by Tom Keene
Matters now began to gather an exciting momentum: Governor Sir Bernard Bourdillon and the Nigerian government readily offered the loan of two tugs based in Lagos: the large government vessel Vulcan, which would be used to tow out the Duchessa d’Aosta, and the smaller tug Nuneaton – together with their officers and crews. The seventeen extra men needed for the actual attack, it was anticipated, would be provided locally by the regular army commander, General Giffard.
†††
In Lagos, the men of Maid Honor Force found themselves surrounded by friends – and by enemies. Yet both were on the same side.
SOE agents, friends and members of the consulate staff had already helped plan the raid. Some had gone considerably further: Vice Consul Colin Michie persuaded a local aeroplane pilot to take him up joy-riding, with the result that he was able to present London and March-Phillipps with invaluable aerial photographs of the harbour showing the precise location of each vessel and its proximity to the shore; it is believed Michie was also responsible for arranging photographs of a rather different kind.4 These were of the pro-Nazi Spanish governor, F.L. Soraluce, bathing naked with his African mistress. After these were brought to the Spanish governor’s attention, his enthusiasm for ordering continuing close surveillance of British activities on Fernando Po decreased markedly.
Another SOE Officer sent to the island in May 1941, Capt. Richard Lippett (W25), had been given the vital task of luring ashore the ships’ officers of both the Duchessa d’Aosta and the Likomba to a dinner party on the night of the raid. Major Laversuch told Lippett that 65 per cent of the raid’s chances of success rested upon his ability to ensure that all the two ships’ officers were his dinner guests ashore and so seated that they would, quite literally, be looking the other way when March-Phillipps and his men swarmed into action. No pressure, then.
Major Victor Laversuch, however, had pressures of his own. He had decided to couple his request for the loan of seventeen troops from General Sir George Giffard with the detailed briefing of the operation to which Giffard, as General Officer Commanding, West Africa, was entitled. Their meeting, however, did not go well.
From the outset, 55-year-old Giffard had objected to SOE’s presence on his patch of West African soil, telling London back in May 1941: ‘To be candid, the trouble with the SOE representatives [of W Section] was that (a) they did not know enough French and (b) they had not the knowledge of what will get under the skin of the African. In general, these SOE representatives are very able, but they are not round pegs in round holes.’ Now the obstinate, hide-bound General proceeded to place Operation Postmaster in real jeopardy. Victor Laversuch (W4) signalled London on 22 December 1941:
1. A snag has arisen at Postmaster Operation owing to attitude GOC West Africa who is at present Lagos.
2. At interview W4 had with him this morning he expressed concern at reaction Spanish authorities.
3. He also hinted operation might jeopardise other possible plans he had in mind and could not -
(a) Give us his blessing
(b) Loan us personnel until he had communicated with C-in-C Freetown which he is doing by cable this morning.
4. We informed him operation in principle had been approved by ZP [the Foreign Office], Admiralty, HE Governor Nigeria and that it was evident ZP had carefully considered point raised by him regarding Spanish reaction before giving their approval.
5. He has promised to give definite reply before December 25.
6. If you can assist your end please do. In meantime we are going ahead with preliminaries.5
Records show that the Foreign Office authorised the attack as far back as 14 November.6 The Admiralty offered the mission full support on 25 November and sent an appropriate signal to C-in-C South Atlantic, Vice Admiral Algernon Willis, with the request that he would ‘afford them all assistance possible’. SOE Lagos had received notification of mission approval in principle ‘by the appropriate authorities’ in signal No 43 despatched on 28 November 1941.7
Almost a month later, on 23 December 1941, the War Office felt obliged to signal General Giffard once more, reminding him the Foreign Office had authorised the raid. In his turn General Giffard was now requested – but not ordered – to give ‘any assistance possible’ to the Fernando Po project. That signal was authorised, sent for transmission – but not despatched. Christmas festivities, it has since been presumed, overcame military efficiency and the vital signal languished in some out tray. Laversuch, however, was cabled on Christmas Eve, wished Happy Christmas and told, incorrectly, that the message had been sent. Ergo, reasoned Laversuch and his SOE colleagues, Giffard would now come on-side. The sense of relief in Lagos that ensued, however, was to be short-lived.
On Christmas Eve Giffard met Admiral Willis and shared his concerns. Willis, it appears, was a kindred spirit. His priority also was to maintain the status quo and thus minimise what he saw as the threat to British colonial interests. Encouraged by Giffard, Willis sided with the army in opposing Operation Postmaster and sent London the following signal. It was despatched at 2305 and arrived in time for Christmas Day:
HUSH MOST SECRET
GOC (? In) Chief West Africa is much against seizure of Axis ships in Fernando Po in view of:
(a) War Office instruction to examine (corrupt group) capture of this island
(b) Fact that origin of operation must become known whether successful or not and this will have bad effect on Spanish attitude.
(c) Operation is unnecessarily provocative unless value of ships considered or to offset repercussions.
2. I concur with G.O.C. in C and have suspended operation [author’s italics] pending further instructions.8
Admiral Willis’ signal went directly to London. In Lagos, SOE’s Victor Laversuch (W4) was still awaiting that promised response from General Gifford by 25 December. He would later claim it never arrived.
