be employed at Stalingrad, and Halder resigned. Hitler never really forgave him for being right on this occasion.
General Franz Halder, head of OKH until his resignation in 1942
As a replacement for Halder at OKH, Hitler chose a youthful officer several ranks junior to Halder named Kurt von Zeitzler. Zeitzler came from the section in OKH which dealt with logistical planning and supply lines. His skills were great, but were largely limited to calculating the payloads of lorry convoys or rail networks. He was a straightforward, efficient staff officer who, in the opinion of his contemporaries, lacked any gifts at handling armies or at planning campaigns. There can be little doubt that this was one of the main reasons Hitler chose him. By late 1943 however, Zeitzler had been sharp enough to realise that his main task was simply to carry out the wishes of the Führer, and then be blamed if events did not go according to plan. Wisely he managed to be conveniently ill during most of the crisis meetings of early 1944, staying in his quarters to recover rather than attending.
It was through these senior men in the high command of the armed forces that Hitler sought to control the Wehrmacht. After the resignation of Brauchitsch it was only Hitler, Keitel and, to an extent, Jodl, who had access to reports and analysis from every front. Only they knew what was really going on. Even the most senior of Field Marshals knew only what was happening in the area where they were operating, and were kept totally in the dark about what was happening elsewhere. Hitler hoped that he would therefore be in a position to control absolutely the Wehrmacht and its commanders.
Despite this degree of control, Hitler still had to deal with the various Field Marshals and Generals who held operational control on the ground. At the outbreak of the war the two most senior army commanders were Gerd von Rundstedt and Fedor von Bock. Both men were superbly trained Prussian officers of the old school who had served with distinction in the Great War. Between them, these two men commanded the main attacking forces which crushed Poland in 1939 and France in 1940. In 1941 the same two men, now promoted to be Field Marshals, led the central and southern army groups in Operation Barbarossa. The northern Army Group was led by Wilhelm von Leeb, a career officer from Bavaria.
None of these three Field Marshals were close to Hitler and all were viewed with some suspicion by the Führer. Most distrusted of all was Leeb, who in 1923 had been the commander who was instrumental in suppressing the Nazi putsch in Munich. As soon as Hitler came to power, the Gestapo investigated Leeb for subversive activities and he was removed from his post. But Leeb was careful to stay out of politics and was so well regarded by Brauchitsch that he regained high command.
After the initial failure of Operation Barbarossa to destroy Russia before winter, Hitler looked for scapegoats and found them in Leeb, Rundstedt and Bock. All three were sacked. Leeb retired to his estate in Bavaria and Bock was later killed in an air raid. Only Rundstedt was not dispensed with completely and was given command of reserve forces in Germany. A few months later, Rundstedt was put in charge of the Germans occupying France. By 1944 this was proving to be a crucial command. When Rundstedt suggested that, with the British and Americans ashore in Normandy, it would be a wise decision to make peace, Hitler sacked him once again.
These sackings of high-profile, competent commanders served several purposes for Hitler. They ensured the removal of men who were rather too quick to criticise. They ensured that the men promoted to take their places were grateful to the Führer. Finally, the sackings sent a very clear signal throughout the officer corps that those who opposed the will of Hitler could expect similarly abrupt treatment.
In any case, Hitler preferred younger and more daring men. There can be no doubt that his favourite general in the first years of war was Erwin Rommel. Born the son of a schoolteacher, Rommel was very different from the stuffy aristocratic army officers that Hitler disliked. He was lucky enough to have been appointed to the command of Hitler’s personal guard during the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Poland. Hitler liked Rommel and gave him command of the 7th Panzer Division in the invasion of France. In February 1941 Hitler put Rommel at the head of the Afrika Korps. For the next 18 months Rommel led his troops in campaigns of swift movement across the deserts of North Africa, earning for himself the nickname Desert Fox.
Rommel’s hero status was enhanced by numerous anecdotes. During one advance he spotted a field hospital and ordered his driver to pull up so he could visit the wounded. Rommel strode into the tents, lined with beds holding troops of both sides. Spotting a German soldier gawping at him, Rommel went to speak to him. The wounded man hissed, ‘Herr General, this is a British hospital!’ Glancing round, Rommel realised that the only armed men in sight were, indeed, British. Saluting the doctors cheerfully, Rommel walked back to his car and told the driver, ‘I think we had better leave.’ The British had, apparently, mistaken Rommel’s German for Polish.
After the final defeat of the Afrika Korps in 1943 by overwhelming Allied forces, Rommel took sick leave. With time to catch up with information about the war outside North Africa, Rommel became pessimistic. His earlier admiration for Hitler waned abruptly as he saw the blunders occurring in the east and Hitler’s growing refusal to accept reality. In 1944 Hitler sent Rommel to defend Normandy. When D-Day put the western Allies into France, Rommel advised Hitler to make peace. Only the fact that Rommel was injured in an air raid saved him from being sacked. He travelled back to Germany to recover from his wounds.
Two of Hitler’s most capable generals Gerd von Rundstedt (l) and Erwin Rommel.
