by Trevor Royle
In June 1940, with the support of the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines, the British Army began using the term ‘commando’ to describe specially trained forces which would be raised for conducting raids in Nazi-occupied Europe. First used in the previous century by the Boer republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State to describe the military system by which men had a requirement to do national military service, it became associated with low-intensity guerrilla warfare tactics. Boer commandos elected their own officers, provided their own horses and weapons, and were adept at field craft. Gradually the term became synonymous with any troops involved in irregular warfare, and the new force was originally designated as Special Service troops whose members wore a distinctive dark green beret after completing their rigorous basic training. (The unfortunate and potentially lethal acronym SS was dropped from badges in October 1944, being too similar to the German SS or Schutzstaffel.) An army ‘commando’ consisted of some 400 soldiers who were all volunteers, and of the original units drawn up, No. 10 and No. 11 Commando were formed from units within Scottish Command. (The latter reinforced its Scottish identity by wearing the tam-o’-shanter bonnet with a black hackle.)
From the outset great reliance was placed on attaining a high standard of physical fitness and creating resourcefulness, the objective being to inculcate an offensive spirit within all units. Courses were held at Lochailort, but individual commando units were supposed to operate as self-contained entities, and the island of Arran with its rocky coastline and hilly terrain was favoured as a training area by the two Scottish commandos. No. 8 Commando, recruited mainly from foot guards regiments, also trained on the island. By 1944 the army had twelve commandos including No. 10 (Inter-Allied Commando) which consisted of men from a variety of European countries, including some Germans, and No. 14 Commando which had been trained in the winter warfare role. Initially commando training was carried out in the area of the Clyde estuary at two main locations: the first in the grounds of Kellburn Estate, just south of Largs, and the second around Inveraray on Loch Fyne, the home of the Duke of Argyll. By then too the Royal Navy had established eight Royal Marine Commandos, and in 1942 training was centred at Achnacarry Castle in Inverness-shire, in a remote glen about fourteen miles from Fort William. The ancestral home of Cameron of Lochiel, it soon attracted a well-deserved reputation for the rigour and thoroughness of its training programmes which were conducted by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Vaughan, nicknamed the ‘Rommel of the North’. The west coast of Scotland was also home to several establishments belonging to Combined Operations Command which had been established in 1940 under the direction of Admiral Sir Roger Keyes to plan and train for amphibious operations against enemy targets in occupied Europe.
The commandos, both army and Royal Marine, all saw meritorious war service, mainly in the Middle East and Mediterranean theatres, but there was one special forces group which took the war back to the enemy from Scottish territory – No. 1 Norwegian Independent Company, also known as Kompani Linge, named after its commanding officer Captain Martin Linge who was killed in a badly planned raid in December 1941. Originally based at Henley-on-Thames, the Norwegians moved north in 1940 to three shooting lodges (Drumintoul, Glenmore and Forest) in the Cairngorms close to Coylumbridge, where they operated as Group 26. The terrain was ideal for winter warfare training, having similarities with Norway, and under SOE direction the Norwegians quickly built up a reputation for their professionalism and toughness. They also had to learn how to melt back into their native Norway while it was under Nazi control because the group’s main purpose was to operate behind enemy lines. This posed obvious risks, not just to the members of Kompani Linge, but also to any Norwegian civilians who gave them assistance and then fell into the hands of the Gestapo. At the time the Germans operated a policy of unrestricted retaliation against Norwegian civilians who were thought to have helped undercover agents.
