This myth would be reworked under the hand of Goebbels so that by the time Germany again went to war, Hitler was being hailed as the greatest military strategist of history. Such grand claims were far removed from reality. But the underlying myth was rooted in Hitler’s battlefield heroism and exemplary service. Without the man who was Corporal Hitler, there could have been no Führer.
By the time Hitler became Chancellor of the German Republic in 1933, he had left his war record far behind him – at least so far as the German public was concerned. He was, however, about to bring his military views and opinions to work on the full armed might of the German nation and, significantly, on the proud aristocratic officer corps which dominated it.
CHAPTER FIVE
Rearming the Reich
In his rise to power inside Germany, Hitler had used luck, skill, propaganda and violence – or the very real threat of it – to achieve his ends. It soon became clear that he was to use very much the same tactics in achieving his aims now that he was the Führer of the German people. For the luck and skill he would rely on his own talents and for the propaganda he could rely on the dark genius of Josef Goebbels. For the violence he turned to the armed forces of Germany, the Reichswehr, and at once realised that this instrument of war was quite simply not up to the job.
The Treaty of Versailles, which ended the First World War was dictated to Germany by the victorious Allies. The numerous provisions were prompted by the unshakeable belief that it had been Germany and her aristocratic, military elite which had started the war. If war were to be avoided in future, the authors of the treaty believed, Germany had to be stripped of any offensive power. Under the terms of Versailles, the German armed forces were to number no more than 100,000 men, none of whom could be conscripts, and were allowed neither tanks nor aircraft. The famously efficient Army General Staff was disbanded.
The new Reichswehr were composed of the Reichsheer, or army, and the Reichsmarine, or navy. The majority of the manpower was in the Reichsheer, which consisted of 2 Group Commands, 7 Infantry Divisions and 3 Cavalry Divisions. The Reichsmarine was so reduced in size that it was little more than a fisheries protection and coastguard service. The aim of Versailles was, simply, to stop Germany from having sufficient armed forces to be tempted into starting a war. The effect was to drive the German governments and military establishment towards finding new and imaginative ways of creating effective military power.
The rearmament of Germany after the catastrophic defeat of the Great War began before Hitler became Führer, but it was to gather pace and urgency once the Nazis were in power. Crucially, it was Hitler’s ambition for an aggressive foreign policy that not only gave the rearmament a timescale, but also pointed the direction which it took. This ambition and the restrictive military terms of the treaty were to have a direct bearing on the form of the new German war machine which Hitler was to create.
Less well-known clauses in the Versailles treaty committed the victorious Allies to reducing their own armed forces. These reductions were not on anything like the drastic scale imposed on Germany, but would have been significant if they had ever been carried out. However the idealistic euphoria for peace and the perceived benefits of the influence of the League of Nations which dominated thinking in 1919 soon wilted in the face of belligerent communism radiating from Soviet Russia and the practical needs of Britain and France to police their empires and colonies. In the event, the planned disarmament of the victorious nations never took place. This, of course, gave Hitler the ready-made excuse he needed for rearming Germany.
In 1935 Hitler openly renounced the Treaty of Versailles when he put before the Reichstag the Law for the Reconstruction of the National Defence Forces. The Reichswehr became the Wehrmacht. The newly formed Wehrmacht would still consist of an army and a navy – the renamed Heer and Kriegsmarine, but a new air force was born as well – the Luftwaffe. Although an efficient and effective armed fist was vital to Hitler’s foreign policy, he preferred to leave most of the detailed work of rearmament to his subordinates. Hitler spent most of his time in these years securing his grip on power at home and engaging in diplomacy abroad. Only when a weapon or idea caught his imagination did he become personally involved in rearming his nation.
The rearming of Germany had, in fact, already begun before Hitler came to power. In 1920 the task of establishing a Reichsheer, or land army, was given to General Hans von Seeckt. Allowed less than 100,000 men with no tanks or aircraft and only light artillery, Seeckt set out to get around the restrictions of Versailles without actually breaking the letter of the Treaty.