The type of swift moving panzer warfare at which Rommel excelled had actually been developed by another younger officer, Heinz Guderian, who earned himself the nickname of ‘Fast Heinz’. When Hitler came to power opinion in the German army was split between those who saw future wars in terms of the static defences and fortifications that had dominated the Great War and those, led by Guderian, who foresaw wars of movement spearheaded by tanks and aircraft. It was Hitler who settled the dispute in favour of Guderian’s ideas and who ordered the rearming of Germany with panzers and Stuka dive-bombers. Guderian commanded panzer groups in Poland, France and in Russia with startling success. In December 1941, however, he disobeyed a direct order from Hitler and withdrew troops from an exposed position. Hitler sacked him.
General ‘Fast Heinz’ Guderian, leading advocate of tank warfare.
In March 1943, Hitler reinstated Guderian as the inspector general of all panzer divisions, charged with equipping and supplying the crucial armoured units. Guderian again performed his task well, ensuring the new Panther and Tiger tanks were supplied to the front line troops as speedily as possible. By March 1944, however, Guderian had become convinced the war was going to be lost. Although he tried to advise Hitler that even the new panzers would not counteract the Russian superiority in numbers, he was ignored.
Almost the same age as Guderian was Erich von Manstein, another early supporter of the Blitzkrieg doctrine. It was Manstein who produced the detailed plan for the invasion of France in 1940 which led to spectacular vic
tory. He was rewarded by Hitler with an independent command, LVI Panzer Corps, in the invasion of Russia. Unlike many other senior officers, Manstein kept his command through the winter of 1941, largely by not arguing openly with Hitler. After his defeat at Kursk in 1943, however, Manstein too came to believe that the war with Russia could not be won and lost his faith in Hitler’s military leadership.
At a conference of senior officers in March 1944, Hitler was making a speech outlining his plans for the coming summer campaign. As usual by this stage in the war, Hitler’s plans had more to do with wishful thinking than actual reality. As usual the officers were listening with dutiful attention, whatever their private views. When Hitler paused after delivering himself of some high flown piece of rhetoric, Manstein’s sarcastic voice cut the silence, ‘Oh yes, my Führer. I am certain it will be so.’ There was a long silence while Hitler glared at Manstein before storming from the room. Manstein went home.
General Erich von Manstein, another Panzer general of genius, meets the Führer
By the early summer of 1944 most of the senior generals, even those who had been among Hitler’s most open admirers, thought that the war was lost. Many of them were in despair at Hitler’s actions and words, foreseeing only disaster for Germany. But Hitler’s absolute grip on the levers of power made it impossible for the generals to oust him. They could advise Hitler, but if he ignored them, as he often did, they had no real choices except to carry out his orders or resign. Relations between Hitler and his senior officers were disastrous. Most generals were disillusioned, but felt powerless to do anything other than watch Germany’s slow slide to defeat.
A few army officers, however, were determined to do something to save Germany. Their plans varied greatly, but all involved the death of Adolf Hitler. Between September 1943 and February 1944 there were four failed assasination attempts, after which the Gestapo arrested or placed under surveillance many of those known to be anti-Nazi.
One officer who escaped Gestapo attention was Colonel Count Claus von Stauffenberg, a career officer from one of Prussia’s oldest military families. In the early war years, Stauffenberg had been an admirer of Hitler but by December 1943 he was a staff officer, having lost a hand and an eye in action. Seeing Hitler at close quarters cured Stauffenberg of his admiration and convinced him that Hitler had to be overthrown.
Stauffenberg contacted a number of other middle ranking officers in key positions throughout the Reich. Many agreed with him that the war should be ended and some said they would help bring this about. Stauffenberg had two main problems. First he had to arrange for Hitler to be killed or arrested. Second he had to have the means to seize control of the government before the fanatically Nazi SS could do so. In June Stauffenberg was promoted to be Chief of Staff of the Home Army, those Wehrmacht forces located in Germany itself. In his new position he would be able to give orders for the army to seize the SS and the government buildings. He was also in frequent personal contact with Hitler himself and could get close enough to kill him.
Stauffenberg hurriedly contacted his sympathisers in various commands and alerted them to the need to take swift action against the SS and Gestapo. Stauffenberg knew that many senior generals were disillusioned with Hitler, but that they were already under surveillance by the Gestapo. He decided to rely on these senior men to follow his lead, but did not contact them directly for fear of alerting the Gestapo. One senior figure who was brought into the conspiracy was General Ludwig Beck, the former chief of staff at OKH who had resigned in 1938. He was to be the interim head of state once Hitler was dead.
Stauffenberg contacted junior and staff officers. Some were fully aware of the conspiracy, others did not want to know details of what was going on but had assured Stauffenberg they would follow his instructions. The conspiracy was given the codeword Valkyrie.