Around 350 recruits passed through the group’s training courses and then took part in missions in Norway, most of which were mounted from Scotland. In addition to dropping by parachute, always a risky business, members of Kompani Linge were flown to Norway by Catalinas of 333 Squadron from its base on the Tay estuary or by submarine from the same location, while others made the equally dangerous journey by small vessels, usually fishing boats, from bases in Shetland. Manned by Norwegian sailors and operated under the aegis of SOE, these were all-volunteer units, and the most famous, the Norwegian Independent Naval Unit, was known as the ‘Shetland Bus’.12 Operating firstly from Lerwick and Lunna Voe, and latterly from Scalloway, the unit mounted forty-three operations during the winter of 1941–2. Of these thirty were counted as successes, but three boats were lost and fourteen crew members were killed, while a serious storm in November destroyed equipment and hampered planning. The following winter season was more disappointing, largely due to the fact that the Germans were better prepared, and the unit lost six boats and thirty crew members.13 In 1943 the situation was eased when the US Navy provided three fast submarine-chasers which operated under the names of Hitra, Hessa and Vigra and offered higher speeds and greater firepower. Another Norwegian operating base was established at Burghead on the Moray Firth but it mounted only five operations, and was shut down after a fatal sailing accident damaged its security.
Given the nature of the operations which had to be carried out over difficult terrain during the short days of winter, there were several setbacks, and the relationship between SOE and Milorg, the Norwegian resistance movement, did not always run smoothly. Bad luck also played a part – the Dundee-based submarine Uredd disappeared with all hands in February 1943 while landing a group to attack the pyrite mines at Sulitjelma in the north. However it was not all losses; at the same time another Norwegian group mounted a spectacular and hugely successful operation against a ‘heavy water’ plant at Vemork in the Hardangervidda. At the time this was considered to be a key component in the quest to harness atomic energy, but because the plant was heavily defended and beyond the range of RAF bombers the attack had to be made overland by ski, the members of Kompani Linge having been dropped by parachute. An earlier glider-borne operation had ended in disaster, but at the end of February 1943 six Norwegians mounted a coup de main assault on Vemork and succeeded in putting the plant out of action.14 It was the high point of the Norwegian war effort, and the exploit was later turned into the film The Heroes of Telemark (1965).
Around a quarter of a million Allied soldiers received special forces training in Scotland during the war – they included US Army Rangers and Polish parachutists – and the remoteness of the West Highlands made it a perfect place to hone their skills. It also helped that most of the facilities were in a Protected Area which meant that their activities could be carried out far from the eyes of prying outsiders. Local people were asked to use their discretion, and soon became accustomed to the presence of soldiers and the sound of realistic training. Natural reticence helped in this respect, as did the long reach of history. One trainer at Lochailort remembered ordering a boatman on Loch Morar not to discuss what was happening and received the reply ‘Aye, we kept Prince Charles secret here.’15 (The reference was to Prince Charles Edward Stuart’s escape following the Jacobite defeat at Culloden in 1746.)
There were other secrets, and in one instance the creation of a sensitive no-go area in the West Highlands meant exactly what it said. In the summer of 1942 Gruinard Island between Gairloch and Ullapool was deliberately contaminated with a highly toxic strain of anthrax called Vollum 14578. The intention was to test the use of anthrax spores as a weapon of war on a flock of eighty sheep by exploding a small chemical bomb, which succeeded in killing the animals. However, later tests showed that the island had been lethally contaminated, and it had to be placed in indefinite quarantine. Gruinard Island was placed out of bounds and remained so until 1990, after it had been decontaminated by spraying it with 280 tonnes of formaldehyde solution diluted in seawater.16
While the west coast and th
e Western Highlands were used extensively for training purposes by special forces and commandos, regular forms of warfare were not ignored by the armed forces. Following the brief foray into France in June 1940, 52nd (Lowland) Division returned to Britain where it was employed on home defence duties, first in eastern England and then in the central belt of Scotland where it guarded the Scottish Command Line which had been established to protect the Tay, Clyde and Forth estuaries. At the same time the battalions within the division started branching out into areas other than anti-invasion training. A sniping school was established in Glen Etive, and battle schools were set up at Forres and Edzell for realistic training, including the use of new commando tactics. But the biggest change came in September 1942 when it became known that training was about to start for a new and specialised role as mountain warfare troops prior to an anticipated invasion of Norway. Beneath the familiar cross of St Andrew worn on the shoulder, the men of the 52nd (Lowland) Division wore a new badge – MOUNTAIN. As the British Army’s only specialist mountain warfare division, the 52nd was given a number of privileges: its manpower levels were sacrosanct, new specialist equipment was always forthcoming, it was expanded to include the Norwegian Brigade, and its Reconnaissance Regiment was equipped with tanks as well as armoured cars. In return it had to work extremely hard.