He began by deciding that the men would all be trained as officers or NCOs, no matter what their nominal rank. In this way, Seeckt planned to be able to expand the army massively by the drafting in of large numbers of recruits to be commanded by the existing professionals, who would all be upgraded in rank. To ensure the prospective recruits had some training, Seeckt not only tolerated the existence of private paramilitary units, such as Hitler’s brownshirts, but in some cases provided cash and training. Likewise, schools and universities were given help in training their students along military lines.
Other provisions of the Versailles Treaty were evaded by the misuse of language. Forbidden to have a General Staff to plan campaigns in detail, von Seeckt established an Administrative Office, which did much the same thing. Instructed not to have tanks, von Seeckt ordered the construction of ‘tractors’ which were light tanks in all but name. In 1926 von Seeckt was caught on the fringes of a political scandal and resigned, but his basic ideas continued to be implemented.
It was in the later 1920s that a new school of thought grew up in the army. A leading proponent of the new theory was Heinz Guderian. Supported by a number of other able young officers, Guderian believed that the close integration in the tactical use of modern weapons could break the trench stalemate which had dominated the First World War. In particular, Guderian believed that a force of mixed tanks, linked by radio to each other and to mobile command posts could punch a hole through any defence. If supported by motorised artillery and motorised infantry, the tanks could then speed on to exploit a breakthrough over a massive area of the enemy rear. It was a nascent form of blitzkrieg.
Guderian’s ideas had two main problems in the early 1930s. The first was that the senior generals did not trust the tanks to be mechanically reliable in actual battlefield conditions of mud and dust. The second was that Versailles banned Germany from having tanks. While calling the vehicles ‘tractors’ or even ‘command vehicles’ was a successful ploy in covering the construction of a few prototypes, mass production of service vehicles could not be hidden.
Then, in 1933, the new Chancellor Adolf Hitler was shown a regiment of armoured cars and light tanks co-operating with anti-tank guns and motorised infantry at an army manoeuvre. ‘They are what I need,’ declared Hitler. After his experiences in the trenches, Hitler would have appreciated the importance of armour and the benefits of mobile warfare. Likewise, his political ambitions for Germany would demand a series of swift, successful strikes on other countries. The slow, merciless grind of conventional warfare with its artillery barrages and infantry advances would not deliver the sort of fast victory Hitler needed. But panzer attacks might. He sought out Guderian and made him Chief of Panzer Troops. Hitler told Guderian to develop the hardware, tactics and strategy needed to crush enemy armies in short, brutal campaigns. With Hitler’s open support and in flagrant disregard for Versailles, the rearmament of the German army could begin.
Although Guderian concentrated largely on the design and production of his tanks, the panzer units were organised to be an elite. About 40% of the men came from the old cavalry regiments, who believed themselves to be the best soldiers in the army, and the new recruits were selected on merit, with many men being turned down. The successful elite were given a smart black uniform designed by top fashion designers and a distinctive black beret.
The men were trained harder and more th
oroughly than recruits to other units. Each man in a tank crew, be he driver, gunner or radio operator, was expected to be able to perform the duty of at least one other crew member. In this way a battlefield casualty would not incapacitate the tank. The panzer crews were drilled relentlessly in mobile warfare tactics. When ordered to take part in the occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, they treated the assignments as full scale war drills. The panzer troops believed they were the shock elite of the new German armed forces.
In April 1934 Guderian proudly presented Hitler with the first 15 panzers off the production line, the Panzer Is. The name is short for Panzerkampfwagen, meaning ‘armoured war car’. The Panzer I was a light tank equipped with twin machine guns or a single 20mm gun. When Germany openly breached the Versailles Treaty in 1935, it was the Panzer I which appeared at parades, rallies and on manoeuvres, often in large numbers. They impressed the German public, but did not unduly worry military observers from Britain or France. The Panzer I was never intended to be anything more than a training or scout vehicle. The British and French had much larger and better tanks already in service. Even the Poles had better tanks.
