Employees were forbidden to enter the compound through any entrance other than the clock house at the north end of the site.21 They walked to their respective change rooms, where they prepared to move to the clean side; they travelled to their respective workshops through the covered aboveground gallery system.22
Pick a Number, Any Number
Engineers commenced numbering GECO’s buildings loosely, starting at No. 1 for the administration building at the most northerly area of the site, at Eglinton Avenue. Moving south, as an empty fuse moved toward the Proof Yard, the numbering on the buildings increased.23 Many small “rooms” were added to the layout as the GECO site grew, sending the original numbered plan askew, causing some higher-numbered buildings to be out of sequence with surrounding lower-numbered buildings.24 Some numbered buildings were neither recorded in the financial records GECO kept for construction costs, nor on the engineer’s sketch of the site.25 For example, the change room housed in building No. 18 was identified on the map but does not show up anywhere in GECO’s financial records.26 Obviously, the change house existed, but its cost to build wasn’t included. Some building numbers were skipped on the map.27 Building No. 13 housed the cafeteria, Building No. 15 housed component stores, but there is no location for No. 14, the clean-side laboratory on the site sketch.
Perhaps these inconsistencies are the result of the fact that, due to the secretive nature of experimental work taking place on site, information about the building was given only on a need-to-know basis. Or perhaps, while GECO kept meticulous notes, this oversight may indicate that the speed at which the plant was built overwhelmed its ability to keep up with ever-changing physical requirements. It’s a fact that many buildings, while they appear on the engineer’s sketch, had no identification as to how they were used.
Many unrecorded “rooms” were washrooms — there were many located throughout the clean side of the plant, attached to fuse-filling workshops, such as Nos. 27, 28, 31, 32, 36, 37, etc. — or were transformer vaults housed in the tunnels (for example, Nos. 109–114).28 Note that Building No. 46 is a men’s washroom; there is no corresponding women’s washroom — women did not work this far south. Waste stations were located in Buildings 95, 96, 99, and 100.
A Fuse’s Journey
Engineers at GECO determined that all plant materials entered through the main gate at the north or “dirty” end of the plant.29 To minimize the chance of accident and maximize efficiency, munitions would travel in a southerly direction from Eglinton Avenue, undergoing all operations necessary for filling, until they reached the Proof Yard at the southern end of the site, ready for final quality testing and shipment.30
Explosives were stored safely in “magazines” (Buildings 157–161) at the south end of the plant until needed, then working quantities of explosives were transported and stored in smaller “expense magazines” situated alongside each fuse-filling building, such as in Buildings 116–125.31 The amount of combustible materials allowed in each small magazine was proportionate to the material’s level of stability — the more unstable the explosive the less could be stored.32 From these smaller magazines, the explosives were supplied to the various workshops as required.
When empties — fuses that had not been filled with explosives yet — arrived at the plant, workmen delivered them to Building No. 15 to await filling.33 The shipping containers in which empties arrived were taken to Building No. 44 or 78 for storage.34 Empty components and filling compounds stored in expense magazines were brought together in filling shops.35 Upwards of seventy separate operations were needed to fill one unit of munitions.36 Once filled, “truckerettes” trucked fuses to Factory Bond where they awaited approval by internal inspectors.37 The filled munitions then travelled to Government Bond where they awaited final inspection.38 Following inspection, fuses moved to soldering and painting shops (Building No. 76 or No. 43), then to packing (Building No. 77 on the H.E. line and No. 45 on the G.P. line).39 A representative sample of each lot filled — a lot contained two thousand units — were “proofed” in the Proof Yard to ensure accuracy, reliability, ease of use, and safety.40 The last step in the filling process involved moving the packed munitions to the shipping area (either Building No. 80 or 47) at the extreme south end of the plant.41 Filled munitions left by truck.42 Some munitions were flown directly to battlefronts in England, India, North Africa, and South Africa.43 A greater portion headed to other ammunition-filling plants in Canada, such as Pickering and Cherrier, where workers assembled filled munitions into complete rounds of ammunition.44
GECO workers transported munitions through the plant’s gallery system. In this particular case, they are transporting a load of completed Fuze 720 to another plant for assembly into compete rounds of ammunition. Courtesy of Archives of Ontario.
If munitions did not pass inspection, they proceeded to Rejection Bond (Building Nos. 72 and 34) then to the Reclaiming Shop (Building No. 71) for correction.45 If the defect was irreparable, the defective stores ended up in the Proof Yard in Building No. 115 for reclamation of empties and filling components.46
What Lies Beneath
More than two and a half miles47 of tunnels lay beneath GECO’s gallery system. These tunnels carried service lines for electricity, water, steam, and compressed air; housed transformer vaults and switch rooms; and helped provide a simpler method for installing sanitary sewers.48 Management felt the additional expense of excavating and installing this elaborate tunnel system was justified because erecting buildings and galleries could be done while laying facilities in newly dug and walled tunnels, shortening construction time.49 Once the plant was in production, the tunnels provided easy access to carry out repairs and maintenance at any time without causing disruptions in production or introducing a hazard through “dirty” maintenance workers entering “clean” workshops.50 Should an explosion occur in one building, having all services buried underground could minimize the impact to production. There may have been loss of life and property, but production in surrounding buildings could continue.