From autumn 1942 and throughout the following year, the division was involved in a series of arduous training exercises in the Cairngorms which involved the men living in the hills for weeks at a time. Instruction was also given in fighting in snow conditions, skiing and handling of loads on horses and, with the help of Sikh handlers, mules. Throughout the training cycle conditions were as close as possible to the anticipated reality of Norway. Exercise Goliath I took place in November 1942 and lasted sixteen days in the northern area of the Great Glen, while Goliath II lasted three weeks in the hills of Perthshire. For the men of 7th/9th Royal Scots it was an entirely new kind of training: ‘This had been arduous and exhausting, involving as it did the carrying of enormous loads over the peaks of the Cairngorms. All will remember Exercise “Edelweiss”, conducted in a two-day blizzard, and “Goliaths I and II”, which lasted two and three weeks respectively. On returning from our advanced training base at Derry Lodge it was a pleasant change to undergo training in combined operations at Inverary.17
Although the soldiers in the division would not have been aware of it at the time, their presence in Scotland contributed to a deception plan aimed at keeping the Germans guessing about Britain’s policy towards Norway. The training for mountain warfare was in deadly earnest – in 1941 plans had been laid for Operation Jupiter, a direct invasion of Norway which Churchill hoped would take some pressure off the Soviet Union. Although these were shelved when it became obvious that any invasion would be doomed to failure, they were revived in late 1943 when General Thorne was asked to draw up plans for a force which would be capable of liberating Norway following the invasion of Europe through Normandy. Two options were chosen: Operation Rankin B which envisaged the Germans withdrawing forces from Norway to help counter the Allied invasion of France, and Operation Rankin C which assumed that the Germans in Norway would stay in place and offer determined resistance. During the summer of 1944, as events moved swiftly in France, Thorne was ordered to plan for Operation Apostle which would create Force 134 for the eventual liberation of Norway.18
As it turned out, Scottish Command was destined not to finalise plans for the planned invasion of Norway and the Rankin operations were shelved, but Scotland did play a vital role in Operation Overlord, the plans to invade Europe through Normandy in the summer of 1944 (see Chapter 11). Many of the amphibious warfare techniques perfected in Scotland were adapted for the regular forces which would be used in the invasion of Europe. One of the assault formations was 3rd Infantry Division, and its training began in south-west Scotland in the winter of 1943–4. With its divisional battle school at Moffat, it then moved to the Combined Training Centre at Inveraray where it was able to practise beach landings on Loch Fyne and further afield on the inner Hebridean islands of Eigg and Rhum, as well as the beaches on the island of Arran. As the training intensified and further realism became essential, the division moved to the Moray Firth area where the seaward areas near Forres and Nairn were similar in topography to the landing beaches in Normandy. The final full-scale exercise took place on the night of 17/18 March 1944 before the division moved to the Channel coast to begin preparations for the D-Day landings. By that stage the tempo had increased to include live firing and the use of innovative weapons such as amphibious armoured vehicles, and to meet the need for absolute security civilians and livestock were removed from the immediate area.