On 20 July Stauffenberg, along with other high-ranking officers, attended a meeting with Hitler at the Wolf’s Lair. He placed a briefcase packed with explosives on a 15-minute fuse under Hitler’s desk and left. At 12.42pm the Führer’s office exploded in flames and smoke. Hearing the explosion, Stauffenberg sent out the radio signals instructing his co-conspirators to begin seizing power. Then he raced back to Berlin to play his part.
Hitler, however, had not been killed. By chance he had stepped around the desk and was shielded from the blast by its solid wooden frame.
Stauffenberg tried to put the Valkyrie plan into action anyway, but only some conspirators played their part. Others were too frightened to move now they knew Hitler was alive or hoped to evade punishment by betraying their colleagues. Only in Paris did the conspiracy take place as planned, with the army arresting the SS and Gestapo men before preparing for an armistice with the Allies.
By midnight the confusion caused by the attempted coup was over. Stauffenberg and his three closest allies at Home Army HQ were shot. Beck shot himself, but survived and was also executed out of hand. Before dawn Josef Goebbels, propaganda minister, and Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS, were firmly in control in Berlin. Stauffenberg had carelessly left written records of some of his agreements with other officers. The SS began the hunt for the conspirators.
As the weeks passed the SS and Hitler, were amazed at how many army officers had been involved in the plot or had known something was about to happen. On 7 August the trial of Field Marshal von Witzleben and seven other officers began, in the Volksgericht, the socalled People’s Court, under Roland Freisler. After a few days of abuse and insults, the men were found guilty and hanged. For months the investigations, sudden arrests and show trials continued as Himmler oversaw a reign of terror. About 5,000 people were arrested in the course of the investigations into the bomb plot and 200 officers, including over 50 generals, were executed. Many hundreds more died in prison or in concentration camps.
Some high profile names were involved. Franz Halder was arrested and had his earlier opposition to Hitler used against him, but he persuaded the Gestapo that he had known nothing about the Stauffenberg plot. He was sent to Dachau concentration camp for his views. Luckier was Heinz Guderian who had known about the plot, but had refused to join it. He was on a hunting trip when Stauffenberg exploded the bomb, so the Gestapo concluded he had not been involved at all.
The most high profile casualty of the purge that followed the failed coup was Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. The Desert Fox had been considering his own plan to arrest Hitler and put him on trial for war crimes when he had been approached by one of Stauffenberg’s conspirators. Rommel had welcomed the approach, but had not committed himself before he was injured and put out of action. Hitler was astonished that Rommel, of all men, had been so deeply implicated. But Rommel was a hero to the German people. Hitler gave him the choice of committing suicide and being honoured as a war hero, or being put on trial and being executed along with his wife. Rommel chose to kill himself.
The July bomb plot of Stauffenberg marked the final break down of trust between Hitler and his army officers. After 20 July no army officer was allowed to enter the same room as Hitler without being relieved of his pistol by the ever-present SS guards. Hitler stopped believing anything the army officers told him, unless it was backed up by a report from the SS or Gestapo.
On 15 August Field Marshal von Kluge was on a trip to inspect his forward positions facing the British in France when a British bomber destroyed his radio truck. When Hitler sent a message to Kluge that evening, he was told the Field Marshal was at the front but out of radio contact. Hitler at once assumed that Kluge had been involved in the bomb plot and was sneaking off to surrender to the British. When Kluge got back to his headquarters he found that he had been relieved of command and was ominously ordered to return to Berlin for questioning. He committed suicide on the plane to Berlin, having a very good idea of what was awaiting him there.
As Hitler’s distrust of the army grew, so the grip of the Nazi machine over the army strengthened. In September the Nazi salute became the obligatory replacement for the conven
tional army salute. The officers of the staff who worked with Hitler were redesignated as Nazi Party officers. Every senior officer had a Gestapo officer attached to his staff to supervise his actions and monitor his dedication to the Nazi Party and to Hitler. Increasingly, senior officers were stripped of the power to command their forces. Every action, every disposition had to be approved by the Führer’s staff before it could take place. And Hitler insisted his staff did nothing without his approval.
The slow paralysis which afflicted so many operations of the German army in the final year of war came directly from Hitler’s distrust of his generals after the bomb plot. In February 1945 Hitler sent out a general order on the conduct of operations. Among other provisions it read:
‘Divisional Commanders are personally responsible for reporting to me in good time any of the following:
Every attack planned in divisional strength or above
Every offensive in quiet sectors of the front of battalion strength or above
Every plan for withdrawing forces
Every plan to surrender a local strong point.
They must ensure that I have time to consider the plan and to intervene in time for my orders to reach the front line.
Commanders in chief, generals and all staff officers are personally responsible to me that every report made to me should contain nothing but the truth. I shall impose draconian punishments on any attempt at concealment from carelessness, oversight or deliberate action.’
Hitler was attempting to manage the war down to the actions of every battalion. Such a task was beyond the abilities of any one person, let alone a man so trapped by paranoia and distrust as Hitler. In the collapse of trust between Hitler and his commanders lay the collapse of the ability of the German army to wage war effectively.
CHAPTER TWO
Hitler: Military Commander Page 2