As noted, the tunnel system was big, equivalent to the distance from St. Clair Avenue at the north end of Toronto to almost Queen Street in its downtown core.51 GECO’s tunnel system was also byzantine, and construction workers were warned of the potential danger of losing their bearings while underground. Making navigating the system even more difficult was the fact that not all of it was laid out on the site sketch. According to the 1956 Fire Insurance Plan of Toronto, an additional tunnel not shown on the GECO engineering sketch ran at a diagonal south from the main east-west tunnel at the north end of the plant to meet the western part of the main north-south tunnel.52 This tunnel created a triangle enveloping Building Nos. 101 and 109.53 In order to avoid workers getting lost, construction crews were restricted to working on short sections of tunnel.
Hartley French’s main tasks as an apprentice electrician included running wires and conduit to underground transformer rooms within the honeycomb of tunnels. The plumbing system for GECO was also housed underground and was installed ahead of the electricians’ arrival. The summer of 1941 was terribly hot, and Hartley enjoyed working underground in the coolness of the tunnels. He recalled wiring a large warehouse on the GECO property, more than likely the site of the future cafeteria where eventually sixty-five thousand meals would be served every month.54
Life Happens: A Change of Plans
The outlook of war changed while GECO was under construction. Subsequently, the Canadian government thrust more responsibility in Bob and Phil Hamilton’s direction to manage aggressive ammunition-filling schedules. The types of munitions to be filled and the revised monthly number of units required to be filled swelled. This meant constructing new buildings not originally planned, adding extensions to existing buildings, extending service accommodations, including expansions to the cafeteria, putting increased strains on water mains and sewers, increasing fire protection, and adding or changing heating, plumbing, electrical, and mechanical equipment for l
aundry and the cafeteria.55
Chief Engineer H.L. Tamplin responded competently to these ever-changing and strenuous demands, amending GECO’s layout. Construction crews adapted well, too. However, on several occasions, construction of buildings occurred concurrently with various modifications to the design and engineering of said buildings.56
Can We Talk?
Bob and Phil Hamilton felt regular staff meetings, as well as taking advantage of frequent impromptu conferences when needed, helped to not only keep the lines of communication open and keep the project moving toward a rapid completion, but also to promote a heightened sense of esprit de corps among all departments of the plant. Good feelings imparted by these affable relationships trickled down to operators working in the fuse-filling workshops and helped employee morale plant-wide.
Regular staff meetings started early in the planning stages of the GECO project and continued during Scarboro’s entire active production period.57 Management, along with all department heads, reviewed the plant’s progress and discussed problems, which ranged in scope from emerging explosive technology to designing women’s underwear. Starting early in June 1941, these meetings developed into a weekly event.58
Minutes of early staff meetings detailed such topics as what special requirements were needed in the design for a truck to carry explosives, potential tray designs to carry fuses, how strict adherence to safety rules should be, what a cafeteria expected to serve several thousand meals a day would need, and whether women engaged in fuse filling would be allowed to wear bobby pins in their hair. Discussions surrounding the use of bobby pins and ladies’ underwear might have seemed trivial and unimportant. This view could not have been farther from the truth. These discussions and the decisions made meant the difference between living another day to see family, or dying in a terrible explosion.
There Is No “I” in “Team”
By the end of July 1941, GECO’s management and supervisory positions were staffed.
There were, of course, the Hamilton brothers, who served as president and vice-president. According to Philip Hamilton, P.D.P. Hamilton’s son and namesake, his father, the vice-president of GECO, was the quiet brother, more technical, and concerned about everyday details of operations. Bob, on the other hand, was gregarious. As president he was eager to promote GECO, and comfortable meeting the public. Their complementary personalities melded into a powerful executive twosome.
Some of GECO’s senior staff, including Dr. Jeffrey, GECO’s medical officer; Major Flexman, operations manager; Mr. Duff, production manager; and Mrs. Florence Ignatieff, Cafeteria Services, lived onsite in six homes at the extreme northwest area of the site.59 This dedicated staff was available twenty-four hours a day, every day, in case of accident or explosion. Good thing, too; their emergency services would be needed before the war ended.