The Panzer II, ordered from Daimler-Benz in 1934, was a real fighting tank. The first ten came off the production lines in January 1936, then manufacture was held up while modifications were made to the design. Finally, in March 1937 full scale production began. Almost 1,900 Panzer IIs were completed that year, though production dipped to 1,000 in 1938 as newer models took over in the factories. Production of the Panzer II was to continue until late in 1943, though by then it was being used as a training tank or as the base for mobile bridging equipment or as an armoured ammunition cart to support other panzer models and other specialist uses.
The Panzer II that entered service in 1937 was a light tank of 10 tonnes which could travel at 30mph and was armed with a 20mm automatic cannon as well as a heavy machine gun. It also had a two-way radio fitted as standard and later models had smoke canisters. When it was ordered, the Panzer II was envisaged as a fast-moving tank able to keep up with cavalry units and to be used to crack strongpoints which the cavalry could not reduce. In the invasion of Poland in 1939 some of the Panzer IIs were used in this way, though the tank commanders sometimes found themselves moving on alone without cavalry support.
Panzerjager I, a Panzer I chassis mounted with 47mm anti-tank gun, France 1940
The key weakness of the Panzer II proved to be its armour which was easily pierced by enemy artillery and cannon. During the invasion of France in 1940, swarms of the Panzer IIs moved ahead and on the flanks of the rapidly advancing panzer columns. Their task was to act as scout vehicles able to deal with enemy infantry or cavalry units and other soft targets, but with instructions to stop and wait for the larger panzers if any serious opposition was encountered.
In the event the vast swarms of these small panzers sweeping across the countryside spread panic and fear so effectively that many enemy units simply fled without bothering to find out if these werethe light Panzer II or heavier and more formidable tanks. The reports sent back by the retreating units to their HQ inevitably reported the tanks from which they fled to be heavy panzers, creating the impression that vast numbers of unstoppable heavy tanks were moving forwards. It was not an effect that Guderian had counted on, but it made the battlefield success of the panzers all the more impressive.
By 1935 Heinz Guderian had worked out the main features of the tactical system to be known as blitzkrieg, or ‘lightning war’. He wanted to see massed assault units made up of panzers, supported by mechanised and non-mechanised infantry and artillery. The assaults would be closely supported by targeted bombing from the skies, especially dive bombing. All units were to be linked by radio. These armoured assaults would smash holes in the enemy line, then drive deep into the enemy rear to destroy supply and communication routes, wipe out reserves and generally disrupt the ability of the enemy to fight any sort of coordinated form of defence. The remainder of the German infantry and cavalry would advance on foot to mop up the scattered remnants of the enemy army. In terms of numbers, the units on foot composed the bulk of the army and were expected to encounter heavy fighting as they reduced strongpoints bypassed by the panzers.
Guderian envisaged the main fighting elements of the armoured assault columns to be made up of two types of tank, which were produced as the Panzer III and the Panzer IV. The Panzer III was the centre of some controversy. Guderian saw it as an anti-tank weapon equipped with a 50mm cannon and twin machine guns. The section of the army responsible for ordering equipment wanted to arm the Panzer III with the standard 37mm anti-tank gun of the German artillery to save costs and to ensure that ammunition would be compatible between the two. In the event the tank was produced with the 37mm gun, but with a turret capable of taking the 50mm gun, which later models did actually carry.
Panzer III on the march through Russia, probably June/July 1941
The design of the Panzer III included very heavy frontal armour as the vehicle was intended as an attack weapon. More crucially all members of the tank crew were linked to each other by an intercom system. This ensured that communication in battle was not hindered by the noise of gunfire or engines and proved to be a key advantage in the tank vs tank battles of 1940 and 1941. Soon all tanks had such a system.