Maid Honor Force, meanwhile, believed their mission was now definitely ON. They were spending Christmas up-country in Olokomeji, staying in the former holiday home of the Governor of Nigeria, firing their weapons in the bush and testing their plastic explosive charges against sample lengths of anchor chain. Again, this was a tactical secret Appleyard chose not to share with his parents:
[we] had three nights there. It was a delightful change and really felt like a Christmas holiday … We had some rifles with us and shot some small game but saw nothing bigger than gazelles … However, we shot quails and guinea-fowl with some success. They were excellent eating. We dynamited fish twice – great sport and yielded a big catch of about 40lbs each day … We had luscious fruits there which we picked straight from the forest trees – oranges, grapefruit, coconuts and tangerine as big as grapefruit, no pips and full of juice – one of the loveliest fruits you could wish for! There were nine of us up there for Christmas – all men, except for the wife of the present occupier of the house. We had a very jolly Christmas Day … and a grand Christmas dinner at night’9
Yet, even as Appleyard and his friends enjoyed their unexpected Christmas festivities, the mission for which they had trained so hard and travelled so far still hung in the balance. And there was another, more personal question mark that also hung over the viability of Operation Postmaster. The question of command, of leadership. It was a question which had lain there, unresolved, for some time.
Station Head Louis Franck had met March-Phillipps and was not completely reassured by what he saw. The man with the stammer and explosive, short-fuse temper lacked, in his view, basic common sense.
There is a file in the National Archives at Kew, London, that records Franck’s reservations and is marked in pencil – presumably by Gubbins himself: ‘For our records but not for circulation.’ The file is a record of a conversation in Gubbins’ office held on 21 November 1941, four days before the Admiralty swung behind Operation Postmaster and sent Willis the signal he either chose to ignore or failed to receive. The meeting was attended by Gubbins, ‘Caesar’ – Lt Col Julius Hanau, Gubbins’ W
est Africa deputy – and one other. Franck began by stating that, although he found all the Maid Honor Force personnel involved ‘admirable in their own way’ he feared that the team ‘did perhaps not have the necessary qualifications of leadership for the successful conduct of an operation of this kind which required a good deal of planning and special leadership’. March-Phillipps, he felt, whilst possessing qualities of courage and enterprise, lacked common sense and was therefore ‘not a suitable leader for this job’.
Brigadier Gubbins heard him out and then added his own view. Which was that, with Appleyard’s assistance to work out the details of the operation, he felt March-Phillipps was quite capable of leading the operation successfully. And there, for a while, the matter rested. Yet, in time, events both off the island of Fernando Po and later, on the beaches of Normandy, would show that both Gubbins and Franck, in their own way, were right. And that Louis Franck’s instincts, his gut-feelings of reservation about some of the personal qualities that drove March-Phillipps to court an impulsive, quixotic death in battle, were not misplaced.
On 26 December, just over a month later, ‘Caesar’, in London, followed up with another memo to Gubbins. Describing the Postmaster plan as ‘sound’ he concluded: ‘We should be interested to know who is in command of Postmaster. You will recollect that W. [Franck] expressed certain misgivings about W01 [March-Phillipps] on temperamental grounds and felt that it might be hazardous to put him in charge.’10 The files reveal that, despite Gubbins’ apparent support for March-Phillipps, SOE London had assumed that Major John Eyre, their senior man in Lagos, would command the raid.
Now SOE Lagos – including John Eyre – sprang robustly to March-Phillipps’ defence. Major Laversuch signalled London two days later:
A) We feel strongly that W01 must be in command for the following reasons.
1. His seafaring and general experiences which are most valuable in an operation of this nature.
2. Personnel of M.H.[Maid Honor] are backbone of whole party and they have utmost confidence and trust in him.
3. W29 [Major John Eyre, Senior SOE Officer, Lagos] volunteered to act under command of W01 in any capacity.
4. In view of above we submit it would be fundamentally wrong to change specifically at this late stage of preliminaries.
London was quick to capitulate and cabled back: ‘In view of your representations we agree that W01 will be in command.’11
On 27 December, the day after Boxing Day, despite his promise, there appeared to be still no word to SOE from General Giffard. Major Laversuch cabled London:
1. Despite the urgent cable sent by Headquarters at Lagos to G.O.C. in C who is now Accra no reply received.
2. Question most urgent and unless we have decision at once our plan will be upset and success of the operation jeopardised.
3. Please request War Office cable urgent instructions G.O.C in C.
4. We also understand reason for delay in reply from G.O.C. in C is due to the fact that he in turn has not had reply from Commander in Chief Freetown.
5. Please also therefore arrange Admiralty signal urgently to Commander In Chief Freetown.12
SOE Headquarters slammed back a reply that same day:
A. Fully realise urgency of position.
B. Admiralty expected signal shortly. Am now working on War Office.13
Laversuch’s urgent plea for higher intervention seems to have worked. Yet there appears to be confusion as to the timing of these important messages between Lagos and SOE Headquarters in London. After claiming righteously that General Giffard had ignored his promise to let him know where things stood by 25 December, a Christmas Day signal to London from Lagos reveals that Laversuch had indeed heard from General Giffard by that deadline. For Laversuch himself cabled London that day:
FROM W4. MOST SECRET. DECYPHER YOURSELF.
WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM GOC IN C. BEGINS:
FOR W4. HAVE CONSULTED COMMANDER IN CHIEF SOUTH ATLANTIC WHO DOES NOT REPEAT NOT AGREE OPERATION SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT PRESENT. ENDS.14
It might be supposed that General Giffard was getting Admiral Willis to do his dirty work for him. Operation Postmaster appeared stalled – dead in the water. Shielded by the impersonal jargon of encrypted communications, by distance and, perhaps, by festive administrative incompetence, this was a direct challenge to its authority that London could not ignore. It did not. Four days later, on 29 December 1941, and in language that neither General Giffard nor Admiral Willis could misconstrue, London restated the position: SOE’s Operation Postmaster was to go ahead and he, Admiral Willis, was to help make it happen. The Admiralty, too, threw some of their weight behind SOE’s request for urgent co-operation, salting – either wittingly or unwittingly – a little untruth into the stream of telegrams flowing between London, Freetown and Lagos. Referring to the signal sent to General Gifford on 13 December which ‘it is regretted was not repeated to you’, the Admiralty, a little disingenuously in view of the London cable sent the very same day, reassured Admiral Willis: ‘These instructions are for examination of the project only and there is no repeat no intention of implementing them in near future [author’s italics] …’ Is it possible that, at this late stage, the Admiralty did not realise the raid itself was imminent? It seems unlikely. Their cable continued:
Activities against Axis interests will always arouse suspicions. Proof of these suspicions must be avoided … Possible political repercussions are acceptable provided collusion of our forces or authorities is not apparent. If present plan is unacceptable to you in this respect, you should have it recast. Shipping involved is of sufficient value to be worth obtaining if possible. War Office concur. Pass to G.O.C. in C West Africa [Giffard].15
Now the word came back to Lagos from Admiral Willis in Freetown who, knuckles rapped, still attempted to salvage a little pride: although he still disliked the idea of Postmaster he was prepared to discuss it. Laversuch and March-Phillipps hurried to Freetown. They arrived on 4 January and saw Admiral WIllis twice on the evenings of 4 and 5 January. Finally, after much discussion at a level of detail that must have sorely tried March-Phillipps’ short-fuse temper, Willis allowed himself to be persuaded: the plan as outlined might well work and, if it did, one of his Royal Navy warships, the corvette HMS Violet, would be tasked to intercept Duchessa d’Aosta on the high seas after the cutting-out operation had been completed successfully.
One down, one to go. Laversuch now requested a meeting with General Giffard: he still needed seventeen fighting men from the General’s command. Laversuch recorded afterwards:
The proceedings were exceedingly brief and the following conversation took place:
Laversuch: ‘I was informed by the C-in-C South Atlantic that you had agreed in principle to the operations taking place, for which we are grateful.’
Giffard: ‘I have agreed, but I tell you frankly I do not like the scheme, and I shall never like it.’
Laversuch: ‘I am very sorry to hear this, but thank you for having given your consent. There is a question of personnel. Could you assist us on this subject?’
Giffard: ‘No – most definitely – no. The only thing I can offer you is my best wishes for the success of the operation.’
Laversuch: ‘Thank you very much, Sir. Goodnight.’16
March-Phillipps was also at that brief and unhelpful meeting, though his reaction outside the general’s office is not recorded – perhaps it is just as well. Both men hurried back to Lagos, from where Operation Postmaster would start. With departure to Fernando Po scheduled for 11 January, time was extremely short. And they still needed seventeen men.
Help, however, was at hand in the form of the Governor of Nigeria, Sir Henry Bourdillon – no friend of General Giffard – who immediately invited Laversuch and March-Phillipps to select seventeen potential volunteers from his own Colonial Service. Civilians all, they selected men from the police, education, public works and administrative branches of the Service, many of whom had previous mil
itary service. All of the seventeen men selected, described as ‘the toughest individuals in the public service in Nigeria’, were approved by the Governor and each was then sent a telegram by March-Phillipps inviting them simply to take two weeks’ authorised holiday and ‘come to a party’ at 12 noon on 10 January at 32, Cameron Road, Lagos. Conjecture was rife. Some thought they would be required to trek hundreds of miles through the bush and had been busy breaking in thick-soled walking boots.17
At Cameron Road they were given a general and non-mission-specific briefing by March-Phillipps about the sort of work that might be involved. He did not mention long treks through the jungle but did invite anyone having second thoughts to step down. No one did. SOE agent Lt Leonard Guise (W10) recalled afterwards:
The situation on 7 and 8 of January was not too good … the question of manpower looked serious. Owing to intense enthusiasm from His Excellency and the Deputy Chief Secretary, Miles Clifford, the entire matter was solved in some twenty-four hours, and at midday on 10 January, as choice a collection of thugs as Nigeria can ever have seen was assembled at 32, Cameron Road.18