A Squeaky Wheel Gets an Earful
In the ensuing months and years of war, when the early days of GECO’s construction were but a sentimental memory for a handful of original, seasoned employees, there may have come the odd grumble from more recent operators over a squeaky door or a doorknob coming loose. These new hires had not witnessed the countless obstacles overcome or the dogged determination and fierce pride of the thousands of patriotic Canadians involved during construction. To anyone who complained the plant did not function perfectly — a squeaky door for instance — came these words of rebuttal, written in the company newspaper from Walter Campbell, one of those seasoned souls:
You weren’t there when caterpillars were completely buried in mud. You were not there when every night over a foot of mud was pushed off the construction road in order to bring in the material to carry on. You were not there when frozen ground had to be blasted so that footings could be rushed. You did not have the complaints from householders three miles away that the electric fixtures came down and marked their dining room table during the blasting periods. One walking around the plant now could not see why there were difficulties, difficulties that were encountered — and licked.”60
When All Is Said and Done: Feeds and Speeds of a Top-Secret Munitions Factory
Financial Totals
Early estimates put the cost to build “Scarboro” at $2.25 million.61 The actual cost reached $7,181,124 — more than three times the original projection.62 The anticipated quantity of units — fuses — to be filled monthly fluctuated from early estimates of 1.9 million per month to 4,135,000 actually filled.63 The Hamiltons originally planned to fill seven types of fuses.64 The plant eventually tooled up for and filled forty-one types, almost six times its original plan.65
Construction Totals
GECO’s construction program took approximately two million man-hours to complete.66 The site contained more than 1.8 miles of paved roadway67 on 345 acres of land, of which 121 acres were enclosed by an eight-foot-high barbed-wire fence that ran for nearly two miles.68 More than three miles of “cleanways” and and nearly three miles of tunnels connected the buildings in the “Danger Zone.”69
What did it take to build a top-secret munitions plant?
more than one million board feet of lumber (the equivalent of 256 acres)
1,270,000 bricks
340,000 concrete blocks
292 tons of reinforcing iron
1,645,000 square feet of plywood and weatherboard
870,000 square feet of roofing
1,330,000 square feet of Gyproc wallboard
985,500 square feet of insulation
420,000 pounds of nails
nearly 400,000 square feet of hardwood flooring
more than 346,250 square feet of linoleum flooring
1,585,000 feet of electrical wire
184,000 feet of conduit, ranging in size from 3/8 inches to 4 inches
451 glued laminated beams or “super structures” comprising 605,000 board feet of lumber, 37 tons of nails, and 16 tons of casein glue.70
4
Ramping Up
Eight months had passed since dynamite had broken ground on rich Scarboro farmland for the future GECO munitions plant. By the end of September 1941, almost 100 percent of the munitions plant was complete. There were 170 buildings up and running, almost forty more shops than staff originally planned.1
However, while the Hamilton brothers, with the help of their dedicated team of engineers and management staff, had erected a huge, sprawling complex of munitions workshops and ancillary buildings, transforming the plant into a lean, mean, fuse-filling machine was another matter entirely.
In a summation written at the end of the war, Major Flexman, plant manager, stated that management was clear about the intent of “Project 24” from its outset: “Scarboro was conceived, constructed, organized, and operated for but one purpose — PRODUCTION — and to that end every department of The General Engineering Company (Canada) Limited made direct or indirect contribution. The success or failure of the project would depend upon the quality and quantity of its output and the ability to deliver the goods when they were required.”2 Major Flexman felt other achievements, while they may have been noteworthy, would be “incidental or secondary” to the plant’s primary purpose.3 Even safety — “important and desirable as it might be” — could not, and would not take precedence over production of top-notch ammunition at a time when countless lives might be sacrificed for lack of dependable shells, grenades, bullets, and bombs.4 “Costs could not be measured in dollars in a period when the survival of an empire was at stake,” Flexman stated. “The comfort and convenience of employees would not be placed ahead of the needs of the men in the armed forces.”5 Quality production and output were always the first concern — that, and safety.
In hindsight, with GECO’s incredible record in both production and safety — over 256 million munitions shipped without one fatal accident — its simple production decree seems straightforward, perhaps even simplistic.6 Boiled down, GECO wanted to get the job done as quickly as possible, hopefully without blowing anyone up.
Talk
Is Cheap: Bring on the High Explosives
Once production got underway, GECO planned to fill eleven natures.7 Of these, four were to be filled on the H.E. side — Fuse 119, Fuse 152, Fuse 251, and Gaine 11 — while the G.P. side would fill Fuse 199, three Primers (Nos. 1, 11, and 12), Tube Vent Percussion 0.5”, another Tube, and Tracer-Igniter No. 12.8
However, with any new undertaking comes the odd glitch. Factoring in the sheer size of an operation like GECO with its aggressive production schedule; the difficulty of keeping over twenty-one thousand employees9 motivated, healthy, safe, and happy; and the pressure to supply the Allied forces with millions of filled munitions, it was a wonder management resolved every glitch, hitch, and snag so well. In fact, to expect new enterprises such as GECO to ramp up production without, as Major Flexman wrote, “…running into all kinds of grief and difficulties” would be unreasonable and perhaps deadly.10
Glitches, Hitches, and Snags
No matter how extensive the training or how thoughtful the foresight, nothing could replace real-time experience.
Wartime industry was new in Canada, a national enterprise that had to be put together not only brick by brick, but department by department. There was no precedent to go back to, to study, or learn from, other than the lessons learned from the British in the Great War two decades earlier.
Bob and Phil Hamilton recognized fully that they needed gifted and capable departmental heads who would drive GECO into production as soon as enough buildings were finished. The Hamilton brothers sought men and women of high calibre. Despite thousands of outstanding personnel already in war administration work from whom they could choose, Bob and Phil selected upstanding men and women from wide-ranging occupations and professions, with diverse backgrounds.11 They were not of the mind that “birds of a feather flock together,” but rather “opposites attract.”
Bomb Girls Page 4