After a series of prototypes were field tested, the Panzer III entered production in December 1938. About 100 had been produced by the outbreak of war, but over 500 were with the Wehrmacht by the time of the invasion of France in 1940. With the sister tank, the Panzer IV, being produced on a similar timescale it can be seen that the rearmament of the Wehrmacht for blitzkrieg was barely complete by the time Hitler threw the army into action.
The Panzer IV was envisaged by Guderian as being the main assault weapon of the armoured columns. It was to have a heavy gun able to attack strongpoints and fortifications as well as to overrun infantry or artillery positions. It was to be defended against enemy tanks by the Panzer III. Hitler took a very close interest in the development and production of the Panzer IV, more so than the other panzers produced before the outbreak of war. Hitler approved the prototype specification of an 18 tonne tank with a speed of 25mph and a 75mm cannon combined with frontal armour able to withstand most French artillery.
Various companies were approached to produce prototypes, but it was Krupp which won the contract for mass production of the Panzer IV in 1936. The first 35 tanks were produced in 1937, but design changes after the tanks entered service meant that only 100 or so were in service with the army when war began. The Panzer IV went on to be produced in large numbers throughout the war and to be adapted for a wide range of battlefield purposes. The chassis of the Panzer IV were used as mobile bases for anti-aircraft gun platforms, assault guns, anti-tank guns, siege howitzers, rocket launchers, bridges, tank-recovery cranes and as ammunition carriers. After the surrender of Germany in 1945 large numbers of the Panzer IV were taken into service by the Red Army or sold to friendly nations by the British and Americans. The Panzer IV last saw action in the desert tank battles of the Arab–Israeli War of 1967 and can lay claim to being the most successful tank design in history.
Panzer IV, with early version 75mm cannon, Russia, probably June/July 1941
While the panzer production programme was getting under way, other methods of supporting rearmament were being driven forward by Hitler. In 1933 he ordered a massive increase in steel production and the stockpiling of oil and petrol. Then, in 1935, Hitler ordered the resumption of conscription. At the age of 20, men were called up to serve in the army, to learn how to handle weapons and to refine the habits of discipline and order which they had already been learning in the Hitler Youth movement, to which all children were recruited at the age of 14. By 1937 the Wehrmacht was 5 million strong, with 8 million trained reserves.
This was the mass mobilisation that Seeckt had envisaged in the 1920s. True to Seeckt’s plan the permanent soldiers were all immediately promoted to being offi
cers and sergeants, ensuring the recruits had well-trained commanders. The plan worked smoothly, and Seeckt lived just long enough to see it happen. Having left the German army after a scandal, the 70 year old Seeckt was in China advising Chiang Kai-Shek on his resistance to the Japanese invasion. A year later, he died.
These vast numbers of men now in the German army were equipped with a surprisingly traditional array of weapons, the panzers aside. The basic German infantry weapon remained the Mauser rifle, the Karabiner 98k. This was the same rifle Hitler had used in the trenches during the First World War. It had a five shot magazine and a robust bolt-action as well as a shorter than average barrel.
Submachine guns were, at first, a weapon used only by a minority of troops. However as the new war experience showed that rate of fire was more crucial on the battlefield than long range accuracy, these machine guns became more common. The first sub-machine gun to enter service was the MP40, though some troops preferred a version of the British Sten gun. During the 1930s, the Germans settled on two light machine gun designs and used these guns, the MG34 and MG42, throughout the war. The latter design was so successful that it was copied by the USA after the war and, in the slightly modified form of the M60, remains in use.
The new theory of offensive blitzkrieg had little room in it for the use of purely defensive weapons, though it was recognised that they would be needed around static installations. However many senior generals did not really believe Guderian’s blitzkrieg ideas would work and so insisted that defensive weapons were also developed and manufactured. By the outbreak of war, the Germans had developed a wide variety of mines.
Hitler: Military Commander Page 8