Despite tight security, the Germans knew that an invasion was imminent but they could not work out where the landings would take place, and inevitably this caused an element of confusion in their own thinking. Their task was also complicated by the Allied deception plans, which had been codenamed Operation Fortitude, and which had come into being as a result of a conference of Allied senior commanders at Combined Operations headquarters in Largs between 28 June and 2 July 1943. Chaired by Mountbatten, its agenda was dominated by the invasion plans, and so many high-ranking officers were present that, with a nod to history, it was nicknamed the Field of the Cloth of Gold.19
Central to the thinking of the planners was the need to make the Germans believe that the main attack would come at the Pas de Calais and that any other attack would be a feint. To that end a number of deceptions were organised to convince the Germans that the area north of the River Seine had to be heavily defended at all costs. Allied air power was used to good effect to instil the idea that the Pas de Calais was the real target. For every reconnaissance flight over Normandy, two were flown over the Pas de Calais, bombing missions were twice as heavy over the same area, and interdiction raids were increased on targets north and east of the Seine. According to the BBC war correspondent Chester Wilmot, ‘the British played upon the notorious tendency of the German Intelligence Officers to approach problems with a card index mind, indefatigable in collecting information, but incompetent in assessing it.’20 By far the most important subterfuge was the creation in Kent of the fictitious First United States Army Group (FUSAG) which consisted of large quantities of decoy equipment – mainly aircraft and landing craft – and a web of communications units which broadcast messages simulating the creation of a huge force about to mount a cross-Channel invasion. The Germans fell for the deception, not least because they learned that FUSAG’s commander was General George S. Patton whom they had come to respect during the fighting in North Africa and Sicily. Despite being warned by Hitler to be wary of landings in Normandy, von Rundstedt continued to be obsessed with the Pas de Calais.
At the same time, a separate deception operation was planned for Norway and the rest of Scandinavia where the German garrison numbered 250,000 troops. Known as Operation Fortitude North, its purpose was to convince the Germans that an invasion of Norway was still an Allied intention and that a large force, the British Fourth Army, was being assembled for the purpose in Scotland. As Thorne did not have the necessary forces under his command, a fictional army with fictional headquarters in Edinburgh was established with the following equally fictional order of battle:
British II Corps (fictional – Headquarters Stirling)
55th (West Lancashire) Infantry Division (Northern Ireland)
58th Division (fictional, Aberlour)
113th Independent Infantry Brigade (garrison for Orkney and Shetland Islands)
British VII Corps (fictional – Headquarters Dundee)
52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division (Dundee)
US 55th Infantry Division (fictional, Iceland)
Three US Ranger battalions (fictional, Iceland)
United States XV Corps (Northern Ireland)
US 2nd Infantry Division
US 5th Infantry Division
US 8th Infantry Division21
To maintain the il
lusion, Thorne established a staff to create increased fake radio traffic amongst the divisions, reconnaissance flights were stepped up over Norway and dummy aircraft were placed on existing RAF bases. For a short period the Firth of Forth was made a Protected Area, suggesting that it would be the assembly point for the invasion force, and 52nd (Lowland) Division moved its headquarters to Dundee. There was also a change in the division’s training cycle in June when it moved to Inverary to be schooled in amphibious operations on Loch Fyne.
Although it has been suggested that Operation Fortitude North did not wholly deceive the Germans, as their attention had been diverted by a build-up of Soviet forces along Norway’s northern border and they therefore did not investigate the Fourth Army’s radio traffic, it is a fact that they did not move troops out of the country at the time of the D-Day invasion. While being interrogated after the war, the German head of operational planning, General Alfred Jodl, admitted that Hitler had feared an invasion of Norway and had maintained the garrison as ‘insurance’ against such an attack.22
Shortly before the D-Day operation, the fictional Fourth Army was removed and the deception operation was concluded. As for its only operational component in Scotland, there was another change of role for 52nd (Lowland) Division. Following the exercises at Inverary it was given a new role as an air transportable formation. The idea was to use the mountain-trained division in support of airborne operations in Europe by landing the division with its own transport (jeeps and trailers) after parachute troops had secured the ground. It was a bold concept, and a number of potential targets were identified including the Brest peninsula and the forest of Rambouillet south of Paris, but the speed of the Allied advance after D-Day put paid to any of the plans being put into effect. A more ambitious plan to use the 52nd (Lowland) Division as air-landing troops in support of the 1st Airborne’s ill-fated operations at Arnhem in September also failed to materialise following the failure of Operation Market Garden, the ambitious but ultimately unsuccessful plan to capture the Rhine bridges by Allied airborne forces in September 1944. Eventually the division was employed in a regular infantry role in Belgium and north-west Europe (see Chapter 11).
